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Abstract 
The thesis examines pay among British childcare workers from 1994 to 2008. It uses 
childcare as an example of female care occupations and selects the UK as a case 
study because in recent years childcare services have expanded substantially. As 
childcare provision has become increasingly formal, the issue of the rewards attached 
to this type of work has become more pressing.  
 
The thesis asks why childcare workers in the UK have traditionally received low pay 
and to what extent they continue to do so. It explores the changes in childcare policy 
that have taken place since the mid-1990s in order to understand whether 
Government’s increased commitment to childcare services has resulted in an 
improvement in workers’ pay. The thesis develops a multi-layered analysis. First, 
based on a review of policy documents and secondary sources, the thesis examines 
British childcare policy and identifies the challenges to higher pay in the sector. 
Second, the thesis investigates changes in the characteristics and pay of the childcare 
workforce between 1994 and 2008 by using data from the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) and from the Early Years and Childcare Providers survey. Finally, cultural 
assumptions about caring motivations and pay are explored on the basis of data from 
the LFS as well as findings from interviews with childcare workers.  
 
The thesis makes three main contributions. Using a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods and a variety of information sources, it offers evidence on 
changes in the remuneration of British childcare workers, paying close attention to 
the way childcare policy, education policy and labour market institutions influence 
wage levels. Furthermore, drawing from the example of childcare in the UK, the 
thesis contributes to the wider debate on the undervaluation of women’s work by 
pointing to some of the institutional dynamics that account for low pay in the sector. 
Finally, the thesis highlights the direct labour market impact of a childcare and early 
education policies, thus exploring an important dimension of welfare state analysis.   
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
In recent years, childcare services have come to the fore of the policy agenda in 
many Western countries and in particular in European ones. At European level, the 
2002 Barcelona Council set targets for childcare provision: at least 90% of children 
between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 
3 years of age (CEU 2002). Most European countries have taken initiatives to 
increase the availability of services (European Commission 2009) and childcare 
participation has gone up in several Western countries (OECD 2011). The expansion 
of services has been especially notable in countries which had historically had lower 
levels of provision – the UK and (West) Germany are two cases in point (Evers, 
Lewis, and Riedel 2005).  
 
Services for pre-school children, however, are often not provided nor entirely funded 
directly by governments. Systems of provision vary substantially across countries, 
but it is common to find a mixed market system, whereby services are located within 
public, private, community and voluntary bodies.  In addition, public interest in the 
issue of childcare is articulated differently in different countries, reflecting variations 
in national contexts and underlying policy goals. So the expansion of childcare 
services can be framed as related to the wish to facilitate work/family balance, the 
need to address the issue of child poverty and to promote better social inclusion. 
Notwithstanding these variations in emphasis, the development of childcare services 
is almost invariably underpinned by the policy goal of increasing female 
employment, coupled, in some countries, with that of promoting fertility rates. 
Indeed, maintaining a high employment/population ratio is seen as a crucial objective 
in order to sustain economic prosperity and competitiveness in the context of ageing 
population and rapid globalisation.  
 
The issue of female employment is therefore central to childcare policies and to 
policy makers’ thinking about it. The labour supply argument for investing in 
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childcare services is well rehearsed: the availability of childcare services has a 
positive effect on mothers’ employment rates. Attendant to this policy focus is a 
large body of research seeking to quantify such impact, with varying degrees of 
attention to women’s normative orientations and the contextual character of 
employment choices (among others: Paull, Taylor, and Duncan 2002; Jaumotte 2003; 
Lewis, Campbell, and Huerta 2008). But childcare services have also another, more 
limited but nevertheless more straightforward impact on employment. As these 
services are very labour-intensive, an expansion of provision has inevitably to be met 
by an increase in employment. Further, given that, in all countries, the childcare 
workforce is overwhelmingly female, childcare services are themselves a source of 
female employment. There is therefore a second interrelation between childcare 
policies and the labour market: the creation or shaping of employment in the 
childcare sector itself. 
 
Yet employment in childcare typically offers low rates of pay, especially in those 
countries where a private system of provision is prevalent. Thus, the expansion of 
childcare services is often attended by the creation of low-paid jobs. In fact Morgan 
(2005) argues that private childcare services are more likely to exist in those 
countries where the labour market is unregulated because only the presence of a low-
wage labour force makes the expansion of private services possible. The USA is the 
obvious example: with only modest government subsidies, a large childcare industry 
is sustained by the extremely low wages paid to childcare workers. Forms of 
childcare employment that enjoy higher relative wages and better working conditions 
are the exception rather than the norm, as they require substantial government 
resources, as is the case in the Nordic countries.  
 
This thesis examines the issue of low pay in childcare services. It focuses on the UK, 
where the expansion of childcare services and the growth of public expenditure 
devoted to them have been substantial. In the mid-1990s levels of formal childcare 
provision in the UK were extremely low by international comparison. Since then, the 
proportion of children enrolled in services has increased markedly, especially among 
three- and four-year-olds. How has the pay of childcare workers changed in the 
context of an increased public commitment towards formal childcare provision? 
What accounts for such change or lack of it? Has the composition of the childcare 
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workforce varied over time? What are the assumptions about the nature of this work 
that are implicated in its low pay? These questions capture the main concerns of this 
study.   
 
My main argument is that childcare work has some unique characteristics and low 
pay has to be understood in relation to them. Childcare work is performed almost 
invariably by women and, at a normative level, is a profoundly gendered type of 
work (Cameron, Moss, and Owen 1999). Further, besides entailing the performance 
of specific tasks and the undertaking of responsibilities, childcare work involves 
emotional attachment to the person-cared-for. Childcare work comprises thus both 
labour and feelings. Although it is paid work, it is an activity that is not clearly 
differentiated from unpaid family care. So, paid childcare work straddles the 
conventional border between the private world of the family and the public sphere. 
This may make childcare vulnerable to undervaluation by the market, whose system 
of rewards pertains the public sphere only.  
 
From a policy perspective, the peculiarity of childcare work arises from it lying at 
the interface of social policies and labour market policies. Childcare workers are 
located at the intersect of the labour market and the welfare state. As for every 
worker, their position and pay is influenced by the characteristics of labour market – 
its level of regulation for example. In addition to that, childcare workers are the 
direct providers of a service that pertains, to varying degree, to the welfare state. 
Indeed, as the issue of childcare has come to the fore on policy agenda, the nature of 
childcare work – its characteristics and its objectives – has increasingly been 
influenced by social policies regarding the funding, the regulation and the provision 
of such services.   
 
In these respects, childcare work is different from other types of work that tend to be 
poorly remunerated, like retail trade or jobs in call centres (Gautié and Schmitt 2010; 
Lloyd, Mason, and Mayhew 2008). Childcare work is deeply implicated in the 
current gendered system of division of labour, both inside and outside the family. 
Unlike some other personal services, childcare work does not belong exclusively to 
the private relation between service users and service providers. As the responsibility 
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for supporting families with children becomes more collective (OECD 2011), 
childcare work comes to be more directly relevant to the welfare state.  
  
Starting from the unique characteristics of paid childcare work, this thesis seeks to 
answer the question as to what accounts for its low pay. The approach developed is 
policy-oriented and multidisciplinary. The thesis combines attention to the policy 
dimension with the investigation of a number of theoretical propositions. In 
particular, this study concentrates on childcare and early education policies, as these 
impact directly on the way childcare services are organised, funded and regulated. As 
for the theoretical component of the study, it draws on different disciplines and, in 
particular, merges insights from the literature on care with those commonly found in 
conventional explanations of the drivers behind low wages.   
 
The remainder of this introduction looks in somewhat more detail the problem of low 
pay in childcare. It explains why low pay in childcare matters and reviews some of 
the issues involved. The following section defines the scope of the thesis. The last 
section presents the thesis structure.  
 
The problem 
Policy makers tend to identify the growth of formal care services – whether social 
care or childcare – as contributing to employment creation. In their view, such an 
expansion of the labour force is highly desirable. For example, the European 
Commission has long supported the development of formal care services with the 
idea that it was an untapped source of new jobs (CEC 1993). For governments 
wanting to increase both the supply of care services and the number of jobs, low pay 
and poor working conditions remain, at best, a secondary concern or, as suggested by 
some scholars, instrumental to the very creation of these services (Moss 1999, 2000). 
Within a policy approach centred on the expansion of services, low pay becomes a 
problem only insofar as it discourages labour supply: if pay is too low it may become 
difficult to attract the necessary numbers of workers.  
 
Economists tend to share this view and consider the issue of the relatively low pay of 
care jobs a “no-brainer”. David Blau, in his comprehensive economic analysis of the 
childcare problem, eschews the issue of low pay by explaining that the fact that there 
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are many women “who are willing to supply their labour for such low compensation, 
despite the fact that higher-wage jobs are available in other sectors, suggests that 
there may be some nonpecuniary rewards to being a childcare provider.” (Blau 2001, 
9). Here the underlying assumption is that, if the demand for higher wages in 
childcare existed, the market would rapidly provide for it.  
 
However, scholars from other disciplinary backgrounds doubt that the market alone 
can be relied upon to improve the pay of childcare workers (Grimshaw and Rubery 
2007; Rubery 1997; Rubery, Grimshaw, and Figueiredo 2005). In their views, the 
functioning of the market is embedded in social and cultural norms and specific 
institutional arrangements. Wages do not only respond to variations in the labour 
supply and demand curves. They are the result of a more complicated set of 
interactions and are likely to be more “sticky” than conventional economic theory 
would predict. Although this critique applies to the overall analysis of the labour 
market, when ascribed in relation to childcare it suggests that relatively low wages 
are unlikely to be a transient feature of this type of work. 
 
There is ample evidence that childcare jobs are prone to poor remuneration, but there 
are important variations across countries and across types of childcare provision 
(OECD 2001, 2006).  Differences across countries are largely accounted for by 
variations in the overall distributions of earnings and by differences in the 
organisation of childcare provision. The Nordic countries tend to couple a 
compressed distribution of wages with extensive public provision of childcare 
services. This in turn makes low pay in childcare uncommon. By contrast, in 
countries in which a private system of provision is dominant, childcare workers tend 
to receive very low wages. High earnings disparities exacerbate this feature.  
 
More specifically, more substantial public funding is associated with higher 
qualification levels among childcare workers (OECD 2007, 2001; 2006, chapter 6; 
Cameron and Moss 2007). And, unsurprisingly, more highly qualified workers have 
higher earnings. Furthermore, in countries that operate a mix-economy of provision, 
it is often the case that better working conditions are found in public services as 
opposed to private ones. So, it largely expected that the Danish workforce – the most 
highly qualified across all OECD countries and commonly employed in publicly-run 
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centres – would earn more than British nursery staff, who have traditionally been 
poorly qualified and employed mainly in the private sector.  
 
But levels of spending are not the only important factor. The type of childcare 
services are also very critical: whether services belong to education or, instead, to 
care. The evidence suggests that those “working closest to the school gate are better 
trained and rewarded.” (OECD 2006, 158). However, the education/care divide very 
often overlaps with the public/private sector divide. Educational services tend to be 
publicly provided, while care services are offered by private organizations of 
different kinds. As employment in the public sector is often more regulated, with 
advantageous effects for employees, it is not clear whether the higher pay of workers 
in the educational segment of provision relates to the philosophy of the service or to 
the more favourable labour market arrangements. 
 
Despite marked national differences, the issue of low pay in childcare is potentially 
relevant to all countries. Indeed, recent expansion of services has often been 
achieved by favouring precisely those forms of provisions that are relatively more 
poorly paid. For example, since 2005 Denmark has favoured the entry of private for-
profit providers. Likewise, in France recent reforms aimed at increasing service 
coverage for children under three, have encouraged family-based care (garde à 
domicile) instead of expanding municipally run centres (crèches). The UK is no 
exception, as the growth in the childcare sector has explicitly favoured the private 
and non-profit sector, where wages are lower, over the public sector. This is not to 
say that these policy choices are inherently damaging for the workforce. It is instead 
to suggest that in a period of welfare contraction, the issue of low pay in childcare is 
likely to become more salient as governments expand services while trying to keep 
down their costs.   
 
Crucially, variations across countries and sectors of provision highlight the 
importance of government intervention. Childcare jobs tend to be poorly 
remunerated when there is no or limited public funding or regulation. Further, union 
representation appears to be important. Family-based childcare providers cannot 
command decent wages if they are bargaining individually with parents. Likewise, 
childcare settings need to keep wages down in order to maintain fees low enough to 
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attract parents. Parents, on the other hand, have limited resources and their choices 
are necessarily based largely on prices, although they naturally tend to think that the 
childcare provider chosen is suitable for their child. Left to the market alone, the 
resulting dynamic leads invariably to low wages (Folbre 2006).  
 
But why does it matter if childcare workers receive low wages? Social scientists 
from different disciplinary backgrounds – education, developmental psychology or 
social work – see low pay as related to poor quality of services. The starting point 
here is that within childcare services the identity of the carer plays a major role in the 
actual delivery of the service. Who cares for children influences substantially what 
kind of care they receive. For example, services led by teachers are found to be more 
stimulating and overall of better quality than those staffed exclusively by non-
qualified workers (Mathers, Sylva, and Joshi 2007; Sylva et al. 2004). As pay and 
qualifications are broadly correlated, poor pay signals the low status of the job and 
hampers the possibility of attracting highly qualified workers. Analyses of childcare 
services also point to the problem of frequent staff turnover (Whitebook 1999). The 
stability of the relationship between children and carers is generally considered an 
important aspect of quality, which is especially valued by parents (Mooney and 
Munton 1998; Roberts 2011). However, low pay is likely to undermine the 
continuity of care, as the correlation between staff pay and turnover rates in the USA 
suggests (Whitebook and Sakai 2003). In short, for those who insist on the 
importance of early childhood services in promoting children’s learning and 
development, low pay can be a factor in reducing the quality of services. 
 
Concerns about low pay in childcare emanate also from a wider interest in gender 
equality. As childcare work is performed disproportionally by women, its low 
monetary rewards contribute to gender inequality. For a long time, the policy 
solution to this gender-unequal outcome has been to encourage women to move out 
of this occupation (for example Women & Work Commission 2006). Historically, 
the move into male-dominated and better-paid professions has contributed to a 
substantial narrowing of pay inequalities between the sexes. However a complete 
reversal of the sexual composition of the childcare occupation is unlikely to occur as 
the sex-typing of this type of job has been remarkably stable over time and across 
countries. Further, the recommendation that women should enter into male 
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occupations begs the question of who is to care for children if this job remains poorly 
paid. In many countries, notably the USA and some Southern European countries, 
the answer has been migrant workers (Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa 2006; Williams 
and Gavanas 2008; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Far from solving the problem 
of low pay, this trend has exacerbated it. The problem is therefore that childcare 
work, and care work more generally, tends to be poorly rewarded. The accurate 
analysis by England et al (2002) shows that care occupations in the USA suffer a 
wage penalty. Those employed in care occupations received lower wages even after 
accounting for jobs skills requirements and individual education levels. The result is 
especially stark for childcare jobs.  
 
Low pay thus matters in relation to two sets of concerns – gender equality and high 
quality childcare services. Such concerns are not antithetical, and, in fact, they meet 
on several points, and the issue of the workforce is an important area of convergence. 
Developing high quality childcare services where staff enjoy generous level of pay 
and favourable working conditions is a policy aim shared by feminists as well as 
those concerned with the education and well-being of children.  
 
This study has as its starting point the debate on the undervaluation of women’s work 
and addresses questions that belong to the literature on care and on women’s work. 
In this respect, thus, the broad context of this study is that of the “complicated 
rebalancing of unpaid work between the market, state, men and women” (Lewis and 
Giullari 2005, 78). Nevertheless, the thesis also takes into account concerns 
regarding the quality of childcare services. Indeed, the issue of the rewards for 
working in childcare is inevitably confronted with the question of how childcare 
services are widely understood and viewed.   
 
In this thesis, the term childcare is used in order to highlight the particular attention 
given to the wider issue of the social organisation of care and to bring to the fore the 
gender dimension within it. However, in recent years the term ‘childcare’ has been 
replaced by other terms, like ‘early childhood education and care’ (ECEC) (OECD 
2001, 2006; Eurydice 2009) or, in the British context, ‘early years’. The new terms 
reflect an understanding of early childhood services as combining both care and 
education. For those advocating a stronger emphasis on children’s learning and 
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development, the term ‘childcare’ is indicative of too narrow an approach, whereby 
early childhood services are organised around the policy objective of parental 
employment (Kaga, Bennett, and Moss 2010; Sylva and Pugh 2005). These concerns 
are important, and they will be discussed in relation to the UK in Chapter 3, where 
the developments of early education and childcare policies will be examined. Indeed, 
the debate around terminology is itself suggestive of the lack of consensus regarding 
the role these services play and their objectives. In the context of this study, 
however, the term ‘childcare’ seems more suitable than ‘early childhood education 
and care’ because low pay is especially prominent in childcare services, as opposed 
to educational ones. In addition, when services are integrated, is the ‘care’ aspect of 
this type of work which seems to be problematic in relation to pay.  
 
The scope of the study  
This study focuses on the UK, a country that has witnessed a significant policy 
change in relation to childcare and early education services. Historically, the UK has 
been characterised by low government support of childcare services. This was 
consistent with the commitment of the British welfare state in favour of the male 
bread-winner model (Lewis 1992). The reconciliation between paid work and care 
was typically achieved through part-time work for mothers. Childcare arrangements 
were considered, and in fact were, almost exclusively a private matter and 
consequently the theme of childcare services was not on the policy agenda of any 
British post-war government.  
 
But the policy orientation changed radically in 1997. Labour gave unprecedented 
attention and resources to childcare and early education services. This commitment 
resulted in the rapid expansion of childcare and pre-school education places for 
children under five and major investment in a series of initiatives targeting 
disadvantaged areas. The policy change makes the UK an interesting case study. As 
public spending increased substantially under the Labour Government, has the pay of 
childcare workers also increased? A close study of policy changes, matched with 
evidence on pay levels in childcare has therefore the potential of offering a richer 
understanding of low pay in this sector.  
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The UK case is interesting also in relation to the organisation of early childhood 
services. The UK has traditionally operated a system in which early education and 
care services were parallel, catering for children of similar age. Reforms enacted 
since 1998 have moved towards the integration of childcare and education, putting a 
stronger emphasis on the educational aspect of services (Moss 2010).  Thus 
exploring pay variations over time and across different groups of workers in the UK 
can shed some light into the factors accounting for low pay.  In addition, services are 
offered by organisations belonging to the public, private and voluntary sectors. 
Comparing workers employed in the different sector, can, once again, help 
understand some of the institutional factors behind low pay.  
 
On the other hand, the UK is very similar to all other OECD countries in that early 
childhood services employ almost exclusively only women. Further, the British 
workforce is, with the exception of teachers, generally low paid (Cameron, Mooney, 
and Moss 2002). In this respect thus childcare work in the UK can be considered a 
pertinent example of what England and Folbre (1999) call “the cost of caring” – the 
pay penalty that characterises care work relatively to other kinds of work.  
 
It is important to clarify from the outset some limits to the scope of the analysis. In 
relation to the low pay of childcare workers, the analysis does not compare pay in 
childcare jobs to pay in other jobs. Such comparison usually involves devising a 
methodological strategy that makes adjustment for the fact that jobs vary in terms of 
their pay-relevant characteristics and their skills demands. Instead, the analytical 
focus of the thesis lies on the institutional mechanisms and the dynamics that have 
resulted in low pay in the precise context of childcare work in the UK. This is not to 
say that the evidence presented here cannot be relevant to other examples of care 
work. It is rather to clarify that the analysis will be focused on childcare only.   
 
The scope of the thesis is also limited to the UK case. Although cross-country 
comparisons help uncovering the assumptions underpinning childcare services (Moss 
2010), a comparative analysis would have gone beyond the manageable scope of this 
thesis and had therefore to be excluded. Nevertheless, examples from different 
countries are used for illustrative purposes, especially in relation to policy. 
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The analysis focuses on services for children below the age of 5. Childcare services 
can encompass, and often do, also after-school provision for older children. Similarly 
to childcare services for younger children, out-of-school provision has expanded 
substantially in the last years. However, in the case of out-of-school services, 
policies are often developed within the realm of education, and therefore not always 
in conjunction with childcare policies. In order to contain the scope of the policy 
analysis, only policies regarding children under five were included. Nevertheless, 
many of the arguments developed in this thesis are relevant to workers employed in 
out-of-school services.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework that guides the empirical analysis. It 
starts by discussing the gender dimension of childcare work and moves on to 
examine the interaction between gender and pay. Further, it draws on an 
interdisciplinary literature to identify two aspects of care work – its skills and 
motivation content – that make it vulnerable to poor remuneration. The research 
questions are then presented.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of childcare policies in the UK since 1997. 
The first part describes British childcare and pre-school education provision and 
highlights the relationship between the structure of the services and the workforce. 
The second part focuses on recent policy changes, with the objective of exploring 
how policy contributes to the structuring of early childhood services and their 
workforce.  
 
Chapter 4 is methodological.  It draws on the research questions developed in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 to present a more “operational” version of them. Further, it 
presents the case for a mixed-methods strategy, illustrating the advantages of using 
both data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Childcare Providers’ Survey,  
together with data from interviews with childcare workers. Finally, the chapter 
explains in detail the methodology followed in preparing the LFS data and in 
carrying out the interviews.   
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The empirical analysis appears in the next four chapters. Chapter 5 and 6 draw 
mainly on LFS data and focus on changes in the childcare workforce and its pay 
from 1994 to 2008. In this respect therefore, they relate more closely to Chapter 3, 
and the policy changes described therein. On the other hand, the analyses presented 
in Chapter 7 and 8 rely on both the quantitative and qualitative data to address the 
questions developed in Chapter 2.  
  
Using mainly data from the LFS, Chapter 5 investigates variations over time in 
childcare workers pay levels and examines possible differences in trends among 
groups of childcare workers. Chapter 6 focuses on the profile of childcare workers, 
in particular their demographic characteristics and their qualifications.   
 
Chapter 7 starts by looking at the relationship between qualification levels and pay in 
childcare. In the second part, it offers evidence on the demands of childcare work as 
perceived by workers. Chapter 8 addresses the theme of motivations, and tests two 
propositions regarding the relationship between pay and caring motivations.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes by reviewing the main findings in relation to the theoretical 
issues presented in Chapter 2 and the research questions. It reflects on the analytical 
approach used, highlighting potential new research questions. Finally, it discusses 
the policy implications. 
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Chapter 2  
Care work and pay: a conceptual framework 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical literature that can help explain why childcare is 
low paid. Its immediate aim is to delineate a set of propositions that will guide the 
empirical analysis. More broadly, the chapter sets out the perspective adopted by this 
thesis. The problem of low pay in childcare can be addressed in a variety of ways. 
Indeed, the issue of low pay belongs to the much wider theme of the distribution of 
rewards within the labour market. Within economics, the emphasis is generally on 
individual characteristics – preferences and productive attributes – and the 
underlying assumption is that wages are mainly the result of economic forces within 
the labour market. Other social sciences, however, are more concerned with the role 
of social actors and institutions in shaping the structures of rewards for labour.  
 
The approach developed here is multidisciplinary. Its aim is not so much to identify 
one set of factors responsible for low pay, as to develop an understanding of how 
different factors overlap and interact in the process of influencing wages. The 
analysis, as will be made clear when the methodology is explained (Chapter 4), is at 
the level of the individual. That is, the unit of analysis is chiefly the individual 
childcare worker. In this respect, the approach is in line with conventional 
microeconomic analysis of the labour market. However, this thesis seeks to offer an 
institutionally informed and culturally rich analysis, whereby careful attention is 
given to the context in which individual workers are placed. The point is not to 
“isolate” one mechanism, but to explore how economic forces, institutional factors, 
cultural assumptions and social norms reinforce or attenuate each other to result in 
low wages in childcare.  
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Within this multidisciplinary approach, the thesis maintains a gender perspective. 
Childcare, and care more generally, is a profoundly gendered issue. As an activity, 
women tend to do more of it, irrespective of whether it is located in the formal or 
informal sectors. Women spend more time than men performing unpaid care work 
within the household (Lewis 2009, 51-59; Crompton 2006; Bianchi 2011). Likewise, 
the paid childcare workforce is overwhelmingly female (Cameron and Moss 2007). 
The gendered aspect of childcare emerges also in relation to care as a responsibility. 
Social norms around care are very different for men and women (Duncan et al. 2003; 
Himmelweit and Sigala 2004), resulting in different patterns of employment and, 
within employment, in different occupational choices between the sexes (England 
2005). Adopting a gender perspective thus means focusing on “the way in which 
caring work is deeply implicated in our current sex/gender system” (Fisher and 
Tronto 1990, 35). 
 
This chapter reviews theoretical contributions on care work and low pay. Because 
women are so disproportionately involved in care work, it is mainly feminist scholars 
who have led the exploration of the issues underpinning the low rewards attached to 
childcare. This review will concentrate firstly on the literature on care, with the 
objective of highlighting the specific characteristics of care work. In particular, it 
devotes some space to discuss the problematic relationship between care and the 
market.  Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the themes of skills and motivation 
respectively and develop some theoretical implications about their role in low pay. 
Section 5 presents the research questions pursued by the thesis, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
Gender issues: care as women’s work  
Feminist scholarship has thoroughly explored the nature of caring, starting from its 
pervasiveness in women’s lives and, linked to this, its role in defining women’s 
identities. In this literature there is a tension between the complexity and variety of 
everyday caring experiences, and one unifying factor: that, wherever and however 
care is done, it tends to be done by women. Care is provided in the public domain – 
hospitals and nurseries – and in the private one – by parents to children.  Within the 
public domain it can be the state, or the market or the voluntary sector supplying it, 
and carers can be relatives, friends, professionals as much as volunteers (Leira 1994).  
 27
 
This thesis is concerned with a particular type of caring work: waged care work with 
children. While remaining mindful of its specific empirical application, paid 
childcare work is viewed here as belonging to the broader social activity defined as 
care (Folbre 2009; Leira and Saraceno 2002; Daly and Lewis 2000; Fisher and 
Tronto 1990; Finch and Groves 1983). That is, the thesis takes the view that paid 
childcare work is not very different from other forms of caring – formal and 
informal, paid and unpaid, contractual and non, etc. (Folbre 2009; Himmelweit 
1999). This is not to deny that the nature of care does change according to the 
circumstances under which it is provided. Much of the feminist literature on caring 
has illustrated in great detail the way in which care is shaped by the specific 
arrangements in which it occurs – caring is highly contextual. However, a broad 
view of care helps to identify the specific, if not unique, features of care. 
Furthermore, a unifying notion of care straddles the usual analytical categories we 
employ, overcoming a number of dichotomies – e.g. public/private, formal/informal, 
paid/unpaid – which have long been shown to mystify rather than illuminate the 
analysis of care work.  
 
If paid childcare work is considered as a specific example of caregiving, the insights 
emerging from the analysis of all caring activities become relevant to this study, 
irrespective of whether they emerged in relation to different specific examples of 
care work. Thus, by considering paid childcare work as belonging to the broader 
activity which is care, I am able to draw on other analyses that use such broad 
concepts but have emerged in relation to other forms of care work, for example 
unpaid elderly care. In the remainder of the section I review feminist scholarship’s 
insight into the nature of care work. Even though these contributions do not always 
address the question of rewards for care work, they contribute to our understanding 
of why it tends to be poorly remunerated.      
 
Care is a complicated concept and activity. Graham’s seminal contribution 
demonstrated how “caring demands both love and labour, identity and activity” 
(1983, 13). This pointed out the double meaning of caring: care for and care about. 
While the former refers to the activity of tending to another person’s emotional and 
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physical needs, the second centres around the desire for the other person’s well-
being. This early insight has remained a central tenet of the literature on care.  
Care thus involves both relationship and activity. This makes it difficult to define its 
boundary. Indeed caring can mean being available for someone, without the actual 
performance of a care-related task. Time use studies have highlighted this problem in 
relation to parental childcare: being around while a child plays with another child can 
indeed be defined as passive care or secondary activity (Folbre and Bittman 2004; 
Folbre and Yoon 2007). Within the sphere of paid care work, the relational aspect of 
care raises problems in relation to the organisation of labour. Narrow time frames, 
fitting only the performance of routine tasks, prevent workers from developing the 
more relational aspects of caring and leave little opportunity to comfort, entertain 
and stimulate care receivers.  
 
As an activity, care “requires the integration of menial, mental and emotional skills” 
(Leira 1994: 189) because it involves the simultaneous performance of different 
tasks. For example, a routine task like feeding a baby can involve scientific 
knowledge on children’s dietary requirements as much as emotional and mental 
skills in the form of stimulating the child and making her feel comfortable. But the 
conventional hierarchy between manual skills and mental and emotional ones tends 
to create a stratified workforce (Duffy 2011). The risks of segmenting care work are 
visible and have been widely documented (e.g. Abel and Nelson 1990). In particular, 
both the quality of care and the satisfaction of care workers are compromised if 
unqualified workers are left to provide the bulk of direct care under the close 
supervision of more trained staff (for an example from nursing, see Davies 1992).   
 
Care is embedded in socially constructed personal obligations and in the process of 
(gendered) identity formation (Finch 1989; Finch and Groves 1983; Graham 1983; 
Ungerson 1983). Indeed, the obligation to care is experienced differently by men and 
women, with women facing much stronger pressures to care than men do (Land and 
Rose 1985; England 2005b). But, as Land and Rose (1985) argued, genuine care 
requires genuine choices – the caregiver needs to be able to choose not to care. They 
referred to women’s unpaid family care and called for “good alternative services”. In 
her history of paid care work in the US, Duffy (2011) points out that white women 
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moved away from caring occupations as soon as alternative occupations became 
open to them.  
From a philosophical perspective, Tronto (1993) suggests that care, as a notion, 
value and activity, is intrinsically relational. Insofar as care embodies the notions of 
need, of interdependency and interconnectedness, it undermines those opposite ideals 
of individuality, autonomy and self-sufficiency, which are commonly treated as 
worthy values. The fact that care is profoundly relational calls for analytical 
approaches that can take into account the importance of human connections for 
personal well-being (England 1993). Feminist scholars have long argued that 
economics is ill equipped to analyse care, because its theory of human action is 
centred on a notion of self-interest (Nelson 2005; England 1993; Folbre and Nelson 
2000). Care's orientation toward others has also practical implications. Folbre (2001) 
notes that carers, by developing an emotional attachment towards those they care for, 
become “prisoners of love” and hence reluctant to withdraw their services in order to 
demand more recognition and remuneration. This mechanism, she suggests, leaves 
care workers with little bargaining power. 
 
Feminist scholarship has uncovered the labour aspect of caring – caring is hard work. 
In this respect, this literature expanded the debate on domestic labour and identified 
care as a specific dimension of unpaid work (for a review, see Knijn and Ostner 
2002). Yet, there remains the issue of care work invisibility. In particular, from a 
political economy perspective, one of the central issues is that care work value is not 
fully recognised, despite its being essential to all economic activities and, more 
generally, to human well-being. In relation to care activities taking place within the 
family, the underlying issue has been that when measuring Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) the conventional accounting system does not include them, because they do 
not have a market value (see, among others, Folbre 2006b). This problem is in part 
solved when care activities take place in the public sphere, as is the case with 
childcare work. Childcare workers receive a wage and parents pay for the service 
offered – these money flows are accounted for in the standard measure of GDP. But 
the market system tends to underestimate the value of activities, whose benefits are 
diffuse and therefore consumption cannot be exclusive for those who pay. A well-
cared for child will benefit from the care received. This effect can, in part, be 
reflected in the price of the service provided. But those around a well-cared for child 
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will also indirectly benefit. For example, a child who has learnt how to interact with 
others, who has developed cognitive and emotional skills will benefit all those 
around her, including her siblings, friends and schoolmates. These spill-over effects 
however cannot be captured in the price system, thus leading to an underestimation 
of the value of care work (Folbre 1994, 1994; England 2005).  
  
Overall it seems clear that care work raises several problems and it is unlikely to be 
bought or sold as any other commody. Care work responds to a basic and 
unavoidable human need, but its pervasiveness makes it difficult to define it 
precisely or to isolate it from other activities. In addition, care work is inherently 
relational. The identity of the caregiver is inseparable from the care work itself. 
Furthermore, ‘care production’ is, in fact, a co-production, whereby the person 
cared-for participates in the relation (Stacey 1980). The next section explores in 
greater detail what happens when care work enters the market arena, and, as in the 
case of paid childcare workers, is exchanged for money.   
 
  
Care and the market 
As care shifted from unpaid to paid work, feminist scholars have debated the 
desirability of this change and its implications (Knijn and Oster 2002).  Even though 
early feminist research on unpaid kin care had dispelled romanticised views of care 
within the family, feminist scholars have illustrated at length the risks of a 
commodification and marketisation of care.  
 
The purpose of this section is to outline some of the problems that arise when care is 
commodified and its provision organised via the market. Before starting, however, I 
follow Leira and Saraceno (2002: 58) and draw attention to the ambivalence of the 
term ‘commodification’. ‘Commodification’ does not distinguish between care 
allocated through market forces and through public services. In both cases it is paid 
workers who provide the care, whether they are employed by private employers or 
by the state. However, and this is Leira and Saraceno’s point, it is only when care 
provision is allocated through the market that full commodification occurs. In this 
case, the market allocates both the provision of care and the labour that constitutes it. 
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By contrast, care remains a public good if the care receiver does not have to 
purchase care.  
 
But why are market mechanisms not conducive to an adequate supply of good 
quality care? At the heart of the problem lies what Baumol famously referred to as 
the “cost disease of services” (Baumol and Bowen 1965, Baumol 1967). He pointed 
to the fact that productivity in the service sector lagged behind manufacturing, 
which, in turn, increased the costs of services relative to the rest of the economy.  His 
analysis remains especially pertinent to care services (Himmelweit 2005, Folbre 
2006b), because, so far, it has proved difficult to increase the productivity of care 
through technology (Goos and Manning 2007). 
 
If productivity fails to increase in the care sector, its wages cannot rise without an 
increase in costs. However, wages elsewhere in the economy will grow, in line with 
of productivity. As a result, in the long-run, care sector workers will be attracted by 
higher wages elsewhere, and the supply of care labour will diminish. Alternatively, 
wages in the care sector will have to keep up with wages in the whole economy. This 
way, the production of care will become increasingly expensive relative to the 
production of other goods and services. This will be reflected in prices: higher labour 
costs will have to be passed onto consumers.  
 
The question then arises as to how consumers’ demand responds to higher prices. 
Will families devote an increasingly proportion of their budget to care services and 
childcare in particular? Not surprisingly, the evidence is mixed. Indeed, the demand 
for childcare is, as shown by Lewis, Campbell and Huerta (2008), highly contextual 
and inextricably linked to patterns of maternal employment and cultural norms 
around proper mothers’ behaviour. Moreover, there are sharp differences across 
families depending on income. Nevertheless, US evidence suggests that expenditures 
on childcare have increased relative to family income (Folbre 2006a; Blau and Currie 
2006). But for families on low income, increases in the price of childcare lead to 
switching to informal care (Blau and Currie 2006).  
 
Furthermore, spending patterns are profoundly gendered and responsibility for 
spending on children remains that of women rather than men (Pahl 2000). This has 
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implications for childcare expenditures, in particular if families do not pool resources 
in one pot (Pahl 2005). Childcare is more likely to be unaffordable if is paid out of 
the mother’s earnings, as women tend to earn less than men. More generally, the lack 
of complementarities in parenting between the sexes means that it is women’s time, 
rather than men’s, that is at  the centre of the trade-off between paid and unpaid work 
(Joshi 1998). But if the decision between paid work and childcare is framed as 
pertaining to the women alone, the costs of formal childcare are measured against the 
woman’s wage, rather than family income (Connelly 1991).  
 
Higher female earnings will thus increase the demand for childcare. Evidence from 
Britain confirms this, as formal childcare is used relatively more by couples in which 
both husband and wife are in full-time, well-paid employment (Joshi et al 1995; 
Hansen, Joshi and Verropoulou 2006). The evidence from the US is similar (Blau 
and Currie 2006).  However, if mothers have to pay the full cost of their children’s 
care, they will be able to enter the labour market only if their wages are higher than 
the wage of the paid childcare worker. For women on low wages, on the other hand, 
formal childcare is likely to be unaffordable. The resulting class division is 
especially stark in the US (for a thorough analysis, see Shalev 2009), but arises also 
in the UK context (Duncan 2005; Ball et al 2004). If paid carers’ wages were to rise 
in line with other wages and childcare prices consequently go up, fewer women 
would be able to afford them.  
  
Besides increasing prices, care providers can, in order to reduce costs, reduce quality 
standards. A home care worker visiting 10 elderly in a day is cheaper than a worker 
who visits five only. Likewise, a reduction in staff to children ratios allows costs to 
be contained. Cost-reduction strategies may be more viable than increases in prices, 
because prices are much more visible to consumers than quality. Care services are 
difficult to monitor. They are an experience good, but third parties, as in the case of 
childcare, often buy them. If good quality care needs to be responsive to a person’s 
needs, quality will necessarily require continuity and will be the result of a repeated 
interaction process rather than something that can be fully judged ex-ante. Finally, 
the meaning of quality is inevitably elusive, as people’s understanding of quality care 
is shaped by contextual factors (Dahlberg, Moss and Pence 1999). International 
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variations in the definition of high quality childcare provision are a case in point 
(OECD 2006).  
 
Overall, if care provision is allocated via the market the resulting scenario is one in 
which the demand for care outstrips supply, care expenses become an increasing 
portion of families budgets, the pay of childcare workers lags behind that of workers 
elsewhere in the economy and there are pressures for keeping care standards low. 
These effects are likely to be uneven across social groups, with higher income 
household able to afford high quality care at the expenses of low wages in the care 
sector.  
 
Public spending can, clearly, attenuate these problems, most obviously by supporting 
families in accessing the care they need. And indeed coutries vary precisely in the 
extent and ways of government involvement, as the comparative literature on care 
services describes in depth (for example, Gornick and Meyer 2003; Anttonen, 
Baldock, and Sipilä, 2003). But even when governments pay entirely for the cost of 
care services, increasing wage costs will create the constant need for greater public 
funding. Thus, even when care is only partially commodified and care services are 
provided outside the market, an “economic strategy for caring” will require public 
spending on care to grow as much as GDP (Himmelweit 2005). This in turn raises 
the question of how to create the political conditions that support such increasing 
public spending on care (Folbre 2006b; Shalev 2009). Divisions across women, 
along the lines of class and income, are likely to stand in the way of political 
mobilization, as women on relatively higher earnings gain from paid carers’ low 
wages (Shalev 2009).    
 
Against this backdrop, feminist scholars have identified several mechanisms that 
contribute to keeping paid care workers’ wages down (England 2005a; England and 
Folbre 1999). Empirircal evidence suggests that occupations that can be defined as 
“nurturant work” or “interactive service work” are found to be affected by a pay 
penalty even after controlling for the effect of individual human capital factors and 
the sex composition of the occupation (England 1992, chapter 3; 2005; England, 
Budig, and Folbre 2002; for evidence on the UK, see Perales 2010).  These results 
support the hypothesis that caring per se is devalued because it “is symbolically 
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associated with women and mothering, and this association affects people’s sense of 
how much that job should be paid” (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002, 457). 
 
In particular, two sets of issues appear to contribute to the undervaluation of care 
work. The first relates to the skills involved. Indeed, if caring is associated with 
mothering, the underlying idea could be that caring is a ‘natural’ activity, which does 
not require skills. The second issue relates to love, or motivation to care. Ideas of 
love and care are likely to clash with ideas of money and pay. The next two sections 
elaborate these insights further and examine in more detail how skills and 
motivations could interact with pay.  
 
 
Skills in childcare work: problems of recognition 
The notion of skills is a central analytical category used to explain the pay hierarchy. 
For example, the development of professions can be viewed as the struggle for an 
exclusive claim on a specific and recognised body of knowledge and skills. 
Likewise, the conventional way of thinking about differences in pay is based on 
human capital theory. Here, again, the theme of skills figures prominently, as 
individuals who acquire more human capital are, by definition, ‘more skilled’ and 
their earnings are relatively higher. In respect to policy, the notion of skills again 
occupies a central position, with much education policy aimed at increasing skills 
levels.  
 
However, the concept of skills is not clearly defined: it is widely used without much 
consensus on what it effectively means (Green 2010). Indeed it is often employed as 
a synonym of competence, human capital, qualification, knowledge or ability. Here I 
follow Green’s (2010) proposal and I interpret ‘skill’ as an individual attribute that 
has three features. It is productive, because by using skills one is able to produce 
value. Skills are also expandable, because they can be enhanced in various ways, 
most usually by training or experience. And, finally, skills are social because they are 
socially determined. In relation to care, all these three features are somewhat 
problematic and this has repercussions on the levels of compensation that care can 
command. 
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Sociological research has long documented how the skilled status of different types 
of work is socially constructed. In respect of women, “skills definitions are saturated 
with sexual bias” (Phillips and Taylor 1980, 79) and indeed the scholarship on 
comparable worth has offered extensive evidence on how the evaluation of skills is 
confounded with workers’ sex (England 1992; Steinberg 1990; Acker 1989). In 
addition, decisions about which jobs are skilled or unskilled are likely to be 
influenced by the bargaining power of workers. In the past, when trade unions’ 
influence was much stronger than nowadays, job grading systems were substantially 
affected by unions. But, as women were less likely than men to be covered by trade 
unions, their jobs were often classified as less skills-demanding then men’s despite 
being rather similar (Craig et al. 1982). The status of skilled labour is therefore 
contested, and cannot be regarded as immutable, neutral or simply driven by 
technology.  
 
National variations in the definition of childcare work further corroborate the point. 
Starting from rather different disciplinary perspectives, both Kremer (2007, 2006) 
and Cameron and Moss (Cameron and Moss 2007) show how childcare services in 
different countries are underpinned by different ideals and discourses. For example, 
Kremer (2006) contrasts the ideal of professional care prevailing in Denmark with 
the ideal of surrogate mother that prevails in Flanders. If childcare services are seen 
as offering something different from family care, workers are more likely to be 
viewed as professionals and be relatively better paid, as is the case in Denmark. By 
contrast, if the objective of childcare is that of reproducing a home environment, 
workers need to resemble mothers, and payment becomes less salient. Likewise, 
Cameron and Moss illustrate how the characteristics of the childcare workforce vary 
considerably among countries, depending on the prevalent discourse around 
childcare. When childcare services belong to the pedagogical or educational 
traditions, workers are highly trained and tend to be relatively better paid. On the 
other hand, countries in which childcare services are considered welfare issued 
concerned only with working mothers or disadvantaged children, staff are invariably 
less qualified and paid less. Comparative studies therefore offer further examples of 
how the skilled status of childcare work can be altered by historical and national 
specific factors like social policies.  
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Views on the skills required by childcare work are closely related to the question: 
how are such skills acquired and developed? Clearly, a notion of care as consisting 
merely of feelings promotes the idea that caring is part of the natural disposition of 
women. This romanticised view, as Graham (1983) has shown, strips caring of the 
labour activity necessarily involve in it. If care is the result of a natural disposition or 
a personality trait, caring skills cannot be acquired or developed. But even the view 
that care work is hard work does not necessarily lead to an emphasis on training.   
Historically the establishment of formal occupational qualifications has been crucial 
to the development of several women’s professions like nursing or midwifery (Witz 
1990; Davies 1995). Studies about the undervaluation of women’s work suggest that 
low accreditation and development of skills through formal training is an important 
institutional mechanism perpetuating the view of caring skills as natural (OECD 
1998; Grimshaw and Rubery 2007).  
 
Although there is agreement on the importance of training, it remains problematic to 
build a discourse linking the caring work with specific skills and knowledge. A 
source of problems is the fact that care work, and childcare work in particular, 
requires ‘loving, thinking and doing’ (Leira, 1994). Yet notions of competence, skills 
and knowledge have found limited application when it comes to the ‘loving’ 
component. While discussions of the caring that takes place within the family tend to 
emphasise this emotional aspect, when caring activities take place in the public 
domain, it is the emotional aspect that is overlooked. The invisibility of ‘emotional 
labour’ and the fact that it remains uncompensated is a central concern of the 
literature in comparable worth (Steinberg and Figart 1999a; 1999b; Steinberg 1999). 
Although both streams of research have uncovered the strain and the effort that 
‘loving’ requires – thus dispelling romanticised views of caring – the ability to deal 
with other people’s emotions remains unexplored as far as its learning process and its 
place in the landscape of skills are concerned. 
 
The literature on skills and in particular on soft skills has devoted some attention to 
the question of whether emotional labour should be considered skilled or not. 
Following the seminal work of Hochschild (1983) on flight attendants, this debate 
interprets emotional work as ‘emotional management’, that is the capacity of regulate 
one’s emotions and feelings so that they are appropriate to the situation at hand or in 
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line with prescriptive organisational rules. Emotional work defined in this way finds 
ample application to almost the entire spectrum of personal service occupations, 
from sales staff to nurses (Bolton 2004).  Although such broad application highlights 
the almost ubiquity of emotional work, it nonetheless risks of conflating the issue of 
autonomy with that of skills (Payne 2009; Hampson and Junor 2010), thus offering 
little insight into  what kind of skills underpins the emotional aspect of care work and 
that are necessary to the performance of care. 
 
What about the ‘doing’ and the ‘thinking’? Is it easier to link these aspects of care 
work with a discourse around how these skills and knowledge can be acquired? The 
answer to this second problem is, in part: yes. The practical aspect is perhaps the 
least problematic. Changing nappies, warming up bottles and overseeing children 
playing are quite straightforward, albeit crucial, tasks, which can be learnt and 
mastered. The type of knowledge underpinning such ability can be called functional 
knowledge (Cameron and Boddy, 2005).  
 
More contentious is the role of professional knowledge, which, for the purpose of 
this discussion, I would define as the ability to apply theoretical knowledge to the 
specific case at hand. This requires knowledge of both the theory and the specific 
context in which the theory has to be applied. Yet it is abstract knowledge, as 
opposed to context-specific, that enjoys higher social prestige, thus creating an 
incentive within each profession not only to control the body of knowledge relevant 
to its field, but also to pursue higher degrees of abstraction and to emphasise the 
general, as oppose to specific, validity of such knowledge (Abbott, 1991). Needless 
to say, higher degrees of abstraction are often achieved at the expense of 
applicability. 
  
In care work the emphasis is reversed: care work is inescapably anchored to specific 
– at the level of the individual – knowledge. Appropriateness cannot be traded-off 
against general validity. Wærness (1984) indeed argued that the type of knowledge 
and skills relevant to care work are different from conventional notions of abstract 
knowledge and skill acquisition. Likewise, in her analysis of nursing, Davies (1995) 
suggests that the sense of connectedness and inter-subjectivity embodied in care 
results in a “concrete and contextual cognitive orientation”. Highly contextual 
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knowledge, however, hardly accrues respect and esteem, other than by the people 
cared for (and their parents in the case of children). This tension creates well-
documented dilemmas for workers in the care professions (Davies, 1995) and also 
poses the problem of what role abstract knowledge should have in the training of 
childcare workers (e.g. Calder, 1995; Cameron and Boddy, 2005). 
 
Thus, professionalization can enhance the status of childcare workers by creating a 
link between caring skills and formal knowledge. However the caring side of the 
practice risks being overshadowed by conventional professionalism. If childcare 
workers are seen as professional, they will require formal training in order to be 
guided in their work by a well-defined body of knowledge. But this may leave 
unnamed all those competencies that take into account the particularities of the 
person in need of care.  
 
Finally, there is the issue of whether caring skills – however defined – are in fact 
productive, in the sense of producing value. As the previous section showed, caring 
activities are likely to have a low market value. Nevertheless, societies can place a 
great importance on the fact that children are well-cared for, kept healthy, safe and 
intellectually stimulated. This is indeed one of the rationales typically underlying 
governments’ spending in childcare (OECD 2006). In relation to skills, it is also 
important that there is recognition that the fact that children are well-cared for, kept 
healthy, safe and intellectually stimulated is the result of care work and that such 
work requires learning, skills and knowledge.  
 
Overall then, skills can be implicated in the low wages of childcare work for a 
variety of interconnected reasons. Training systems are hard to develop, and 
historical examples suggest that women’s occupations have experienced additional 
difficulties in establish accreditation mechanisms. The design of an appropriate 
training system is further complicated by the fact that care work requires different 
types of knowledge. In particular, the contested role of abstract knowledge 
undermines claims to professional status. And yet, it is clear that if childcare work is 
seen as requiring caring motivation only, it will not command high pay. And it is to 
the issue of motivation that the next section turns.   
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Motivation to care and money: an uneasy mix 
Whereas looking at skills highlight the labour dimension of care, a focus on 
motivation shifts the attention to love. Feelings of love and affection provide the 
sense of connectedness which, according to Fisher and Tronto (1990), is essential to 
caring about –  the first phase of the caring process. This aspect of caring also has an 
impact on the outcome of the caring activity. Folbre and Weisskopf (1998) argue that 
it is only caring activities based on feelings of affection and concern that can deliver 
a sense of self-worth to the care recipients by confirming that somebody cares for 
them.  
 
How does this motivational aspect of caring activities play into the issue of monetary 
reward? Economists have identified two mechanisms that could be at work and could 
explain why the idea that care work is based on love results in it receiving low pay. 
First of all, low pay acts as a screening device: if the pay is low, only the individuals 
who have the strongest feelings of concern and affection will choose to provide care 
(for an application of this argument to the public sector, see Besley and Ghatak 2003; 
for an application to the case of nursing, see Heyes 2005).  
 
The logic underpinning this explanation is that of ‘wage-compensating differentials’. 
The argument runs that jobs are characterised by intrinsic non-monetary rewards or 
penalties. Workers forego pay in order to receive the non-monetary rewards – for 
example prestige or enjoyment. On the other hand, workers will receive a 
compensatory pay premium if they choose disagreeable jobs – for example work in a 
loud environment or underground. Since workers in caring occupations are 
intrinsically motivated and hence derive satisfaction in helping people, it is possible 
to pay them less money.  
 
Second, once the appropriately motivated people are working, their pay should be 
kept low, because an increase in pay would crowd out their motivation (Frey 1998; 
Frey and Jegen 2001). Frey distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, 
defining the first as the motivation to perform an activity without any apparent 
reward except the activity itself, while extrinsic motivation is the type of motivation 
triggered by external incentives. External incentives diminish intrinsic motivation 
because individuals perceive an external intervention either as reducing their self-
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determination, or as devaluing their involvement and competence. Le Grand (2003) 
suggests that this disincentive is likely to emerge when individuals already receive 
full monetary compensation for their work. Instead, when they receive fairly little 
monetary compensation – as in the case of token payment – an increase in pay is 
likely to be perceived as acknowledging and supporting workers’ intrinsic 
motivation.   
 
Underlying these explanations is the idea that money represents self-interest and 
selfishness, while altruistic motives belong to a sphere of moral sentiments which 
cannot be associated with money. Nelson and Folbre (Folbre and Nelson 2000; 
Nelson 1999) have forcefully argued that money itself should not be set in opposition 
to caring motives. They develop two connected points. First, money exchange has 
different social meanings, and not all of them are related to selfishness (in particular: 
Nelson 1999). Money exchange, for example, can take place within the family 
alongside altruistic concerns. Folbre and Nelson’s second important point is that 
motives themselves are mixed, as people tend to act upon a complicated combination 
of motives rather than upon just one. In the case of childcare workers, the self-
interested motivation of earning a wage can be mixed with the sense of responsibility 
towards the children cared for or intrinsic enjoyment for the work.  
 
Waged childcare work, as all forms of work for pay, is motivated by contractual 
rewards and therefore contains a strong aspect of self-interest (Folbre and Weisskopf 
1998). Self-interest is often contrasted with the altruistic nature of unpaid care within 
the family. But family care is not necessarily always “out of love”. Feminist 
literature on family obligations made it clear that care work could be performed 
without feelings of love but out of sense of duty within family relations (Millar and 
Warman 1996). Waged care work is thus not anomalous in being characterised by a 
variety of motives: care within the family is rarely the outcome of spontaneous love 
only. This is not to say that the motives behind care within the family are similar to 
those of paid care workers. Rather the point is that motivations are mixed and that 
the selfishness/love dualism is likely to be misleading (Nelson 1999).  
 
As discussed above, pay has different functions. Pay represents the reward for the 
work done, but is also a means for living. Thus, the fact that caring activities are 
 41
compensated gives the possibility to engage in such activities to those who need a 
living. If working in childcare does not offer high enough wages, it will be 
impossible for many caring people to choose this occupation. The need for an 
independent living is however gender-biased, insofar as the economic independence 
of women has historically been deemed less relevant than that of men(Kessler-Harris 
1990). 
 
Although women’s caring experiences can and often are enriching and rewarding, 
the fact that responsibility for care is inscribed into women’s identity has historically 
undermined gender equity. Within an economic perspective, the  way in which 
identity can act as a constraint is explored by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). By adding 
the argument of identity to the well-known individual utility function, they show that 
individuals have an identity gain when they abide to their prescribed role; however 
this can have detrimental effects if the behaviour prescribes actions that are not likely 
to increase the individual’s utility. Their framework effectively captures the idea 
(which sociologists have long been familiar with) that people can be trapped in the 
social category to which they belong.  
 
Taken together, these ideas point to some explanations of low pay for childcare 
work. We would expect low pay in childcare, because workers trade-off pay for their 
intrinsic enjoyment and motivation to work with children. Although such a trade-off 
applies to many jobs, in the case of childcare the trade-off is considered starker. This 
is because conventional ideas about care out of pure love lead to a view whereby 
caring motives are seen as incompatible with money. Within this view, the rewards 
for care work should be mainly non-monetary.  
 
Further insights as to why childcare workers are low paid emerge also from 
examining the interaction between motivation and gendered norms. If women 
experience stronger pressure than men to exhibit caring motives, they will experience 
greater social sanctions for moving away from an ideal of care out of love only. For 
example, if women in caring occupations are expected to be more caring than their 
male colleagues, they may find it more difficult to negotiate over pay. The contrast 
between caring motives and wage is less pronounced when pay is viewed as a living. 
However, if women’s financial independence or their financial contributions to the 
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household are considered less important than men’s, women will be less likely to ask 
for higher wages. Gendered norms therefore reinforce the notion that caring motives 
conflict with money.  
 
Women’s wages 
So far, the chapter has explored the nature of care, why it is problematic in relation to 
the market and the ways skills and motivations to care may interact with pay. 
However, it has largely left unaddressed the question of what pays is. This section 
attempts to illustrate, albeit briefly, how gender amd pay interact.  
 
Pay serves multiple purposes and is the result of the complex interaction of economic 
forces, social assumptions and cultural constructs. Most importantly, wage serves as 
a social practice that constructs and represents a crucial set of gender relations (Land 
1980; Kessler-Harris 1990; Figart, Mutari, and Power 2002; Grimshaw and Rubery 
2007).  The concept of wage, and the gender prescriptions contained within it, has 
changed over time, as the historical account of Kessler-Harris (1990) illustrates.  
 
Despite historical and national variations, it is possible to trace two persistent 
discourses around wages: wage as a price, and wage as a living (Figart, Mutari, and 
Power 2002). Considering wage as a price focuses on the worker’s contribution to 
production. Wage as a living, on the other hand, indicates that the purpose of wage is 
that of providing support for an independent living. These discourses thus broadly 
correspond to two distinct but overlapping functions of wages (Rubery 1997). Wages 
serve to allocate workers with various levels of productivity to different jobs – the 
“price allocation function”; and wages, by virtue of being the prime source of 
income, are the main determinant of differences in standards of living within 
societies – the “social stratification function” (Rubery 1997, 338, 339). Rubery 
(1997) suggests that wages serve also a third function: they are an incentive used by 
management to control and motivate the workforce. Different social sciences tend to 
privilege one function of wages, thus failing to develop an integrated analysis which 
takes into account all of them and their interaction. 
 
Gender interacts differently with these various functions; yet women invariably end 
up with wages lower than those of men. Historically the struggle for the family wage 
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was recognisably underpinned by a discourse of wage as a living. The family wage 
was the wage earned by the male bread-winner alone that sustained the entire family. 
It therefore contained gendered expectations: men needed to be able to support their 
wives and children, women did not. For organised labour, the family wage was a 
strategy to obtain higher wages. Women wage earners were seen as requiring only 
self-support, despite the fact that a great proportion of them supported their family 
members. The prevailing notion was that women’s needs were less than those of 
men’s. As Fraser and Gordon (1994) argue, “the family wage was, therefore, a 
vehicle for elaborating meanings of dependence and independence that were deeply 
inflected by gender, race and class”. The family wage produced a social order in 
which men could provide for their families and receive the service of women; and 
women were dependent on men and, ideally, could stay out of the labour force and 
embrace their domestic role.  
 
But gendered expectations also permeate the other discourse of pay, that of pay as a 
price for worker productivity. The fight for equal pay embodies this notion, as it 
demands that women doing the same job as men are paid the same on the basis that 
women can be as productive as men. This shift in focus has given more prominence 
to the argument that family responsibilities negatively affect productivity. Within 
economics the different pay performances of the two sexes have been largely 
explained (and thus justified) by the unequal division of domestic and care work 
within the household. Thus, discrimination has been seen as arising only insofar as 
gender differences in pay are not accounted for by observable factors, like education, 
occupational choices or employment patterns. This way mainstream economics has 
devoted far less attention to the fact that choices of education, occupation or 
employment patterns can and do reflect deeply gendered social norms.  Furthermore, 
a discourse centred on the concept of productivity within the same job does not 
consider a gender-segregated market that assigns to men better jobs with higher 
wages relative to women’s as problematic.  
 
The “comparable worth” movement during the 1980s altered the terms of the debate 
and moved the focus from the productive characteristics of job incumbents to the 
characteristics of jobs themselves. Importantly, the movement called for eliminating 
the hierarchical nature of the gendered division of labour. By uncovering the 
 44
responsibility and skill content of women’s jobs, it sought to bring about a 
revaluation of women and of the work that they traditionally perform. The main 
insight from the comparable worth movement and the research surrounding it is that 
the classification of jobs cannot be taken as a neutral process resulting only from 
technology and by the smooth functioning of the market. Instead, it is subject to 
potential biases, especially when a job has been subject to strong class-based or 
gender-based social closure. Analyses of job content have therefore the potential of 
revealing such biases and also of putting into question the notion of productivity.    
  
A closer look at the pay dynamics within firms can also lead to seeing pay as an 
incentive. Within the employment relationship pay is one crucial aspect of the 
wage/effort bargain struck between employers and workers (Grimshaw and Rubery 
2007). Because management often cannot monitor all aspects of the compliance and 
effort of workers – what economists refer to as ‘contract failure’ – higher pay is used 
to elicit workers’ cooperation and loyalty (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007; Rubery 
1997). For example, management may use higher pay in order to increase workers’ 
retention or, as in the case of efficiency wages, to minimise shirking. But gendered 
assumptions are likely to affect this function of pay as well. If men are perceived as 
more interested in pay than women are, employers may be more likely to grant 
higher wages to men than to women. Thus traditional roles within the family, 
whereby men are seen as the breadwinners and women only earning ‘pin-money’ are 
likely to influence the use of pay as an incentive (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007). 
Likewise, a more recent strand of research has highlighted gender differences in self-
confidence that impact on the pay negotiation process with employers. If women are 
less likely to ask for pay increases, they may end up with lower wages (Babcock and 
Laschever 2003; for an assessment of this hypothesis in the British case, see 
Manning and Swaffield 2008).  
 
There is a partial overlap between the discourses on pay and the themes that I have 
identified as common across the different literatures on care – skills and motivation. 
Clearly, the theme of skills in care work presupposes a conceptualisation of wage as 
a price reflecting worker productivity. Likewise, a focus on motivation leads to 
seeing pay as an incentive tool. This thesis will explore to a greater extent these two 
functions of pay because they pertain to the two themes selected – skills and 
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motivation. Thus the issue of pay as a living will not be addressed directly. An 
analysis of childcare workers’ income (as opposed to pay) would have gone beyond 
the manageable scope of this study. Nevertheless it is clear that, in reality, pay serves 
all these three functions. In particular, the function of pay as a living will emerge in 
relation to motivations (Chapter 8).  
 
Research questions  
The thesis seeks to answer the broad question of why childcare workers are low paid. 
The approach developed in the thesis has as its starting point feminist scholarship on 
care work. Within this scholarship care work belongs to the broader social activity 
which is “care”. As such, care work lies within the complex net of family-state-
employers-market relations, and therefore needs to be understood in relation to the 
context in which it takes place. The thesis follows in the steps of this scholarship by 
paying great attention to the way in which childcare work is embedded into a wider 
set of social, cultural and institutional structures. In addition, the thesis develops the 
insights of feminist research on care by seeking to explain childcare workers’ low 
pay in relation to the distinctive characteristics of care work. More specifically, three 
main themes have been derived from this literature.  
 
The first relates to the role of policy. As the problem of low productivity in care has 
illustrated, a market system of care provision is likely to lead to poor wages. In this 
respect, the role of policies is crucial, as it can attenuate the effects of the market. In 
addition, social policies contain an implicit understanding of what constitutes good 
care, and how they influence societal views of care work (Finch 1993). Historically, 
the UK has had minimal levels of publicly sponsored childcare provision. This 
corresponded to a precise “ideal of care” (Kremer 2007): that maternal care or 
mother-substitute care was best for children. The expansion of childcare services 
brought about by the Labour Government since 1997 has signalled a new way of 
thinking and new, albeit often contradictory, assumptions about what constitutes 
good care. If the role of the state in shaping the rewards of childcare work is to be 
understood, care policies and their underpinning assumptions must be examined 
carefully. Indeed, as Ungerson (2004, 2003, 1997) has extensively illustrated in the 
case of cash-for-care schemes, the precise policy design and regulatory details matter 
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greatly because they impact on the position of carers and the rewards to their work. 
This prompts the need for attention to the way in which the welfare state funds 
childcare services and contributes to the definition of childcare work. The first 
research question is therefore:  
 
1) How does childcare policy influence the pay of childcare workers?  
 
This question is exploratory and will be based on the analysis of British childcare 
policy since the end of the 1990s. More specifically, the aim will be to understand 
the reforms introduced by the Labour Government and particularly their implications 
for workers.  
 
The review of the literature on care work has also lead to an important idea: care 
work has some unique characteristics that make its relationship pay problematic. In 
particular, I have identified two themes which raise intricate problems in relation to 
pay. One is the problem of the recognition of skills; the other is the conflict between 
caring motivations and money.  
 
In relation to the theme of skills, problems arise in regard to both the skill demands 
of the job and the skills possessed by workers. That is, recognition, or lack of it, 
operates simultaneously on the demand side and the supply side. So for example, 
childcare work is seen as easy and undemanding, while the skills brought to the job 
by workers are not acknowledged because they are not formally accredited by the 
training system.  
Thus, the second research question is: 
 
2) In what way does skill recognition, or lack of it, contribute to low pay in 
childcare?  
 
The first step will be to examine the relation between pay and those skills that are 
formally accredited through the qualifications system. However, the question 
attempts to go beyond a “neutral” notion of skill and to problematize the association 
between skills and qualifications. Thus, the second step of the analysis will be to 
explore the contested nature of skill-definition. This means examining the 
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mechanisms through which cultural assumptions about childcare work are reinforced 
by institutional structures like the training system.  
 
In relation to the theme of motivation, this thesis seeks to shed light on the 
interaction between motivation to care and money. It starts from the recognition that 
motivation is central to care work and moves on to explore whether there is an 
inherent conflict between pay and caring about children. The third research question 
is: 
 
3) What is the relationship between pay and caring motivation?  
 
As for question 2), the attempt is made to go beyond a narrow definition of 
motivation. Drawing on the insights offered by feminist scholars, the thesis seeks to 
develop an analysis that sees childcare workers’ behaviour as underpinned by a 
variety of motives and, at the same time, limited by a number of constraints. In 
particular, attention will be devoted to the context in which childcare workers take 
the decision to enter into childcare and to the factors, other than pay, that contribute 
to their caring motivation.  
 
Conclusions  
The chapter has discussed the problem of low pay in childcare from a theoretical 
perspective. It has argued that childcare work and the pay it earns are connected to 
the wider issues of care and gender. Because care work is disproportionally done by 
women and is relevant to the definition of their identity, it is mainly gender scholars 
who take an interest in unravelling the complicated ways in which care work is 
organised and compensated.  
 
Thus, the first part of the chapter has reviewed the feminist literature on care work in 
order to highlight what is specific about care work. Such specificities have then been 
analysed in relation to market mechanisms and this exercise has outlined the 
economic pressures that contribute to (child)care workers’ low wages. From this 
analysis, two themes have emerged: skills and motivation. The second part of the 
chapter has examined them in turn, and has considered in more detail how they could 
be implicated in low pay. In particular, the chapter has previewed some of the 
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theoretical arguments which will be elaborated at greater length in the later chapters, 
where the analysis of the theoretical literature will be accompanied by empirical 
evidence.  
 
The final part of the chapter has presented the research questions which will be 
explored in the thesis. These questions will be broken down into more “operational” 
questions in Chapter 4, where the methodology will be discussed. The first question, 
which is centred on the role of policy aims at offering an institutionally informed 
analysis of low pay in childcare. In particular, by examining childcare and early 
education policies, the thesis brings in a level of analysis higher than that of the 
individual worker. This highlights the institutional context in which childcare 
workers and their pay are embedded.  
 
The second and third research questions are more directly related to theoretical 
propositions, rather than to policy itself. The approach taken in answering them is 
that of developing an analysis which takes into account the specific features of care 
work. The literature reviewed takes different approaches, from the psychological to 
the institutional, to explaining low pay in childcare. The empirical analysis will 
attempt to discover how processes at both the individual and institutional level 
contribute to low pay.  
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Chapter 3  
The policy context: early childhood services and their workforce 
 
Introduction 
The position of childcare workers heavily depends on the way childcare services are 
organised, financed and regulated, because these factors tend to determine who the 
carers are, the kind of care provided and the circumstances under which it occurs. 
Childcare policy is one of the drivers of the institutional arrangements in which the 
position of childcare workers is embedded.  
 
British childcare and pre-school education provision is complicated, not least 
because there is a mixture of overlapping services, with different origins, ethos and 
organisational forms. The first objective of this chapter is therefore to offer an 
overview of childcare and early education provision. In doing so, I set out the context 
for the empirical analysis. The second objective of the chapter is to explore how 
policy contributes to the structuring of early childhood services and their workforce. 
By examining childcare policy one is able to identify some of the answers as to why 
childcare workers have historically been low paid and why and to what extent they 
continue to be so. 
 
In the UK, early childhood services have historically featured only marginally among 
the state’s concerns and social policies for children and families. State interventions 
have instead been motivated by other interests, most prominently the promotion of 
children’s health, the protection of children from neglect and cruelty, the 
preoccupation with the home environment as an incubator of delinquency, the care of 
deprived children without families, and the support of families at risk (Hendrick 
2005, 115-120). The provision or funding of day-care services was simply not on the 
public policy agenda of any British post-war government until the end of the 
twentieth century.  
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The low level of public childcare provision  was consistent with a historical 
commitment of the British welfare state to favour the male bread-winner model, 
which defined women’s position as mothers and wives rather than as workers (Lewis 
1992). British mothers have typically reconciled family responsibility and paid work 
by taking up part-time work and/or by interrupting employment until their children 
were in school, and by relying on informal childcare by relatives and friends. In other 
words, childcare arrangements were considered, and in fact were, almost exclusively 
a private matter. The issue of childcare crept into the policy agenda only towards the 
end of the 1980s, following a rapid increase in the number of mothers with young 
children taking up paid work. Yet policy initiatives under Conservative governments 
remained marginal.  
 
The scenario has been radically different since 1997, as Labour gave unprecedented 
attention to early childhood. This commitment translated into several policy 
initiatives and into an unparalleled level of resources devoted to childcare and pre-
school education services. Hence there has been a remarkable shift towards more 
public responsibility in the field of childcare, signalled, most notably, by the 
expansion of formal provision. Recent policies have also sought to change the way 
childcare is organised and practised, and to this end Labour introduced important 
changes in the way the sector is regulated.  
 
This chapter focuses on the policy developments that have occurred since 1997. 
Inevitably, however, such developments have to be understood in relation to the 
situation that Labour inherited. Thus, the next section gives a brief account of 
childcare and early education services before 1997. The third section is a more 
detailed account of the policy changes brought about by the Labour Government. 
This account is organised in chronological order and policy initiatives are discussed 
first in relation to childcare services and second in relation to the workforce. The 
forth section discusses the major challenges faced by childcare workers. The last 
section offers some reflections on the role of policy in explaining childcare workers’ 
low pay.  
 
Before starting, two important caveats are necessary. The first regards terminology. 
As mentioned, the UK has a variety of early childhood services. As a consequence, 
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there is not a single term apt to describe the entire range, here understood as both 
pre-school education and care services. Traditionally, these were referred to as 
nursery education and day-care services. However, language has evolved over the 
years, reflecting both concrete changes in services and shifts in policy-makers’ 
thinking about them. So, since the 1990s terms like childcare, early years education 
and also simply early years have become predominant, although their meaning is not 
always clear. A specific source of confusion is the fact that the term “early years” 
refers to various age ranges: sometimes it refers to the three to five age group (DES 
1990; HM Treasury 2004), sometimes to children aged nought to eight (Sure Start 
2003) and at other times to those aged nought to five (Sure Start 2008).   
 
In describing services at different points in time, this chapter adopts the convention 
of using the specific term in use in the pertaining period. However, the term “early 
childhood services” will be used when I need to refer to the whole range of 
provision, thus comprising education and care service for children from nought to 
five.1 As for workers, they will be referred to as “childcare workers”, although it will 
become apparent how heterogeneous this workforce is. Finally, policy will be 
referred to as “childcare policy”, irrespective of whether decision-making is located 
in welfare, health or education departments. This choice is motivated by the belief 
that it was a shift in childcare policy that triggered reforms from 1997 onwards, 
notwithstanding the fact that policies were also framed as, and indeed were, 
concerning education.   
 
The second caveat relates to whether this chapter refers to the UK in its entirety or to 
England only. Countries within the UK have, to different extent, autonomy in several 
social policy areas. For example, the regulation and delivery of social and education 
services are matters of national policy and this creates differences across countries 
within the UK. Notwithstanding this diversity, the levels and characteristics of early 
childhood services before 1999 were broadly similar across the entire UK (Cohen 
1990; Cohen et al 2004; Melhuish et al 2006). Since devolution, policy developments 
in childcare policy have been parallel, as all countries have witnessed a growing 
interest in early childhood services matched by increased public funding. Policy 
                                                      
1 Appendix 3 contains a glossary of terms. 
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differences have emerged mostly in the details of implementation rather than in the 
overall approach. Thus the chapter can be considered relevant to the entire UK, even 
though, for reason of space, policy details will be described in relation to England 
only. In addition, as will be explained, funding for early years services was made 
available through the tax and benefit system, which remains the responsibility of the 
UK government.    
 
Early childhood services and their workforce before 1997  
Throughout the twentieth century, childcare and educational services for pre-school 
children developed haphazardly and in the almost total absence of an explicit 
national policy for children to help parents to take up employment. By the mid-
1990s, the resulting system of services was highly fragmented, as there was not a 
“core” service that the majority of children attended. Instead, children used services 
of several types, which varied markedly in their availability and their characteristics.  
 
Minimal state involvement meant that direct state provision tended to be limited and 
it targeted either children in need or those from more deprived areas. Likewise, there 
was sparse and modest public funding of services provided by the private and 
voluntary sector. Besides the lack of a co-ordinated or unitary system of provision, 
there was no common training among those working in different services. The two 
factors – the structure of provision and the absence of common training – made the 
very definition of a ‘childcare’ occupation difficult and contested.  
 
This section has two aims. First, it describes the services available and their pattern 
of usage as they were in the mid-1990s, so as to offer the reader an account of the 
system that New Labour inherited. Second, the section examines the structure of 
training and the qualifications available to childcare workers around the time Labour 
took office.  
 
The structure of early childhood services 
Services varied along several dimensions: geographically, with high variation across 
local authorities; socially, with a polarisation between high-income families catered 
for by market provision and a small minority of families at risk catered for by social 
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services; functionally, with different forms of provision following different 
philosophies of provision, which were, however not mutually exclusive; 
organisationally, with a large share of services operating on a part-time or on a 
sessional basis and only during term time. For the purpose of this brief overview, I 
draw Drawing on Moss and Penn (1996) and distinguish services according to sector:  
public sector, voluntary sector and, finally, the private for profit one. This distinction 
was especially crucial for the workforce, as will be made clear.  
 
Publicly provided services 
Within the public sector, services for children were provided by local authorities 
under the auspices of two distinct and separate departments: education and social 
services. In both domains, local authorities had considerable discretion in deciding 
the characteristics and level of provision, resulting in substantial differences in the 
services available to families (Randall 2004; Audit Commission 1996, 12-15).  
National legislation permitted, but did not require, local authorities to offer education 
to children under five. However, in the early 1970s, policy at the national level 
encouraged provision in deprived urban areas. The aim was to offer an educationally 
enriched experience to children from more disadvantage background. Although such 
commitment was not sustained over time at the national level, it influenced the 
distribution of nursery education provision, which remained concentrated in more 
urban areas.  
 
Besides geographical variations, educational provision for pre-school children 
comprised of three types of services: nursery schools, nursery classes and reception 
classes. Nursery education was originally autonomous from primary education, and 
catered specifically for children from three to five and took place typically in nursery 
schools. Indeed,  a nursery school was  a free-standing service, with its own 
management structure – a headteacher and a deputy. Nursery classes, on the other 
hand, had been set up in the 1970s and were attached to primary (infant) schools. 
Nursery education in nursery classes was a cheaper option, as it shared overhead 
costs with primary schools (Moss and Penn 1996). Both nursery schools and classes 
typically operated on a sessional basis, with children attending either one morning 
session or an afternoon one (Moss and Penn 1996).  Data from 1993 show that 
around 50% of all children aged three were receiving nursery education in nursery 
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classes or nursery schools (Audit Commission 1996, 9). Among these, only a tenth 
were actually in nursery schools because nursery classes were much more 
predominant. Finally, schools generally admitted children aged four in reception 
classes. Although reception classes were not formally compulsory schooling, in 
1995, around half of four year olds were in reception classes full-time (Audit 
Commission 1996, 9).  
 
Because these forms of services were in schools, they were staffed by teachers. 
Working alongside teachers, there was also another occupation group: nursery 
nurses, whose education level was markedly lower. Their role was subordinate to 
teachers and they were therefore referred to as ‘nursery assistants’. The two groups 
worked together as a team, but teachers had the lead (Clift, Cleave, and Griffin 
1980).  
 
Besides nursery education, local authorities also ran day nurseries. These were under 
the oversight of social services departments and were mainly catering for the small 
minority (less than one percent) of children classified as “in need” by social services. 
In this respect, day-care was a service contiguous to residential care. Yet the precise 
function and role of day nurseries varied across local authorities and over time and 
this was reflected in changes in nomenclature. For example, during the 1980s, many 
local authorities’ day nurseries became family centres, which signalled a stronger 
emphasis on supporting mothers as well as offering day care for children. In a 
handful of well-documented cases, day nurseries evolved into combined centres 
whereby education and care were integrated under one roof (Penn 2000; Makins 
1997). Unlike provision in schools, local authorities’ day nurseries were opened all 
year round, on a full-time basis and accepted children from nought to five. 
Importantly, they were staffed by nursery nurses only, as social workers were not 
usually deployed in the direct provision of day-care.   
 
Neither strand of services – care or education – was provided on a universal basis. 
But public day-care services were certainly more targeted, as they were focused 
mainly on distressed families. Thus, although the core offer of local authorities’ day 
nurseries – in their various incarnations – was routine day-care, this service was not 
aimed at helping parents take up employment. The problem of the care of children 
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whose mothers were in paid work was unaddressed by public services. This made 
provision marginal and consequently, the demand for labour in public services was 
limited and geographically uneven.  
 
Voluntary sector 
In the 1990s, playgroups were the most common form of provision, both in the 
number of children catered for and of places available. The playgroup movement had 
emerged in the early 1960s, when mothers started to set up voluntary groups offering 
morning or afternoon “sessions” in which children could learn through play. The 
movement had gained impressive support and increased extraordinarily, but 
continued to operate only a few times a week with sessions lasting 2.5 hours. As the 
majority of children attended two or three session a week only (DES 1990, Meltzer 
1994), playgroups were of little use for working mothers. In addition, the majority of 
playgroups were managed by parent committes and parents were also typically 
involved on a rota basis in the actual running of the playgroup (DES 1990). Paid staff 
was commonly employed on a part-time basis. It was often the case that parents, 
after becoming involved through their children, became trained staff, but voluntarism 
remained a defining aspect of this form of service (Baldock 2011: 54; Lloyd et al 
1989).  
 
Playgroups relied mainly on parental fees and fund-raising activities. Around one 
third of playgroups also received small grants from local authorities. Playgroups 
aimed to offer learning experiences through play activities and, although they were 
overseen by the Department of Health and Social Services, were therefore seen as 
providing an educational service. Around 80 percent of playgroups belonged to the 
Pre-school Playgroups Association (DES 1990), a national educational charity that 
provided training and gave playgroups a “voice” at the national level. As for their 
geographical distribution, playgroups grew in those local authorities where there 
were relatively few nursery education places and better socio-economic conditions 
(Owen and Moss 1989). As playgroups were widespread in relatively more affluent 
areas, recruiting staff among service users contributed to give playgroups a distinct 
middle-class profile. 
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Besides playgroups, there were a number of community nurseries, set up by local 
community groups to meet the demands of working parents. As with playgroups, 
these nurseries relied on parental contributions and, to varying degrees, on local 
authority grants. In a few cases, these nurseries became similar to local authorities’ 
combined centres, in that they started to integrate day care with education, thus 
offering a more holistic service (Makins 1997).  
 
Finally, large national voluntary organisations like Barnardo’s, the Children’s 
Society or the National Children’s Bureau, were present in areas of high social need 
where they ran family centres (Moss and Penn 1996). These centres were often partly 
funded by local authorities social services which did not provide day-care services 
directly and were staffed by trained and qualified staff (Tizard, Moss, and Perry 
1976, 78). Although these national charities had historically been concerned mostly 
with children in need, at the beginning of the 1990s, they were influential in 
advocating for government intervention to expand services.   
 
Private sector 
The dearth of publicly-run day care services and the fact that playgroups were open 
only few hours a day meant two things. First, women took breaks during the child 
rearing years and mothers tended to work part-time (among others, Gregory and 
Connolly 2008; Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel 1999; Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1999; 
Crompton 1997; Macran, Joshi, and Dex 1996; Lewis 1991). Second, private forms 
of provision were necessary to cater for those children whose mothers were in paid 
work. These private forms of provision expanded during the 1980s, as mothers of 
young children took up paid work in increasingly greater numbers (Moss and Penn 
1996) .   
 
The longest-established form of private provision was childminding. Childminders 
catered for a small number of children in their own house. This was a private 
arrangement between the parents and the minder, who was self-employed. Provision 
was generally full-time, although was often combined with other services – 
especially nursery education – when children reached the age of three and four.   
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In the 1980s, the raise in the number of women with higher qualifications and higher 
earnings was accompanied by a sharp growth in the number of private day-nurseries. 
This form of provision was full-time and expensive. Moss and Penn (1996) reported 
fees between £50 and £200 a week in 1995. Thus, private day-nurseries catered 
essentially for children from dual-earner families on high incomes.  
 
Until the 1990s, there was no national scheme to help parents with the cost of private 
childcare. The only form of government intervention was regulation.  Since the after-
war years, childminders had been required to register with local authorities’ social 
services. In the subsequent decades, regulation became more stringent and 
enforcement stricter. The 1989 Children Act further strengthened registration 
requirements and obliged local authorities to inspect annually all childcare services 
outside the maintained sector. Although inspection practices varied across local 
authorities, the Act contributed to establishing a link between local authorities and 
private nurseries. However, a private form of provision that remained totally 
unregulated was that of nannies, who were employed directly by the parents and 
cared for children in the children’s home.  
 
The training system  
Within such variety of services, workers had substantially different levels of training, 
ranging from teachers with degrees or postgraduate qualifications to workers without 
any relevant qualification. Not surprisingly, a common training system did not exist.  
The main training scheme for those willing to work with children came into being in 
1945 and was overseen by the National Nursery Examination Board (NNEB), which 
awarded the ‘NNEB certificate in nursery nursing’ – usually referred to simply as 
‘the NNEB’.  Colleges wishing to offer NNEB courses had to gain the Board’s 
approval. The Board was indeed responsible for centrally deciding the syllabus and 
administering the examination, and for making sure that colleges complied with the 
Board’s guidelines (Wright 1999). The composition of the Board changed over the 
years, but included representatives from various government departments, local 
authority departments and allied associations in the field of health, nursing and 
children’s welfare (Wright 1999).    
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The training generally lasted two years and was open to young girls aged 16 and over 
(Wright 1999; Moss and Penn 1996; Penn and McQuail 1997).2 Methods of selection 
varied across colleges, but were commonly based on GCSE or CSE examination 
results and candidates’ interviews (Moss and Penn 1996; Clift et al 1980). The 
course combined college-based learning with practical placements in approved 
establishments, like local authorities’ day-care nurseries or nursery classes. As for 
the subjects covered, the course spanned different areas: child development and 
education; health; and social work. The examination comprised of written papers and 
continuous in-course assessment of practical work (Wright 1990).  
 
The precise arrangements of the training changed repeatedly over the years, with 
some matters never fully resolved (Wright 1990). In particular, one set of issues was 
ever-present: the balance between training that was relevant to specific job roles and 
more general preparation. This problem is common to almost all vocational courses, 
but the fragmentation of childcare and education services made them especially 
intractable.  
 
The variety of services made it impossible for candidates to spend sufficient practical 
training time in each form of provision and this raised the question of which services 
were the cornerstone of childcare training (Wright 1999). Should the candidate be 
required to have training with all age groups? Was it acceptable to award the NNEB 
certificate to candidates who had not had any experience and observation of children 
in, for example, residential care or nursery education? In short, the problem was that 
the “nursery” – intended as a place in which children from nought to five were cared 
for and educated – did not in fact exist. In its place, there were several, more 
specialised services and their availability varied widely across the country. This 
made a common training scheme inherently problematic: it was not clear for which 
type of work NNEB candidates were trained for. Not surprisingly then, the actual 
training arrangement often depended on the facilities available in the local authority. 
Likewise, the employment destinations of qualified NNEB workers varied. Besides 
local authority day nurseries and nursery education, which had limited labour 
demand, NNEB nurses were employed in the Health Service, in maternity and 
                                                      
2 Boys became eligible as candidates only in 1979. 
 59
children’s wards, with Social Services, part of home visiting teams or in an advisory 
capacity for childminders, and, most common of all, were in private families (Wright 
1999, 147; Clift, Cleave, and Griffin 1980, 21).  
 
Despite being the most common qualification for those working with children, the 
NNEB never became a statutory qualification (Wright 1999; Moss and Penn 1996). 
That is, it was not required for any type of work with children. In practice, most day 
nurseries run by local authorities did only hire NNEB qualified workers. Likewise, 
the majority of nursery assistants working in nursery schools and classes had the 
NNEB. But other forms of provision, most notably private nurseries, did not require 
either the NNEB or other qualifications (Moss and Penn 1996).  
 
Over time, different organisations had developed their own training schemes that 
were tailored to the services actually provided. This was, for example, the case of 
playgroups. The PPA had its own training system. It awarded qualifications in play-
work, notably also at managerial level, with the “playgroup leader” qualification 
(DES 1990, 22). However, these qualifications however had little currency outside 
the playgroup network. Likewise, national charities running both residential and day-
care/family centres, for example the National Children Bureau, had developed their 
own training courses. As for childminders, the National Childminding Association 
(NCMA) did not run training courses. Instead, it provided material and offered 
guidance to local groups setting up courses in childminding (DES 1990, 22-23).  
 
Training for nursery education teachers was at the other end of the qualification 
hierarchy. It consisted of either three or four years of graduate level training, 
covering primary teaching and nursery teaching together. One problem with this 
arrangement was that teachers were mostly trained to work with older children and, 
therefore, lacked the preparation necessary for teaching children below compulsory 
schooling age (Abbott and Kane 1998; Moss and Penn 1996, Ch. 7; Sylva 1991).  
 
The system of training was therefore fragmented, as courses and qualifications varied 
in content, length and currency within the system of services. With the exception of 
teachers, qualifications tended to be at a low level. The NNEB required a two-year 
vocational training course, but was not accepted as a valid entry requirement for 
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higher education or for higher professional training. In fact, the NNEB led to only 
one qualification at a higher level – the Certificate in Post-Qualifying Studies 
(CPQS). However, the CPQS had only been set up in the late 1980s and was 
available only in a few higher education colleges. Thus, it did not offer a 
comprehensive solution to the problem.  
 
Another qualification, established only in 1989, was the Business & Technology 
Education Council (BTEC) diploma in nursery nursing. The BTEC was a two-year 
vocational course similar to the NNEB, but it was slightly more selective and was 
offered in far fewer colleges (Moss and Penn 1996). Unlike the NNEB, the BTEC 
qualification allowed progression to the Higher National Diploma (HND), a 
vocational qualification at post-secondary level offered in polytechnics.  
 
The only degree-level qualification outside teaching emerged at the beginning of the 
1990s and was offered in a handful of universities (ex-polytechnics). These “Early 
Childhood Studies” degree programmes encompassed both “care” and “education” 
philosophies and imparted specialist knowledge appropriate to working with children 
from nought to eight (Calder 1990; Fawcett and Calder 1998). However, all these 
initiatives were partial or exceptional and could do little to offset the general low 
level of qualifications that characterised employment in childcare.  
 
The training system was therefore not organised around the principle of progression. 
There was not a qualification that prepared better academically qualified students for 
posts of responsibilities. Career advancement for childcare workers was very rare 
and invariably meant either becoming a teacher, a nurse, or a social worker. 
However, training that was specific to childcare hindered such career choices.   
 
Against this backdrop, the introduction of a system of National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs) added another layer of qualifications. NVQs were introduced 
in the late 1980s, but in the childcare sector they emerged more slowly. NVQs were 
competence-based qualifications – to gain it the candidate needed to be assessed as 
being capable of his or her job to defined standards (O'Hagan, Griffin, and Dench 
1998). NVQs could be obtained in colleges or directly in the workplace. This way, 
the distinction between initial training and in-work training disappeared, and the 
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emphasis shifted from the learning process to the performance outcome. The linchpin 
of NVQs was the assessment, which consisted of the observation and recording of 
performance at work, or a simulation of it (in case the NVQ was gained in college) 
(West and Steedman 2003).  
 
The development of NVQs was partly responsible for the dissolution of the NNEB in 
1994 (Wright 1999). The government assigned the task of defining the job standards 
underpinning the NVQs to “Lead Industry Bodies”. However in the field of childcare 
and of care work more generally, there was no such existing organisation of 
employers. Thus, the government created  a Care Sector Consortium which included 
representatives from various private and public sector organisations related to care 
services (Calder 1995). This arrangement meant that the NNEB Board had lost its 
main function – deciding and regulating the content of nursery nurses training. This 
way, the longest established qualification in childcare disappeared, replaced by, 
arguably, a weaker form of training – a point which will be developed in the next 
section.  
 
A fragmented workforce 
By 1997, several reports had documented the inadequacies of childcare and early 
education services in the UK (for example, Cohen 1990; Meltzer 1994; Audit 
Commission 1996). Public provision was scarce and divided between day-nursery 
services – with social and welfare aims – and nursery education, which, instead, put 
stronger emphasis on children’s learning. Childcare as a service for working parents 
existed almost entirely in the private sector, either through childminders or private 
day-nurseries.  
 
The well-documented fragmentation of services was matched by a disparate 
workforce working with children under five. Four groups of workers were clearly 
identifiable. First, there were teachers, qualified at degree level or post-graduate 
level. They were employed typically in the maintained sector only. Their working 
conditions were generally favourable, as they worked only term time and were 
covered in terms of social security and pension benefits (Moss and Penn 1996). Their 
training was centred on educational aims, but was not necessarily considered 
appropriate for working with pre-schoolers.  
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Second, qualified nursery nurses were another identifiable group of workers. They 
had gained the NNEB or similar qualification in childcare. Their training was rooted 
in the social services tradition and had strong emphasis on the health and well-being 
of the child. Qualified nursery nurses were, in the main, employed in the public 
sector, either in day-care or in education. In both cases, pay was set according to 
local pay scales, and covered also sickness, annual leave, and pension benefits. Pay 
was slightly higher in day-care, where employees generally worked longer hours and 
had shorter holidays. In schools, qualified nursery nurses had a teacher as direct line 
manager, while in day-care it was either a more senior nursery nurse or a social 
worker (Moss and Penn 1996, DES 1990). Qualified nurses were also employed in 
the private sector, although here they generally occupied senior management roles. 
Working conditions within the private sector varied, but were altogether worse in 
comparison to the public sector, especially as far as social security was concerned 
(Moss and Penn 1996).  
 
The third identifiable group of staff was unqualified workers, employed mainly in 
the private sector or as childminders (Moss and Penn 1996, Mayall and Petrie 1983). 
For them, there was no legal requirement to be qualified. Finally, there were 
playgroup workers, who constituted a separate group with its own hierarchy and 
training system (DES 1990, Lloyd et al 1989). 
 
Notwithstanding these differences, the great majority of those working with children 
had low-level qualifications. The lack of professional training was particularly acute 
among those working with babies and toddlers. Professional training at degree level 
existed only for teachers. But teachers were employed in the public sector, while, by 
the end of the 1990s, many of the services had developed in the private and voluntary 
sectors. Underpinning such an inadequate system of services was a central feature of 
the British welfare state, namely its supporting a strong male-breadwinner family 
model (Lewis 1992). It was when this underlying assumption about the role of 
women was finally abandoned that childcare services started to change.  
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Changes in the provision of childcare and early education since 1997 
The Labour Government elected in 1997 brought about substantial changes in the 
field of childcare policy, which were marked by the publication of Meeting the 
Childcare Challenge in May 1998 (DfEE and DSS 1998).  Labour’s initiatives 
signalled a significant departure from previous governments’ policies. They changed 
a core idea informing the role of the state, namely that childcare arrangements were 
exclusively a private responsibility.  
 
The term ‘childcare’ assumed a new connotation: while ‘child care’ (two words) had 
traditionally indicated those services focusing on children’s welfare and catering for 
the minority of children in foster or residential care, the ‘childcare challenge’ 
referred to day-care services for preschool children whose parents are at work. 
Furthermore, the Labour Government’s strategy focused on strengthening pre-school 
education provision, with the aim of promoting children’s early learning, in the 
context of tacking social exclusion and child poverty. So, the policy goals were 
mixed, but nevertheless care and education services for children under five became a 
legitimate and important area of policy intervention.  
 
This commitment was sustained in both Labour’s second and third terms in office 
and led to a vast programme of interventions backed up by large public investments. 
In what follows I will give a chronological account of these reforms, while seeking 
to highlight their implications for the workforce.  
 
Labour’s first-term: laying the foundations 
Labour’s National Childcare Strategy (DfEE and DSS 1998) identified three key 
objectives: promoting good quality childcare, making it more affordable, and 
increasing its availability.  
 
In order to help parents to meet childcare costs, the government introduced a 
childcare subsidy in the form of a childcare component attached to the Working Tax 
Credit – also referred to as the Childcare Tax Credit. Low income parents working at 
least 16 hours were eligible and the actual amount depended on household income, 
cost of childcare and number of children, but not on any characteristics of the 
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childcare provider.  All forms of registered provision were covered: centre-based 
settings, playgroups and childminders alike.   
 
The idea behind the subsidy was to increase low-income parents’ ability to purchase 
childcare at market prices (Waldfogel and Garnham 2008). Importantly, the subsidy 
was capped at 70 percent (later 80 percent) of childcare fees, within a certain 
maximum value. This way, the scheme introduced an incentive for parents to look 
for the cheapest option and for providers to compete on price rather than on quality.  
 
In addition, in 2000, pre-school education became a free entitlement of 12.5 hours a 
week during term time for all four year-olds. In theory, the entitlement could be used 
across all providers as long as these complied with a new Code of Practice, which 
required much greater emphasis on the ‘educational’ (as opposed to ‘care’) aspect of 
provision (QCA and DfEE 1999, 2000). In practice however, 80 percent of children 
aged four were already enrolled in either nursery classes or, the majority, in 
reception classes. Thus, they received their entitlement in maintained sector schools 
(DfES 2003, Table 3; 2005, Table 3). It is however noteworthy that attendance rates 
increased precisely in non-maintained settings, albeit from the much lower rate of 
around 15 percent. Monies were made available directly to providers via local 
authorities, which distributed the funding on the basis of the number of eligible 
children attending each setting (West 2006).3  
 
Although children could access the entitlement in maintained and non-maintained 
settings alike, the payments to providers were different. Primary schools with 
primary classes received slightly higher funding than private, voluntary and 
independent providers (NAO 2012, West, Roberts and Noden 2010). The difference 
in funding per child is small, but nursery classes, as it will be explained below, 
operated with a different staff to child ratio and could share overhead costs with the 
primary schools they were attached to. Funding for nursery schools in the maintained 
sector – which must employ a headteacher and have no shared overheads – was 
                                                      
3 It should be noted however that initially funding was made available through the ‘Early Years 
Development and Childcare Partnerships’ (EYDCPs) scheme, which aimed at including voluntary and 
private sectors providers into the planning phase of childcare and nursery education expansion at local 
level. The partnerships were however considered ineffective and subsequently abandoned (Penn and 
Randall 2004; Lewis 2004).  
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considerably higher. Beside these differences across sectors, and within each local 
authority, the funding mechanism did not take into account providers’ differing costs 
per child. So a private nursery employing a teacher did not receive higher payment 
than a nursery with staff with minimum qualifications.  
 
The tax credit and the free entitlement became the core interventions of the childcare 
strategy. The most substantial share of public resources was devoted, over the years, 
to these two initiatives (Brewer, Crawford, and Dearden 2005). These two initiatives, 
with their separate funding arrangements, reflected two distinct aims underpinning 
the childcare strategy. On the one hand, there was pre-school education, aimed at 
strengthening children’s school readiness. On the other, there was childcare, whose 
goal was to promote mothers’ employment (Lewis 2003). This sustained the view 
that childcare was for working parents and the nursery education was for pre-
schoolers (Moss 2010). With this view was also the long-standing notion that issues 
concerning quality were of greater relevance to educational provision than they were 
to care services (Cohen et al 2004: 63). Indeed, providers offering the entitlement 
had to comply with the precise guidance on early years education in order to receive 
public funding (QCA and DfEE 2000). By contrast, eligibility for the tax credit was 
linked to parents’ employment status and working hours and was not related to the 
quality of provision purchased.   
 
The policy objective of increasing the quality of provision was thus mostly 
concerned with pre-school education. Regulation was strengthened considerably, 
albeit unevenly across types of provision. In particular, providers from different 
sectors had to comply with differing child: staff ratios (Ofsted 2001; DfES 2001a) . 
In school-based provision, these were higher, to reflect that better qualified staff (i.e. 
teachers) were employed. In the private and voluntary sectors, on the other hand, 
ratios were lower, with fewer children for each member of staff (Munton et al 2002).  
 
By distinguishing between forms of provision, rather than by staff qualification, the 
regulation did not introduce any incentive for non-schools providers to hire teachers 
or graduates, as the higher costs could not be offset by a higher ratio.   
With regard to services for children aged three to five, the regulatory requirements 
introduced by Labour did not concern the structural aspects of provision only (e.g. 
 66
staff to children ratios). Instead, regulation specified the actual principles and 
practices that were to guide the delivery of the free entitlement. That is, regulation 
regarded the process of childcare work. The “Curriculum Guidance to the 
Foundation Stage” (QCA and DfEE 2000) required workers to plan learning 
activities and to observe and document children’s progress.  This way regulation 
affected directly the content of childcare work and gave greater prominence to the 
educational goal of services.  
 
Labour also launched a number of other initiatives, which were not implemented 
nationally, but targeted children living in the most deprived geographical areas. The 
Sure Start programme was certainly the most prominent and well-known one. 
However Sure Start was not firmly part of the childcare strategy, but a response to 
the policy goal of reducing child poverty through early intervention  (Eisenstadt 
2007). Increasing the availability of childcare places became a key objective of the 
programme only later on (Lewis 2011). Other programmes included the Early 
Excellence Centres, which offered extended day care integrated with early education, 
and the Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative (NNI), which channelled funding to set 
up nurseries in the most deprived areas, where limited financial viability discouraged 
the private and independent providers (Bertram et al 2004; NNI Research Team 
2007).  
 
Lastly, Labour’s initiatives in the early years sector included a myriad of different 
opportunities for shorter-term funding, for example start-up grants for new 
childminders and childminders’ networks, funds for information services and staff 
training (Lewis 2003; Cohen et al. 2004).   
 
In the “flurry of activity” (Moss 1999, 230) that characterised the first term of 
Labour in government, relatively less attention was given to the issue of the childcare 
workforce.  From the outset, Labour acknowledged that “childcare is a low status, 
low pay occupation” (DfEE and DSS 1998, 13), but the issue was framed exclusively 
in relation to the expansion of services.  
 
The problem therefore was that the poor status of the occupation would “make it 
difficult to recruit people of the right calibre to the profession and to retain them” 
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(DfEE and DSS 1998, 13). Government’s preoccupation was that the growing 
numbers of alternative sources of employment coupled with women’s rising 
qualifications were bound to reduce the pool of people available to work in childcare 
(Rolfe et al. 2003; Cameron, Owen, and Moss 2001; Cameron et al. 2001). The issue 
of low pay was addressed only in passing, and Government made clear that the 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) would ensure that “childcare 
workers’ pay does not fall short of a decent minimum” (DfEE and DSS 1998, 24). 
 
Policy effort concentrated especially on recruitment, leaving the problem of retention 
largely unaddressed. It was envisaged from the beginning that New Deal 
programmes would offer opportunities to train in childcare (DfEE and DSS 1998, 
15). In particular, employment in childcare was seen as particularly suitable to lone 
parents (DfEE and DSS 1998, 23). In line with these views, the Sure Start 
recruitment campaign was targeted at people not in work, and also tried specifically 
to attract men into the sector (Osgood 2005). Margaret Hodge described the key 
message of the campaign: “It is all about saying ‘you can do this if you have got a 
way with kids’ and bringing people in and then hopefully, through professional 
development when they are in a particular setting, enhancing quality” (HC 2001a, 
Question 460).  
 
A better qualification system was considered necessary to increase the attractiveness 
of working with children, and the Government set out to develop a “climbing frame 
to help people enter, move and progress in the sector, as well as to move to other 
related occupations” (DfEE and DSS 1998, 26). There was no mention about what 
kind of training or qualifications should actually be put in place, despite the fact that 
the Curriculum Guidance for the Foundation Stage was very detailed about the 
content of childcare work. The fact that increased regulation may presuppose a better 
qualified workforce was never acknowledged.  
 
Policy related to qualifications in childcare needs to be understood in the context of 
the broader developments taking place in education policy and, more specifically, in 
relation to the expansion of NVQs and the role of the National Qualifications 
Framework (NQF). Both the NVQs and the NQF had been introduced by the 
Conservative Governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s, but remained central to 
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Labour’s education and employment policies (Wolf 2004). The institutional 
mechanisms described hereafter therefore refer also to the years under the Labour 
Government.  
 
As already mentioned, the NVQs were characterised by an assessment regime based 
exclusively on observation and evaluation of performance at work (West and 
Steedman 2003). Candidates were assessed on the basis of the competence they 
showed in performing the job. The standards of competence were set nationally by 
employers and defined at a level from one to five, with higher levels corresponding 
to greater mastery and proficiency. NVQs required less educational infrastructure 
than other vocational qualifications. At the minimum, candidates needed to register 
with a certified training provider, who would be in charge of arranging for an 
assessor to evaluate the candidate performance (O'Hagan, Griffin, and Dench 1998; 
Moss and Penn 1996).  
 
In the 1990s the NQF was also established. It classified all qualifications – 
vocational and academic alike – at one of five levels, reproducing the structure of the 
NVQs across all available qualifications (Robinson 1996, 1997). In the case of 
childcare, the old NNEB qualification was pitched at level 3, together with other 
vocational qualifications like the BTEC diploma in childcare, but also together with 
academic qualifications like A-levels (QCA 1999). So someone with an NNEB and 
someone with A-levels were both said to have qualifications at level 3. This notional 
parity was highly criticised (Robinson 1996, 1997) and had substantial repercussions 
on the vocational education field.  The NQF was crucial because regulation used the 
language of ‘levels’, without specifying which qualification was required. The NQF 
made very different qualifications become equivalent, despite the different 
educational content they had and the varied recognition from employers they 
received.  
 
The introduction of the NQF contributed to the increase of the popularity of NVQs. 
Progressively, vocational qualifications became known by their “NVQ-equivalent” 
level. In addition, the funding system favoured the expansion of NVQs at the 
expense of other qualifications (Wolf 2004). The funding was also organised in a 
way that put pressure on training providers to reduce standards. Put simply, training 
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providers received funds on the basis of the number of qualifications awarded. In 
competence-based qualifications, a candidate can only pass or fail, so the pressure to 
grant a pass is enormous (Wolf 2011, 87).  
 
Having explained the context in which NVQs developed, it is easier to understand 
their role in the childcare sector. NVQs were introduced in the childcare sector in 
1992, but notably they did not cover all the progression stages and were offered only 
at level 2 and level 3 (Calder 1995). Implementation problems hindered their take up, 
and in particular there were difficulties related to funding and access. In a sector like 
childcare characterised by small workplaces, self-employment and generally low 
pay, it was unrealistic to expect either candidates or employers to finance NVQs 
(O'Hagan, Griffin, and Dench 1998). However, the NVQs’ structure fitted the 
childcare recruitment strategy launched by Labour because they did not require any 
previous qualification and could be gained on the job. Their design met the 
Government’s desire of “bringing people in without any qualification” and then train 
them up. Labour funded training opportunities to gain NVQs at level 2 and level 3 
(HC 2001b). With considerable government back-up, NVQs in childcare started to 
expand.   
 
Labour supported the creation of a National Training Organisation (NTO) specific to 
the Early Years sector. It included representatives of the private, public and 
voluntary sectors and associations like Pre-school Learning Alliance4, National 
Childminding Association and the National Day Nurseries Association (Abbott and 
Pugh 1998: 13). One of the task of the NTO was to revise the standards underpinning 
the NVQs, in order to take into account changes in regulation and thus in the 
demands of the job.  
 
Regulation on staff qualification was set in accordance with government’s backing of 
NVQ2 and NVQ3. Labour legislated regarding minimum qualification requirements, 
but it applied to the setting, not to the individual worker. It remained therefore 
possible to be working in childcare without possessing a relevant qualification. At 
setting level, the requirements were as follows. Managers and deputies were to have 
                                                      
4 The PPA changed its name in 1995 to Pre-school Learning Alliance.  
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a qualification at level 3. Likewise, all supervisory staff were to be qualified at level 
3. Half of the rest of the staff were required to hold a qualification at level 2 (DfES 
2001a; Sure Start 2003a, 2003b).  
 
In the year running up their introduction, the requirements about supervisory staff 
had been subject to a long debate. Initially the Government had proposed to 
introduce only two standards, one for managers and deputies – qualified at level 3 – 
and one for half of the rest of staff – qualified at level 2. But the sector protested 
against the notion that staff holding a level 2 qualification could be even considered 
‘qualified’. Nursery World, the leading magazine in the sector, launched the 
campaign ‘Stop the drop’ and asked for more stringent requirements – 50 percent of 
staff qualified at level 3 and all support staff qualified at level 2 (Wiltsher 2000). In 
addition, they pushed for managers and deputies to have at least 2 years’ experience. 
The argument was that all staff responsible for children had to be qualified at level 3. 
That was the level, for example, of the old NNEB, which had trained people to enter 
into working with children. Support staff, on the other hand, were not directly 
responsible for children, but rather were in charge of assisting in the overall 
provision. Nursery World thus argued that qualifications below level 3 were 
acceptable only as far as support staff were concerned (Thomson 2000; Mercer 
2000).  
 
The campaign ran for the whole of 2000, but the Government made only the 
concession of requiring staff responsible for other workers to be qualified at level 3. 
According to the minister, the standards were to be considered as minimum 
requirements, and therefore were not meant to highlight best practices (Hodge 2000a 
2000b). Thus, the opportunity for introducing a powerful incentive to raise 
qualifications had been missed.  
 
By the end of Labour’s first term in office, plans were in place for a NVQ at level 4. 
There was confusion, however, as to whether it was a qualification open to managers 
only. The NVQ4 meant to be equivalent to 2 years of higher education. Among 
policy makers, the idea was that this qualification could enable practitioners to move 
on to become qualified teachers (HC 2001a, Question 100). But this vision was 
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inconsistent with the mixed economy of provision, because teachers were employed 
almost exclusively in schools.  
 
Labour’s second term: finding a compromise 
Labour’s second term was mostly dedicated to the implementation of initiatives 
launched during the first term. It was also during the second term that the childcare 
strategy was reviewed and that the different policy initiatives were evaluated, 
reformed or expanded. The Treasury introduced major changes in the tax and benefit 
system in Spring 2003 and increased the financial resources spent on the childcare 
tax credit by raising both the average amount and the number of families benefiting 
(Brewer, Crawford, and Dearden 2005, 151). The expansion of the childcare system 
was thus ensured by subsidising parents’ demand.  
 
In 2004, the early years education entitlement was extended to all three year-olds, 
which allowed the private and voluntary sectors to benefit to a greater extent than 
before. While schools had been able to accommodate three-quarters of four-year 
olds, by 2005 the majority of three-year olds received the entitlement from the 
private and voluntary sector (DfES 2005a, Table 2). 
 
Because the focus remained firmly on expansion and on the creation of more 
childcare places, the strategy towards the workforce was framed accordingly. 
Concerns were, once again, about staff recruitment. Interestingly, the Government 
took the view that employers did not have difficulties in finding qualified staff, rather 
it was a general lack of applicants that risked hampering growth in childcare places 
(DfES et al. 2002, 21). In relation to regulation, the prevailing view was that 
“Vigilance will be required to ensure that neither difficulties in expanding the 
workforce, nor regulations, act as a brake on market growth” (DfES et al. 2002, 14).  
 
Developments in relation to the quality of provision were somewhat disparate. In 
2002 the childcare sector saw the launch of a new vocational qualification at tertiary 
level – the “Early Years Sector Endorsed Foundation Degree” (DfES 2001b). 
Foundation degrees had been promoted across different vocational fields with the 
intent of creating an intermediate level qualification in higher education. They were 
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two-year courses designed for working practitioners, requiring weekly attendance but 
were compatible with full-time work. Policy makers in the childcare area presented 
the foundation degree as a stepping-stone towards qualified teacher status, despite 
government commitment to a mixed economy of provision (DfES 2001, Foreword). 
The Foundation Degree specific to the early years sector had been promoted by the 
Early Years NTO. However, it was dismantled in spring 2002 alongside other 
industry NTOs. In this way, the early years sector lost its voice on matters regarding 
qualifications.   
 
In relation to work practice, no further statutory regulation was introduced. However, 
in 2002, the ‘Birth to three framework’ (DfES and Sure Start 2002) was published. 
This guidance was aimed at all practitioners working with babies and toddlers and 
provided information on child development and assistance for effective practice 
centred on play and learning. The novelty was in the emphasis on stimulating 
activities: children were not only to be in a warm and protective environment but 
also to be offered a wide range of stimulating experiences which could enhance their 
development and learning. It was the first guidance document addressing work with 
children under three, which had been traditionally considered particularly 
unattractive and usually allocated to younger trainees and more inexperienced staff 
(Abbott and Langston 2005).   
 
A piece of research that was very influential in the policy debate about the quality of 
childcare was the Effective Provision of Pre-school Education (EPPE) study. Since 
1997 EPPE had followed 3,000 children receiving care and early education in 
different types of services with the objective of assessing the impact of different 
forms of provision on children’s outcomes. Interim results based on observational 
assessment of the various settings indicated that best practices were to be found in 
integrated centres, nursery schools and nursery classes (Sylva, Siraj-Blatchford, and 
Melhuish 1999). Result of the outcomes for the children that emerged in the mid-
2000 confirmed that those who had attended higher quality settings had better 
outcomes, especially in relation to cognitive developments. Crucially, EPPE pointed 
to the role of teachers in offering high quality early education and care (Sylva et al. 
2004).  
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These results were widely cited in policy documents, but the government had to 
reconcile somehow its commitment to a mixed economy with a vision of quality 
closely linked to the presence of teachers. In 2004, the government’s long-term 
vision for childcare services was unveiled with the publication of Choice for parents, 
the best start for children: A 10-year strategy for childcare (HM Treasury et al. 
2004).  The Strategy admitted “the single biggest factor that determines the quality of 
childcare is the workforce”  (HM Treasury et al. 2004, 4:44). It was the first time that 
the objective of reforming the workforce was given precedence over that of devising 
appropriate regulation.  
 
The Government acknowledged the importance of teachers in enhancing the quality 
of provision, but also introduced the idea that the presence of graduates rather than 
specifically teachers had beneficial effect on provision. Two possible ways forward 
were outlined. One option was to have ‘early years teachers’. This would have 
entailed reinforcing teacher training for the early years, perhaps by devising a 
specific training track. Another option was to create a specific early years 
professional qualification at the graduate level and to ensure that all day-care settings 
were led by a graduate professional. 
 
By the end of Labour’s second term, the issue of the workforce had gained more 
prominence and the Government started to address it, with particular attention to the 
problem of not having enough graduates in the sector. It set up a new government 
agency, the Children’s Workforce Development Council (CWDC), charged with 
training and more generally of overviewing the Children’s workforce, but the 
CWDC’s remit did not include teachers.  The creation of a dedicated agency helped 
to increase the visibility of the theme of the workforce but also moved away from the 
sector-led approach that had existed until then.  
 
Beginning of Labour’s third term: too late to reform the childcare workforce?  
In its third term in office, Labour took forward the proposals outlined in the 10-year 
strategy (HM Treasury et al 2004) and enshrined them in a major piece of 
legislation. The 2006 Childcare Act gave local authorities a statutory duty to survey 
local needs and secure sufficient childcare, which was defined as encompassing both 
educational and care provision for children under five.  
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Importantly, the Act indicated that local authorities should not set up their own 
funded childcare provision if an alternative provider already existed or was willing to 
offer the service.5 Thus Local Authorities were given a central role in facilitating the 
market, but were made “provider of last resort”, with the exception of educational 
provision by schools. The emphasis on commissioning childcare services to the 
private and voluntary sector was particularly relevant in light of the pledge to 
increase the number of Children’s Centres to 3,500 by 2010 (Daycare Trust and TUC 
2008). Local Authorities’ duties in relation to private and voluntary providers 
consisted in offering information, assistance and training.  
 
The Childcare Act also introduced the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS), a 
single regulatory and quality framework bringing together the previously separated 
requirements. The EYFS combined the Curriculum Guidance to the Foundation 
Stage and the Birth to Three document.6 Under this new regulation all providers 
catering for children from nought to five were obliged to follow the EYFS 
framework. This included childminders as well as all other types of settings. Thus 
the initiative integrated ‘education’ for three and four year-olds with ‘care’ for babies 
and toddlers. In common with the curriculum for the foundation stage, the EYFS 
required practitioners to plan activities and to observe children in a systematic way, 
in order to record their progress and difficulties. As for interaction with children, it 
was to combine child-led activities with moments in which the adult had a more 
prominent role in stimulating learning.  
 
This approach had already been in place for the three to five age group, but was new 
for work with younger children. For this segment of provision, it was the first time 
that regulation was being used not only in relation to some structural aspects of 
provision, like staff to children ratios or health and safety requirements; it was also 
                                                      
5 Part 1, point 8 “Powers of local authority in relation to the provision of childcare” (HC 2006). 
6 The EYFS applied only to England. Wales introduced the Foundation Phase Framework for 
Children’s Learning, which however covers only 3 to 7-year-olds and is not a statutory curriculum. 
Likewise, Scotland maintained the distinction between children under 3 and those above. The 
“Curriculum for Excellence” was introduced in 2004 as a non-statutory framework guiding teaching 
practice with children from 3 to 18, while the document ‘Birth to three: supporting our younger 
children’ offered guidance to those working with babies and younger children.  Northern Ireland is yet 
different because compulsory schooling starts at the age of 4. Thus the ‘Foundation Stage’ is the 
school curriculum for year 1 and 2 and is fairly similar to the English Curriculum Guidance.   
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used to ensure that the interaction between workers and children reflected an 
approach which was centred on children’s development and learning.  
 
But while the Foundation Stage had been part of the National Curriculum, the EYFS 
was not, which signalled how provision for the under five was not an integral part of 
the education system. This, in turn, made it more difficult for teachers to train for the 
early years, as the foundation stage was no longer formally on a par with subsequent 
key education stages.  
 
As for inspections, all early years providers – defined as providing childcare or 
education for children under five – had to register with Ofsted. Ofsted was given the 
responsibility of inspecting all settings against the EYFS, with a system of evaluation 
organised in four grades: inadequate, satisfactory, good and outstanding. However, 
provision offered in nursery classes was to be inspected under a different framework 
because they were considered part of the primary school to which they were attached 
(Ofsted 2010). Another incongruity regarded childminders. Although the EYFS 
introduced a framework common to all types of provision, childminders could not 
automatically offer the free entitlement for three and four year olds. In order to 
access this stream of funding, childminders needed to be part of their local 
childminders’ network (Ofsted 2008a, 2008b).    
 
In terms of funding, the first years of Labour’s third term saw aggregate spending on 
childcare and the early years increasing (Stewart 2009). Beside the Childcare Tax 
Credit, financial incentives to provide employer-supported childcare were 
strengthened. Through these schemes parents could opt to be part-paid in childcare 
vouchers, reducing income tax liability, as long as their employer was signed up to a 
voucher scheme. This subsidising mechanism favoured, once again, private 
provision.  
As provision expanded, concerns about the level of spending per child started to 
emerge (NAO 2006). The funding of the free entitlement was especially contested by 
private sector providers, who argued that the funding made available by local 
authorities was falling short of covering the real costs of provision (FSB 2007).  
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In spring 2005, the Government launched a Children’s workforce strategy (DfES 
2005). The proposals regarding the early years workforce were very similar to those 
advanced in Meeting the Childcare Challenge back in 1998. These were: 1. creating 
a qualification framework in order to increase career opportunities in the sector; 2. 
supporting the Government recruitment campaign to expand the workforce; 3. 
Improving the information given to parents, who, as customers, were “better placed 
to influence provision on a day-to-day basis” (CWDC 2005, 30). Thus, several old 
ideas were once again repeated.  
 
There were however two significant and concrete initiatives. One was the creation of 
the “Transformation Fund” explicitly dedicated to financially supporting employers 
willing to hire better qualified workers or sponsoring their training. The second was 
the launch of a new graduate-level category of staff: the Early Years Professional 
(EYP) (Daycare Trust and TUC 2008).  
 
The option of creating a new professional figure distinct from teachers had already 
emerged in the Ten-year strategy (HM Tresury et al 2004) and the enduring 
commitment towards the mixed economy of provision made it inevitable. The EYP 
was defined as a professional figure at the graduate level with expertise in child 
development that combined aspects of medicine, social work and education. The 
EYP was not a qualification, but a professional category on a par with the “Qualified 
Teacher Status” (QTS). The EYP status could only be obtained after a degree, but 
was accessible via different routes. Applicants were required to have GCSEs at 
grades A*-C in both English and Maths, which was also a requirement for obtaining 
QTS. It was meant to be a professional category of the same calibre as that of 
teachers, but concerns remained that the rigour and the funding of EYP training was 
lower than of that available to teachers (Ranns et al 2011). 
 
In 2008 there were 35 higher education institutions that could award the EYP status 
(CWDC 2008). Many of them had offered, since the early 1990s, three year honours 
degrees in early childhood. However, because students and practitioners could obtain 
their EYP status via different routes, it was difficult to understand the exact 
institutional arrangements of EYP training. In addition, funding was channelled in 
various ways: to applicants via Local Authorities and to colleges and university via 
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CWDC (CWDC 2008, Hadfield et al 2011). As with the NVQs, it was not clear who 
was responsible for monitoring and assessing the quality of training provision, a 
function outside the CWDC remit. Nevertheless, policy makers increased the funding 
of the EYP in 2007. But guidance recommending that all childcare settings were led 
by an EYP never became statutory.  
  
The creation of the EYP raised concerns about how it compared to teachers. 
Teachers were opposed to the EYP status, because of fears of being squeezed out 
(NUT 2005). Teachers were caught in a double bind: to preserve their pay and 
conditions on the one hand, and to retain control over the provision of education for 
three and four years olds in schools on the other. However schools offered nursery 
education during school hours only (approximately between 8AM and 4PM, term 
time only). Any integration between education and care required an extension of 
working hours and was therefore opposed by the teachers union.  
 
Traces of this opposition remained in the cumbersome requirements for staff to 
children ratios contained in the EYFS and in place since September 2008 (Sure Start 
2008, Appendix 2). Ratios for children under three remained unchanged: one 
member of staff for every three children under the age of two and one for every four 
children under the age of three. As for qualifications, those with supervisory roles 
were required to have a relevant qualification at level 3, while half of the remaining 
staff were to have a relevant qualification at level 2 (Sure Start 2008, Appendix 2). 
For employers there was therefore no incentive to employ an EYP. 
 
 For children aged three and four, regulation was complicated. First of all, school-
based provision required the presence of someone with a QTS (Sure Start 2008, 
Appendix 2), and therefore an EYP could not work in schools other than in the 
capacity of nursery nurse supporting the teacher. This meant that as far as nursery 
classes and nursery schools were concerned, teachers were not undercut by EYPs. 
For all other settings there were different ratios according to staff qualification and, 
more peculiarly, according to the time of the day. EYPs and QTS were considered 
equivalent and the ratio was set at one to 13. However, this ratio applied only 
between 8AM and 4PM. For other staff, the ratio was one to eight. At any time 
outside the hours of 8AM and 4PM, the ratio was one staff to eight children, 
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irrespective of staff qualification(Sure Start 2008, Appendix 2). This produced the 
oddity that an EYP was working with two different ratios: one to thirteen between 
8AM and 4PM, and one to eight otherwise. This regulation strongly reduced any 
advantage of hiring an EYP in lieu of a teacher, something that could be possibly 
relevant for Children’s Centres. In addition, it diminished the incentive to hire an 
EYP. A supposedly higher salary could be in part offset by a more favourable 
staff/children ratio. But, if this more favourable ratio could not be in place 
throughout the entire day, the advantage was somewhat weakened.  
 
Childcare workers have traditionally lacked any form of trade union representation, 
with the exception of those working in the maintained sector. The EYP had just been 
launched when the Standards for early years provision were issued in 2008. The 
CWDC was the only body strongly promoting EYPs – it supported their training and 
promoted their image and indeed the EYP was their flagship programme. But the 
CWDC was a government agency whose remit excluded issues relating to 
remuneration and working conditions (Daycare Trust and TUC 2008). In addition, its 
leverage within the Government was negligible. More generally, by the time the 
Government had started addressing the theme of the childcare workforce, the reforms 
of the childcare sector had already happened, leaving little margin for the “radical 
reforms” of the workforce promised in the Ten-year strategy (HM Treasury et al 
2004).  
 
Reforming the childcare workforce: what are the challenges? 
The previous section has set out to give an historical account of the reforms 
introduced by Labour since it took office in 1997.  It is clear that Labour’s 
commitment to the early years was unprecedented, both in terms of the money spent 
on it and the number of initiatives introduced. This wave of reforms however fell 
short of addressing squarely the issue of the workforce and failed to introduce 
significant reforms affecting the position and characteristics of those working in the 
sector. This section discusses the factors that militated against more vigorous policy 
changes.  
 
The Labour Government’s Childcare Strategy had three key policy objectives – 
increasing availability, quality and affordability. Clearly, in a context of limited 
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public resources, there is a tension between the three objectives. In particular, a 
trade-off arises between cost-containment and quality. This is nothing new, and the 
literature on elderly care points to similar policy dilemmas (for example,  Ungerson 
and Yeandle 2007).  
 
A further issue regards the way in which quality was pursued. As observed by West 
(2006) policy-makers saw regulation of early childhood services as assuring quality, 
notwithstanding the difficulties in defining quality and its elusive nature. Labour 
certainly made large use of regulation and quasi-regulation via guidance and 
established a stringent monitoring and inspection system, making the English 
childcare sector one of the most regulated in Europe. Leaving aside the much larger 
issue relating to the ubiquitous use of regulation (Power 1997) and the intricate 
question of what quality is (Tanner, Welsh, and Lewis 2006), the question arises as 
to what precisely Labour regulated.  
 
More specifically, it is useful to distinguish between types of regulation. First, there 
is regulation of the service itself. This type of regulation specifies what service 
should be provided and how. Examples are numerous: regulation about the security 
of the premises, the safety of equipment, children to staff ratios, but also regulation 
requiring staff to observe and record what children do, and to prepare a plan of 
activities.  
 
The second type of regulation refers to the workers supplying the service - who 
should it be? Examples could include vetting procedures, which include a criminal 
record check, but also, more importantly regulation about initial training and entry 
qualification. For example, in schools, only teachers can offer the early education 
entitlement. This means that the state has set a rule about who is to provide the 
service. Finally, there is regulation about the conditions of employment, which 
influences the terms under which labour is exchanged.  The national minimum wage 
is a form of regulation of this kind, but examples could include the right to a certain 
number of training days or entitlement to social benefits. 
 
Labour privileged the first type of regulation: prescribing directly and extensively 
how the service was to be delivered. By contrast, it has tried to minimise 
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interventions about who should be supplying the service and the related employment 
conditions. In relation to qualifications, the previous section has reported how the 
requirements introduced in 2000 were contested by several associations in the early 
years sector (Mercer 2000; Thomson 2000; Wiltsher 2000). In particular, those 
requirements failed to establish a minimum qualification for working in early 
childhood services. In addition, requirements were established at setting-level, and 
not always at the level of the individual worker. For example, certain settings were 
required to have half of their staff qualified at level 2. This way, regulation about 
qualifications was framed, as much as possible, as relating to the service rather than 
to the workers. In the case of childminders, no qualification requirement was 
introduced.  
 
However, regulation of the service and regulation of training and/or qualifications 
can have profoundly different implications on workers. More extensive regulation of 
practice can reduce workers’ autonomy and initiative by prescribing the way in 
which the service must be delivered. By contrast, regulation centred on qualifications 
and training shifts the focus onto the role of workers in delivering the service. From 
the perspective of a qualified worker, this type of regulation is certainly more 
empowering.  
 
Another factor that militated against more vigorous policy changes was the training 
system itself. More specifically, the lack of an organisational body in charge of 
training made it difficult to develop courses and qualifications at a more advanced 
level than the NNEB or, later on, the NVQ3 (Pugh 1998). In other industries, 
especially manufacturing ones, it is often the case that employers or professional 
bodies contribute to the organisation of training. That is the case for example of the 
Business & Technology Education Council or the City and Guilds of London. But in 
the case of childcare work, neither an association of employers nor a professional 
body actually existed.  
 
In the case of the NNEB, the Board included a number of representatives, coming 
from various government departments (Health, Education and the Home Office), 
local authorities and professional associations of those involved either in the training 
of nursery nurses (e.g. further education teachers) or working with them (e.g. 
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association of social workers) (Wright 1999).  This reflected the fact that nursery 
nurses were employed in a wide range of public services under the responsibility of 
various departments. But, with such disparate composition, the NNEB Board was a 
fragile institution, which struggled to coordinate training in a field of work which 
was never clearly delineated (Wright 1999).  
 
Since the 1990s, the concomitant disappearance of the NNEB, the expansion of 
private childcare provision and the advent of NVQs further complicated the 
organisation of training and made the need for a coordinating body more pressing. In 
particular, the introduction of NVQs required the involvement of employers, as it 
was employers who had to define the national occupational standards underpinning 
the NVQ. This meant spelling out what “competent performance” entailed at 
different levels, so that assessors could be guided in judging candidates.  
 
Yet the reality has been one of great turbulence and confusion. So, since the early 
1990s, the interests and views of employers in the early childhood service sector 
have been represented by (in turn) the Care Skills Consortium, the Early Years 
National Training Organisation and the Council for the Development of the Children 
Workforce together with the Care Skills Council.  
 
In a sector characterised by small workplaces, there is little chance of developing a 
coherent training system or even a few qualifications without an organisation which 
is well-established. It is notable that private for-profit employers many not have an 
interest in developing a training system beyond basic level of competences. Indeed, 
higher qualifications may translate into an increase in wages, with repercussions on 
employers’ costs. This makes it difficult to imagine how they could contribute in a 
substantial way to the setting up of an education and training system for the sector.  
 
Finally, it is clear that the regulatory framework and the system of training are 
interconnected and reinforce each other. It is difficult to introduce regulation setting 
qualification requirements to work in childcare if there is no training system offering 
such qualification. At the same time, low qualification requirements reinforce the 
idea that the sector does not need to develop a training system with more advanced 
qualifications. 
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Conclusions 
The chapter has examined childcare policy in the UK, paying particular attention to 
its implications for the workforce. Policy has been analysed mainly “from above”, by 
looking at policy documents. This analysis sets the context for the research findings 
of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. In particular, the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 
5 and 6 will be discussed also in relation to the policies described here. As has been 
made clear, childcare and early education provision in the UK remained complicated. 
Notwithstanding Labour’s attempts to increase the level of coherence of the system, 
in 2008 there was still a vast range of services – some offered mainly nursery 
education while others provided full-day childcare – some to be found in the 
maintained sector while others belonged in the private or voluntary ones.  
 
Pay and working conditions are likely to be influenced by these factors. It is thus 
necessary to examine this complex system of services carefully before presenting the 
empirical analysis, as the design of the empirical strategy and the interpretation of 
the results will be inevitably related to the policy context. In short, childcare 
workers’ pay is embedded in the complicated context that this chapter has sought to 
explain.  
 
However, the policy dimension is not only relevant because it provides a context for 
empirical analysis. Policy is, quite evidently, an important factor behind the low pay 
of childcare workers. That is, childcare policy is part of the explanation in regard to 
the question that this thesis has set out to answer – why are childcare workers low-
paid and to what extent do they remain so? In particular, the Chapter has drawn 
attention to two policy levers that are most likely to influence the status and the pay 
of the childcare workforce.  
 
The first is the mixed economy of childcare. The persistent mixed economy of 
childcare is likely to have direct implications for workers, for different reasons. First, 
as discussed in the previous section, a very diverse and incoherent system of 
provision makes it harder to devise policies that can improve working conditions 
across the board. Second, the mixed economy of provision partly overlaps with 
different labour markets, which vary in their levels of wages and quality of working 
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conditions. Insofar as some segments of provision, most notably the private sector, 
are characterised by poorer pay and working conditions, a commitment to the mixed 
economy of provision is problematic for workers – this point is explored in more 
detail in Chapter 5.  Thirdly, and perhaps more fundamentally, market mechanisms 
tend to allocate care services in a way that does not protects both consumers’ and 
workers’ interests (Chapter 2, Folbre 2006, Himmelweit 2005). In relation to 
consumers, allocation via the market does not guarantee both access and quality. In 
relation to workers, competition to attract consumers combined with low 
productivity results in low wages. If the market is relied upon in order to expand 
childcare services, policies are needed to avoid a low quality and low wages 
scenario. Were Labour’s policies suitable, at least on paper, to avoid poor quality and 
low labour costs? The chapter has illustrated how Labour heavily relied on regulation 
to ensure quality. Although quality of services is something important for both 
service receivers and service providers, the type of regulation adopted was tilted in 
favour of consumers and did little to protect workers’ interests. In addition, the 
chapter has illustrated how funding mechamisms fell short of creating the conditions 
for high quality services staffed by well-paid workers. Indeed, demand-side subsidies 
introduced powerful incentives for parents to shop for the best price rather than the 
best quality. Likewise, the paucity of supply-side funding discouraged providers 
from raising quality. These policies added pressure on providers to contain costs, 
with likely repercussions on workers’ wages, as Chapter 5 will document.  
 
This chapter has also pointed to a second policy lever: qualifications. It seems clear 
that as long as childcare workers hold low-level qualifications, pay conditions are 
unlikely to improve. Of course, this does not imply that higher qualifications will 
necessarily bring pay improvements. The relation between pay and qualifications is 
by no means straightforward and will be explored in detail in Chapter 7. However 
this chapter has illustrated that the politics around qualifications is complicated by 
contextual factors, like the actual availability of training. Further, cost containment 
certainly creates pressures to weaken qualifications or to minimise statutory 
requirements.   
 
Besides these two policy levers, the chapter has illustrated how several issues are 
inextricably knotted together. For example, the mixed economy of childcare has 
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made it difficult to increase qualification standards across the entire sector, while the 
low qualification requirements supported further expansion of private provision. The 
objective of the empirical analysis in the following chapters will be to analyse these 
issues in turn and to explore them in more detail. The empirical analysis will 
complement the account “from above”, given here, and will offer evidence on the 
pay and working conditions of childcare workers in the UK. The next chapter 
explains the methodology used.  
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Appendix 3 A glossary of terms  
 
Child care and childcare: child care (two words) has traditionally indicated those 
services focusing on children’s welfare and catering for the minority of children in 
foster or residential care (Baldock 2003; Alcock, Erskine, and May 2002). Childcare 
(one word) has instead been used to indicate routine day-care services for preschool 
children whose parents are at work. However, this distinction albeit not clear-cut, 
refers to the British case; other countries vary in their use of language. Labour 
Government has always used “childcare” to refer to day-care services for working 
parents.    
 
Childminders: provide care for one or more children in their own home, for all or 
part of the day. Childminding is a private arrangement, usually between the parents 
and the childminder and fees are negotiated between them.  Childminders ought to be 
registered. Since 2001, they are registered by Ofsted and receive a short training in 
first aid, health and safety upon registration (DfES 2001a).  
 
Children’s Centres have evolved from different initiatives: Sure Start Local 
Programmes, Early Excellence Centres, Neighbourhood Nursery Initiatives or from 
Nursery Schools or Local Authority Day Nurseries. As each centre has its own 
trajectory and evolution, they vary markedly in relation to their core offer and 
institutional arrangement (Lewis 2011, Lewis, Roberts and Finnegan 2011). In terms 
of what is on offer, some centres provide a large number of services. For example, 
some centres provide childcare and early education for children from nought to five, 
speech and language therapy and/or function as base for the local childminding 
network and family visiting scheme. At the other end of the spectrum, some centres 
offer only information on the services available in the area, without actually bringing 
different services under one roof. In terms of institutional arrangement, some centres 
are run directly by local authorities, while others are managed by voluntary or private 
for-profit organisations.  
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The Children’s Workforce Development Council (CWDC) was a government 
agency established in 2005 and responsible for taking forward the government 
reform plans about the children’s workforce (DfES 2005). The agency covered local 
authority workers in the children's sector, playworkers, school staff (excluding 
teachers), youth workers and youth justice workers. It was dismantled in 2012.   
 
Combined centres: emerged in the 1980s and were, in many ways, the prototype for 
Early Excellent Centres first and Children’s Centres later on. They offered integrated 
service for children from a few months old to five years, thus combining care and 
early educations. Although numerically negligible, they were influential in informing 
integrated practice. Usually they were funded by Local Authority services (Moss and 
Penn 1997; Mankis 1997).  
 
Council for Awards in Children’s Care and Education (CACHE): a qualification 
awarding organisation specialised in the care and education sector. CACHE was 
established in 1994 as a result of the merger of the National Nursery Examination 
Board (NNEB) and the Council for Early Years Awards (CEYA) (Moss and Penn 
1997; Penn and McQuail 1997; Wright 1999).  
 
Day nurseries provide childcare either full-time or part-time. The term day nursery 
allowed distinguishing them from residential nurseries (Randall 2000). Day nurseries 
cater for children under school age during the day or part of it. Local authority day 
nurseries used to cater mainly for children in need, upon referral from social services 
(Moss and Penn 1996; Van Der Eyken 1983). Under Labour, most local authority 
day nurseries have become Children’s Centres. By contrast, private day nurseries 
(also referred to as “nurseries”) charge fees and cater for children from relatively 
more affluent families in which both parents worked.  
 
Early childhood services: I use this term to refer to both care and early education 
services for children age nought to five. Other academics and commentators use the 
term rather similarly, in order to refer to the entire gamut of formal provision, from 
childminding to nursery classes.  
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Early education and childcare: from the late 1990s policy document often use this 
double term in order to indicate both the part-time free provision of nursery 
education and the subsidised care provision for younger children or for the remaining 
hours of the week which are not covered by the free entitlement (e.g. DfEE and 
DSS1998; HM Treasury et al 2004).  
 
Early education: generally indicates educational provision for three- and four-years 
old, irrespective of the type of setting. It is often used interchangeably with nursery 
education.  
 
Early years: the term was introduced in the early 1990s by different organisations 
working in the field of pre-school education and care (including residential care) 
(Pugh 1998). The choice of term indicated the intent to overcome differences within 
the sector in order to construct a common platform to advocate for better policies for 
children.  
 
Early Years Foundation Stage: name of the national “curriculum” which became 
statutory in September 2008 (Sure Start 2008). The document contains the set of 
standards that all early years providers must follow and are inspected against. The 
EYFS is not part of the school curriculum, but it must be followed in reception 
classes and nursery classes as well.  
 
Early Years National Training Organisation (NTO): national training 
organisations were industry bodies responsible for advising government on 
vocational qualifications and training. They were established by the Conservative 
Government in the early 1990s. Labour created an organisation specific to the early 
years, responsible for advising government on the reforms of the qualifications 
system specific to the early years (Pugh 1998). The body comprised several national 
charities, sector associations and CACHE. However, in 2001 all national training 
organisations were superseded by larger organisations spanning across different 
industries.  
 
Early Years Professional status (EYP): professional category created in 2006 by 
Labour Government and, more specifically, by the CWDC. It is a professional 
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category open to graduates who have GCSEs at grades A*-C in English and Maths. 
Graduates from different disciplinary backgrounds can gain the EYP status. 
However, there are different routes depending on the subjects previously studied and 
level of experience (CWDC 2008).  
 
Family centre: emerged in the 1980s, when some services for children, run either by 
local authorities or voluntary groups, started to offer services for families, thus 
involving parents. Family centres varied markedly in their core offer and their 
approach, usually depending on the individual centre history. For example, family 
centres that had previously been play-groups were often self-help groups for 
families. By contrast, centres that had evolved from day-nurseries were often funded 
and run by local authority social services (Moss and Penn 1996). Family centres can 
be viewed as precursors of Sure Start centres.  
 
A nanny is a person who cares for one or more children in the children’s home. This 
is a private arrangement between the nanny and the family employing her/him. 
Nannies can be registered by Ofsted, but registration is not compulsory (SIRC 2009).  
 
National Childminding Association: established in 1977, it supports childminders 
by offering information and advice to its members. More recently, it has collaborated 
with CACHE in order to devise a level 3 qualification for childminders, and with 
local authorities in order to set up childminding networks (Mooney et al 2001).   
 
National Nursery Examination Board (NNEB): national qualification specific to 
nursery work. It was established in 1945, but in 1994 was replaced by CACHE 
qualifications (Wright 1999).  
 
Nursery assistant: job title which refers to different jobs depending on the 
organisation. It used to be the job title of nursery nurses employed in schools, 
although this practice has changed and nowadays is more common to find job titles 
like “nursery education officer”. Besides school-based settings, nursery assistants are 
usually qualified at level 2, and have no managerial responsibility (Cameron, Owen 
and Moss, 2001).  
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Nursery class:  children aged three are admitted in nursery classes, usually attached 
to a primary school. Schools with nursery classes tend to be located in areas with 
greater economic disadvantage (Moss and Owen 1989).  
 
Nursery education: traditionally offered in schools, the term has come to refer to 
early education provision in a variety of settings.  
 
Nursery education officer: job title that refers to those employed in schools.  
 
Nursery nurse or nursery officer: job title, usually it refers to workers who do not 
require any supervision.  
 
Nursery school: stand-alone schools catering exclusively for children aged 3 to 5.  
 
Playgroups used to offer term-time sessions of 2 hours, generally to children aged 
three. Since the 1990s, playgroups have increasingly extended their provision and 
many settings have changed their name into pre-school (Lloyd et al 1989; Baldock 
2011).  
 
Pre-school Playgroup Association: national charity organisation representing 
playgroups. It changed its name into Pre-school Learning Alliance in 1995. It is the 
largest voluntary sector provider of childcare and early education. 
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Chapter 4  
Methodology and data sources 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has set out to explore the causes of low pay in childcare. The problem is 
clearly multi-layered and a variety of approaches and perspectives could be 
employed to address the issues. Drawing on different strands of the literature, 
Chapter 2 outlined an analytical framework to guide the analysis. Policy changes that 
have occurred since 1997 were presented in Chapter 3. The chapter thus set the scene 
for the empirical study. All of the empirical chapters will use data from the UK and 
part of the exercise will be devoted to examining the changes that have occurred 
since 1994.7 This chapter builds both on the analytical framework of Chapter 2 and 
on the policy context analysis of Chapter 3. The aim here is to present the specific 
“operational” research questions that the empirical analysis will address and the data 
and methods used to address them.  
 
The thesis uses mixed-methods. It combines analysis of data from two large national 
surveys – the Labour Force Survey and the Childcare and Early Years Providers’ 
Survey – with the collection and analysis of qualitative data through interviews with 
childcare workers. Because all chapters employ a mixed-strategy, it is easier to 
discuss the data sources and the data collection in this chapter and describe in more 
detail the methodology used in the data analysis as they pertain to the individual 
empirical chapters. The present chapter is therefore mainly focused on discussing the 
different data sources, while it gives only an overview of the methodological strategy 
used in the actual analysis. In particular, attention is given here to the procedures 
followed to prepare the Labour Force Survey dataset and to collect information 
through the interviews.  
 
                                                      
7 The choice of cut-off points is dictated mainly by data availability and will be discussed in more 
detail later in the chapter, where the individual data sources are presented.   
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In this discussion a critical point is the definition of childcare workers. As Chapter 3 
made clear, childcare services in the UK are not homogenous and this has led, among 
other things, to a fragmented childcare workforce. It follows that defining who 
childcare workers are is not a straightforward matter and that statistical information 
may be collected for some groups and not for others. This chapter will discuss this 
problem in detail.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the research questions 
and discusses each briefly. Subsequently, an overview of the methodology is given 
and the data sources are presented. Each source of information is then discussed 
individually in separate sections. In particular the section on the LFS examines how 
childcare workers are defined, and how the dataset was prepared. The section on the 
interviews explains in detail the sampling strategy and the interview process. Finally, 
the last section concludes by presenting some reflections on the use of mixed-
methods.  
 
The “operational”  research questions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis seeks to answer three research questions.  This 
section briefly presents how these three questions are broken down into the 
operational questions which will be investigated in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The 
specific questions will be presented again within each pertaining chapter.  
In all cases, the questions refer to the UK, but the time periods considered vary, 
depending on data availability. More details on this point will be given later in the 
chapter, where the individual data sources will be discussed.  
 
The first research question presented in Chapter 2 was:  
1. How does childcare policy influence the pay of childcare workers?  
This question has already been explored, in part, in Chapter 3, which analysed 
British childcare policy since the 1990s. However, the analysis carried out in Chapter 
3 was based on policy documents – it centred on the “policy from above”. This 
account will be complemented by an analysis of childcare workers’ pay and 
characteristics over the years 1994-2008. In particular, Chapter 5 will address the 
following subsidiary questions: 
1a. How has childcare workers’ pay changed between 1994 and 2008? 
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1b. Does childcare workers’ pay vary across different types of childcare provision? 
Further, Chapter 6 will present evidence on the characteristics of the childcare 
workforce and in particular its gender composition and its educational qualifications. 
By looking at who works in childcare, Chapter 6 will pursue two specific subsidiary 
questions: 
1c. How has the childcare workforce changed over time? 
1d. What are the specific features of the childcare workforce relative to the labour 
force as a whole? 
The questions addressed in Chapter 5 and 6 help understand whether policy reforms 
in the childcare field have been associated with changes in the pay levels and the 
characteristics of childcare workers.  
 
The second question presented in Chapter 2 was: 
2. In what way does skill recognition, or lack of it, contribute to low pay in 
childcare? 
This question will be broken down into two questions, aimed at addressing the 
problem of skills from two complementary perspectives: 
2a. Within childcare, are individual productive characteristics, and qualifications in 
particular, correlated with pay? 
2b. What are workers’ views on the skills demands of childcare? 
These questions are exploratory and attempt to illuminate the way in which the 
relationship between skills and pay is shaped by larger social, cultural and 
institutional structures. These questions will be examined more closely in Chapter 7.  
 
Finally, the last guiding question of this thesis, is: 
3. What is the relationship between pay and caring motivation? 
The question is operationalized in two ways, corresponding to two theoretical 
propositions about the interaction between pay and motivation. The first subsidiary 
question is: 
3a. Are better paid childcare workers less likely to exhibit commitment or over-
perform in their job than worse paid workers? 
The aim here is to assess the idea that lower wages can serve as a screening device, 
to select the most motivated workers. The second subsidiary question refers to a 
different theoretical proposition, namely that pay can crowd-out workers’ 
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motivations: 
3b. Are pay increases among childcare workers associated with a reduction of job 
commitment? 
These questions will be addressed in Chapter 8, where two ancillary questions will 
be also introduced.   
 
Research methods 
The thesis combines quantitative and qualitative research. In particular, survey 
research and qualitative interviews are combined, as it is not possible to rely entirely 
on one single source of data in order to answer all the research questions. That is, the 
thesis adopts a “multi-strategy research” approach (Bryman 2004, Chapter 22) so 
that findings gained through different methods can complement each other.  
 
Three sources of information are used: the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Childcare 
and Early Years Providers’ Survey (henceforth: Providers’ Survey) and 50 semi-
structured interviews, of which 42 are with childcare workers and 8 with local 
government officials, trade-union officials and national government agency officials.  
The integration of the two research methods – quantitative and qualitative – varies 
across chapters. While details of how the chapters use this combined methodological 
approach will be given in each chapter, some more general considerations can be 
presented here.  
 
The necessity of combining data from the LFS and the Providers’ Survey with data 
from the interviews arises from an interest in both childcare workers themselves and 
in their views and experiences about their job. The LFS and, to a far lesser extent, the 
Providers’ Survey, allow the tracing of some characteristics of childcare workers and 
their employment conditions, but fall short of collecting information on their views 
and opinions about their job and on their overall experience of it. In this respect the 
interviews can be seen as a convenient way of filling an information gap. Because 
some information is not elicited neither by the LFS nor the Providers’ Survey, 
interviews became necessary.  
 
Although this justification is clearly legitimate, there is a more fundamental reason 
that motivates the choice of using a small number of interviews as well as survey 
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data. The interviews serve to explore the varieties of views and experiences childcare 
workers may hold. Their purpose is not to assess the distribution of certain views or 
experiences, rather to uncover such views and experiences (Bauer and Aarts 2000).  
The interviews allow the discovering of issues that are relevant to answering the 
research questions in a variety of ways. In particular, the information elicited through 
the interviews can help with interpreting results from the survey data. That is, the 
interviews serve to facilitate interpretation (Bryman 2004). Chapter 5 and 6 use the 
interviews to this purpose. These chapters aim to present reliable evidence on the pay 
of childcare workers and on who is likely to work in childcare. As sample survey 
data are necessary to address these questions, the chapters rely mainly on the LFS. 
 
By contrast, Chapters 7 and 8 make more substantive use of the interviews. In 
Chapter 7 each research question is addressed by employing, in the main, different 
data and methods.  In Chapter 8 two theoretical propositions are tested using LFS 
data. The interviews are used to further our understanding about the results emerging 
from the LFS data. Further details of how the chapters incorporated two research 
approaches will be given in each chapter.  
 
In the next section I explore the three different sources of information individually. 
More attention will be devoted to the LFS and the interviews than to the Providers’ 
Survey, with which I start.  
 
The Childcare and Early Years Providers Survey 
The development of a Childcare Strategy by the Labour Government in 1997 was 
accompanied by the need for precise statistical information on childcare and early 
years services. However, as Chapter 3 noted, such information was not available at 
the time. Data referred to publicly provided provision only and were collected in 
different ways depending on whether provision was classified as care or education. 
In short, a survey of childcare and early years education was essential in order to 
better understand the characteristics and the patterns of usage of the whole gamut of 
services for children under five. 
 
 Various surveys were carried out between 1998 and 2003 and in 2005 a more co-
ordinated survey was launched: the Childcare and Early Years Provision. This 
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comprised two strands: the Parents’ Survey and the Providers’ Survey. Figures from 
pre-2005 surveys are not comparable with those collected later, because of 
differences in both the sampling strategy and the questionnaire.  
 
The Providers’ Survey was carried out by “BMRB. Social Research” – a private 
social research agency – and sponsored by the then Department for Children, 
Schools and Families (DCSF).8  The survey has been conducted every year since 
2005, but covers only England. Results from 2008, 2009 and 2010 were only made 
publicly available at the end of September 2011, when it was unfortunately too late 
to use them for the purpose of this thesis9. The Providers’ Survey aims to collect 
information on the number and characteristics of childcare and early years providers, 
workforce composition, qualifications and training, and business operations.  
 
Crucial to the Providers’ Survey’s sampling strategy is the definition of “childcare” 
and “early years” providers. The former encompasses all centre-based provision 
which is not based in maintained sector schools and, in addition, childminders. 
Under the label “early years”, instead, the survey samples schools – nursery schools 
and primary schools with nursery and reception classes (Nicholson et al. 2008).  
 
The Providers’ Survey is organised in a way that reflects the fragmented nature of 
childcare and early years provision. Indeed, the Survey consists of four separate 
sample surveys, one for each type/sector of provision: full day and sessional care, 
out-of-school care, childminders and early years providers. Providers are sampled on 
the basis of the Ofsted register, thus giving the same weight to very small settings 
and very large ones. Each survey is nationally representative of that specific type of 
provision, albeit in England only. So for example, the early years providers sample is 
representative of nursery schools and nursery classes. However, this means that 
combining the different surveys does not lead to a nationally representative sample 
of childcare providers, as less common forms of provision are oversampled.  
                                                      
8 The Childcare and Early Years Providers survey are Crown copyright; they have been accessed 
through the UK data archive and have been used with permission. The use of the Providers’ Survey 
data does not imply the endorsement of neither BMRB, nor DCSF (currently Department for 
Education) nor the UK Data Archive in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data.   
9 I was able to gain access to the 2007 survey a few months earlier than the public release in 2009. 
But, unfortunately and puzzlingly, I was not able to obtain early access to the 2008 sweep, despite 
offering the guarantee that results from my analysis would not be made public before the public 
release.   
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This sampling strategy poses several problems to a study focused on workers. First 
of all, the Providers’ Survey samples providers rather than workers. In the case of 
childminders, the two coincide, thus making the childminders’ sample a 
representative one. However, for centre-based provision the Providers’ Survey is not 
a nationally representative sample neither of the provision experienced by children 
nor of the childcare workers. Moreover, the Providers’ Survey does not collect 
information on all workers employed in each setting sampled. Instead, questions are 
asked only about any three workers, irrespective of the setting’’ size. This 
necessarily leads to an under-sampling of workers in large childcare settings. In 
summary, it is not possible to draw on the Providers’ Survey to obtain a 
representative sample of the childcare workforce, with the exception of childminders.  
 
Besides the problem of sampling, the Providers’ Survey is available only from 2005. 
This necessarily limits the possibility of exploring variations over time and in 
particular of assessing whether pay among childcare workers has increased or 
workers’ characteristics have changed. Finally, the information on workers’ pay is 
likely to be subject to measurement error, as the respondent from each setting is 
asked to report the wages of three workers, without the individuals being interviewed 
directly.  
 
Given these limits, the Providers’ Survey will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 only and 
with the specific objective of filling gaps in the information available through other 
sources.  
 
The Labour Force Survey 
I use the LFS as the main source of information on childcare workers’ pay and 
characteristics. LFS data are Crown Copyright; they have been made available by the 
UK Data Archive and have been used with permission. The LFS is a household 
based survey and is administered by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).10 Since 
1992 the LFS has been conducted every three months and in each quarter about 
60,000 households are sampled (which is approximately equivalent to 115,000 
                                                      
10 The use of the LFS data in this thesis does not imply the endorsement of neither the ONS nor the 
UK Data Archive in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data.  
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individuals or 0.2 percent of the population). The LFS asks respondents about their 
personal circumstances and their labour market status.  
 
The LFS has thus been chosen as it contains information on wages and its sample is 
large enough to include a sufficient number of childcare workers. The only other 
national survey that covers a similarly large number of workers is the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), which samples approximately 280,000 workers 
every year and is also administered by the ONS. The ASHE replaced the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) in 2004, and continuous data are available from 1997 
onwards. The ASHE (and the NES before) is based on a one percent sample of 
employees/jobs taken from HM Revenue and Customs PAYE records. Because 
information on wages is taken directly from employers’ payrolls, it is generally 
considered accurate and less likely to be affected by measurement error than 
information elicited directly from workers, as with the LFS. However, the greater 
precision of the NES/ASHE is partly off-set by limitations in its sample. Because the 
sample includes only those jobs registered in a PAYE scheme, many of those earning 
below the tax threshold are likely not to be registered and therefore excluded. This 
issue of limited coverage is likely to affect those in casual and low-paid jobs 
disproportionally.11  
 
Besides the problem of its limited sample, the NES/ASHE covers only a very narrow 
set of information. For example, no information about qualifications or family status 
is included. Furthermore, childminders, who are generally self-employed, are not 
sampled. Therefore the NES/ASHE was unlikely to offer a more complete picture 
than could be the case with the LFS.  
 
Although the LFS is the most comprehensive source of information on UK workers, 
it is not without limitations. I now discuss two distinct issues: the identification of 
childcare workers and the data manipulations carried out to prepare the data for the 
analysis. Problems related to the measurament of wages will be, instead, discussed in 
                                                      
11 The introduction of the NMW in 1999 has spurred a vast literature on wage measurement in the 
UK, with particular attention to the problem of accurately estimating low wages. Both the NES/ASHE 
and the LFS are generally used to calculate the number of people whose wage falls below a specific 
threshold. These problems will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, when childcare workers’ pay 
is analysed. 
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Chapter 5, where the relevant analysis is performed. Likewise, specific issues related 
to some of the variables used will be presented in the relevant chapters.  
 
Defining childcare workers 
The LFS contains rich information on workers’ characteristics and is representative 
of the British workforce. However, within the LFS it is not possible to distinguish the 
childcare sector, which is grouped together with other economic activities like social 
work and primary education. This means that the LFS, unlike the Providers’ Survey, 
does cover the childcare and early years sector as it is commonly understood in the 
British context, which encompasses provision by childminders, in different types of 
nurseries and in schools.  
 
It is possible to identify childcare workers by using information on type of 
occupation, and, more specifically, by using the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC), which classifies jobs on the basis of their content and the 
required skill level. Interviewees are asked about their job and they are assigned to a 
category from the SOC. The matching process can be thought of as one in which a 
job title is assigned to a SOC category. Indeed the coding indexes for SOC 
classifications contain more than 24,000 job titles, which are uniquely matched to the 
corresponding unit group category.  
 
The SOC was revised in 2000, so that two different classifications cover the years 
1994-2000 and 2001-2008 respectively. This creates a break in the classification and 
there is no exact correspondence between the two: job titles that were introduced in 
the SOC2000 cannot be identified before 2001 and likewise there are occupational 
categories that disappeared after 2001. One of the purposes of the SOC2000 
classification was to develop better definitions for “a wide range of jobs in what can 
loosely be termed ‘caring’ or ‘community work’ occupations” (ONS 2000). Not 
surprisingly then, some jobs related to the childcare sector have been affected by the 
changes, and this raises the question as to how to use the SOC over the 1994 to 2008 
period.  
 
There are therefore two issues when using the SOC. First, whether all the jobs in the 
childcare and early years sector can be identified. Second, whether the changes 
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between SOC 90 and SOC 2000 hamper comparisons over time. Table 4.1 reports 
the coding of occupations that are or could be related to the childcare and early years  
1Table 4.1: Childcare occupations according to SOC classifications 
SOC 90 SOC 2000 
CODE TITLE CODE TITLE 
17 
Managers and proprietors in 
service industries 
123 
Managers and proprietors in other 
service industries 
179 
Managers and proprietors in the 
service industries 
1239 
Managers and proprietors in other 
service nec 
23 Teaching professionals 231 Teaching professionals 
234 
Primary, nursery education 
teachers 
2315 
Primary and nursery education 
teaching professionals 
239 
Other teaching professionals 
nec 
2319 Teaching professionals nec 
65 
Childcare and related 
occupations 
612  
Childcare and related personal 
services 
650 Nursery nurses  6121 Nursery nurses 
651 Playgroup leaders 6122 
Childminding and related 
occupations 
659 Other childcare occupations nec 6123 Playgroup leaders/assistants 
Based on SOC 1990, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1990) and SOC 2000, ONS (2000). 
My elaboration. 
 
 
sector. Both SOC versions classify occupations in a hierarchical manner, so that 
individual occupations (unit groups) are first nested into minor groups, then into sub-
major groups and finally into major ones. Table 4.1 reports only unit groups and the 
minor group in which they are nested.  
 
The first thing to notice in the SOC classification is that there is a minor group that is 
explicitly designed to capture occupations in childcare. In the SOC 90, it is the minor 
group: “Childcare and related occupations”; in the SOC 2000 it is the similarly 
labelled one: “Childcare and related personal services”. In both cases, the group 
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includes nursery nurses, playgroup workers and childminders, albeit this latter group 
is not labelled as such by the SOC 90.12   
 
The SOC classifications thus mirror the organisation of provision and, 
unsurprisingly, divide workers roughly according to the three main types of 
provision: playgroups, centre-based provision and childminding. No distinction is 
made between workers in school-based provision and other centre-based ones. 
Indeed, in both SOC the unit group “Nursery nurse” encompasses a number of job 
roles, from nursery officer to pre-school assistant or crèche helper irrespective of the 
form of provision. Notably, however, nursery teachers are grouped together with 
other teachers, and thus they belong to the minor group “Teaching professionals”. 
Overall, then, both SOC versions appear to recognize some groups of workers 
involved in childcare and early education – nursery nurses, childminders and 
playgroup workers. In contrast, two categories stand out as missing: managers and 
teachers.  
 
Both SOC versions group nursery teachers together with primary teachers. This 
choice reflects the fact that nursery education provision occurs, in large part, in 
nursery classes attached to primary schools and that teachers often move between the 
preschool years (nursery and reception classes) and primary school years. For 
example, a primary school teacher could work with eight year olds one year and with 
three year olds in nursery class the year after. Indeed, entry-level training is almost 
identical between the two groups. Similarly to the SOC, statistics from the 
Department of Education typically combine figures on primary school teachers with 
those on nursery teachers. It is therefore not possible to separate the two groups.  
 
The second group of workers that cannot be identified on the basis of the SOC is 
managers. It was mentioned that the changes introduced by the SOC2000 also aimed 
to better capture jobs in the care sector. One example of such greater precision is 
                                                      
12 Both SOC also include “educational assistants” within the childcare minor group (not reported in 
Table 4.1). I exclude “educational assistants” from my definition because only a small percentage of 
them work with children under five and it is not possible to isolate this group from those working with 
school-age children. In addition, the number of “educational assistants” is fairly large relative to other 
childcare workers, thus their inclusion would affect the results. Machin, McNally and Ou (2010) 
include educational assistants in their analysis, and therefore their results are not comparable with 
those presented in this thesis.   
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given by the new minor group “Health and social services managers”, which 
comprises the unit group “Residential and day care managers”. Unfortunately, the 
SOC2000 does not define a specific category for children’s nursery managers. 
According to the coding index for SOC 2000, children’s nursery managers and 
owners belong to the unit group “Teaching professions not elsewhere classified” 
(ONS 2000). This is a residual category that includes jobs such as “Exam marker”, 
“Dancing school principal”, “Home tutor” and “Training establishment principal”. 
This category is too heterogeneous to be used to identify nursery managers even 
when it is combined with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 92).  
 
What are the implications of leaving out these two occupational groups? Clearly, 
these groups include the most qualified and experienced, and most likely best paid 
workers, within the childcare and early years sector. Thus their exclusion leads to a 
substantial underestimation of pay in the sector or, possibly, of the qualification 
levels. Notwithstanding this objection, it is useful to remember that numerically 
neither teachers nor managers constitute a large proportion of the childcare 
workforce.  This is not to say that they are irrelevant to the quality of the provision or 
to the structure of services.  
 
Rather, the point here is that the incidence of managers and teachers on the overall 
number of those working in childcare and early years is low. The low number of 
teachers is the result of relatively high ratios in the maintained sector, with one 
teacher to every 26 children, while the number of managers is tightly linked to the 
number of settings.13  But the omission of teachers may not be problematic for one 
additional reason. Government policy has been explicit in ruling out the employment 
of teachers in the entire childcare and early years sector. As illustrated in Chapter 3, 
policy developments around the workforce have concentrated on workers in the 
private, voluntary and independent sector. To the extent to which this thesis aims at 
commenting on changes in the workforce in light of recent policy, the absence of 
teachers from the sample is unlikely to be misleading.  
 
                                                      
13 The ratio is 1 adult to 13 children and the class is required to be ‘teacher-led’. This means that 
nursery classes are capped at 26 and staffed with one teacher and one nursery nurse. In reception 
classes the ratio is higher, with 30 children per class.   
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The case of managers is however different, at least because policy changes have 
affected them more substantially. Yet, while teachers undoubtedly constitute a 
distinct professional group with its specific training, this is not the case for managers, 
who tend to arrive at a managerial position after working in childcare (Cameron, 
Owen, and Moss 2001, 77). In this respect, it is possible to make cautious inference 
as to their profile by examining childcare workers as defined in the LFS.  
 
The second main problem when using the SOC is the discontinuity created by the 
change of classification from SOC 90 to SOC 2000. The coding of “Nursery nurses” 
has remained the same and the job description reported in both SOC guides is 
broadly similar (ONS 2000; Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 1990). More 
problematic is instead the coding of playgroup workers and childminders. In the case 
of playgroup workers, the discontinuity arises because in SOC 90 only playgroup 
leaders are uniquely identified. Other playgroup workers are classified in the residual 
category “Other childcare occupations not elsewhere classified”.  
 
Likewise, childminders are part of the same residual category. This residual unit 
group – “Other childcare occupations not elsewhere classified” – comprises, in large 
part, midday assistants, who are generally employed in schools to assist and 
supervise children during lunch time. The SOC2000, on the other hand, classifies 
midday assistants separately, within the minor occupational group “Elementary 
security occupations”. The challenge is therefore to identify playgroup assistants, 
childminders and nannies grouped within the SOC 90 unit category “Other childcare 
occupations not elsewhere classified”.   
 
For childminders I use information about employment status, and in particular on 
whether the respondent is self-employed or not. I classify as childminders only those 
who are self-employed, in line with the evidence on the organisation of 
childminding. I have checked that no other job title that was classified as “Other 
childcare occupation not elsewhere classified” is typically held by self-employed 
workers. Likewise, I use information on self-employment in order to isolate 
childminders in the SOC 2000 unit group “Childminding and related occupations”. 
This way I achieve consistency in the definition of childminding across the two SOC 
classifications.  
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Another group of workers that can be distinguished out of the SOC 90 residual group 
“Other childcare occupations not elsewhere classified” is nannies.  Nannies are 
typically employed directly by parents and work in the child’s home (SIRC 2009).  
The LFS classifies all jobs also according to the Standard Industrial Classification of 
Economic Activities (SIC 92) (ONS 2007). I combine the SIC 92 classification with 
the two SOCs, and define as nannies those belonging to the SOC 90 category “Other 
childcare occupations not elsewhere classified” or the SOC 2000 category 
“Childminding and related occupations” and whose activity is classified as “Private 
household with employed person” according to the SIC 92.  
 
The identification of playgroup assistants in the years before 2001 is more 
complicated. The difficulty arises from the fact that it is hard to distinguish 
playgroup assistants from midday assistants, as playgroup assistants could be 
working in schools where midday assistants are also employed. The only difference 
is that playgroup workers – whether leaders or assistants – straddle two groups of 
economic activities: “Education services” and “Social work activities without 
accommodation”.  To avoid including midday assistants, I use a restrictive definition 
of playgroup workers, defining them as those who are classified, according to SIC 
92, under the sub-class “Social work activities without accommodation”. This 
decision is also motivated by the fact that playgroup workers in educational services 
are likely to offer out-of-school care (and thus for school-age children).14 Insofar as I 
am concerned with services for pre-schoolers, the decision to limit the analysis to 
playgroup workers outside schools appears more coherent.  
 
Overall then, I am able to define childcare workers in a way that is consistent over 
time and overcomes the break in the SOC classification. The empirical analysis 
based on the LFS defines childcare workers in the following groups: 
 Nursery nurses and assistants 
 Playgroup workers (leaders and assistants) 
 Childminders 
 Nannies 
                                                      
14 As a result, if in recent years playgroup workers have been increasingly employed in educational 
services, this trend would not be captured by the empirical analysis presented in this thesis.   
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As will be illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the analysis will not distinguish between 
these groups, because the small sample size does not allow for such disaggregation. 
However, it is important to point out from the beginning that the LFS does not 
collect information about pay from respondents who are self-employed. This means 
that most of the analysis carried out in the empirical chapters will exclude 
childminders.  
 
Preparing the data 
The LFS, as noted above, is a quarterly survey conducted by the ONS. The ONS 
releases different original datasets on the basis of this survey. This thesis draws on 
two LFS versions: the standard quarterly LFS and the longitudinal 5 quarters LFS. I 
will now spend significant time explaining the data-management work done on the 
standard quarterly LFS. The longitudinal version is less problematic and is only 
explained briefly at the end. For ease of reading, the term ‘LFS’ will indicate the 
standard quarterly datasets.  
 
I use LFS data from 1994 to 2008. The choice of the time period is dictated by 
different criteria and constraints. The quarterly LFS is available from 1992. But the 
coding of industrial and economic activities (SIC 92) that I use to define some 
groups of childcare workers and that I also need in part of the analysis is available 
only from 1994. Thus 1994 is chosen as the starting point of the analysis. This allows 
an examination of the childcare workforce’s pay and composition before the 
development of Labour’s Childcare Strategy.  
 
On the other hand, 2008 was chosen because it is the most recent year largely 
unaffected by the financial crisis and the subsequent recession. From the perspective 
of labour market analysis, the period between 1994 and 2008 is fairly homogenous, 
without any sudden peak in unemployment or drop in Gross Domestic Product. 
Perhaps more crucially, a large part of the analysis was carried out before 2010, 
when data from all 2009 quarters had not yet been released.   
 
The LFS is released every three months, so that the original datasets refer to a 
specific quarter in a year. Although the LFS is largely used for cross-sectional 
analysis, it contains a rotating panel. Each household is interviewed for five 
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consecutive quarters and then dropped from the sample. This way, in each quarter, 
one fifth of the sample is interviewed for the first time, one fifth for the second time 
and so on. Importantly, information on pay was elicited only on the last interview 
and, since 1997, on both the first and last interviews. Therefore, in each quarter, only 
two fifths of the sample would have pay information or only one fifth before 1997. In 
order to increase the sample size, I pool quarterly data and include respondents only 
from one wave. This way I avoid including the same respondents more than once. 
 
 I construct two datasets: one containing only respondents from the first wave and 
one including only respondents from the fifth wave. Sample size is generally slightly 
larger at the first wave, because of attrition. In other words, not all the households 
interviewed the first time will be reached for five consecutive quarters. The first 
wave is therefore preferable, as it allows greater precision in the estimates. However, 
because no wage information was collected on the first interview before 1997, it is 
not possible to analyse pay before 1997 when using the first wave sample. 
Throughout the thesis I use mainly the fifth wave sample, on which the analysis of 
pay can be performed from 1994 onwards. However, in Chapter 6, which is not 
concerned with pay, data from the first wave sample will be used. Robustness checks 
have been carried out to ensure that the choice of the sample did not affect the 
results.  
 
Pooling data from various quarters and limiting the sample to respondents from a 
specific wave precludes using the statistical weights constructed by the ONS and 
available in each quarterly dataset. The weights are calculated with the dual aim of 
producing population estimates and of compensating for differential non-response 
rates among different sub groups in the population. However, the weights are derived 
so as to reflect the population at that precise point in time. For example, weights 
contained in the LFS 2007 January-March quarter are calculated on the basis of 
population projections relative to that specific time-period and aim at accurately 
calibrating the entire quarter sample. If only a portion of observations from each 
quarter is used, there is no meaningful way of using the weights provided. Thus, 
throughout the thesis, I rely on the standard deviation of the variables used in order 
to judge the reliability of the estimates presented.  
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Besides the discontinuity in the SOC classification, several changes have affected the 
LFS between 1994 and 2008. An important change was the switch from seasonal 
quarters to calendar quarters. Until 2005, the LFS was conducted on a “seasonal” 
basis, so that the first quarter of year – the “spring” quarter – covered the months 
March to May and the last quarter, the “winter” quarter ran from December to 
February of the subsequent year. Since 2006 however the LFS has used “calendar” 
quarters, so that the first quarter of each year is now January-March, and the last 
quarter is October-December.  
 
The ONS released a series of historical LFS on a calendar-quarter basis. I use this 
series, as it avoids overlap between the years 2005 and 2006. However, this historical 
series was not as complete as the original ones. In particular, information from those 
questions that varied from quarter to quarter was often not available. For this reason, 
I have also constructed ‘ancillary’ datasets based on the original ‘seasonal quarters’ 
survey to retrieve information which was asked only in a specific quarter. For 
example, respondents were asked about union membership only in autumn quarters 
or, since 2006, in the October-December quarters. In cases like this, I pool data from 
the quarter of interest from different years, irrespective of whether the quarter is 
calendar or seasonal. 
 
The pooling of a total of sixty quarterly datasets made extensive recoding essential to 
ensure the highest possible degree of homogeneity.  Several variables changed 
definition and/or coding over the years. For example, the response categories of the 
question on the ‘highest qualification held’ were changed four times as to reflect 
changes in the qualifications available. The statistical software STATA was used for 
data manipulations and these data management tasks were recorded and stored in do-
files to facilitate tracking and replication.   
 
Finally, the five quarters longitudinal datasets were also used for a specific piece of 
analysis, which is presented in Chapter 8. In theory, one should be able to link the 
quarterly datasets to construct a longitudinal dataset following respondents for five 
consecutive quarters. That is, first respondents in quarter should be easily linked to 
the second wave respondents in the subsequent quarter. In practice, this is not the 
case as the linking process is cumbersome and often ineffective, with only a small 
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portion of the sample consistently matched across the quarters.15 The ONS releases a 
‘clean’ longitudinal series, which contains less than one fifth of the quarterly sample 
but is consistent across quarters. I pool these short panels to build a sufficiently large 
dataset and the resulting dataset spans from 1997 to 2008.   More details on the 
resulting structure of the dataset will be given in Chapter 8.  
 
The interviews 
Besides the Providers’ Survey and the LFS, the thesis relies also on material gathered 
through semi-structured interviews with workers in the early years and childcare 
sector. The interviews aimed to capture workers’ experience in the sector, their views 
on the skills demands of the job and their commitment to their work.   
 
Due consideration was given to the School research ethics policy and the plan to 
carry out interviews with workers was reviewed by the Ethics Research Committee. 
Although the interviews did not entail any direct contact with children, I obtained 
clearance through a Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check. This was done as a 
measure to protect managers and childminders against possible risks deriving from 
my accessing the settings or their homes. All interviewees were given a presentation 
letter, which clearly stated the purpose of the research and guaranteed confidentiality 
and anonymity. In the following subsections I examine the selection strategy pursued 
and the procedures followed when interviewing.  
 
The selection strategy 
Forty-two workers were selected and interviewed between June and October 2009. 
The selection of interviewees was guided by the desire to recruit a very mixed group 
of workers, who either work in their own homes or are employed in a variety of 
settings. The forty-two workers are, of course, in no sense random or representative 
of the population of those working with children under five. Instead, the processes 
underpinning the selection of interviewees can be best understood as “corpus 
construction” (Bauer and Aarts 2000). This is defined as a purposeful selection of 
units of analysis aimed at maximising the variety of an unknown phenomenon 
(Bauer and Aarts 2000, 33).  
                                                      
15 I am grateful to Tania Burchardt who advised me on this problem.  
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Here the object was to discover childcare workers’ views and experiences of their 
job. Because workers from different types of settings or forms of provision may hold 
different views, I wanted to include interviewees from the whole range of formal 
childcare provision. However, the study is not concerned with making comparisons 
between groups of workers belonging to different types of settings. Such an objective 
would have required a larger sample and greater attention to the classification of the 
type of providers and forms of provisions.  Forty-two interviews were instead 
sufficient to reach ‘saturation’ – the point at which views and experiences became 
recurrent, so that variety was not increased any further.   
 
Out of the forty-two workers interviewed, four were childminders, while the 
remaining thirty-eight were employed in a number of different settings. The settings 
were selected so as to arrive at a group that reflected the diversity of provision that 
characterises childcare services in the UK. Several types of centre-based provision 
were included (Table 4.2). The list of settings visited comprised three children’s 
centres, one of which was a school. In addition, a primary school with nursery 
classes attached was also included. As for day-care nurseries, a number of settings 
were chosen: a day nursery owned by a chain, a private independent nursery where 
the owner was also managing the setting, a private nursery with a clear split between 
ownership and management and a workplace nursery attached to the local hospital. 
Finally, a playgroup and a nursery each run by an independent voluntary committee 
were included. 
 
Given that variation was pursued along the double dimension of type of provision 
and characteristics of providers, all interviewees were recruited in the same local 
authority. Local authorities differ from one another mainly because they are 
characterised by different levels of provision and by a different composition of 
provision. That is, some local authorities have very few maintained nursery schools 
or nursery classes, but have a high number of playgroups and private day care 
nurseries. In contrast, some other local authorities are characterised by a high number 
of nursery classes, community non-profit nurseries and relatively fewer playgroups  
or private day-nurseries. Thus, it was necessary to choose a local authority where the 
entire spectrum of provision was represented.  
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2Table 4.2: Selected settings and their characteristics 
SETTING CHARACTERISTICS 
NUMBER OF 
INTERVIEWS 
Children’s centre 1 Medium size, public 
(managed by the local authority) 
2 
Children’s centre 2 Large size, public 
(managed by the local authority) 
7 
Children’s centre 3 Nursery school 3 
Nursery and reception 
classes 
Primary school 3 
Day nursery 1 Medium size, private sector 
(owned by a large chain) 
1 
Day nursery 2 Small size, private sector 
(owner also manager) 
4 
Day nursery 3 Medium size, private sector 
(owner not in situ) 
4 
Day nursery 4 Workplace nursery, public sector 5 
Day nursery 5 Medium size, voluntary sector 
(run by a voluntary committee) 
4 
Playgroup Small size 
(run by voluntary committee) 
4 
 
 
 
This was indeed the main criterion followed to select the local authority for the 
study. In order to have an overview of the level and the composition of provision in 
English local authorities, I used 2008 data from Ofsted and DCSF. Ofsted data report  
the number of registered providers and places by local authority. On the other hand, 
DCSF data report the number of children receiving the early years entitlement by 
local authority.  
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Using this information, I constructed a small dataset containing three variables for all 
English local authorities: the number of Ofsted registered childcare and early years 
places, the number of Ofsted-registered providers, the number of places in the 
maintained sector. For each measure, local authorities were then ranked on the basis 
of the distribution of each of the three variables. These rankings suggested where 
there was ‘more’ provision, where there were a relatively high number of providers, 
and where there was a high number of places in the maintained sector. The local 
authority I have chosen for the study was among those that were in the top third of 
the distribution of all three rankings. This ensured that the selected local authority 
would have a large number of providers to sample from and, possibly, a high number 
of schools with nursery classes. In addition, I used data on the quality of local 
authorities’ children’s services to check that the local authority chosen was not an 
outlier.  
 
Any local authority chosen for a research study is bound to have some specific 
characteristics. Given that the presence of maintained nursery education was a 
criterion for selection, it is not surprising that the local authority where the study was 
conducted was an urban one. Again, no claim is made here that the local authority 
chosen is representative of the country or of the childcare and early years sector. The 
process underpinning the selection was simply aimed at guaranteeing that the final 
choice was suitable for recruiting workers from different settings. The local authority 
had to have a sufficiently high number of providers and a sufficiently diverse mix.  
 
Once the local authority was chosen, I arranged to interview the local officers 
responsible for childcare and early years. Three managers responsible for different 
sections of provision – children’s centres, childminding and early years in the non-
maintained sector – were interviewed. These interviews aimed at understanding what 
support was made available to providers, either directly through funding or, for 
example, by making training or specific material available.  
 
In addition, publicly available official documents on the state of childcare were 
examined. These could range widely. A particularly valuable document was the 
‘Childcare sufficiency assessment’, an evaluation of provision that all local 
authorities were required to carry out and report on. This report contained detailed 
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information about the distribution of services within the local authority and the 
resulting policy priorities. In addition, I collected information material aimed at 
parents, which explained the range of options available to them with regards to 
childcare. These could be short leaflets or the complete list of childcare providers 
and childminders in the local authority. The list of all providers was crucial, as my 
sample was based on it.16   
 
The settings were contacted in a variety of ways. I obtained the contact details of 
providers through the list compiled by the local authority and, with a few exceptions, 
I cold-called them and arranged for an appointment. This method was employed with 
both schools and non-maintained sector settings, but not with childminders. While all 
non-maintained settings contacted agreed to participate in the study, it proved more 
difficult to establish contact with schools. Three settings – the one school in the 
sample and two nurseries – were approached through the intermediation of people 
who were or had been involved in the settings (not necessarily as workers) and 
whom I was able to contact.  As for childminders, three of them were recruited by 
visiting a children’s centre that held morning drop-in sessions for local minders. The 
other childminder was instead contacted through an interviewee from a nursery – a 
snowball approach.  
 
With the exception of two settings, only a few workers per setting were interviewed. 
The ways individual workers were selected within each setting varied.  In some cases 
it depended essentially on who was there and willing to take part. In others, 
managers selected the workers. This clearly introduced a further bias as managers 
seemed to select the workers who, in their view, were less likely to be disgruntled or 
despondent. In one case (a nursery owned by a large chain) the manager did not 
consent to my interviewing the workers.  
 
Workers with leadership and management positions were also interviewed. This 
group of workers was crucial to an understanding of pay systems, hiring practices 
and the overall organisation of the nursery. Besides, it was expected that those in 
charge of the settings would have had previous experience in the sector working  
                                                      
16 This implied that un-registered childminders and nannies were not included.  
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3Table 4.3: Number of interviews by job titles 
JOB TITLE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS
Manager, head, leader and deputy 11 
Teacher 3 
Nursery nurse, nursery officer, nursery education officer, 
room leader 
15 
Nursery assistant 8 
Childminder (includes coordinator) 5 
Note: An Early Years Coordinator in a primary school is counted as “teacher”, whereas a teacher who is head of a 
Children’s Centre is included among “Managers, heads etc”. Among “childminder” is also included the network 
coordinator. 
 
directly with children. Their views and experience therefore could complement and 
enrich those of other workers without managerial responsibilities.  In the case of 
childminders, a local network coordinator who was in charge of organising drop-in 
sessions for childminders and children was also interviewed.  
 
The resulting group of interviewees was very diverse, as it consisted of workers with 
various positions and qualifications. Two points are worth highlighting here. First, I 
also selected teachers without managerial responsibilities. As the number of settings 
visited encompassed two schools, teachers working directly with children and 
responsible for a class were also interviewed. Second, each organisation had its own 
classification of jobs and its own hierarchy. That means that similar job posts were 
given different titles across settings and could have slight different content 
depending on location.  
 
Differences were particularly noticeable among leadership and management 
positions. In nurseries, the person responsible was usually referred to as ‘manager’. 
The playgroup visited had a ‘leader’. Children’s centres were more in line with 
schools’ nomenclature and defined the top position as ‘head’. However, in contrast to 
schools, this position was not necessarily held by a teacher. In the school included in 
the sample, I interviewed the ‘early years coordinator’ who, as is always the case, 
was the teacher responsible for the foundation stage – nursery and reception classes.  
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To a lesser extent, there were differences in the job titles for middle- and low-level 
positions. For example, the title ‘nursery nurse’ was not used by all settings. 
Variations included ‘senior nursery officer’, ‘nursery nurse’ and ‘nursery education 
officer’. Sometimes, an indication of the qualification or of a specific job 
responsibility was included in the job title. This was the case with ‘room leaders’, the 
person responsible for coordinating the nursery practice for a specific age group – 
babies, toddlers, and pre-schoolers. Finally, the playgroup followed a different 
convention, whereby all workers were referred to as assistants.  
Table 4.3 reports the number of interviewees for each group of job categories.  
 
As for the demographic characteristics of respondents, the most unifying aspect was 
certainly gender. All but two interviewees were women. The two men worked as 
nursery assistant and nursery nurse in two different settings. Age, on the other hand, 
varied. The youngest workers were in their early twenties, while among the oldest 
ones was a 61-year-old woman. A large proportion, thirteen, did not have or had not 
had children. Finally, a considerable number of respondents appeared to have a 
Black or Ethnic Minority background and this was not surprising given that the study 
took place in an urban area. However, it should be noted that no specific question 
was asked about respondents’ ethnicity and this information was only noted down as 
part of the interview annotations made after the interview.  
 
The interviewing process  
The interviews were carried out by myself in person at the setting or at childminders’ 
homes. All interviews were one-to-one, but in one case two childminders preferred to 
be interviewed together. Usually, respondents were interviewed during working 
hours, but in four cases I interviewed workers in their free time, whether during a 
lunch break or at the end of the working day.  
 
Clearly, it would have been much more difficult to interview workers outside 
working hours. The greater accessibility was traded-off with the freedom of selecting 
workers myself rather than relying on the manager of the setting. It should be noted 
that I visited settings more than once in all cases with the exception of two settings. 
After the first time, once I had somehow become a known face, it was easier to 
approach workers directly without the intermediation of the manager. In the case of 
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childminders the trade-off was slightly different: clearly, conducting the interviews 
during their working hours was more convenient, but it entailed my visiting their 
homes.17 But some minders refused to be interviewed precisely because they did not 
want to have a stranger in their home.  
 
Not all interviews were recorded: three workers from three different settings 
preferred not to be taped, while three childminders decided against recording because 
the children were in the room and their voices could have been captured as well. 
Another interview was not recorded because of the recorder malfunctioning. In these 
cases, extensive notes were taken instead. An outside contractor was hired to 
transcribe the recorded interviews. Transcripts and notes were then analysed 
manually.  
 
The interviews were semi-structured. Two interview schedules were prepared: one 
for interviewing those with managerial positions and one for all other workers. 
Starting with the latter group, the schedule contained three topic areas. The first was 
aimed at eliciting information about the respondent’s trajectory into childcare and 
their current position. The second topic area was about the demands of childcare 
work and qualifications. Finally, the schedule contained a series of questions about 
respondent’s views and future plans in regard to working in childcare as opposed to 
working in other jobs. The schedule for managers was different in that it contained a 
section about the setting itself: its institutional structure, the organisation of provision 
and of the staff. This set of questions were generally asked at the beginning.18  
 
The interviews varied in duration from over two hours with one manager to 45 
minutes with one front-line worker. Questions common to all interviews were 
formulated identically or very similarly, in order to ensure consistency. But, clearly, 
the interviews were flexible enough to leave ample space for different follow-up 
questions, prompts and clarification questions depending on the issues raised by the 
respondent.  
                                                      
17 It was not possible to conduct the interviews at the drop-in centre because minders would have not 
been able to leave the room, given that children required supervision. At the same time, interviewing 
one minder while other minders and the network coordinator were present would not have ensured 
privacy.  
18 In the first two interviews with managers, questions about the setting were left at the end. However, 
it became clear that ‘the setting’ was a sort of natural starting point, and the order was changed.  
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Some thematic areas required familiarity with childcare work, which had to be 
developed in the run-up to the interviews. The importance of such specific 
knowledge became apparent in Summer 2008 during a pilot interview with a nursery 
school teacher. At the time I was not thoroughly conversant with the issues regarding 
educational qualifications in the sector or about the details of government regulation.   
 
Two sets of actions were taken in order to become more familiar with these topics 
and, more generally, with some aspects of working in childcare. First, I began to read 
the leading magazine in the sector, Nursery World. This was especially helpful for 
the preparation of the interviews because it contained several sections reporting 
workers’ perspectives and stories, and made me more attuned to work practices in 
nurseries.  
 
Second, five expert interviews were carried out with government officials and 
stakeholders. More precisely, I interviewed: two trade union officials responsible, in 
their respective union, for the early years area; two officials from the Childcare 
Workforce Development Council (CDWC) – a government agency – and, finally, an 
official from a national charity in the childcare sector. This small group of interviews 
were used to sharpen my understanding of some government policies and their 
implications for the practice of work in nurseries. Thus, they were essentially used to 
facilitate the interpretation of the policy context in which childcare workers operate.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to do three things: present the research questions, introduce 
the overall methodological strategy, and explain in detail how data were gathered 
and prepared for the analysis. Relatively more space has been given to the latter 
point, because the research questions and the methodology will be discussed in more 
detail in the pertaining chapters.  
 
Now that the data sources have been explained at length, it is possible to draw 
attention to how they fit together. Two points are important here. This thesis is 
interested in assessing changes over time. Question 1 and 2 are indeed also about 
changes in the pay and the characteristics of childcare workers since 1994. However 
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only the LFS allows the systematic exploration of this point. In fact, the different 
data sources cover different periods. In particular, the interviews were conducted in 
summer 2009, while data from the LFS and the Providers’ Survey are from 1994 to 
2008 and 2005-2007 respectively. This means that the information elicited in the 
interviews cannot always be used to comment on findings from the quantitative 
analysis, as the two refer to different periods.  
 
The second point refers to the question of how childcare workers are defined. This 
thesis is interested in the childcare workforce defined as encompassing different 
forms of provision: childminders, workers employed in playgroups, day-care 
nurseries or  nursery and reception classes. This definition straddles long-standing 
divisions between forms of provision – a point that was discussed in Chapter 3.  But 
it is evident that there is no source of statistical information on childcare workers 
which uses my same definition.  
 
Within the LFS it is not possible to identify managers or teachers. Likewise, the 
Providers’ Survey has disadvantages because it does not sample workers, but 
providers. Through the interviews, on the other hand, it was possible to reach 
workers from different types of settings and also to recruit childminders. The 
interview selection strategy was indeed purposive (rather than statistical) and aimed 
at including the whole range of formal provision. Thus, once again, there is a 
discrepancy between the coverage in the interviews and that achieved through the 
LFS.  
 
This last point is related to a wider issue, which will come up again throughout this 
study. By using secondary data one is bound to rely on categories formulated by 
other researchers. The principles underpinning the Standard Classification of 
Occupations (SOC) are certainly different from the ones used here to identify 
childcare workers. For example, both SOC versions group nursery teachers together 
with primary teachers, rather than with nursery nurses. Thus, it is possible to see 
another reason why the interviews are a crucial component of this study. They 
complement the analysis of LFS data with the use of a categorisation of childcare 
work that is closer to the purpose of this study. 
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Appendix 4  List of interviews 
Name Interview date 
Job title 
Amanda 2/07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Amelia 2 /07/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Angela 21 /07/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Ann 29 /09/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Ashia 6 /07/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Beth 3 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Brooke 2 /10/ 2009 Childminder 
Carol 6 /07/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Cath 2 /07/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Christine 28 /09/ 2009 Childminder 
Claire 30 /09/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Deborah 1 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Dianne 13 /07/ 2009 Teacher 
Donna 29 /07/ 2009  Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Harriet 29 /09/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Hazel 7 /07/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Heidi 28 /09/ 2009 Childminder 
Janet 25 /09/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Janine 29 /09/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Jenny 2/09/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Jessica 24 /09/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Leanne 29 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Lizzie 2 /09/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Lorraine  1 /07/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Maral 4 /06/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Marcia 30 /09/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Mary 23 /09/ 2009 Teacher 
Michelle 25 /09/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Nikki 28 /07/ 2008      Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Nina 3/08/ 2009 Childminder 
Pam 21 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Rachel 4 /08/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Rose 11 /06/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Sam 15 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Sandra 24 /09/ 2009 Teacher 
Shadia 16 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Steven 29 /07/ 2009 Nursery nurse or officer, nursery education officer, room leader 
Susan 30 /09/ 2009 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Tasha 27 /07/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Terrence  24 /08/ 2009 Nursery assistant 
Tessa 28 /07/ 2008 Manager, head, leader and deputy 
Thelma 4 /10 /09/ Childminder 
Note: Excludes support interviews with national government, local government and trade union officials, which 
are not reported in the text. All names have been changed in order to ensure anonymity.  
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Chapter 5  
Pay in childcare: wage levels, trends and variations 
 
Introduction 
One of the fundamental premises of this thesis is that pay in childcare is low. The 
analysis presented in this chapter explores this assumption and offers a detailed 
account of wage levels, their trend over time and the pay-setting arrangements that 
underpin them.  
 
As Chapter 2 discussed, wages serve different purposes and are the outcome of 
various social, institutional and economic forces. In particular, a wage can be 
understood as having three functions:  to provide a living, to serve as a price to 
allocate labour, and to motivate workers (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007; Rubery 
1997). The concept of a wage as “a living” is based on the premise that wages must 
be sufficient to guarantee an adequate level of support. In contrast, the understanding 
of a wage as a price focuses on the value of the worker’s contribution to production.  
Finally, when the wage is seen as a tool to enhance workers’ motivation and effort, 
attention is on the precise structure of wages and their make-up in order to 
distinguish between, for example, basic pay and premiums.  
 
Although the three views do not exclude the other, analytical approaches tend to 
concentrate only on one aspect, and to measure wages accordingly. Within the social 
policy literature on low pay, wages are interpreted as a living or, more importantly, 
as one source of income. Often, the objective of this stream of scholarship is to 
uncover the relationship between low wages and poverty (Millar and Gardiner 2004; 
McKnight 2002). Therefore, the emphasis tends to be on earnings over a specific 
time period, usually the week or the year.  On the other hand, when wages are seen 
as prices, the attention is on the productive characteristics of workers and, to a much 
lesser extent, on the features of their jobs. Within this approach, the interest lies in 
the relation between workers’ and jobs’ features and pay. Consequently, pay is 
usually measured as hourly wage to net out differences in the number of hours 
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worked. Finally, when interest lies in the incentive function of wages, it becomes 
paramount to take into account the precise design of payments and to measure basic 
pay alongside additional payments, like bonuses or premiums. Thus, the objective is 
to measure the entire pay package.   
 
Throughout this study, the focus will be on wage “as a price”. Indeed, the analysis 
concentrates on exploring the direct relationship between pay and workers’ and jobs’ 
characteristics. Thus, no attempt will be made to calculate childcare workers’ income 
or assess the extent to which they may be poor or financially dependent. Likewise, it 
is impossible, for reasons that will become clear in this chapter, to examine 
systematically childcare workers’ pay package. Therefore, the measure of wage used 
in this study is hourly wage. This is not to say that the other functions of the wage 
will be ignored. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, workers give importance to their 
ability to earn a living and are affected by the employment contract as a whole. 
Rather, the point is that a direct analysis of childcare workers’ income and their 
detailed employment contract is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter seeks to answer two distinct, albeit related, sets 
of questions. First, I am interested in exploring how much childcare workers are paid 
and whether their wages have increased over time. Chapter 3 discussed the policy 
changes that have occurred since 1997 – the expansion of childcare provision, the 
rise in the level of public funding available and the introduction of new regulations. 
Given such a picture, we expect childcare workers’ wages to have increased. At the 
most immediate level, an expansion of services could lead to an increase in labour 
demand and this, in turn, could drive up wages.  
 
Furthermore, the increase in government subsidies for childcare could contribute to 
wages’ growth, depending on the elasticity of childcare workers’ labour supply (Blau 
1993). Finally, we could would expect new regulations to have a positive impact on 
wages, insofar as regulation could have restricted the labour supply and could have 
made the job more demanding. In short, there are good reasons to expect a positive 
trend in the wages of childcare workers and the first step of the analysis will be 
devoted precisely to testing this point. It should be made clear, however, that the 
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analysis will be descriptive, in the sense that no claim will be made about possible 
causal relationships between recent policy reforms and wages.   
 
One of the main messages of Chapter 3 was that in the UK childcare services are 
fragmented along several lines, with providers belonging to both the public and 
private sector, offering education as well as childcare services, catering for different 
age groups, and on a different time basis, with some settings operating full-time and 
others only part-time. The second part of the analysis presented in this chapter draws 
explicitly on this overall picture and seeks to understand whether pay varies across 
different types of providers.  
 
This part of the analysis will give prominence to the institutional dimension of the 
problem of pay. The simple exercise of mapping pay levels onto the different types 
of services helps in framing the analysis of pay in relation to the overall architecture 
of childcare services provision. Are workers in the public sector paid more than those 
in the private one? Is there a systematic difference in the pay of those working in 
services classified as ‘care’ as opposed to ‘education’? These questions help bring 
the structure of provision to the fore of the analysis. It is fairly obvious that the 
position of childcare workers heavily depends on the way childcare services are 
organised, financed and regulated, because these factors tend to determine who the 
carers are, the kind of care provided, and the circumstances under which it occurs. 
Nevertheless, conventional analyses of pay tend to overlook the context in which the 
labour exchange occurs and focus predominantly on workers’ individual 
characteristics. By linking pay to type of provision, the chapter seeks to draw 
attention to some of the institutional mechanisms that contribute to low wage levels 
in childcare.  
 
The chapter is organised in the following way. The next section introduces the data 
used and discusses how wages are measured. Section 3 presents evidence on pay 
levels and their trend between 1994 and 2008. Section 4 explores how differences in 
the way services are organised interlock with differences in pay. Finally, section 5 
discusses the results and concludes.  
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Data and methods 
The analysis combines information from two national surveys – the LFS and the 
Providers’ Survey – and from the interviews carried out in one Local Authority. All 
three sources of information have been described in more detail in the previous 
chapter. This section aims at discussing how the different datasets and the interviews 
are used in the chapter and some of the specific problems related to the measuring of 
pay.  
 
The bulk of the analysis draws on the LFS data. The LFS is structured as a rotating 
quarterly panel: each sampled household is surveyed for five consecutive quarters, so 
that in each quarter one fifth of the sample will be interviewed for the first time, one 
fifth for the second time and so on. I use all quarters of the years 1994-2008, but 
limit the analysis to the fifth wave respondents, because, between 1994 and 1997, 
questions on pay were asked only at the last interview. The LFS has two main limits 
for the analysis carried out here: first, it contains a measure of wage that can be 
considered imprecise; second, it does not cover childminders.   
 
The LFS asks all respondents classified as employees about their gross earnings. A 
“weekly gross earnings” variable is then constructed on the basis of their answers, 
harmonising answers referring to different time spans. In addition, the LFS asks 
respondents how many hours a week they work, and differentiates between usual and 
overtime hours. An “hourly wage” variable is conventionally constructed by dividing 
“weekly gross earnings” by the number of usual hours worked. I follow this 
procedure and throughout the chapter wages will always refer to hourly wages. 
Following ONS guidelines and usual practice, observations with wages below £1 are 
dropped. 
 
It is well-known that the LFS measures of earnings and hours are subject to error. 
The problem has been discussed and analysed at length in relation to the introduction 
of the NMW in 1999 (e.g. Manning and Dickens 2002; Robinson 2002). Clearly, an 
accurate and reliable measure of wages at the bottom of the earning distribution is 
crucial for deciding the appropriate level of the NMW. Because childcare workers 
tend to be among the low-paid – as this chapter will illustrate – the measurement 
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errors contained in the LFS hourly wage data could affect estimates of childcare 
workers’ wages.  
 
Manning and Dickens (2002) thoroughly explain the various sources of measurement 
error and possible remedies. Not all of them are relevant to childcare workers; for 
example, errors arising because the respondent includes bonuses in the reported 
earnings are implausible in the case of childcare workers. Likewise, the inclusion of 
paid overtime is unlikely, because as this chapter will illustrate, childcare workers’ 
pay is usually basic pay. There remain however two sources of inaccuracy: 
miscoding and proxy respondents. The former is rare and, as mentioned above, is 
addressed by dropping observations with wages below £1. The issue of proxy 
respondents is potentially more serious, as around 23 percent of the responses on 
childcare workers’ wages are from someone other than the person they refer to. 
Proxy responses are likely to be less accurate. Moreover, hourly pay information 
obtained by proxy respondents is systematically lower than the rest of the sample 
(Robinson, 2002). The appendix at the end of the chapter reproduces most of the 
analyses presented but discards proxy responses (Appendix 5.1). The pattern of the 
results does not change.  
   
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is no satisfactory solution to this problem because 
datasets with more reliable wage information have traditionally left out workers 
whose earnings fall below the National Insurance contributions threshold. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, wage measures contained in the LFS appear 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this study. Indeed, they are in line with the 
data from the Childcare and Early Years Providers’ Survey (hereafter: Providers’ 
Survey), which, albeit less accurate, can serve as a benchmark. Finally, much of this 
chapter’s interest lies in assessing the relative pay of childcare workers. Pay in 
childcare is either examined overtime or relative to the entire British labour force. 
Insofar as measurement problems are not limited to the specific case of the childcare 
workforce or to some years, they should not affect the analysis.  
 
The second problem of the LFS is that it does not contain income information for 
childminders, because they are self-employed. I partly overcome this problem by 
using information from the Providers’ Survey . Data refer to only the years 2005-
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2007 thus hampering analysis over time. Nevertheless, this data allows us to 
understand whether childminders have roughly similar wages to those of workers 
employed in childcare settings.  More generally, the Providers’ survey will be used 
when it offers helpful information not contained in the LFS.  
 
Finally, the chapter draws on the interviews to explore how wages are set. Indeed the 
LFS does not offer much insight on wage agreements. In contrast, interviews with 
setting managers explored this specific issue and asked in detail how workers’ pay 
was decided. In addition, the information was checked in the interviews with 
workers, who were asked a few questions about their pay, including its amount, the 
benefits attached to it and whether or not it was set by collective agreement.  
 
Trends in pay and the incidence of low wages among childcare employees 
Three points concerning trends in childcare workers’ wages are considered in this 
section. First, I examine whether or not real wages have increased and whether 
increases have been uniform across the wage distribution. Second, an assessment is  
made about changes in the relative pay of childcare workers between 1994 and 2008.  
Third, I present evidence on the incidence of low pay among childcare workers. As 
explained in the previous section, trends in pay can be explored only in relation to a 
subsample of childcare workers, namely those employees for whom the LFS contains 
a valid pay entry. So, although the generic label ‘childcare workers’ is used, the 
information reported does not cover childminders, whose pay level will be discussed 
later in the chapter.  
 
In the graphs that follow, I start by reporting real wages, in order to give the reader a 
clear picture of the level of pay prevalent among childcare workers. I then move on 
to using the logarithm of hourly wages. In comparing trends between groups of 
workers, the logarithm has the advantage of making differences in growth rate more 
easily visible.  
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1Figure 5.1 Real hourly wage among childcare workers, 1994-2008 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Sample includes all childcare workers aged from 16 to 59 (women) 64 (men).  
All wages are deflated at 2005 prices. Horizontal dotted line set at £5.05. Vertical dotted line set at 
2005.  
 
 
When looking at trends in the real pay of childcare workers, a steady improvement is 
visible. Figure 5.1 shows trends at three points of the distribution: the 10th percentile, 
the median and the 90th percentile. Wages at all three points have roughly doubled 
from 1994 to 2008. In this respect, childcare workers fared better in 2008 than in 
1994, and the improvements have been even across the wage distribution. Figure 5.1 
reports wages deflated at 2005 prices and also reports a reference line corresponding 
to £5.05 – the adult rate of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in 2005. Yearly 
point estimates are bound to be imprecise because sample size for each year is, on 
average, 230 observations. Nevertheless, two things emerge clearly from Figure 5.1.. 
First, almost half of childcare workers have an hourly wage below the NMW.  
Second, over the fifteen years examined here real wages have improved quite 
substantially.  
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4Table 5.1 Real hourly wages among childcare workers, by time period 
 1994-1998 2004-2008 % change 
Median 3.41 6.08 +78.3 
10th 1.59 3.65 +129.6 
90th 6.18 9.38 + 51.8 
90:10 ratio 3.9 2.6 -33.4 
Unweighted base 1188 1198  
Source: LFS, 1994-1998 and 2003-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: Figures are hourly wages deflated using 2005 as base year. Sample includes all childcare workers aged 
between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men).   
 
 
 
In order to get more precise estimates of wage levels, I pool observations into three 
five-year periods and report figures for the periods 1994-1998 and 2004-2008 to 
assess the magnitude of the changes (see Table 5.1).  The wage of the median 
childcare worker was approximately £3.41 (expressed in 2005 prices) between 1994 
and 1998 and grew to £6.07 between 2004 and 2008, thus increasing by 44 percent.19 
At the bottom end of the distribution, wages have increased faster – by 57 percent – 
so that by 2004-2008 the worst paid childcare workers were earning £3.65 an hour. 
For the highest paid 10 percent the increase was slower – at 35 percent – and meant  
an hourly pay of £9.38 between 2004-2008. As a result of these different growth 
rates, the 90:10 has narrowed from 3.9 to 2.6. Thus there has been a wage 
compression from the bottom, which has reduced the overall level of dispersion. It 
remains however surprising that even within a fairly homogeneous occupation like 
childcare there can be such a large gap between the top and the bottom earners.  
 
But should the wage increases plotted in Figure 5.1 be considered small or large? Do 
the gains that childcare workers have made reflect an improvement in their relative 
position in the British labour market? Figure 5.2 plots the evolution of the logarithm 
of the median wage in childcare against the overall median.  
                                                      
19 Throughout this chapter, earnings figures are adjusted to 2005 terms.   
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2Figure 5.2 Median wages: childcare workers and UK employees, 1994-2008 
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wage), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. Sample includes all workers 
aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
Relative to the median UK employee, the position of childcare workers does not 
appear to have improved. The real wage of the median UK employee has grown as 
much as that of the median childcare worker, so that the gap between the two has 
remained constant. In absolute terms, the distance between the median employee and 
the median childcare workers has widened, with the overall median hourly wage at 
around £10.80 and the median childcare employee being paid £7 per hour.  
 
What is remarkable about the result presented in Figure 5.2 is the actual size of the 
gap. The difference is indeed substantial: median hourly wages in childcare are 
roughly equivalent to two-thirds of the overall median wage. This coincides with a 
common definition of low pay, whereby the low-paid are defined as those whose 
hourly wage is below two-thirds of the wage of the median employee (Lloyd, Mason, 
and Mayhew 2008; Millar and Gardiner 2004; McKnight 2002; Stewart 1999). Thus,  
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3Figure 5.3 Incidence of low-paid employment among childcare workers 
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: The two thresholds – two-thirds median and half median – are calculated over all UK 
employees of working age. 
 
 
according to this definition, half of childcare workers are to be classified as low-paid 
and this proportion has remained stable over the years.  
 
A more restrictive definition of low-paid workers uses the threshold of half the 
median employee wage – I will refer to this group as ‘very low-paid’. Figure 5.3 
plots the proportion of childcare workers who are defined as low-paid on the basis of 
both definitions. While the proportion of childcare workers paid below two-thirds of 
the median wage has remained stable over the years, the incidence of the ‘very low-
paid’ has decreased from around 30 percent to 20 percent. Once again, yearly point 
estimates display high variance because of the small sample size. Nevertheless, a 
trend is recognisable and indicates that fewer childcare workers were paid at a 
relatively very low rate in the mid-2000s compared to the mid-1990s.  
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5Table 5.2 Percentage of childcare workers in the bottom three deciles of the 
overall wage distribution, by time period 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
1st Decile 33.2 30.1 32.8 
2nd Decile 15.1 15.3 17.6 
3rd Decile 9.6 12.5 15.4 
Cumulative  57.9 57.9 65.8 
Unweighted base 1,188 1,198 1,064 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: Deciles are calculated over a five-year distribution of real wages 
 
 
This result can be explained by the introduction of the NMW in 1999. The NMW 
was set well below two-thirds of the median wage, so its arrival was bound to have a 
limited effect on the proportion of people defined as low paid. On the other hand, 
those on very low pay were more likely to be affected by both the NMW and its 
subsequent up-ratings (Robinson 2002; Manning and Dickens 2002). If we restrict 
the sample to workers older than 22, the proportion of ‘very low paid’ childcare 
workers is smaller – around 15 percent (Results reported in Appendix 5.2). This 
indicates that it is mainly young workers who receive the very low wages.  
 
Another, slightly different, way of looking at the relative position of childcare 
workers is by examining where they fit within the overall wage distribution. Table 
5.2 reports the percentage of childcare workers whose wage falls into the different 
deciles of the overall wage distribution. Figures are pooled into three five-year 
periods in order to make the sample size larger and estimates more reliable. The 
majority of childcare workers have wages that fall into the three bottom deciles: 70 
percent of UK employees earn more than them and this situation has hardly 
improved over the years. Despite the distance between bottom wages and the wage 
of the median employee having narrowed over the years, almost a third of childcare 
workers can be ranked as the lowest-paid workers in the labour force, as their wages 
fall into the bottom decile of the overall distribution.  
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One could argue that this result is largely predictable. Occupations are defined so 
that they are also fairly homogeneous in relation to skill levels and, relatedly, to pay 
(Elias and McKnight 2001). As occupations are hierarchically ordered, it is almost 
inevitable that those at the bottom of the classification will have relatively lower 
wages. However, childcare workers are not, as was explained in Chapter 4, drawn 
from the bottom of the occupational classification. Indeed, the sample used here is 
derived from the macro category “Personal Service Occupations” which is ranked 6 
out of 9. Thus, it is not possible to anticipate such low wage levels by simply looking 
at where childcare workers are pitched in the standard classification of occupations. 
If we were to order occupations according to their pay, childcare workers would end 
up together with occupations such as “Food preparation trades” “Elementary 
cleaning occupations” or “Elementary sales occupations”.20 These comparisons, 
although highly imprecise, are reminiscent of some striking examples from the 
comparable worth literature: jobs in childcare rated lower than those of parking lots 
attendants.  
 
All together, the results presented so far suggest the following points. The gap in pay 
between the best paid and the worst paid childcare worker has narrowed over the 
years. But the median wage among childcare workers has not caught up with the 
median wage across all British employees. At the bottom, the distance between the 
worst paid childcare and the median British worker has diminished and this is visible 
in the lower incidence of the very low-paid workers. This change is likely to have be 
driven by the introduction of the NMW. Yet, overall, childcare workers remain at the 
very bottom of the wage distribution.  
 
Public and private sectors: two distinct labour markets? 
Wages in the childcare sector appear to be invariably low, but there is nonetheless a 
sizable gap between the best paid and the worst paid childcare workers. This could 
reflect the fact that childcare services are particularly fragmented in the UK. In this 
section I turn to examining a specific structural feature of the childcare services – 
their straddling between the private and public sectors. In Chapter 3 it was reported 
that historically workers have enjoyed better pay and working conditions when 
                                                      
20 This exercise, whereby occupations are ranked according to their average wage, is presented in 
Appendix 5.3. 
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employed in local authorities’ nurseries or schools. This section focuses on this 
distinction and in particular on uncovering whether sectoral differences may be 
correlated to systematic disparities in the wages of childcare workers. It starts by 
looking at pay levels and trends over time. Then it moves on to discussing whether 
the public and private sector differ in the way wages are set. Finally, it presents some 
evidence on the differences between the two sectors in their ability to pay higher 
wages.  
 
Comparing pay levels: the pay advantage of public sector workers  
The LFS collects information on the kind of organisation in which respondents are 
employed. It is therefore possible to distinguish between those employed in various 
public sector organisations, like the NHS or local authorities, in a private company or 
a charitable organisation or trust. I have constructed a binary variable which 
separates public sector employees from all others. Details are given in Appendix 5.4. 
This variable captures whether the employing organisation belongs to the public or 
private sector and not necessarily whether the childcare service offered is or is not 
public. Although the two tend to overlap, they do not necessarily coincide. For 
example, a nursery attached and run directly by a grant-funded educational 
establishment would be classified as a public-sector workplace, although childcare 
services are likely to be purchased as a private good parents pay for. 21 
 
                                                      
21 It should be noted that the sample includes nannies, who are classified as employed in the private 
sector. Nannies, however, account only for a small proportion of childcare employees – around 10 
percent – and the findings reported in this section remain stable whether nannies are included or not.   
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4Figure 5.4 Average wage in childcare by sector, 1994-2008 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wage), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. In the LFS ‘public sector’ is 
defined as that owned, funded or run by central or local government, and ‘private sector’ as all else 
(ONS 2007, 68). Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
 
I begin by plotting the logarithm of the average hourly pay of childcare workers 
employed in the private and the public sector respectively  (Figure 5.4). Real wages 
in the public sector tend to be substantially higher than in the private sector. In the 
mid-1990s public sector workers were earning on average twice as much as those in 
the private sector. Over the years, however, wages in the private sector have 
increased slightly faster so that in the second half of the 2000s the public-private 
wage gap was less stark, with average pay in the public sector around 1.5 times 
larger than in the private sector. In absolute terms, the public-private wage gap has 
remained roughly similar at around £2.20.   
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6Table 5.3 Real hourly wages in childcare by sector and time period (£) 
 1994-1998 2003-2008 
Private sector   
Mean 2.91 5.66 
10th 1.36 3.32 
90th 4.50 7.98 
90:10 ratio 3.31 2.40 
(Unweighted base) (712) (475) 
Public sector   
Mean 5.14 7.85 
10th 3.07 4.71 
90th 6.88 10.60 
90:10 ratio 2.24 2.25 
(Unweighted base) (681) (379) 
Public sector premium 76.63% 38.69% 
Source: LFS, 1994-1998 and 2003-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: All wages are in constant (year 2005) prices. In the LFS ‘public sector’ is defined as that owned, funded or 
run by central or local government, and ‘private sector’ as all else (ONS 2007, 68). Sample includes all childcare 
workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
As well as looking at the averages, it is insightful to examine the distribution of 
wages in the two sectors. Table 5.3 reports, beside the average wage, the 10th and 
90th percentile of the wage distribution in both sectors. Data are pooled in two five-
year periods in order to increase the sample size and I report figures for 1994-1998 
and 2003-2008 to assess changes over time. In each time period both the 10th and the 
90th percentiles of the public sector wage distribution were greater than the 
equivalent percentile of the private sector wage distribution, thus indicating that 
wages along almost the entire distribution are higher in the public sector than in the 
private one.  
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Once again, the ratio between the two percentiles can be used as an indicator of wage 
inequality in the two groups. For public sector workers, inequality has remained 
stable over time. Inequality has instead decreased in the private sector, reaching the 
same level of dispersion as in the public sector. Overall, the two sectors have become 
more similar, but the public wage premium remains substantial despite its 
remarkable decrease. Indeed, public sector workers are likely to receive a wage 39% 
higher than their colleagues employed in the private sector.  
 
This results are in line with more aggregate trends: the public/private wage ratio has 
diminished since the mid-1990s across all occupations. However, it is noticeable that 
the public sector wage premium in childcare remains much larger than is the case 
across the entire labour market, for either men (13.41%) or women (21.87%).22 This 
finding dovetails with those of Dolton and McIntosh, who show that the distinction 
between the public and the private sector is especially salient for low-paid 
occupations (2003, 218-222).  
 
Given the large public/private pay gap, changes in the proportions of workers 
employed in either sector are likely to affect overall pay levels. Data from the LFS 
indicate that two thirds of childcare employees work in the private sector (Table 5.4). 
Furthermore, in recent years this proportion has increased from 61 percent to 68 
percent.   The changes are not dramatic, around six percentage points, but 
nonetheless are statistically significant.   
7 
8Table 5.4 Childcare employment by sector and time period 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
Public 38.8 37.4 32.4 
Private 61.2 62.6 67.6 
Unweighted base 1577 1649 1592 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: Figures indicate percentages.In the LFS ‘public sector’ is defined as that owned, funded or run by central or 
local government, and ‘private sector’ as all else (ONS 2007, 68). Sample includes all childcare workers aged 
between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
                                                      
22 My calculations, using the LFS 2003-2008, all employees. 
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Setting the pay: different practices, little transparency    
In order to understand one of the mechanisms behind the public/private pay 
differential, one needs to examine how pay is set. Interviews with childcare workers, 
local authority officials and trade-union officials were used to explore this point and 
gather information on wage-setting practices. The most recognisable difference 
between the two segments is that in the private sector payment systems are usually 
informal. By way of contrast, in the public sector wages are determined via 
collective agreement and the resulting payment structure has a higher level of 
formality. This pattern, which emerged from the interviews, is supported by LFS 
data on trade unions. LFS data show that union presence and coverage vary markedly 
between the  
two sectors (Table 5.5). Only 10.6 percent of workers employed in the private sector 
work in a setting where there is a union member. In the public sector the proportion 
is 74.3 percent. Likewise, a much larger share of workers in the public sector are 
covered by a collective agreement – 48.2 percent – compared to only 3.2 percent in 
the private sector. However, there is no difference between the two sectors in the 
incidence of temporary employment: this type of contract is similarly common in 
both sectors, with one out of ten workers on a non-permanent contract.  
 
9Table 5.5 Union presence, coverage and type of employment by sector 
 
UNION PRESENCE† UNION COVERAGE† 
TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT‡ 
 % (base) % (base) % (base) 
Private sector 10.6 (3884) 3.2 (3820) 8.9 (2605) 
Public sector 74.3 (1,325) 48.2 (1,391) 10.1 (1411) 
Source LFS, various years (see below) 
Note: In the LFS ‘public sector’ is defined as that owned, funded or run by central or local government, and 
‘private sector’ as all else (ONS 2007, 68). † indicates that data are from 1999 to 2008. Questions about unions 
are asked only in Autumn quarters.  Union presence is defined by whether the respondent or someone at his/her 
workplace is a union member. Union coverage is defined by whether pay and working conditions are affected by 
agreement between trade unions and employer. ‡ indicates that data are from 1999 to 2008. Sample includes 
childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
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Besides the lack of collective agreement among employees in the private sector, the 
interviews highlighted other characteristics of employment contracts in the private 
and the public sector.  Interviews with workers and managers employed in the 
private sector drew attention to the extent of arbitrariness in employment practices. 
Pay varied markedly not only between employers, but sometimes also between 
workers employed in the same setting. So pay could be determined on an individual 
basis between employer and workers, or there could be a single common wage for all 
the employees in an individual setting.  
 
The resulting pay differences were often not related to workers’ experience or 
qualifications. Even when pay was set on an individual basis, better qualified or 
more experienced workers were not necessarily paid more than other workers in the 
same setting. For example, Rachel, the manager of a chain nursery who has a certain 
level of autonomy in deciding workers’ wages, reported that being  “bubbly and fun” 
and “flexible” were the aspects that she valued the most and offered better pay for 
these qualities. On the other hand, Angela, the manager of a nursery, reported that 
there was a standard contract for all employees and that differences across staff were 
minimal. But this meant that staff who gained a new qualification were not entitled 
to higher pay. In addition, Angela commented : 
they [workers] haven’t had a pay rise for over a year I think. We’re not likely to get one 
because the nursery financially is not doing that great 
Interviews therefore consistently point to a lack of rules and standards on which 
workers can rely upon in order to obtain certain levels of wages or pay increases. It 
seemed that pay was the random result of managers’ preferences and the specific 
financial circumstances of the nursery in question. Not surprisingly, therefore, some 
workers did not know why they were being paid a particular amount. Cath is a case 
in point:   
When we were asking for a rise, I think after nine years they gave us ten per cent, but I 
run round all the playgroups and I asked them: ‘I know this is a private question but can 
I ask you how much you get paid an hour?’ and one playgroup the woman says she gets 
paid £8 an hour and the one playgroup says she gets paid £19 an hour. And I was very, 
very sad to hear you know that this lady’s doing a really good job and so is the other 
one, but she’s getting £8 an hour and I think when we got the increase it went to £14.50 
for me an hour.  I think it’s actually £14.48; it’s a real strange… I don’t know who put 
that on and to me I was just amazed that I was getting that an hour. 
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One consequence of this lack of well-defined criteria was the seemingly unlimited 
managerial discretion and, sometimes, favouritism. In the words of Deborah:   
Yes, because I found in the private sector, in the nursery that I was in in particular, it 
was… it’s very much who you know and how you get on with your managers, to how 
quickly you move up […] where I came from, the manager was the owner, so it was her 
say and that was that.  So, if you was on her side and she liked you, you moved up very 
quickly and if she didn’t like you, you didn’t.  
A similar view was echoed by Rachel, who explained her progression to 
management level by saying that she ‘got on very well with the manager’. 
 
Generally, pay corresponded to basic pay without bonuses or premiums23. While pay 
rates were quite different across settings, holiday entitlement was found to be fairly 
uniform and corresponded roughly to the statutory minimum. As for sick pay, it was 
often the case that workers were not covered. In none of the private sector providers 
visited was there a pension scheme that workers could join.  
 
In the public sector, on the other hand, workers were generally covered by some 
form of collective agreement, and formal pay structures were usually in place. 
Invariably, employment contracts included more generous holiday entitlement, sick 
pay and pensions. Not surprisingly, pay and working conditions were found to be 
more favourable in the public sector than in the private one.  
 
However, unlike in the case of teachers and nurses, the employment contract of 
childcare workers is bargained at local level, thus creating differences between local 
authorities. Furthermore, the interviews revealed how fragmented pay settlements, 
whereby different sets of terms and conditions applied to different groups of 
childcare workers within the same Local Authority, created a certain degree of 
confusion and uncertainty. In England and Wales, this fragmentation is, in part, the 
result of schools’ autonomy.24 Nursery nurses working in schools are legally 
employed by the Local Authority, but schools’ governing bodies control and manage 
employment contracts. In Scotland, on the other hand, local authorities are 
responsible for the direct management of employment contracts of nursery nurses in 
schools and a more centralised arrangement perhaps contributed to the long-lasting 
                                                      
23 Rachel, the chain nursery manager, reported that she used Boots vouchers as special awards for 
deserving staff.  
24 This point was also noted by the Kingsmill Review (Kingsmill 2003, 4.20). 
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wage dispute between Scottish local authorities and nursery nurses in 2003 and 2004 
(Findlay, Findlay, and Stewart 2009).  
 
The presence of institutionalised pay structures was not without problems. Pay scales 
for nursery nurses can be fairly compressed, so that the potential maximum pay rate 
within the scale remains low, as Harriet explained: 
We had to fight really hard to move up from the [pay] scale to the next, so our pay 
would continue to rise, and that took a real battle: we had to write to the Chair of 
Governors, who then spoke to the rest of the Governors, who then spoke to the Head 
and it was a real battle to get that increase. […] Teachers have the chance to move up a 
pay scale and take on responsibility within the School. NEOs [Nursery Education 
Officers] don’t have that chance: I couldn’t take on an area of responsibility … we 
don’t have that opportunity which would then move us up the scale as we went.  
An additional problem was that each school employs only a few nursery nurses and 
this can contribute to a feeling of isolation: 
There’s only four of us here, and we’re sort of left, sort of hanging around, and we’re 
not, we’re not teachers, we’re not teaching staff, we’re not really support staff, we’re 
sort of that group that hangs around in the middle and never knows which side to go. 
[Harriet]  
Since 1997, local authorities have been compelled to carry out a pay review in order 
to tackle gender discrimination.25  According to a trade-union official, the pay review 
processes have often resulted in nursery nurses receiving lower pay. This is because 
their contract is no longer modelled on that of teachers, and, consequently, they are 
now paid only during term time, receiving just a small provision during holiday time. 
This new arrangement has resulted in nursery nurses in the maintained sector 
becoming essentially part-time workers. The interviews gave some further evidence 
on this. For example, one Children’s Centre director explained the employment 
contract of one of her staff: 
She was just a Nursery Education Officer, scale 4 […] term time only.  So it’s a very, 
very generous contract, because they’re paid as if they work 52 weeks of the year even 
though they don’t.  The whole [Local Authority] is being reprogrammed at the moment 
for single funding... no, single pay scale: making everybody fit. […] Her scale 4 
contract… that’s gonna be like gold dust. [Susan] 
Within Children’s Centres managed directly by the Local Authority, different staff 
were paid according to different pay scales, reflecting pre-existing sectoral divisions 
                                                      
25 The Single Status Agreement demands comparable pay for comparable jobs. Public employers have 
carried out extensive job evaluation processes in order to bring together in a single structure the pay 
structures of different groups of workers. Teachers are however excluded from the Single Status 
Agreement.  
 138
between health, education and care. An additional complication was created by the 
fact that often Children’s Centres were previously Sure Start Local Programmes, 
which meant that some staff had been hired under different contracts.  The overall 
situation was, as one head of a Centre put it, a bit ‘doggy’, and she later brought up 
this example in relation to one of the workers in the centre: 
She got TUPEed form the NHS to [Local Authority], but the pay scale was an anomaly 
if you see what I mean.  [Local Authority] didn’t take them off the health pay scales and 
put them on local authority pay scales, they weren’t allowed to because of the TUPEing 
process.  They just kept them on these weird health ones and they will do that until 
they’ve all left.26 [Susan]   
 
Among the settings visited was an NHS hospital nursery. The nursery catered mainly 
for NHS staff’s children, and was managed directly by the hospital. This meant that 
nursery workers were employed under the same terms and conditions as other NHS 
staff in the hospital and had therefore been affected by the change brought about by 
‘Agenda for Change’, a wage-setting agreement introduced in 2004. One of the 
specific objectives of this agreement was that of improving the relative position of 
the lowest paid workers (Grimshaw and Caroll 2008). The interviews with the 
hospital nursery appeared very aware that, within the childcare sector, they had 
substantially advantageous conditions. Interestingly, a trade-union official 
interviewed at the very early stage of the field work had commented that ‘Agenda for 
Change’ had resulted in much more generous employment contracts for nursery 
assistants and nurses employed in the NHS than for those employed in Local 
Authorities. Apparently, the job evaluation exercise conducted within the NHS had 
given greater visibility to the demands of childcare work than had been the case in 
several local authorities. It is outside the scope of this thesis to pursue this point 
further and gather evidence on the different job-evaluation exercises carried out by 
the NHS and other public authorities. It remains nonetheless potentially a very 
interesting line of investigation.  
 
Labour costs: different constraints 
The labour markets of the private and public sector appear to have different 
institutional arrangements, with the public sector characterised by a much stronger 
                                                      
26 TUPE is an acronym for Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of Employment) Regulation. Its 
purpose is to protect employees if the business they are employed in changes hands (UNISON 2009).  
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presence of unions and, relatedly, of collective contracts. But the interviews also 
highlighted differences between the two sectors in relation to their sources of 
funding, which, in turn, affected employers’ ability to pay higher wages. Managers 
were asked about the financial situation of the nurseries, their strategies to ensure 
that they broke even at the end of the year, and how this affected wages.  
 
For private nurseries, the main source of income was fees. The private nurseries that 
received the Nursery Education Grant did not consider it as part of their funding. For 
example, Rose explained: 
We don’t get any funding because we’re private. 
but when asked about the Nursery Education Grant replied: 
You get the Nursery Education Grant but that’s not for private gains is it?  It’s for the 
children to be able to afford to come.  You know, it’s deducted off their fees. 
Government funding was therefore considered as covering a very small portion of 
costs.  
 
The fact that fees had to be kept low was taken for granted by all managers 
interviewed, although reasons varied. For example, one interviewee took a very 
pragmatic view, based on how she saw the childcare market work:  
We charge £4 an hour here and I think that’s pretty reasonable, put our fees up and 
nobody’s gonna come, you know. Why do they want to pay £6 an hour here when they 
can go to that nursery and pay £4.50 an hour? And that’s what it comes down to 
[Lizzie].  
In one nursery the manager was very aware that parents found it difficult to pay the 
fees:  
They’ve got two children here and it’s very hard to catch up because they’re behind into 
like £300 over a week so if you’ve got four weeks and then you’ve got a month, that’s 
nearly £1,500 a month for a parent, even with the Tax Credit, it’s hard.  So they will run 
into a bit of debt [Rose]. 
For other managers keeping fees low was related to their more general views on 
childcare provision. Indeed, one manager, who also owned the nursery, saw 
affordable childcare as a right: 
Parents shouldn’t have to make somebody rich because they need childcare. Childcare 
should be a priority of a working parent – something that she can afford. [Patricia].  
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Keeping fees low appeared as an explicit objective in settings managed by parents’ 
committees. This, however, had repercussions on wages. Patricia, for example, 
recounted her experience as the only paid worker in a small voluntary nursery during 
the 1990s:  
I had to fight all the time if I wanted a wage increase. They didn’t want me to have a 
wage increase because they didn’t want the fees of the nursery go up. I was battling all 
the times.  
The financial situation of another setting, run by a voluntary managing committee, 
had been dire for several years and wage increases had required an injection of 
public funding:  
We had a massive increase from [Local authority], I think it was about two years ago 
and the man [on the managing committee] said: “now you can have your pay rise” and I 
started crying. […] because it’s a parent committee and they’re going from term to 
term, they may go, nobody ever really knows that you’ve been there forever doing all of 
these things and virtually it was a lot in your own time, your own resources, you 
know.[Cath] 
 
Specific public funding streams were indeed important for voluntary sector 
providers, but the recurrent problem was that these forms of funding were temporary:  
We don’t have any money from them [Government funding scheme] now, it’s finished. 
So we have to bring in our own money [Maral].  
Therefore, it remained the case that fees were the main source of income also for 
non-profit nurseries: 
The main income is from the fees for us. Only a percentage is from [Local Authority x]  
- we are getting £20000. And from [Local Authority z], for only eight children, we are 
getting  £42000 and the running costs for this nursery is over £300,000.  […] we are… 
business-like but in the middle: fees are the most important thing for us. [Maral] 
Such being “in the middle” required a careful balancing act: a sliding fee structure 
(parents paid according to their income), constant fundraising to bring in donations 
and government funds – all coming “in one pot”. This, in turn, enabled Maral to offer 
some places also to families on low income and to pay her staff above the minimum: 
Our salaries are better than private nurseries, because we are not aiming for profit but 
less than statutory nursery services. 
Likewise, Patricia managed to pay her staff slightly above the market rate because, 
despite being classified as a business, she did not make any profit and happened to 
operate in rent-free premises:   
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I look around what other people are paying, and I try to pay a little bit more […]. I try to 
keep at least 50p an hour more. 
 
The children’s centres visited, which were managed directly by the local authority, 
relied more heavily on public funding. This certainly secured higher budgets, but 
centres were nonetheless exposed to the prospect of funding cuts: 
We’re front line [service] but we’re not statutory […] Frontline, because it’s not 
statutory, always gets cut, whichever government gets in. I understand there’s a 
recession going on, there’s not an endless pot of money but I don’t know, I don’t know 
what the answer is, but it is just going to be worrying from April next year, the next 2 
years, because Sure Start is then pulling out. We’re all supposed to be 
sustainable…[Janet] 
And financial sustainability was, in her opinion, a chimera, unless: 
“Unless you’re a nursery attached to a bank, that all your bankers’ children are going to 
go there” 
 
Each children’s centre received its budget from the local authority, together with 
fairly strict rules on how to allocate it. Nevertheless, the interviews highlighted how 
managers had different priorities, and, within the narrow margins they had, spent 
their resources accordingly. For example, one manager placed particular emphasis on 
catering for children in need:  
I don’t believe that filling them, Children’s Centres, up with people that can pay is what 
the real work that Children’s Centres should be doing. And I think this is where [Local 
Authority] is going amiss somewhere, but then how do we sustain the places? It’s a 
catch 22.  
The centre thus offered more places to children in need than it received funding for, 
and this meant that they had to cross-subsidise places:  
I’m of the opinion that if we’ve got spaces and these children need it, then we will take 
them […] we try and get a few more Band 3 in, which are the more expensive fee 
payers, to actually pay for these places. 
Two other managers, who were keen to have highly qualified staff, talked about how 
they used their budget to this end. In one centre, the head wanted to hire two 
additional teachers and in order to do that she had replaced four nursery officers with 
four nursery assistants:  
This way I’ve got more actual bodies.  I’ve got 9 people in the classroom now and I 
used to have only 7. […] I’ve got more teachers and... cause I got... cause I save the 
money from the nursery officers.  Nursery assistants are cheaper.  Anyway, I don’t 
know.  I don’t know if it’s sustainable in the long-term finance wise, but it is for the 
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next couple of years and we’ll see how it works out.  So we’ve now got 4 teachers out 
there. [Susan] 
In another centre, the head had sought a way to make early years professional 
positions both attractive for candidates and financially sustainable for the centre:  
I have developed and I got the girls to develop an Early Years Professional job 
description and personal spec.  I sent it off, I thought it was good and so I sent it off to 
be evaluated by [Local Authority] and it came back as far too high a pay scale, nobody 
would be able to afford them because of their pay scale as such attached to EYPs.  So 
we looked at it again. [Tessa] 
Eventually, she devised a complicated employment contract whereby early years 
professionals were on a pay scale that started on a relatively low level, but had 
substantial increments over the span of six years:  
So I saw that [the contract] as something that the nurseries in Children’s Centres would 
be able to afford in the beginning. It would give them [early years professionals] six 
years’ career development and increase over each of those years; they would not come 
in […] and jumped to too much money and they would within those six years, I would 
be expecting them to be where there were other jobs after two or three years, may be to 
put in for an assistant head’s post. 
  
All three children’s centres managers therefore reported how their budget did not 
allow a financially sustainable strategy as soon as they either wanted to offer places 
to families in need or wanted to employ more qualified staff. In particular, in order to 
have additional teachers, Susan had created four low-paid positions with little 
prospect of career advancement. The solution found by Tessa appeared more 
equitable but was based on the assumption that early years professionals would look 
for better-paying position within two or three years in their contract.   
 
 
Overall then, there seems to be a clear demarcation line between public and private 
sectors. Differences in wages are especially prominent, with wages in the public 
sector 39 percent higher than in the private sector. Behind this striking pay 
differential are two distinct labour markets, characterised by different institutional 
arrangements and by different funding sources.  
 
When looking at pay setting arrangements, there appeared to be little consistency in 
the terms and conditions offered to workers in the private sector. In the public sector, 
on the other hand, pay rates were linked to defined scales and this appeared to be the 
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outcome of collective agreements bargained by trade unions. In addition pay also 
covered non-working periods: holiday, sickness. In contrast, in the private sector, 
pay was close to the basic rate, thus covering almost only the “actual performance of 
labour” (Harvey 1999). However, the interviews drew attention to the lack of 
transparency in employment practices which characterised the entire childcare 
sector. In the private segment of the labour market this feature took the form of 
almost complete managerial discretion. In the public sector, both fragmentation in 
and changes of pay structures often resulted in a lack transparency and uniformity 
across groups of workers. Against this backdrop, it seemed that workers had little 
chance of progressing within a coherent employment contract, because pay levels 
were often disjointed from any recognisable criteria that applied to all workers. 
But beside differences in wage-setting institutions, and lack of them, the interviews 
also illustrated the budget constraints all settings were facing. The interviews pointed 
to the fact that parents could not pay higher fees, either because they could not afford 
them or because they were more sensitive to prices than to other aspects of provision. 
Against this backdrop of limited financial sustainability, settings varied in their 
accessing different forms of funding and in their strategies to reduce costs. Public 
settings had clearly larger budgets at their disposal, but without an “endless pot of 
money” they struggled to pay graduate-level wages.  On the other hand, low fees and 
limited access to public funding meant that private (and voluntary) nurseries hardly 
managed to keep their wages 50p above the prevailing wage in their local area.  
Managers who succeded in offering slightly higher wages were supplementing their 
budget through fundraising and were not making any profit. Thus, although the 
constraints were different across the sectors, all settings appeared in need of greater 
funding, without which the possibility of paying higher wages seemed fairly limited.   
 
 
Different forms of childcare provision: different labour markets? 
So far I have discussed differences between workers employed in the private and 
public sectors, and briefly introduced the distinction between profit making and 
voluntary settings. The private/public divide is clearly related to the mixed-economy 
of provision which is characteristic of early childhood services in the UK. Because 
provision is very skewed in favour of private sector providers, the majority of 
workers are employed in the private sector. But beside the public/private divide, 
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Chapter 3 illustrated that early childhood services are fragmented along several other 
dimensions.  
 
Attention was drawn in particular to the long-standing division between care and 
education. In addition, the point was made that childcare provision in the UK also 
varies in relation to the age groups catered for, with schools generally not admitting 
children below the age of three. Finally, some forms of provision – typically 
playgroups – belong to the voluntary sector, rather than to the private for-profit 
provision.  This section explores these dimensions and presents, where possible, an 
assessment of whether pay levels differ systematically between types of provision 
with different characteristics.  
 
Care and education   
I begin by investigating whether wages are lower in the care segment of provision as 
opposed to the educational one. I then examine how the private/public divide 
overlaps with the care/education one. The LFS codes industrial sectors, 
distinguishing – at the most detailed level – 458 industrial sectors on the basis of the 
SIC 92. Most childcare workers are classified as working in two sectors: “Primary 
education” and “Social work activities without accommodation”.27  
 
Essentially, this classification distinguishes between services offered in schools and 
those offered in other types of settings, and can therefore be used to capture the long-
standing divide between care and education. Of course, this classification does not 
necessarily reflect the content or the nature of the work performed by workers. For 
example, someone working in a children’s centre and employed directly by the Local 
Authority would not be classified as belonging to “Primary education” industry, 
irrespective of the fact that the job is likely to be fairly similar to that offered in 
schools. Nevertheless, SIC 92 classification is useful insofar as it captures how 
services are defined and therefore it allows exploration of the relevance of this 
distinction, however artificial it may be.   
 
                                                      
27 However if nurseries are attached to a workplace, for example the Foreign Office or a bank, 
workers from the nursery will be classified as working in the foreign and bank sectors respectively. 
To avoid this, I classify all workplace nurseries as belonging to the ‘care’ sector, as their primary aim 
is to care for children while their parents are at work. 
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5Figure 5.5 Average wage in childcare by type of provision, 1994-2008 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wages), with wages deflated by 2005 prices. ISC92 classification is used to 
distinguish between care and education. See text. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 
(women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
Figure 5.5 plots pay levels of the two groups of workers over the period 1994 and 
2008. It is clear that those working in schools are paid at a markedly higher rate than 
those employed in care. However, the pay gap between the two groups has 
substantially narrowed over this period, both in absolute and percentage terms.  
Between 1994 and 1998, someone working in schools was being paid on average 40 
percent more than someone working in a care setting, with a difference of around 
£1.5. But in the years 2004-2008, the education-sector premium had fallen to around 
16 percent, with workers in schools earning £7.10 and those in other type of settings 
earning £6.10. This change may reflect the integration between the two segments of 
provision that has been pursued, however incompletely, under Labour.  
 
It is noticeable that the care/education pay differential is smaller than the one 
between the private and public sectors. This already suggests that there is not a 
perfect overlap between the two sets of distinctions and that the one between public 
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and private may have a stronger bearing on pay levels. In order to map how the two 
intersect, I look at the care/education composition of the private sector workforce 
and the public sector one (Table 5.6). Starting with the latter, around 61 percent of 
workers in the public sector are in the educational segment of provision, that is in 
schools. The remaining 40 percent of are employed in settings classified as care. This 
proportion may seem high in light of the fact that only a tiny proportion of the day-
care provision is offered by local authorities’ social services, and is concentrated on 
children at risk only.  
 
However, two factors can help in explaining this figure. First, nurseries belonging to 
the public sector are not necessarily offering public childcare. Following up on one 
of the examples from the previous section, a nursery attached to an NHS hospital 
would be classified as a public sector workplace but the service offered is in fact 
private, in so far as it is a workplace nursery for NHS staff and a private nursery for 
all other parents.  Second, the education segment of provision requires fewer staff in 
relation to the number of children catered for. Staff to children ratios are higher in 
schools, thus making this segment less labour-intensive relative than care provision. 
Furthermore, teachers are also employed alongside childcare staff. If teachers were 
included in the sample, the proportion of public-sector workers employed in schools 
would be higher. 
 
10Table 5.6 Employment in care and education, by public/private sector 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
Public:    
Care 39.1 40.8 41.6 
Education 61 59.2 58.6 
Private:    
Care  82.9 80.5 74.9 
Education 17.1 19.5 25.1 
Unweighted base 1577 1649 1592 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: Figures are percentages. In the LFS ‘public sector’ is defined as that owned, funded or run by central or 
local government, and ‘private sector’ as all else (ONS 2007, 68). For care and education distinction, see text. 
Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men).  
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11Table 5.7 Wage premiums associated to public sector and education 
 LOG(HOURLY WAGE) 
Public 0.414*** 
Education 0.119*** 
Observations 3442 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Figures are OLS estimates of regression coefficients on log(hourly wage). Additional controls: region and 
year. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
Overall then, as far as childcare workers employed in the public sector are 
concerned, there is a fair balance between those working in schools and those 
employed in care services, albeit educational provision remains prevalent.  
 
When looking at private-sector workers, the picture is much more skewed in favour 
of the care segment. Between 2003 and 2008, around 75 percent were employed in 
the care services, leaving only one quarter working in the educational services. This 
latter group coincides, almost totally, with non-maintained schools.  
 
The evidence presented so far has suggested three points. First, pay levels are higher 
in the public sector relative to the private. Second, there is also a pay gap between 
the education and the care sectors, which however is smaller than that in the 
public/private one. Third, when looking at the workforce, the private/public sector 
divide coincides only in part with the education/care divide. For example, workers 
employed in the public sector do not necessarily work in schools.  Taken together, 
these results seem to suggest that both characteristics – whether the workplace is a 
school or not and whether the employer is from the private or public sector – have a 
separate effect on pay levels.  
 
A multivariate analysis that includes simultaneously both indicators confirms this 
result. Workers employed in the public sector are paid on average 41 percent more 
than those in the private sector. In addition, someone employed in a school is paid on 
average 12 percent more than someone who is not (Table 5.7)  
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The presence of a pay differential between care and education brings up the question 
as to whether the nature of work and its organisation varies between schools and 
other types of setting. Two differences stand out. First, childcare workers employed 
in schools work alongside teachers, and therefore are likely to have fewer planning 
and managing responsibilities than their colleagues in the care sector because 
teachers are their line managers. Some of the workers in the care sector, on the other 
hand, will have managerial responsibilities themselves – for example if they are 
responsible for a specific age group. Second, working in schools implies, by 
definition, working with children aged three and four, and therefore does not include 
a wide range of tasks that are instead part and parcel of working with babies and 
toddlers.  
 
Children under and above the age of three 
Although it is clear that workers employed in the education segment are not involved 
in the care of younger children, the reverse is not necessarily true. Staff working in 
day-care settings cater for children from nought to five and would be classified as 
employed in the care segment of provision. So, the education/care divide does not 
overlap perfectly with an age divide. It would be therefore interesting to test whether 
working with very young children as opposed to three and four year olds is 
correlated with an additional pay differential within the care segment of provision.  
 
However, neither the LFS nor the Providers’ survey contain the necessary 
information: the LFS does not ask detailed enough questions about respondents’ 
jobs, whereas the Providers’ survey collect information at the level of setting, thus it 
is not possible to measure differences in pay between staff working with children of 
different ages. Instead, it is possible to examine to what extent workers employed in 
the care segment are actually caring for very young children. Indeed it is not 
altogether clear whether work with children under three is common or not. On the 
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12Table 5.8 Childcare settings’ characteristics: age of children and number of 
staff 
 
UNDER 2 BETWEEN 2 & 3 ABOVE 3  Unweighted base 
% of settings catering 
for children aged … 
46 43.5 10.5  
Average No of staff 
per setting 
13.7 6.7 6.5  
7552 
Source: Childcare and Early Years Providers’ Survey; 2005, 2006, 2007. Childcare providers sample. 
Note:. Figures in the first line are percentages over the entire sample of childcare providers. Age 
group definitions indicate age of youngest child provided for.   
 
 
one hand children under the age of three are less likely than older ones to use formal 
centre-based childcare (e.g. Bryson, Kazimirski and Southwood 2007; Kazimirski et 
al 2008). On the other, staff to children ratios are higher for younger children (Sure 
Start 2008). For example, a nursery catering for 20 children, of whom only five are 2 
years old or younger, would need at least 4 staff and would deploy two of them with 
the younger children.   
 
The Providers’ Survey can be used to gather some further insights into this point. 
The survey samples providers on the basis of a classification which is reminiscent of 
the one employed in the LFS, whereby schools belong to a separate sample from all 
other types of setting. When looking at the providers classified as ‘childcare’ (as 
opposed to early years, which is the label for the schools sample) it is possible to 
examine the percentage of providers that cater for children aged two or below. Table 
5.8 reports the results. Figures in the first row confirm that almost all childcare 
settings provide for children under the age of three. Furthermore, slightly less than 
half of the providers cater also for children under two (first column). These data from 
the Providers’ survey are collected at the level of the setting, but differences in 
settings size is bound to affect the number of workers providing for the youngest 
children. The bottom line of Table 5.8 reports the average number of paid staff by 
age group catered for in the setting. The difference is quite striking: in those settings 
catering also for children under two, the average number of staff employed is 14, 
while settings that do not have any child under the age of two tend to be considerably 
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smaller, with on average 7 paid staff. Both the fact that most childcare providers 
actually cater for children under three and that the presence of babies is correlated 
with higher numbers of employees suggest that working in care settings implies 
working most of the time for children under the age of three.  
  
The voluntary sector 
So far, when looking at pay levels, no distinction has been made between the 
voluntary sector and the for-profit one. It could be argued that the mixed-economy of 
childcare also includes providers from the voluntary sector, and it is therefore 
inaccurate to examine different types of provision without taking this further 
distinction into account. In addition, the evidence from the interviews suggests that  
voluntary providers manage, at times, to pay slightly higher wages. The rest of this 
section examines this issue and shows that the distinction between voluntary and for-
profit is of a lesser relevance to the workforce than it is to the overall structure of 
provision.  
 
6Figure 5.6 Average wage in the for-profit and voluntary sectors, 1994-2008 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wages), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. Voluntary sector includes: 
charity, voluntary organisation or trust. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) 
and 64 (men). 
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First of all, pay in the voluntary sector is very similar to that of workers in the private 
for-profit sector. When plotting the average real wage of workers in the private for-
profit sector and those in the voluntary one it is clear that there is not much 
difference between the two (Figure 5.6). Moreover, there does not seem to be a 
systematic variation over time: wages in both the voluntary and for-profit sectors 
have grown at a similar pace, although the small sample size results in a few spikes 
in the wage of employees in the voluntary sector.  
 
The second point is that the share of workers employed in the voluntary sector is 
rather small: only about 15 percent of those employed in the private sector (about 10  
of all childcare employees) and this share has decreased slightly in recent years.28 At 
first sight, this figure may seem at odds with the number of childcare non-profit 
settings, because a substantial number of providers are known to belong to the 
voluntary sector (Butt et al. 2007). One however has to remember that we are 
assessing the characteristics of employers, not necessarily those of providers. 
Differences in type of provision, number of paid staff and use of volunteers are all 
relevant in determining the incidence of providers’ labour demand 
 
Drawing on data from the Providers’ Survey, Table 5.9 reports some of these 
differences. When looking at age groups, the first thing to notice is that voluntary  
 
13Table 5.9 Childcare settings’ characteristics: age of children, number of staff 
and volunteers, by provider’s sector 
 CATERING FOR CHILDREN 
AGED:  
 
EMPLOYING:  
 
 
Under 2 2 3 
 No. paid 
staff 
No. 
volunteers 
 
Unweighted 
base 
Private 62.4 31.3 6.3 11.4 0.3  4,044 
Voluntary 16.6 67 16.3 7.3 1.1  2778 
Public 72.5 16.4 11.1 12.1 0.3  657 
Source: Childcare and Early Years Providers’ Survey; 2005, 2006, 2007. Childcare providers sample. 
Note: Figures in the first three columns are percentages within the sample of the different types of providers – 
private, voluntary or public. Figures in the third and fourth columns are averages. Age group definitions indicate 
age of youngest child catered for. 
 
                                                      
28 My calculations using LFS data, 1998-2008.  
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sector providers tend not to cater for children under the age of two. Consequently,  
voluntary settings tend to employ substantially fewer staff than those childcare 
settings that belong to the private for profit or the public sectors. Finally, the 
voluntary settings differ from others in the practice of employing volunteers, with on 
average one volunteer per setting as opposed to around one volunteer for every three 
for profit or public settings. All these factors contribute to the relatively small 
influence that voluntary childcare settings have on the employment demand.  
 
Childminders: a world apart?   
The evidence presented so far has referred to childcare employees only. But, as was 
pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, childminders are an important source of 
childcare, especially for children under the age of three . Therefore an account of pay 
and working conditions among childcare workers cannot be complete without 
exploring, as far as possible, the specific position of childminders. Childminders are 
self-employed and provide care for a maximum of six children in their own home.   
The LFS is of little use in examining childminders’ pay, because it does not report 
any income information for self-employed workers. Thus this section will draw on 
data from the interviews and, to a greater extent, from the Providers’ Survey. As 
explained in Chapter 4, unlike the LFS, the Providers’ Survey is available only in the 
years from 2005 to 2007; therefore it will not possible to assess whether pay and 
working conditions among childminders have changed over the years. The 
Providers’ Survey samples childminders separately from other childcare or early 
years providers and reaches around 750 childminders yearly between 2005 and 2007. 
Because of its large sample size and its design, the survey is a more reliable source 
of information about childminders than it is about centre-based workers.  
 
I start by looking at childminders’ weekly earnings from parents’ fees.  According to 
the Providers’ Survey, weekly earnings were £143 over the period 2005-2007 . This 
figure is roughly equivalent to 86 percent of the earnings of the median employed 
childcare worker and 42 percent of those of the median UK employee. Of course the 
comparison is only indicative: data are from different sources and are not meant to be 
comparable, if only for the fact that the relevant questions are formulated slightly 
differently. In addition, weekly earnings among childminders are perhaps more likely 
to vary throughout the year, given that securing a steady income from fees is one of 
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the most challenging aspects of childminding. Finally, data from the Providers’ 
Survey may contain measurement errors to a greater extent than found in the LFS, 
for example because interviews are carried out on the telephone rather than in 
person.  
 
Despite these caveats, it remains plausible that earnings among childminders are 
similar to, albeit slightly lower than, those of workers employed in centre-based 
settings. This is indeed the recurrent finding of the literature on childminding: 
childminders risk falling well below the NMW as soon as they have some vacancies 
(Mooney et al. 2001). Besides the need of filling all their places, childminders also 
face the problem of earning enough to cover annual leaves. All childminders 
interviewed charged for some holiday; as one interviewee put it:  
I always say to them [parents]: ‘Look, I need wages 52 weeks a year’ 
The Providers’ Survey asks several questions about childmiders’ availability and fees 
during school holidays, but it is not possible to understand whether or not fees cover 
annual leave. A survey of roughly 500 childminders carried out in 1999 revealed that 
roughly only half of them were charging for holidays (Mooney et al. 2001). Among 
those interviewed, policies about sick pay varied, with some childminders not 
expecting to be paid if they were sick, and others entitled to a few days off in the 
case of illness.  
 
Information about gross income from fees needs to be complemented by figures on 
expenses. Unlike workers in group settings, childminders need to buy all the 
necessary equipment, which includes not only toys, but also crucially, more 
expensive items like buggies, high chairs, car seats and the like. Furthermore, food 
and insurance are important expense items. In 2007 the Providers’ Survey asked 
respondents about their total outings: on average, childminders spent £2200 a year. 
With average annual earnings from fees at £7770, childminders do appear therefore 
to have extremely low net earnings.   
 
But how do childminders set their fees? And what are the characteristics of the 
market in which they operate? According to the Providers’ survey, two thirds of 
respondents did not vary fees from child to child. But the interviews suggested that 
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minders had a mixture of criteria for deciding fees. Not surprisingly, interviewees 
appeared mindful of parents’ ability to pay; for example, Brooke, when asked how 
much she charged, said:  
I don’t have it set in stone. Depends on how much the parents can pay … roughly £40 a 
day. 
The relationship between childmiders and parents tended to be far richer than a pure 
market transaction. At the time of the interviews, one childminder was caring for the 
sons of a man who had been in her care twenty-four years earlier. Naturally, she felt 
that she knew the family well and she was overall gratified: 
 It’s nice to know that you’ve had their dad and had them come back to you. [Thelma] 
In general, childminders’ account of their relationship with parents suggested a high 
level of informality. For example, Brooke was flexible with late pick-up, as long as 
parents sent her a “text” in advance. Likewise, Thelma reported that she usually 
agreed with parents on when to take her holidays. It was, however, difficult to 
understand to what extent the fact that childminders were accommodating parents’ 
need was the outcome of a collaborative and trusting relationship or responded to the 
need of offering a competitive service. One childminder, for example, explained that 
the mother of a child in her care was expecting a second child and the baby was due 
soon. The childminder had offered to go to the child’s home had the mother needed 
to go to hospital in the middle of the night. After explaining the arrangement, she 
remarked that no day nursery was offering such service.  
 
Despite the informality or familiarity that childminders could sometimes have with 
the parents, the market for childminding appeared highly competitive. Childminders 
needed to charge on the basis of the prevailing rate and indeed were well informed 
about current rates in their local area. They tried to exercise some control on the 
existing charging rate, although their way of monitoring each other was highly 
informal and not necessarily effective. For example, Thelma reported: 
I normally get told off [by other minders], because I’m charging under. And they tell 
me that I’ll make it bad for them. 
It was in childminders’ interest to avoid price competition, but each childminder 
could potentially gain from setting lower rates. There was essentially a coordination 
problem and individual childminders seemed able to establish strong support 
 155
relationships with only a few other minders without achieving an influence on 
market price. So, for example, all childminders interviewed were close to one or two 
other childminders with whom they met up regularly and to whom they referred 
potential clients if they themselves were unable to accept additional children. But 
these forms of support involved only very small groups and were based on close 
friendship.  
 
A more institutional mechanism was the local childminding network. The network 
had been directly established by the Local Authority, which employed a coordinator 
with the role of supporting childminders. The explicit objective was to raise the 
quality of childminders’ provision, and to this end training sessions were organised 
in various centres around the Local Authority. The basis for joining the network was 
simple. Childminders willing to be part of it had to be inspected by a local 
coordinator, who would certify the high quality of provision. In practice, the network 
operated a system of quality assurance parallel to the national one operated by Ofsted 
but on a purportedly higher level. One childminder was sceptical:  
It’s exactly the same as Ofsted inspection, it really is. You don’t need that twice: it’s 
bad enough once. [Thelma] 
Being part of the network however gave some advantages to childminders. For 
example, the Local Authority brochure listing all registered childminders in the 
different areas clearly marked those who were part of the network as being a 
“Member of a quality assured childminding network”.  
 
Not surprisingly, the Local Authority network made no attempt to raise fees or 
improve working conditions among childminders. In this respect it was very different 
from the organisations described by Greener (2009), which set uniform fees across a 
large group of childminders and a system of internal referrals within the 
organisations. These organisations were successful in raising childminders’ income 
and smoothing the flow of work through a system of brokerage, whereby 
childminders receiving a request but unable to service it had to redirect the parent to 
the available childminders within the organisation. Unlike the cases analysed by 
Greener, it is hard to assess whether the childminding network in the Local Authority 
visited made it easier for its members to charge higher rates on the basis of the 
quality assurance mechanism underpinning it. Data from the Providers’ Survey 
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reveal that minders who are part of a network have a higher average weekly income 
from fees than those not part of a network –  £168 and £153 respectively.29  But it 
could be that more confident and capable minders are more likely to be both part of a 
local network and set higher fees.  
 
Overall, the pay of childminders does not appear to differ markedly from that of 
other childcare workers. Similarly to workers employed in the private sector, 
childminders lack organised representation as far as fees are concerned. Rates are 
ultimately set on the basis of local supply and demand and this arrangement has 
created a downward pressure on the fees that minders can charge.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter has centred on pay in childcare – it has examined pay levels, their 
change over time and how they vary across different services.  Has the pay of 
childcare workers gone up since 1994? The most immediate answer is yes, because 
real wages have improved. Most importantly, wages in childcare have kept up with 
wages elsewhere in the economy, despite the fact that productivity is likely to have 
been lower (Himmelweit 2005). It could be that the increase in public funding in the 
sector has contributed to maintain childcare workers’ wages in line with aggregate 
trends in the entire labour market. It remains nonetheless notable that the more 
substantial changes in childcare workers’ pay have occurred at the bottom of the 
wage distribution. The proportion of childcare workers on very low pay has indeed 
diminished. This is likely to be linked to the introduction of the National Minimum 
Wage, rather than to policy measures specific to the childcare sector. 
 
As their relative pay has remained roughly constant, childcare workers continue to be 
at the bottom of the income distribution with earnings around 65 percent of the 
median British worker. In this respect, the higher visibility of the childcare sector 
and government funding have not fundamentally transformed the position of 
childcare workers in the labour market.  
 
                                                      
29 Data from 2006 and 2007. Figures are real prices, and use 2005 as the base year.  
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When looking at the characteristics of provision and their correlation with pay, two 
main findings have emerged. First, the distinction between the private and the public 
sector is crucial. Pay is much higher in the latter. The size of the gap underscores the 
importance of demand-side factors to an understanding of low pay. Furthermore, the 
interviews illustrated how nurseries could have not possibly passed higher wage 
costs onto parents, who are income constrained. As one interviewee put it, this 
market mechanism could work for a nursery catering for bankers’ children only.  
The low productivity of the sector combined with parents’ inability and 
unwillingness to pay higher fees leave nurseries in the need of public funding in 
order to increase wages.  In addition, the fact that pay is much higher in the public 
sector indicates that levels of funding are crucial. Indeed, maintained provision, 
whether in schools or children’s centre, receive a larger amoung of public money 
than other settings (Chapter 3, West, Roberts and Noden 2010). 
 
Of course, it could be argued that the low pay in the private sector simply reflects the 
possibly different characteristics of the workforce. In other words, it could be that 
workers in the private sector are less qualified or ‘productive’ than those in the 
public sector. This point will be explored in both the next chapter and in Chapter 7. 
However, it is important to remember that public provision is not evenly spread 
across the country, rather is it concentrated in some urban areas where local 
government has traditionally supported services for children. It is unlikely therefore 
that workers are sorted either into the private or the public sector on the basis of 
some individual characteristics alone. Furthermore, the evidence reported in this 
chapter on wage setting systems is compelling. Workers in the private sector have 
little bargaining power: management sets wages unilaterally and with no 
transparency nor clear criteria. In this respect, the labour market childcare workers 
face has the characteristics of a monopsony (Manning 2003, 555). In a 
monopsonistic labour market, employers have the possibility of cutting wages 
without losing all their workers.     
 
On the other hand, workers in the public sector are more likely to be covered by a 
collective agreement and have relatively higher wages. It is therefore likely that 
outsourcing public childcare services, for example Children’s Centres, will lower 
wages, as feared by unions (Daycare Trust and TUC 2008). This would be also in 
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line with evidence from other sectors, for example the home-care one (Eborall, Will, 
and Woodrow 2010).  
 
Besides the distinction between private and public sectors, the findings have pointed 
to another important division: that between care and education. Whether services are 
framed as offering childcare as opposed to early education seems to matter, in that 
pay is higher in education. This wage differential in part reflects different job 
contents. Workers in the care sector are likely to work with toddlers and infants, 
while those in education cater only for three and four-year-olds. But care and 
education have also traditionally had different statuses, with care work invariably 
considered less demanding than educational work. This point will be explored further 
in Chapter 7, wherein will be discussed the implications of the care/education divide 
on the skilled status of the job.  
 
The fact that education is regarded more highly than care is also common in other 
countries. For example, the USA, France, Belgium and Italy have a system of 
services split between education and social welfare and they tend to staff the two 
tiers rather differently, with better trained and better paid staff employed in the 
education tier (OECD 2006; Moss 2010).  
 
The findings have thus suggested that childcare policy is likely to affect pay in three 
ways. First, tilting the balance towards private providers affects workers’ pay. 
Insofar as employment in private and public sectors is characterised by different 
institutional arrangements, a move towards more private childcare provision can be 
detrimental to workers’ pay. Second, funding arrangements are paramount, as they 
affect settings’ ability to pay their workers. Left to market devices alone, childcare 
workers’ pay is likely to fall even further behind and/or families are likely to pay an 
increasing proportion of their income on childcare. Third, childcare policy influences 
the philosophy underpinning different services. When services are considered 
educational, pay appears to be higher, even when the sector of provision is taken into 
account. The integration of care and education under the auspices of the Department 
of Education could therefore contribute to improving pay among those working 
outside schools.  
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This chapter has focused exclusively on pay and on its relation to the way childcare 
services are organised. The next chapter complements the analysis presented here 
and looks at workers’ characteristics. 
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Appendix 5.1 Proxy respondents: robustness checks 
Proxy respondents are likely to report wage information with less accuracy than the 
rest of the sample. Indeed one is more likely to know better his or her own pay slip 
than that of another member of the household. However these errors are not random, 
as proxy respondents tend to report systematically lower wages. This creates 
problems when assessing wages against absolute values (as in the case of the NMW).  
Regarding childcare workers, the magnitude of the problem does appear to be 
negligible insofar as the objective of the analysis is not so much to produce accurate 
estimates but rather to gauge the prevailing pay levels and their evolution over time. 
This is why the chapter has included proxy respondents in all the analyses presented.  
 
In order to show that such inclusion does not change the pattern of results, I 
reproduce all the graphs presented in the chapter, with the only difference of 
excluding proxy responses. Inevitably, as the sample is substantially smaller, 
estimates may be more accurate but nevertheless less precise. I present one graph per 
page and offer a brief comment on the differences arising when discarding proxy 
responses.    
 
It should be noted that the differences from analyses run over the entire sample are 
minimal. In particular, when using the logarithm of the hourly wage, as in the 
comparisons within the childcare workforce, hardly any difference is detectable. This 
is because the logarithm copresses wages, thus reducing differences. In addition, 
there is no significant (at 5% level) difference across groups of childcare workers in 
the incidence of proxy responses.   
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7Figure A5.1.1 Real hourly wage among childcare workers, 1994-2008 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Sample includes all childcare workers aged from 16 to 59 (women) 64 (men). It excludes proxy 
respondents. 
All wages are deflated at 2005 prices. Horizontal dotted line set at £5.05. Vertical dotted line set at 
2005.  
 
 
When looking at real wages absolute levels, the exclusion of proxy repondents 
results in a very slight increase in wages, which is mostrly evident along the 10th 
percentile line. (Comparison: Figure 5.1)   
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 8 Figure A5.1.2 Average wage in childcare by sector, 1994-1998 
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wage), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. Sample includes all 
workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
The trend in real wages growth is almost identical to the one reported in Figure 5.2. 
Likewise, the difference between the two groups is very similar. If anything, it is 
slightly larger. This is probably due to the different incidence of proxy responses. In 
particular, information on women is more likely to be obtained directly by the person 
it refers to than is the case for men. Thus, among childcare workers there is a lower 
percentage of proxy responses than is the case in the rest of the sample. In the LFS 
dataset used throughout the chapter, of the observations with wage information, 22 
percent of those on childcare workers were given by proxy respondents against 27 
percent for the rest of the sample. This means that the inclusion of proxy responses 
produces a stronger downward bias on the wages of the rest of the sample than it 
does on the wages of childcare workers.   
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9 Figure A5.1.3 Average wage in childcare by sector, 1994-2008 
 
   
   
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, fifth wave respondents only. 
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wage), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. In the LFS ‘public 
sector’ is defined as that owned, funded or run by central or local government, and ‘private sector’ as 
all else (ONS 2007, 68). Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 
64 (men) and excludes proxy respondents. 
 
 
In comparison to Figure 5.4, the only difference is that the gap is slightly smaller in 
years 2005, 2006, 2007. In those three years, the percentage of proxy respondents 
among childcare workers was slightly higher than in other years, at around 28 
percent. This probably why a difference emerges in relation to those years only.
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10 Figure A5.1.4 Average wage in childcare by type of provision, 1994-2008 
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wages), with wages deflated by 2005 prices. ISC92 classification 
is used to distinguish between care and education. See text. Sample includes all childcare workers 
aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
As before, differences between the figure above and Figure 5.5 are minimal and 
suggest that the pay gap between care and education is slightly smaller than that 
presented in Figure 5.5.
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11Figure A5.1.5 Average wage in the for-profit and voluntary sectors, 1994-2008 
 
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: Those reported are log (hourly wages), with wages deflated at 2005 prices. Voluntary sector 
includes: charity, voluntary organisation or trust. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 
16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men) 
 
. 
 
In comparison to Figure 5.6, the exclusion of proxy respondents further reduces the 
gap between wages in voluntary sector settings and private for-profit ones. As the 
evidence presented in Figure 5.6 had been interpreted as pointing to no significant 
difference between the two sectors, the finding above confirms the chapter results.
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Appendix 5.2 Additional figure 
12 Figure A5.2.1 Incidence of low pay among childcare workers older than 22  
 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: The two thresholds – two-thirds median and half median – are calculated over all UK 
employees of working age. 
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Appendix 5.3 Ranking of occupations by pay 
Here occupations are ranked on the basis of their average hourly wage. Occupations are 3-digit categories as labelled in  SOC92 for the 1994-
1998 period and as in SOC2000 for the 2003-2008 period. Thus the two figures are not exactly comparable. In both cases, however, childcare 
workers as defined throughout this thesis (see Chapter 4) are singled out and form an individual category.  
13Figure A5.3.1 Ranking of occupations by average hourly wage, 1994-1998 
 
Source: LFS, 2003-2008, all quarters.  
Note: vertical axis £ at 2005 prices. Occupations as in SOC92 “minor groups” (i.e. 3-digit), with the exception of “childcare workers” who are defined as described in Chapter 
4.  
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14Figure A5.3.2 Ranking of occupations by average hourly wage, 2003-2008 
 
Source: LFS, 2003-2008, all quarters.  
Note: Vertical axis: £ at 2005 prices. Occupations as in SOC2000 “minor groups” (i.e. 3-digits classification), with the exception of “childcare workers”, who are defined as 
described in Chapter 4.  
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Appendix 5.4 Private/public sector classification in the LFS 
 
I report here the questions that are used to distinguish between public and private 
sector workers.  LFS respondents who were in work were asked the following 
questions (ONS 2007, 26-27): 
 
 Was that [firm/organisation you work for] … 
a. a private firm or business or a limited company  
b. or some other kind of organisation?  
 
 What kind of non-private organisation was it?  
1. A public limited company/plc?  
2. A nationalised industry/state corporation?  
3. Central government or civil service?  
4. Local government or council (including police, fire services and 
local authority controlled schools/colleges)?  
5. A university or other grant funded education establishment  
6. A health authority or NHS Trust?  
7. A charity, voluntary organisation or trust?  
8. The armed forces?  
9. or was it some other kind of organisation? 
 
The ONS combines the answers to these two questions are combined to produce the 
variable “publicr” as:  
Private sector = a + 1 + 7 
Public sector = 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8  
In addition, in order to single out the voluntary sector, I have constructed the variable 
“whichsector” as: 
Private sector = a + 1  
Voluntary sector = 7 
Public sector = 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 8 
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When examining differences in pay across different groups of childcare workers, I 
have checked that including 5 “A university or other grant funded education 
establishment” into the public sector did not alter the results. 
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Chapter 6  
Who works in childcare? 
 
Introduction  
The main message from the previous chapter was that childcare workers are 
generally low-paid, with the median childcare worker earning around two thirds of  
the wage of the median British employee. This chapter leaves aside the topic of pay 
and concentrates instead on the characteristics of the childcare workforce. The 
objective is therefore to analyse trends in the characteristics of childcare workers. 
This way, the analysis will ascertain the other fundamental assumption of this thesis 
– namely, that childcare work is an exclusively female occupation. Beside the gender 
composition of this occupation, attention will be devoted to other demographic 
characteristics, working patterns and qualifications. For all these domains, I will 
explore changes over time in order to understand whether the profile of the childcare 
workforce remained unaltered from 1994 to 2008.  
 
Given the changes at policy level, we could expect work in childcare to attract, in the 
most recent years, workers with different characteristics relative to the mid-1990s. 
For example, both regulatory reforms and the launch of some qualifications at 
tertiary education level could have contributed to attracting workers with a relatively 
higher education background. At the same time, the evidence from the previous 
chapter has suggested that pay has remained roughly stable; thus it is unlikely that 
new recruits have been attracted by higher relative wages. The empirical evidence 
presented here will shed light on this point.  
 
Besides assessing the degree of change in the childcare workforce, this chapter also 
looks at the differences between various groups of childcare workers. Are employees 
in the private sector different to those employed in the public one or to childminders? 
By contrasting the different groups, I seek to pursue the analytical approach 
developed in the previous chapter, where attention was paid to the architecture of 
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childcare services and its association with pay. The empirical analysis presented here 
complements that reported in the previous chapter, because it allows understanding 
of whether the differences in pay could be mediated by differences in workers’ 
characteristics.  For example, if childcare workers employed in the public sector 
appear to be markedly different from those employed in the private sector, this could 
contribute to explaining the public/private pay differential described earlier.  
Finally, this chapter also briefly compares childcare workers with all other British 
workers – this contrast allows highlighting those features that are specific to the 
childcare workforce.  
 
Data and methods 
As in the previous chapter, the analysis is based mainly on data from the LFS from 
1994 to 2008. While in the previous chapter I used data from the fifth wave, here I 
use the first wave, because most information is collected  at the first interview. Thus, 
the first wave is the most suitable for the  analysis carried out here. Indeed, the LFS 
contains rich information about respondents’ demographic characteristics, their 
employment patterns and their qualifications. The Early Years and Childcare 
Providers’ survey, instead, has little information about individual workers’ 
characteristics, and for this reason will not be used in this chapter.  
 
This chapter will devote much space to the topic of qualifications. Concerning this 
specific issue, I will also draw on information from the interviews. The interviews 
elicited information on workers’ qualifications and their views on the qualifications 
attained. In particular, I asked interviewees how qualifications had helped them and 
what difference they had made. This evidence will be relied upon especially to gain a 
better understanding of a specific group of qualifications. Finally, material from the 
interviews is used when it helps to clarify or interpret data from the LFS.  
 
Demographic characteristics of the childcare workforce 
I start by examining childcare workers’ demographic characteristics and evidence is 
reported in Table 6.1. One of the most striking features of this occupation remains 
the high level of gender segregation. Similarly to a decade earlier, between 2004 and 
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2008 childcare workers were still virtually all women. When looking at the years 
2003-2008, there are only two other occupations which are the entire preserve of  
women: that of midwives and school midday assistants (so-called “dinner ladies”).30 
The fact that little has changed in the level of gender segregation in childcare 
suggests that explicit efforts to recruit men into this occupation have not surfaced 
into aggregated data.  
 
Variations in average age are barely detectable, and not statistically significant. In 
terms of family composition, there have been some notable changes. While two 
thirds of workers were either married or cohabiting in the mid-1990s, the proportion 
had slightly dropped by 2004-2008.31 But the proportion of workers with dependent 
children has remained unvaried. These two trends have been matched by an increase 
in the share of lone parents, in fact, given the scant presence of men in the sector, of 
lone mothers. Whereas between 1994 and 1998 only 7 percent of the workers were 
lone mothers, by 2004-2008 the percentage had jumped to 11 percent, an increase 
which is stastically significant. The larger presence of lone parents in childcare 
occupations is surely related to broader trends and in particular to the marked 
increase, under Labour, of the lone parents’ employment rate. Indeed, data from the 
LFS indicate that, among all women in employment, the share of lone mothers has 
increased from less than 6 percent between 1994 and 1998 to more than 8 percent 
between 1999 and 2003.32  
 
However, the marked increased of lone mothers among childcare workers also 
reflects the precise policy objective of promoting employment in childcare 
specifically through New Deal programmes (DfEE and DSS, 1998: ES9). The idea 
was that childcare could promote female employment in two ways: first, by offering 
a service to mothers; second, by creating employment opportunities for mothers out 
of work. In order to pursue this second objective, opportunities to train as childcare 
workers were systematically made available through New Deals, and several  
14 
                                                      
30 My own calculations based on LFS data and using four-digit SOC2000 occupational categories.  
31 For simplicity, throughout the rest of chapter I will refer to “married or cohabiting” simply as 
“married”, although cohabitation will be always included. On average between 1994 and 2008, the 
percentage of childcare workers cohabiting with their partners was 8.1, while the percentage of those 
married and living with their husband/wife was 56.4. 
32 My calculations. See also Gregg, Harkness and Smith (2007). 
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Table 6.1 Demographic characteristics of childcare workers, by time period 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
Women 98.9 98.5 98.8 
Age 34 35 36 
Married or cohabiting 66.5 64.7 63.8† 
With children 50.4 48.6 50.1 
Lone parent 7.4 8.3 11.4‡ 
Born in the UK & White 90.1 90.2 89.7 
Unweighted base 2175 2235 2149 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: All figures are percentages, except for age, which indicates average age.  ‘With children’ indicates that 
worker lives together with his/her child(ren) under the age of 16. † indicates that the percentage is statistically 
different (at 5% level) from that for 1994-1998. ‡ indicates that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% 
level) from that for 1999-2003. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
 
 
programmes targeted women out of work from disadvantaged areas.33 LFS data 
allow little exploration on whether lone mothers have taken up employment in 
childcare in connection with New Deal for Lone Parents programmes or equivalent 
‘welfare to work’ measures. But when looking at respondents’ employment status a 
year before the LFS interview, it emerges that more than 4 percent of those in 
childcare reported that they had been looking after family at home, whereas among 
employed women this percentage was around 2 percent.  
 
If the changes in the share of lone parents among childcare workers seem to magnify 
similar trends occurring in overall employment, variations in the national and ethnic 
composition of the childcare workforce are almost absent, despite a significant 
increase in the total number of workers from foreign countries and/or from ethnic 
minorities. Indeed the percentage of childcare workers born in the UK and white has 
remained almost unvaried at the remarkably high level of nearly 90 percent.  Such 
uniformity is surprising in many respects. Recent research indicates that the 
proportion of migrants among workers in care services for the elderly has increased, 
and more so after the inflow of workers from Eastern Europe after 2004 (Cangiano et  
                                                      
33 The “Training in Childcare” project in Birmingham is one of such examples. The programme 
offered training and work experience to women over 25, out of work, without qualifications and living 
in disadvantaged areas.  
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15Table 6.2 Demographic characteristics of childcare workers, by type of 
provision/sector 
 PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
CHILDMINDERS
Women 98.3 99.1 99 
Age 32 37† 40†‡ 
Married or cohabiting 53.3 68.5† 82.6†‡ 
With children 38.4 46.7† 73.6†‡ 
Lone parent 7.4 8.9† 11.7†‡ 
Born in the UK & White 87.9 91.8† 93† 
Unweighted base 3200 1690   1639 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: All figures are percentages, except for age, which indicates average age.  ‘With children’ indicates that 
worker lives together with his/her child(ren), under the age of 16. † indicates that the percentage is statistically 
different (at 5% level) from that for the private sector. ‡ indicates that the percentage is statistically different (at 
5% level) from that for the public sector. Base sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 
(women) and 64 (men). 
 
 
al. 2009). Evidence from Mediterranean countries suggests that an increasing number 
of migrant women is employed in household services, caring mainly for the elderly 
but also for very young children (Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa 2006). In the USA the  
share of Hispanic and Black women is far higher in childcare than in overall 
employment (Center for the Study of Child Care Employment 2006; Whitebook 
1999).   
 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that recent policy changes have tended to favour private, 
centre-based provision. It could be therefore that different groups of workers have 
witnessed different trends, which are not visible when looking at the childcare 
workforce as a whole. But breaking down the results by type of sector and provision 
leads to a very similar conclusion: the only recognisable change over time is an 
increase in the proportion of lone parents among employees in both the private and 
the public sectors and among childminders (Results are reported in Appendix 6). 
 
Although trends have been fairly similar across the different groups of childcare 
workers, there are some marked differences in their demographic profiles (Table 
6.2). In particular, childminders stand out as the oldest group.  This could indicate  
176 
 
16Table 6.3 Presence of young children and age of childless workers by type of 
provision/sector, 1994-2008 
 WITH A CHILD UNDER 5 
YEAR OLD 
AVERAGE AGE IF 
CHILDLESS  
Private sector 12.8 29 
(unweighted base) (3210) (1959) 
Public sector 13.9 37 
(unweighted base) (1700) (900) 
Childminders 26.4 48 
(unweighted base) (1639) (433) 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: Figures in the first column are percentages, while those in the second column are average age. Base 
sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men).  
 
 
that childminding is taken up at a later stage in life, most probably during child-
rearing years. Indeed childminders are more likely than any other childcare worker to 
have children. Figures in Table 6.3 suggest that more than a quarter of childminders  
have a child under 5. At the same time, those without children at home are much 
older than is the case among other childcare workers.  This suggests that 
childminders often continue their activity after their own children have grown up, 
which is in line with results from other studies (Mooney et al. 2001). As for the share 
of lone parents among childminders, it was noted above that this is the result of 
recent changes. Indeed, childminding  had been identified by Labour as a good 
employment option for lone parents, as it allows combining paid work with caring 
responsibilities (Rolfe et al. 2003). 
 
When comparing childcare workers employed in the public sector to those employed 
in the private sector, three differences are visible. First, workers in the public sector 
are generally older, with the average age around 37 while in the private sector it is 
32. Second, and linked to this, is the higher incidence of marriage and parenthood 
among public sector workers. The percentage of lone parents is similar in the two 
groups. However, this means that the private sector has a higher incidence of lone 
parents relative to its overall number of parents than is the case in the public sector.  
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17Table 6.4 Part-time work by time period, 1994-2008 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
All  48.4 43.7† 43.6† 
(unweighted base) 2175 2235 2149 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: Part-time defined by the respondent. When an ‘objective definition’ is used, employing 30 hours as the 
cut-off point, figures do not change substantially. † indicates that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% 
level) from that for 1994-1998. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
 
 
Third, a higher proportion of workers in the private sector are foreign or from Black 
and Ethnic Minorities (BEM). This is surprising, given that public provision tends to 
be concentrated in urban areas with a relative higher incidence of BEM. 
 
Taken all together, the findings on childcare workers’ demographic characteristics 
points to strong continuity: the demographic profile of this workforce has remained 
largely unchanged. The most striking feature continues to be the high level of gender 
segregation – 98 percent of workers are women. Despite explicit efforts to recruit 
men, childcare work is still a female job. Furthermore, almost the majority of 
childcare workers have children of their own. This, together with the high and 
increasing incidence of lone parenthood, is bound to give prominence to issues of 
reconciliation between family and work responsibilities. This point will be explored 
in detail in the next section.  
 
Working patterns, flexibility and distance to work among childcare workers 
The majority of mothers in the UK have traditionally combined pay work and family 
responsibilities by working part-time, which resulted, in the mid-2000s, in 45 percent 
of women in part-time work  (Lewis 2006; Manning and Petrongolo 2004). Equally 
well-documented is a downward trend in part-time employment among mothers 
since the early 1990s (Harkness 2008).  
 
Not surprisingly, working patterns among childcare workers are broadly in line with 
this aggregate picture. Part-time work is fairly common in childcare, but has fallen to 
around 44 percent since 1998  (Table 6.4). However, this trend of part-time work is  
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18Table 6.5 Part-time work by time period and type of provision/sector,  
   1994-2008 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
Employees in private sector 54.2 48† 49.2† 
(unweighted base) (1027) (1079) (1104) 
Employees in public sector 37.7 38.1 44.6†‡ 
(unweighted base) (577) (616) (507) 
Childminders 48.9 41.5† 30.7†‡ 
(unweighted base) (569) (535) (535) 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: Part-time defined by the respondent. When an ‘objective definition’ is used, employing 30 hours as the 
cut-off point, figures do not change substantially. † indicates that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% 
level) from that for 1994-1998. ‡ indicated that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% level) from that for 
1999-2003. Base sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). 
 
not consistent across different groups of childcare workers (Table 6.5). Indeed, 
among childcare workers in the private sector and among childminders there has 
been a decline in part-time work; this, however, has not been the case in public sector 
childcare, where part-time work has gone up. This difference could be in part 
attributed to the pay reviews carried out under the Single Status Agreement, which  
have often changed the number of weeks covered by full pay in the contract of 
nursery nurses employed by Local Authorities. Alternatively, the increase in part-
time employment in the public sector could be related to the increase in the number 
of lone parents, who have greater difficulties in reconciling paid work and caring 
responsibilities. But this explanation would be at odds with the downward trend in 
part-time work in the private sector and among childminders, given that the 
incidence of lone parenthood has increased in these groups of workers as much as 
among public sector workers.  
 
The case of childminders is especially notable, because the reduction in part-time 
work is much larger than among private sector workers. The interviews with 
childminders have highlighted the feeling that childminders need to compete with 
centre-based provision, and offer a service that is more flexible and extensive than 
that which parents can get in day nurseries or children’s centres:  
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19Table 6.6 Total number of hours worked, by time period 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
0-15 21 16.2† 14.8† 
16-30 28.9 29.8 32.9†‡ 
30-44 35.8 40.2† 38.7† 
45+ 14.4 13.8 13.5 
Holding a second job 9.8 7.7† 7.4† 
Unweighted base 2165 2233 2140 
Source:  LFS, 2005-2008, second quarter, first, second, third and fourth wave only.  
Note: Figures are percentages. Total hours worked include paid and unpaid overtime.  † indicates that the 
percentage is statistically different (at 5% level) from that for 1994-1998. ‡ indicates that the percentage is 
statistically different (at 5% level) from that for 1999-2003. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 
16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men).  
 
I am very flexible. You need to be very flexible when you work in this kind of job. 
Generally I start at 7am and finish at 7pm. But I do overnight care, I am registered for 
that and I do evening work too. [Brooke]  
This could explain why childminders have a working pattern that resembles that of 
childless women, despite a considerable proportion of childminders being mothers of 
small children.  
. 
Figures on part-time and full-time work can however be misleading: first, they do not 
take into account the number of hours worked. ‘Long’ part-time hours can be very 
similar to ‘short’ full-time hours. Second, the part-time figures presented refer to the 
job, rather than to the person. Someone holding two part-time jobs would here be 
counted as working part-time, while in fact she may be facing more difficulties in 
reconciling family responsibilities and paid work than someone employed full-time.  
 
Table 6.6 summarises the total number of hours worked by childcare workers over 
the three time periods. The figures show a 7.2 percentage point drop in the 
proportion working less than 16 hours (from a base of 21 percent in 1994-1998), a 
trend which is likely to be related to the introduction of the Working Families’ Tax 
Credit in 1999 and of its successor – the Working Tax Credit – in 2003.34 This drop 
in the proportion working less than 16 hours is matched by an increase in the share of 
                                                      
34 Both the Working Families’ Tax Credit and the Working Tax Credit were available to families 
working at least 16 hours a week.The Working Tax Credit extended eligibility to singles and couples 
without children.  
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workers reporting working hours between 16 and 30 hours and between 31 and 45. 
Thus, by 2003-2008 more than 70 percent of childcare workers reported working 
between 16 and 45 hours. This trend has been concomitant with a slight reduction in 
the proportion of workers holding a second job. However, the incidence of second 
job holders is very high. For example, among all people in paid work the proportion 
is around 4 percent. The high incidence of workers holding a second job is arguably 
related to the low pay in the sector.  
 
Although part-time work has traditionally been the chief way of reconciling family 
responsibilities with paid work, there are other aspects related to working times that 
are likely to affect workers’ flexibility. The material from the interviews has indeed 
highlighted how workers give importance to having the time to fit small chores or 
commitments in their weekly schedule. In particular, shift work was often considered 
desirable as both Ashia and Rose explained: 
You know, shift work here is more convenient for me, cause if I’m on early I finish at 
three and I can go and pick up my brother from school or, you know, I would do things 
that I need to do for family and stuff.  If I’m on the late shift I start at ten thirty, so I’ve 
got that opportunity to drop my brother off to school or if I need to do anything for my 
mum. [Ashia] 
It’s the shift that makes the difference.  You know, that’s what makes the difference. 
[…] At least I know that this week I was on 10.00 till 6.00. Next week I’ll be doing 8.00 
till 4.00 but at least I’ve still got time to go to the optician, dentist or whatever. [Rose] 
While shift work seemed quite common among the interviewees working in private 
day nurseries, data from the LFS indicate that this working arrangement is very 
marginal among childcare workers, with only 9 percent of childcare workers  
reporting to have some kind of shift arrangement (Table 6.7, first column). Working 
only during term time is instead more widespread, with one worker out of five 
working only when schools are open (Table 6.7, second column). This number 
coincides with the proportion of workers employed in the public education sector 
(see Chapter 5: Table  5.4 and Table 5.6).  
 
The need to balance family responsibility and work is also likely to be reflected in 
the distance that childcare workers are ready to travel to work. The third column of 
Table 6.7 presents figures on time taken to travel for childcare workers. On average, 
childcare workers take 14 minutes or 21 minutes to get to work, depending on 
whether they are part-timers or full-timers respectively, and this indicates that they  
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20Table 6.7 Family-friendly working arrangements and time to travel to work 
 SHIFT WORKa TERM TIMEb TRAVEL TO WORK 
TIMEc 
Percentage/Minutes 8.8 20.5 18 
Unweighted base 1431 1491 800 
Source: 
a. LFS, 2005-2008, second quarter, first, second, third and fourth wave only.  
b. LFS, 2005-2008, second and fourth quarters, first and second wave only. 
c. LFS, 2006-2008, second quarter, first, second, third and fourth wave only. 
Notes: Figures in the first and second columns indicate percentages over childcare workers aged 
between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men); figures in the third column are minutes.  
 
 
travel 5 minutes less than the average working woman in the UK.35 The fact that 
childcare workers seem less prepared than the average British woman to travel long 
distance to work surely mirrors their lower pay – as their wage is relatively lower, 
they cannot afford to travel as far. But it also indicates that family responsibilities are 
likely to affect the range of jobs accessible to childcare workers which, in turn, 
makes the state of the local labour market particularly relevant to them (Manning 
2003, Chapter 7; Yeandle 2009).  
 
The case of childminders is obviously different as, by definition, they work at home. 
Interviews have however pointed to some forms of constraints that may not be 
obvious to those not familiar with this type of work. First, childminders tend to leave 
the house every day, in order to go to drop-in centres where children can either be 
outdoors or do “messy play”, i.e. with sand and water, wet paint and similar. 
Therefore, they do have to travel during their working hours, and they do so with 
children in tow. Second, childminding imposes several constraints on home 
arrangements, and can clash with other family members’ needs. For example, one 
interviewee who was working part-time in a day nursery explained that she would 
have liked to take up childminding but she could not have had children making noise 
in the house during the day, because her husband was a bus driver and often worked 
during the night and hence needed to sleep during the day.  
                                                      
35 Indeed on average women travel 19 minutes if working part-time or 26 minutes in working full-
time. Men take respectively 22 and 30 minutes. My calculations on 2006-2008 data from LFS.  
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 In a labour market in which, in 2003, 45 percent of women worked part-time 
(Manning and Petrongolo 2004), childcare workers do not seem to be exceptional – 
indeed the incidence of part-time work is very similar if not slightly lower. As is 
generally the case for women, childcare workers’ choice of working part-time is 
likely to be dictated by the need to balance family responsibilities with paid work. As 
for other forms of flexibility, these do not seem to be common. Indeed shift work, 
flagged up as important by interviewees, is, according to the LFS, available only to 
less than 10 percent of childcare workers. Another important aspect of jobs is how 
far one has to travel. Data on travel to work indicate that childcare workers take less 
time than the average woman to get to work. This is turn could be a result of poor 
pay or family responsibilities. Yet the bottom line in this discussion is that family-
friendly working conditions do not figure prominently among childcare workers.  
 
Educational qualifications: understanding changes beyond simple labels 
Previous studies on the characteristics of the childcare workforce have pointed to the 
general low level of qualifications held by the majority of workers. With the 
exception of teachers, there has been the tendency to recruit childcare workers from 
among school leavers with relatively poorer educational attainment (among others, 
Cameron, Owen, and Moss 2001; Abbott and Pugh 1998). This section builds on 
previous analysis and adds further evidence by looking closely at the education 
profile of childcare workers from 1994 to 2008.  
 
In its essence, this is a descriptive exercise. But, unlike the issues examined in the 
previous sections, it presents more challenging measurement problems. The rest of 
this section is therefore devoted to explaining these methodological issues before 
presenting the actual findings in the next subsection. Three issues stand in the way of 
getting a precise picture on the educational profile of childcare workers. First, in the 
case of childcare workers the boundaries between education and training are likely to 
be more blurred than is usually the case. Indeed, several vocational courses are 
designed to be almost equivalent to workplace training, but are nonetheless 
considered part of the education system. This means that the number of years in full-
time education is not a valid indicator in the case of childcare workers, as they often 
acquire specialised knowledge following a pathway other than full-time education. A 
more appropriate indicator would be a measure of attainment, like the highest 
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qualification held, as this would encompass both educational and professional 
qualifications, whether they are obtained via training or while in full-time education. 
Although a focus on qualifications is suitable for childcare workers, it moves 
attention away from educational achievement at the end of compulsory schooling, 
which is a critical determinant of the subsequent choice between academic courses, 
vocational ones or employment.  
 
The second, related problem, is that it is difficult to construct a classification that 
compares different qualifications in a valid way. While it is trivial to rank GCSEs, A-
levels and degrees, there are several qualifications that do not univocally map onto 
each other. Is a BTEC diploma equivalent to A-levels? They are both post-16 
qualifications, usually obtained in two years. However A-levels give access to higher 
education across the board, while a BTEC diploma is accepted as a valid entry 
requirement only by vocationally-oriented degrees (West and Steedmand 2003). 
Finally, the third problem relates to information collected by the LFS. Although the 
LFS presents respondents with a detailed list which comprises in the most recent 
years 40 qualifications, many qualifications that are common among childcare 
workers are not uniquely identified. For example, the NNEB (National Nursery 
Examination Board diploma) and its successor, the CACHE (Council for Awards in 
Care, Health and Education) diploma, are not on the LFS list. This inevitably creates 
some coding errors and limits the level of precision is assessing qualifications among 
childcare workers.  
 
Given these challenges, I have sought to construct a measure that is as reliable and 
valid as possible and that tackles the problems outlined above. I use a measure based 
on the qualifications obtained, and in particular on the highest qualification held. 
Table 6.8 presents this classification and shows how it maps onto the list of 
qualifications recorded by the LFS. Despite all the caveats outlined above, this 
classification has the advantage of giving a clear picture of attainment levels: the 
percentage of childcare workers holding a diploma in nursing or A-levels, for 
example. In order to take into account exam achievement at the age of 16, the 
distinction is made between 5 or more GCSEs A*-C and fewer. This way, a measure 
of attainment at the end of compulsory schooling is included.  
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21Table 6.8 Classification of qualifications 
CLASSIFICATION I CLASSIFICATION II (DETAILED) LFS QUALIFICATIONS INCLUDED 
General education/academic qualifications  
GCSE (< 5A*-C) GCSE (<5A*-C) Fewer than 5 GCSE A*-C  
   
GCSE (≥5A*-C) GCSE (≥5A*-C) 5 or more GCSEs A*-C  
   
A-levels A-levels A-level  
  International baccalaureate  
  Access qualifications 
   
Degree and above First degree First/foundation degree† 
 Higher degree Higher degree 
   
Vocational/occupational qualifications  
Entry/Vocational Lev1 Low skill & other entry Young people Training certificate 
  Key skills qualification 
  Basic skills qualification 
  Entry level qualification 
 NVQ1  NVQ level 1  
 RSA low RSA other 
 C&G low City & Guilds foundation 
 BTEC certificate BTEC first certificate 
   
Vocational Lev2 NVQ2 GNVQ interm. NVQ level 2 or equivalent 
 RSA diploma RSA diploma 
 C&G craft City & Guilds craft 
 BTEC diploma BTEC general diploma  
   
Vocational Lev3 NVQ3-5 NVQ level 3 
  NVQ level 4 
  NVQ level 5 
 RSA high RSA higher diploma 
  RSA advanced diploma 
 C&G advanced City & Guilds advanced craft 
 OND OND, ONC  
   
HND HND, HNC 
Vocational Lev4 and above Diploma in HE  Diploma in higher education 
 Other HE below degree Other higher education below degree
 Teaching diploma Teaching, further education 
  Teaching, secondary education 
  Teaching, primary education 
  Teaching foundation stage 
  Teaching, level not stated 
 Nursing diploma Nursing diploma 
Note: † I separate “Foundation degree” from “First degree” and include it in “Diploma in HE” and 
therefore in “Vocational Lev 4+”. Scottish and Welsh qualifications are included and equivalised to 
English ones.   
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Furthermore, the classification used distinguishes between academic and vocational 
qualifications at secondary level. The British educational system is characterised by 
the presence of an academic track, which is held as the educational gold standard and 
by what I call, for simplicity, a “vocational track”. The academic track is pursued by  
a minority of pupils and is marked by the attainment of 5 or more GCSEs at grades 
A*-C  at age 16, two or more A-Levels at age 18, and, ultimately, a degree. Outside 
this standard, there is a large plethora of options, which go from full-time college-
based courses combining general education with a strong vocational element to 
work-related educational programmes aimed at “disaffected” young people (Pring 
2008; West and Steedman 2003). Although the vocational branch is far from 
homogeneous, a strong demarcation exists between the gold standard and all other 
qualifications, and it is therefore important to take this distinction into account.  
 
This distinction also reduces the need to devise a classification that harmonises all 
qualifications. As it was explained in Chapter 3, the Government has established a 
“qualifications framework” (the NQF) at national level, which classifies all 
qualifications – vocational and academic alike – at one of five levels. According to 
the NQF, for example, the NVQ3 is equivalent to other vocational qualifications like 
the BTEC diploma and also to academic qualifications like A-levels. So someone 
with an NVQ3 and someone with A-levels were both said to have qualifications at 
level 3. In the NQF levels are clearly defined, but this clarity is achieved at the 
expense of a valid and credible correspondence between qualifications (Robinson 
1996, 1997; Wolf 2004). Thus the classification presented in Table 6.8 keeps the 
academic track separate from the vocational one.  
 
Finally remains the problem that some professional and vocational qualifications 
specific to the childcare sector are not uniquely identified by the LFS. This may be 
especially relevant for NNEB and CACHE diplomas. It is not possible to get any 
more precise information on these qualifications; thus, when discussing the results, it 
is important to remember that the category ‘vocational qualifications’ at both levels 3 
and 4 and above include qualifications which may be quite different from each other. 
I will return to this point later in the chapter. 
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15Figure 6.1 Highest qualification held, by time period 
 
Source: LFS data, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: “Entry/Vocational L1” includes “No qualifications”. For a detailed description of how qualifications are 
defined see text and Table 6.7 Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
 
 
Trends in the qualifications held by childcare workers 
After this methodological detour, we can finally assess whether or not the 
qualifications held by childcare workers have changed over time or not. Figure 6.1 
reports the highest qualification held by childcare workers over the last 15 years. As 
before, data are reported over three five-year periods in order to increase sample size. 
The immediate point to notice is the mix of qualifications: the modal group never 
reaches more than 30 percent. This means that this workforce, despite having fairly 
homogeneous demographic characteristics, is quite varied in terms of the 
qualifications held. There are five groups of qualifications that have a relative high 
prevalence: GCSE, with different grades, and vocational qualifications at levels 2, 3, 
4 and above. Thus, the saliency of the vocational track is evident, since the only 
widespread academic qualification is, in fact, the general education certificate gained 
upon completion of compulsory schooling. Besides these five groups of 
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qualifications, the residual group “Any other/foreign qualifications” is fairly large. 
This in part reflects the difficulty of classifying some qualifications specific to this 
sector, which may not be easily converted into the LFS coding.   
When looking at time trends, the first key aspect regards low education attainment – 
either no qualification at all, very basic vocational training or poor GCSEs. Their 
share has fallen considerably, so that by 2004-2008 less than 20 percent of childcare 
workers had either no qualification or very poor ones as compared with 35 percent in 
1994-1998. On the other hand, vocational qualifications at levels 2 and 3 have 
become increasingly popular. This trend is especially marked for those qualifications 
that are at level 3. Indeed, whereas between 1994 and 1998 only around 6 percent of 
childcare workers had a vocational qualification at level 3 as their highest 
qualification, in more recent years this share has jumped to 27 percent.  
 
These figures may however overestimate the magnitude of the change because they 
probably also capture variations in the way some qualifications were classified. In 
particular, it is not clear whether the NNEB and the CACHE diploma were classified 
at level 2 or 3 before the introduction of the National Qualification Framework in 
1996. If the NNEB was considered equivalent to 2 O-levels until 1997 and 
subsequently equivalent to NVQ3, part of the changes depicted here are due merely 
to a reclassification, rather than an actual change in the qualifications held by 
childcare workers.36 Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the NNEB and CACHE 
diplomas against which to check the numbers obtained from the LFS. My 
calculations based on a guesstimate by Moss and Penn (1996, 100) would suggest 
that around 10 percent of the workforce was holding an NNEB/CACHE at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Thus part of the change between 1994-1998 and 1999-2003 
is likely to have been created by changes in the way qualifications were recorded.  
 
Even though these numbers need to be taken with caution, there is nonetheless a 
visible shift towards vocational qualifications. In particular, vocational qualifications 
at level 3 have become increasingly common, so that by 2004-2008 they were the 
modal qualification type among childcare workers. The fact that the proportion of 
workers with five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C as their highest qualification has 
                                                      
36 In 1972 the NNEB was classified as equivalent to 2 O-levels (Wright 1999).  
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dropped should not be interpreted as a decline in general education qualifications. 
GCSEs are, in the official qualification framework, pitched at a lower level than 
vocational qualifications at level 3. This means that a vocational qualification at level 
3 would be recorded as the highest qualification held by someone with 5 or more 
GCSEs at grades A*-C , even though good GCSEs are more likely to confer access 
to more advanced qualifications than many vocational qualifications at level 337.  
 
Finally, there has been a slight increase in the share of workers holding post-
secondary qualifications. In particular, a growth in vocational qualifications above 
level 4 occurred between 1998 and 2003, while later – between 2003 and 2008 – the 
proportion of workers holding a degree increased.  
 
These results suggest that the majority of childcare workers are qualified either at 
GCSE level or at adjacent vocational ones, namely vocational levels 2 and 3. The 
incidence of post-secondary qualifications is limited to around 20 percent. However, 
when looking at the other end of the attainment spectrum, it is also clear that only a 
small percentage of workers has not obtained their GCSEs, or has ‘poor’ GCSEs. In 
terms of trends, the results suggest that changes in the highest qualification held have 
not occurred evenly across types of qualifications or levels. Indeed, there has been 
only modest growth at tertiary level, though a rapid expansion of vocational 
qualifications at level 2 and even more particularly at level 3. 
 
While over time the picture of childcare workers’ qualifications has remained 
roughly stable, there are some notable differences across groups of workers. As 
before, I distinguish between workers employed in the private sector, those in the 
public sector and finally childminders. Figure 6.2 reports the highest qualification 
held by workers in different groups. There are three points to notice in this 
comparison. First, the incidence of vocational qualifications at levels 2 and 3 is 
highest among employees in the private sector. Second, it is only among workers in 
the public sector that vocational qualifications at level 4 and above are common, with 
more than one in four public sector workers holding a vocational qualification gained 
at post-secondary level.  
                                                      
37 Hereafter I often refer to 5 or more GCSEs at grades A* to C as “good GCSEs” and to less than 5 
GCSEs at grades A* to C as “poor GCSEs”. 
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16Figure 6.2 Highest qualification held, by type of provision/sector 
Source: LFS data, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: “Entry/Vocational L1” includes “No qualifications”. For a detailed description of how qualifications are 
defined see text and Table 6.7. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
 
 
Third, childminders appear to be the least qualified but it is notable that the 
percentage of childminders with a degree is in fact higher than for other groups. This 
is in line with other studies on childminding, which have suggested that childminding  
is often picked up just for a few years by highly qualified women employed in other 
sectors when they have their own children (Greener 2009; Mooney et al. 2001).  
 
Overall, it appears that workers in the public sector are better qualified and this 
could, in turn, explain their higher pay. This point will be explored in more detail in 
the next chapter.  
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A closer examination of vocational qualifications 
Because changes between 1994 and 2008 have mainly regarded vocational 
qualification at level 2 and level 3, in the rest of the section I will examine more 
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22Table 6.9 Highest qualification held, by time period 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008
Other qualification 11.5 10.7 6.4 
Entry level/Vocational L1 11.3 7.1 5.7 
No qualification 8.9 5.6 4.9 
Low skill  0.1 0.1 0.2 
NVQ1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
RSA low 0.8 0.9 0.2 
City & Guilds low  1.4 0.1 0.1 
BTEC certificate 0.1 - 0.1 
GCSE (<5A*-C) 28.9 20 15.9 
Vocational Level 2 6.9 8.9 11.8 
NVQ2 1.5 5.0 9.3 
RSA Diploma 0.4 0.1 0.1 
City & Guilds craft 0.7 0.4 0.5 
BTEC diploma 1.0 0.7 0.6 
GCSE (≥5A*-C)  12.3 12.4 9.2 
Vocational L3 6.1 13.3 25.6 
NVQ3  1.6 7.7 19.9 
RSA High 0.3 0.1 0.1 
City & Guilds advance 0.6 0.3 0.2 
OND  3.7 5.2 5.3 
A-levels 7.3 6.5 5.7 
Vocational L4 and above 12.9 18.6 15.2 
HND 1.7 2.9 3.7 
Diploma in Higher Education (HE) 0.8 2.1 3.2 
Other HE diploma (below degree) 1.4 2.6 1.3 
Teaching diploma 1.5 2.2 1.3 
Nursing diploma 7.5 8.7 5.4 
Degree and above 2.7 2.6 4.4 
First degree 2.3 2.2 4.0 
Higher degree 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Unweighted base 2230 2157 1941 
Source: LFS data, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only. 
Note: percentages do not necessarily add up because of rounding. Scottish and Welsh qualifications are included 
and equivalised to English ones. Sample includes all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 
(men). 
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closely this group of qualifications. The analysis has two objectives: 1. To 
understand more precisely what qualifications belonging to these groups have 
increased more markedly; 2. What the relationship between general education 
qualifications and vocational ones is.  
 
As for the first point, Table 6.9 reports changes in the highest qualification held by 
childcare workers, but breaks down the categories used so far into almost unique  
qualifications. The point to notice is that, among vocational qualifications at level 3, 
it is NVQ3 that have witnessed the most rapid and substantial expansion. Other 
vocational qualifications at level 3 have remained uncommon or, in the case of the 
OND (Ordinary National Diploma), have increased only slightly. Likewise, among 
vocational qualifications at level 2, it is the NVQ2 that has driven much of the 
change. As before, caution is needed when interpreting this result. NVQs are a 
specific type of qualification, but it could be that other qualifications are recorded 
under this heading because the LFS does not list all the vocational qualifications that 
are awarded in the childcare sector. For example, someone with a level 3 “Diploma 
in Early Years Care and Education” is likely to instead be recorded as holding an 
NVQ3. This would happen simply because the Diploma is considered equivalent to 
an NVQ3. The question arises then as to whether the increase in NVQ qualifications 
described in Table 6.8 reflect an increase of true NVQs rather than of some other 
qualification.  
 
There are several reasons to think that the data from the LFS capture, by and large, 
the growth of NVQ qualifications exactly rather than some other vocational 
qualification not listed by the LFS. First, the defining feature of NVQs is that it does 
not need to be taught in full-time or part-time courses because the focus of NVQs is 
on standards of performance (West and Steedman 2003; O’Hagan, Griffin and Dench 
1998). Consequently, assessment consists in observation of performance at work. 
This assessment regime is therefore different to those of other vocational courses 
which typically combine class-based learning with periods of work-experience; the 
assessment regime of these other vocation courses usually consists in a series of 
written examinations. The defining feature of a NVQ is that it can be obtained 
outside an educational institution. Thus, although NVQs are often taught in colleges, 
they are on offer as on-the-job training (West and Steedman 2003; O’Hagan, Griffin  
193 
 
23Table 6.10 Where highest vocational qualification was obtained,  
    by time period 
 1999-2003 2004-2008 
 
NVQ 
All other 
vocational 
qualifications 
NVQ 
All other 
vocational 
qualifications 
Solely through school or college 44.4 81.4 40.3 81.2 
Solely at place of work 20.6 1.5 20.2 1.4 
Combination: workplace and 
academic institution 
31.4 15.3 35.4 16.6 
Some other way 3.6 1.9 4.1 1 
Unweighted base 306 531 692 295 
Source: LFS 1999-2008, second quarters, all waves.  
Note: percentages are calculated among childcare workers who receive NVQ only and all other 
vocational only. Therefore someone who has an NVQ and a BTEC would not be counted. This is 
because I am ultimately interested in seeing where those who gain NVQ do so. So, I need to 
distinguish them from those who have also gained some other qualification.   
 
 
and Dench 1998). Wherever the qualification is obtained, assessment consists in an 
observation of performance at work or a simulation of it, and candidates receive the 
award if their performance reaches a set of standards.  
 
Since 1999, the LFS asks respondents where they have obtained their highest 
vocational qualifications. This information allows tracking one characteristic of  
NVQs, namely that they are often gained solely through work.  Table 6.10 reports 
results for childcare workers and distinguishes between those who have obtained an 
NVQ and those who hold other vocational qualification, but not an NVQ. The point 
to note is that the difference between NVQs and other vocational qualifications is 
picked up by the LFS data, which correspondingly report a much higher incidence of 
‘solely at work’ attainment among those holding an NVQ than among those who 
have obtained a different vocational qualification. Indeed, in 2004-2008, only around 
40 percent of childcare workers obtain their vocational qualification only at college, 
while the percentage is almost 81 percent for other qualifications. Over time these 
proportions have not varied significantly. This means that, despite the imprecision 
created by coding errors, the overall upsurge in the proportion of childcare workers  
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24Table 6.11 Vocational qualifications at level 3: previous and subsequent    
educational attainment, by type of qualification 
 NVQ3 OTHER VOCATIONAL L3 
Highest qualification   
Vocational L3 89.8 71.3 
A-levels 7.5 7.6 
Vocational L4+ - 19 
Degree  2.8 2.1 
GCSE (≥5 A*-C) 36.9 46.2 
Unweighted base 615 380 
Source: LFS, 1996-2008, first wave respondents only.  
Note: Figures are percentages relative to all childcare workers holding an NVQ3 (first column) or a 
different vocational qualification at level 3 (column 2). Information on all qualifications – as opposed 
to the highest qualification – is collected consistently only since 1996.  
 
tholding an NVQ3 qualification reflects an actual increase in this type of 
qualification. This result is in line with aggregate evidence on NVQs, which points to 
he rapid increase of this type of qualification and its large use by employers in the 
care sector (Cooke et al. 2000).   
 
Now that we have established that the increase in NVQ3 qualifications visible in LFS 
data is likely to be a reasonably accurate picture of what is happening, we can ask 
ourselves what this increase means. From the start, it is worth remembering that the  
role of NVQ qualifications in the field of childcare has been debated since their 
inception (Cameron and Boddy 2006; Moss 2000), with some practitioners 
welcoming NVQs as potentially able to recognise relevant skills (O'Hagan, Griffin, 
and Dench 1998) and others fearing that NVQs would water down standards and be 
unsuitable for the training of ‘reflective’ practitioners (Calder 1995) . This thesis 
cannot enter into this debate; instead, it can offer some insight into the relation 
between NVQ3 and other qualifications and also on the views about NVQ3 collected 
during the interviews with childcare workers.  
 
When examining how an NVQ3 is usually combined with other qualifications, two 
results stand out (Table 6.11). First, only around 37 percent of childcare workers 
holding an NVQ3 have obtained 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C . The percentage 
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is higher among those childcare workers who have other vocational qualifications at 
level 3 (i.e. OND). Second, among those workers who have gained an NVQ3 almost 
90 percent will not gain a higher qualification; the NVQ3 will thus be their highest 
qualification. On the contrary, among those who have a vocational qualification at 
level 3 other than NVQ (i.e. OND), almost 30 percent will obtain another 
qualification at a higher level. This result is not surprising: very few NVQs have 
been issued at levels 4 or 5, while the OND is part of a well-defined progression, 
culminating in the attainment of an HND/HNC (Higher National 
Diploma/Certificate) on offer in higher education institutions. Therefore, compared 
to other vocational qualifications at level 3, NVQs tend to draw their candidates from 
school leavers with lower grades and are less likely to guarantee further progression.  
 
Evidence from the interviews on the role and value of NVQ3 was mixed. The 
interviews confirmed in part a point that had already been noted by Moss and Penn 
(1996, 103): although NVQ qualifications are at a basic level, they are a source of 
pride to those who have obtained them. For example, Ann was explicit in saying that 
the NVQ3 had not changed her practice, but that it had nonetheless given her a sense 
of professionalism.  
I work that way anyway.  I’ve always worked that way.  So... I guess it makes you feel a 
little bit more professional.  
The link between NVQ3 and professionalism was also expressed by two 
childminders, who had gained the qualification in their spare time with considerable 
effort.   
Some workers appreciated the opportunity of overcoming specific problems they 
had. Amelia for example explained that she didn’t like “to read in a large group” and 
that while doing the NVQ course she had learnt ways around that:  
You don’t need to be stuck on a book and it’s boring to hear the book, [but] you act the 
story, it’s very, very nice. 
Furthermore, some workers reported that by obtaining an NVQ3 they had gained 
more confidence; for example Janine: 
When you’re doing Level 3 you’ve gotta do presentations, standing up in front of 
people and that’s one thing I’m not good at.  I really lack confidence, so that helped me 
out quite a bit.  That’s why I think got better with it [talking to parents]. 
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Despite the differences in opinion, all interviewees reported that they had gained 
their NVQ qualification either solely on the job or through a mixture of work and 
college training. Often, however, the contribution of the college tutor was rather 
minimal, as Amanda recalled: 
I wasn’t going to a class where we can get feedback from other people, I was just like 
on my own, yeah, because 2 days she [the tutor] comes here and assess me and then she 
would say to me, phone me if you’re stuck, but you don’t want to be phoning, so it was 
fairly stressful but I got through it. 
Interviewees appeared eager to undertake further training and to progress to higher 
level qualifications. For many, the progression between level 2 and level 3 had been 
almost unplanned and natural. Amanda for example recalled that her manager had 
asked if: 
I want to want to do my level 3. I said: ‘why not? Because I have done my level 2 I 
might as well get on to level 3’.  
However, those who expressed the desire to move on to the next level – NVQ4 –
were aware that this was not easily achievable because the few NVQ4 courses 
available were in fact related to the ‘business’ aspect of day nurseries, so actually 
training nursery managers rather than practitioners. In the words of an official from 
the Children’s Workforce Development Council (CWDC): “there is a bit of a leap” 
from NVQ3 to any higher qualification relevant to childcare.  
 
Who works in childcare?  
So far the chapter has documented several features of the childcare workforce – their 
demographic characteristics, their  working patterns and their educational 
qualifications – but has examined them one by one, using mainly cross-tabulations. 
However, the analysis presented in this section looks simultaneously at the different 
characteristics considered so far and it assesses their influence on working in 
childcare. I use data from the LFS, but restrict the analysis to the more recent five 
years. The results therefore can be interpreted as describing how the childcare 
workforce looked between 2003-2008, ignoring the question of what changes have 
occurred in the last decade and a half.  
 
Two separate questions are considered in this section. First, an overall assessment is 
made of the differences between childcare workers employed in the private sector, in 
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the public one, and those working as childminders. Second, I examine to what extent 
certain characteristics are associated with employment in childcare as opposed to 
employment elsewhere.  
 
The bivariate analysis has suggested that childcare workers in the private sector are 
younger, less likely to have children, and are not as well qualified as those in the 
public sector. Childminders, on the other hand, are older and more likely to have  
children than are the other two groups, but they tend to hold lower qualifications. 
This picture is confirmed by a multivariate analysis. I use a multilogit regression 
model, which estimates the effect of different variables on the probability of working 
in three alternative groups: the private sector, the public sector, and as a childminder.  
Table 6.12 reports the odds ratios, or the greater or lesser chances that workers with 
certain characteristics have of working in the public sector as opposed to the private 
sector (column 1), as a childminder as opposed to the private sector (column 2), and 
as a childminder as opposed to the public sector (column 3).38  
 
Four points can be taken from Table 6.12. First, workers younger than 25 tend to be 
concentrated in the private sector. Likewise, workers above age 45 are more likely to 
work as minders than as employees in either the private or the public sector. Second, 
working part-time is associated with the private sector rather than with the public 
sector or with childminding. This in turn could suggest that there may be a part-time 
penalty even within childcare, as private sector workers are more likely to work part-
time and earn substantially less. However, and this is the third point, there is no 
significant difference between workers in the private and public sector regarding 
family status. On the other hand, childcare workers with children are more likely to 
be working as childminders than to be employed in either the public or the private 
sector. For example, a childcare worker who is a single parent is more likely by a 
factor of 3.7 than a married worker without children to work as a childminder rather 
than in the private or in the public sector. Finally, when looking at qualifications, the 
previous conclusions are confirmed. In particular, relative to someone without 
qualifications, a childcare worker with GCSEs is more likely to work in the public 
                                                      
38 I run the multilogit model using the STATA command mlogit. I then obtain the odds ratios using 
the post-estimation command listcoef.  
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sector than in the private. Likewise, holding a vocational qualification at level 4 or 
above is significantly associated with employment in the public sector. In contrast,  
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25Table 6.12 Factors associated with working in one sector/type of childcare 
provision relative to another               
                     PUBLIC   
VS. 
PRIVATE 
CHILDMINDERS 
VS. 
PRIVATE 
CHILDMINDERS 
VS.  
PUBLIC 
Age 16-25     0.2403***     0.0829***     0.3449**  
   (0.0486)      (0.0273)      (0.1226)    
Age 26-35     0.5452***     0.8600        1.5775*   
   (0.0900)      (0.1430)      (0.2953)    
Age 46-55     1.1571        2.6173***     2.2619*** 
                       (0.2318)      (0.5509)      (0.4969)    
Age 56-65     1.1139        5.6537***     5.0758*** 
                       (0.3647)      (1.8858)      (1.8099)    
Female                    1.1742        0.3502        0.2982    
                       (0.8020)      (0.2395)      (0.2354)    
Part time                 0.5794***     0.1441***     0.2487*** 
                       (0.0805)      (0.0216)      (0.0404)    
Married with children                0.9234        4.3911***     4.7554*** 
                       (0.1706)      (0.9025)      (1.0376)    
Single with children                1.0187        3.7420***     3.6732*** 
                       (0.2434)      (0.9698)      (1.0194)    
Single without children                0.7542        0.3250***     0.4309**  
                       (0.1410)      (0.0876)      (0.1228)    
BEM or foreign        1.3899        0.8903        0.6405    
                       (0.3121)      (0.2300)      (0.1769)    
Other qualification     0.9510        0.5898        0.6202    
                       (0.4049)      (0.2051)      (0.2790)    
GCSE (<5A*-C)     2.2094*       0.6630        0.3001**  
                       (0.7811)      (0.1959)      (0.1115)    
Vocational L2     1.2624        0.4192**      0.3320**  
                       (0.4755)      (0.1387)      (0.1388)    
GCSE (≥ 5A*-C)     2.5352*       0.6027        0.2377*** 
                       (0.9560)      (0.1988)      (0.0952)    
Vocational L3     1.8812        0.2700***     0.1435*** 
                       (0.6394)      (0.0780)      (0.0525)    
A-levels     1.8854        0.6977        0.3701*   
                       (0.8047)      (0.2739)      (0.1748)    
Vocational L4 and above     3.9389***     0.2571***     0.0653*** 
   (1.3563)      (0.0812)      (0.0247)    
Degree and above     1.2637        0.5049        0.3995    
                       (0.5657)      (0.1924)      (0.1936)    
Pseudo R-Square 0.2053 
Wald chi2 831.23 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Observations 1964 
Source: LFS, 2003-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only. 
Notes: Multilogit model. Sample: all childcare workers aged between 16 and 59 (women) and 64 (men). Figures 
are odd ratios; figures in parentheses are standard errors; statistical significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** 
p < 0.01. Controls for region and year are included.  
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holding any qualification reduces the chances of working as a childminder as 
opposed to working in centre-based settings. Put another way, childminding tends to 
attract workers with lower educational backgrounds.  
 
The analysis has, until now, concentrated on childcare workers alone. Indeed, 
comparisons have been made only among different groups of childcare workers and 
across different time periods. But this type of analysis does not directly address the 
question of which characteristics are typically associated with childcare workers. For 
example, given that the NVQ3 is fairly common among childcare workers, we may 
be interested in knowing whether holding an NVQ3 increases the chances of working 
in childcare as opposed to other occupations.  
 
I carry out a multivariate logistic regression analysis on the probability of working in 
childcare (outcome = 1) as opposed to all other occupations (outcome = 0). Table 
6.13 summarises the results, expressed as odds ratio. The reference category is a 
white  man, aged 36-45, employed full-time, married without children, with no 
qualifications, living in the south-east. An odds ratio greater than one indicates that 
working in childcare is more likely for those with that characteristics relative to the 
reference category.  
 
Looking at the odds ratios for different age groups, it appears that younger workers 
are more likely to work in childcare than those aged 36-45. In part this is due to the 
fact that there is no qualification entry requirement to work in childcare, while entry 
into many other occupations is restricted to workers with higher qualifications, who 
are necessarily older. As may be expected, women are far more likely than men to 
work in childcare. Indeed, the predicted probability of working in childcare for a 
white  man, aged 36-45, employed full-time, married without children, with no 
qualifications, living in the south-east is 0.001percent (our reference category). For a 
similar woman, the predicted probability is 1percent, one hundred times greater. In 
contrast to this result, a worker from a Black or other ethnic minority background or 
born overseas is less likely than a white UK-born worker to be employed in 
childcare.  
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26Table 6.13 Factors associated with working in childcare, 2003‐2008 
 ODDS RATIOS 
Age 16-25 2.5169*** 
 (0.1849) 
Age 26-35 1.3390*** 
 (0.0851) 
Age 46-55 0.9831 
                     (0.0744) 
Age 56-65 0.6661*** 
                     (0.0795) 
Female                101.9770*** 
                     (21.4995) 
Part time             0.9222 
                     (0.0458) 
Married with children            1.8904*** 
                     (0.1288) 
Single with children            1.5920*** 
                     (0.1413) 
Single without children            0.9129 
                     (0.0638) 
Black or ethnic minority background       0.6646*** 
                     (0.0576) 
Other qualification 2.2292*** 
                     (0.2940) 
GCSE (≥ 5A*-C) 1.9061*** 
                     (0.2055) 
Vocational L2 2.2790*** 
                     (0.2618) 
GCSE (< 5A*-C) 1.3914** 
                     (0.1650) 
Vocational L3 4.7448*** 
                     (0.4920) 
A-levels 0.8875 
                     (0.1182) 
Vocational L4 and above 2.3759*** 
 (0.2576) 
Degree and above 0.3348*** 
                     (0.0477) 
Pseudo  R-Square      0.1859 
Wald chi2 4100 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Observations  208551 
Source: LFS, 2003-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only. 
Notes: Logit model. Sample: all those in employment. Figures are odd ratios; figures in parentheses are standard 
errors; statistical significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  Controls for region are included. 
Reference category: a man, age 36-45, working full-time, married without children, White and born in the UK, 
with no qualification, living in the south-east.  
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Part-time work is not statistically significantly associated with employment in 
childcare. That is, someone who works part-time is not more likely to work in 
childcare than someone who works full-time, once all other characteristics are taken 
into account. On the other hand, having children is highly significant, as the chances 
of working in childcare are higher for those with children than for those who are 
married and childless. In particular, childcare work is a more common choice of 
employment among lone parents than among those without children. In order to  
examine the correlation between part-time work and the presence of children, I have 
run the same logit regression without including family status and presence of 
children (results presented in Appendix 6). The odds ratios for part-time employment 
are 1.11. Thus, not surprisingly, part-time workers are more likely to work in 
childcare than are full-time workers as they are more likely to be parents.  
 
When looking at qualifications, the thing to notice is that only two qualifications 
decrease the chances of working in childcare: A-levels and degrees. Workers holding 
any other qualification are more likely to be in childcare than a worker without any 
qualifications. This result dovetails with the descriptive analysis of the previous 
section: only a small percentage of childcare workers do not have any qualifications 
and, likewise, the share of workers with A-levels and degrees is rather small. On the 
other hand, the odds ratios of vocational qualifications at level 3 is especially large. 
Indeed, the predicted probability of a woman with such a qualification working in 
childcare is 4 percent, compared to the 1 percent of a woman without any 
qualification. Overall then, this piece of analysis leads to conclusions similar to the 
ones reached in the bivariate analysis. Childcare does not seem to attract the most 
poorly qualified workers nor those with the highest qualifications. Instead, childcare 
workers tend to be drawn from vocational qualifications which are notionally pitched 
at the middle of the qualifications distribution, but remain below the tertiary level of 
education.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis presented in this chapter allows an understanding of what the childcare 
workforce looks like, how it has changed over time and who, in the most recent 
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years, is likely to work in this sector. Attention has been given to three sets of issues: 
the demographic characteristics of workers, their working patterns and what kind of 
flexibility employment in childcare gives and, finally, the educational qualifications 
of childcare workers. This section summarises the results and offers some reflections 
on the relation between the findings and the broader theme of the thesis, namely low 
pay.   
 
The empirical evidence presented has confirmed that childcare is almost completely 
an all-female occupation. This lends support to the premise of this thesis – namely 
that childcare has to be understood as a deeply gendered occupation. The results have 
also pointed to, perhaps more surprisingly, the lack of change in the gender 
composition of the childcare workforce since 1994. Despite explicit policy efforts to 
recruit men, their almost total absence from this occupation endures. This finding 
underscores the evidence by Cameron, Moss and Owen (1999), who carefully 
illustrate how childcare work tends to be seen as normatively female and 
consequently men employed in nurseries face formidable challenges. 
 
The lack of change in the gender composition of childcare is also noticeable when 
compared to other prevalently female jobs. Men have made inroads as company 
secretaries, telephonists, nursing auxiliaries, care assistants and retail cashiers, 
which, at the beginning of the 1990s had more than an 80 percent female share 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 2007, 93-103). Arguably, as noted in Chapter 2, the 
association with motherhood is likely to be stronger here than in other occupations 
dominated by women (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002). Furthermore, historically, 
childcare has always been the exclusive province of women, in contrast with 
occupations like elementary teaching or secretarial work, which were originally 
dominated by men. Finally, the fact that childcare remains dominated by women 
from a White British background perhaps suggests that, in the UK at least, this 
occupation is not prone to attract foreign workers or those from ethnic backgrounds.   
 
The fact that this occupation is entirely female brings to the fore the issue of 
reconciliation between family and paid work and in particular that of part-time 
employment. The finding that mothers are more likely to be found in childcare than 
are childless women may be interpreted as suggesting that employment in childcare 
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is particularly family-friendly. In addition, evidence about childminders, and in 
particular the high incidence of mothers of young children within this group surely 
further corroborates the idea that employment in childcare is chosen because it 
allows combining the need of earning a living with family responsibilities. Finally, 
the regression analysis has shown that part-time work is significantly associated with 
employment in the private sector as opposed to the public one. As pay is higher in 
the public sector, one could interpret this as further evidence that part-time work is 
implicated in low pay.  
 
But, in fact, it seems unlikely that issues of reconciliation and part-time work are 
relevant to understanding the low pay in childcare. Although part-time employment 
is undoubtedly common among childcare workers, the evidence presented clearly 
suggests that it is not a defining feature of this type of work. The majority of 
childcare workers work full-time, and this remains true even when we exclude 
childminders. Thus working schedules in childcare are not similar to those of mid-
day assistants, a job that has traditionally attracted women also because of the very 
short working hours and their perfect match with school opening times (Crompton 
and Sanderson 1989). Indeed, once we control for family status, part-time work is 
not significantly correlated to employment in childcare.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on the part-time pay penalty suggests that it is the 
association between part-time and low paid occupations that drives much of the 
penalty (Manning and Petrongolo 2004; Connolly and Gregory 2008). Thus, women 
working part-time are at a disadvantage precisely because reduced hours jobs are 
available almost exclusively in occupations with relatively lower pay. While making 
part-time jobs available in better paying occupations has been often indicated as a 
sensible strategy to reduce the part-time pay penalty (Gregory and Connolly 2008) , 
it seems implausible that reducing part-time in childcare would mitigate/solve the 
problem of low pay in this occupation.  
 
When looking at qualifications, a more complicated picture has emerged. On the one 
hand, childcare workers remain qualified only at a very basic level. The proportion of 
workers holding a degree remains low, at around five percent, in sharp contrast with 
occupations like those of teachers or social workers, who are almost entirely 
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composed of graduates. On the other hand, childcare workers do not belong to the 
very bottom rungs of the qualifications ladder: workers with no qualifications tend to 
take up jobs in other sectors rather than in childcare.  
 
The types of qualifications that are prevalent among childcare workers are the 
school-leaving certificate and vocational qualifications gained at age 16 or 18. In 
particular, upper secondary vocational qualifications are significantly associated with 
work in childcare. The analysis pointed to a rapid increase in the proportion of 
workers holding NVQ at level 3 (NVQ3) and thus confirmed that the ‘up-skilling’ of 
the childcare workforce promoted by Labour has been based mostly on this type of 
qualification. However, the analysis has shown that the NVQ3 is easier to obtain 
relative to other vocational qualifications and, it has been suggested, cheaper to offer 
for training providers (Wolf 2004). In addition, this type of qualification is not 
designed around the principle of progression, as the NVQ3 in childcare is not linked 
to further qualifications.  
 
The fact that the NVQ3 is now the most common qualification held by childcare 
workers does not seem to have introduced a substantial change in the educational 
profile of this workforce. In 1990 the limitations of the NNEB were so summarised: 
“It is not accepted as a valid entry requirement for higher education or for higher 
professional training in teaching, nursing or social work. Yet there are few 
opportunities for career progression for the holder of the NNEB without further 
education or training.” (Dept. of Education and Science, 1990: 22). The introduction 
and expansion of the NVQ3 does not appear to have overcome these problems, thus 
limiting the potential of this qualification in raising the overall qualification level of 
childcare workers.  
 
By exploring the characteristics of the NVQ3 relative to other qualifications, the 
chapter has pointed to another important institutional dimension – that of education 
and training. In this way, this chapter complements the evidence that had emerged in 
Chapter 5, when attention was brought to characteristics of employment relationships 
in the childcare labour market. It is plausible to think that the lack of organised 
representation across all groups of childcare workers is in part responsible for the 
lack of a well-established training path.  
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It has been argued that the childcare recruitment strategy run by Labour provides a 
vivid example of the “classed nature of working in childcare” (Osgood 2005), 
whereby the image of who should enter the childcare workforce is directly linked to 
notions of long-term unemployment and out-of-work mothers. The evidence 
presented in part confirms this. A higher percentage of childcare workers are 
recruited from non-employment than it is generally the case in the aggregate labour 
market, and the proportion of lone mothers has visibly increased. Although the class 
dimension of childcare is not directly explored in this thesis, undoubtedly classed 
images of childcare work have implications on whether childcare is considered a 
skilled or unskilled job.  
 
Up to now, the thesis has established one main point: childcare continues to be a 
female and low-paid job. Despite all the policy changes, the wages and the profile of 
this workforce has not changed. The next two chapters will delve further and 
examine, in turn, the way qualifications and skills are implicated in low pay (Chapter 
7) and the role of caring motivations in keeping wages down (Chapter 8).   
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Appendix 6 Additional Tables 
27Table 6.A.1 Demographic characteristics of childcare workers by time period 
and type of provision/sector 
 1994-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 
Employees in private sector    
Women 98.7 98 98.6 
Age 32 32 32 
Married or cohabiting 54.7 54.3 53.5 
With children 38 37.1 41.8 
Lone parent 6.1 6.6 10.1‡† 
Born in the UK & White 86.2 87.6 88.7 
Unweighted base 1027 1079 1104 
Employees in public sector    
Women 99 99 99.4 
Age 35 37† 39† 
Married or cohabiting 69.8 68.6 67.5 
With children 45.9 47.2 48.1 
Lone parent 7.1 8.1 12.6† 
Born in the UK & White 93.6 91.9 90 
Unweighted base 577 616 507 
Childminders    
Women 99.3 99.1 98.9 
Age 38 40† 42†‡ 
Married or cohabiting 84.7 81.3 81.5 
With children 77.5 73.8 69.2‡ 
Lone parent 9.8 12.1 13.1 
Born in the UK & White 93.5 93.6 91.8 
Unweighted base 569 535 535 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only.  
Notes: † indicates that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% level) from that for 1994-1998. ‡ indicated 
that the percentage is statistically different (at 5% level) from that for 1999-2003 
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28Table 6.A.2 Factors associated with working in childcare, 2003-2008 
 ODDS RATIOS ODDS RATIOS 
Age 16-25 2.5169*** 1.7544*** 
 (0.1849) (0.1135) 
Age 26-35 1.3390*** 1.2848*** 
 (0.0851) (0.0808) 
Age 46-55 0.9831 0.7448*** 
                     (0.0744) (0.0524) 
Age 56-65 0.6661*** 0.4283*** 
                     (0.0795) (0.0472) 
Female                101.9770*** 98.3725*** 
                     (21.4995) (20.7104) 
Part time             0.9222 1.1085* 
                     (0.0458)  
Married with children            1.8904***  
                     (0.1288)  
Single with children            1.5920***  
                     (0.1413)  
Single without children            0.9129  
                     (0.0638)  
Black or ethnic minority background       0.6646*** 0.6769*** 
                     (0.0576) (0.0582) 
Other qualification 2.2292*** 2.2367*** 
                     (0.2940) (0.2947) 
GCSE (< 5A*-C) 1.9061*** 2.0241*** 
                     (0.2055) (0.2173) 
Vocational L2 2.2790*** 2.4613*** 
                     (0.2618) (0.2810) 
GCSE (≥ 5A*-C) 1.3914** 1.4348** 
                     (0.1650) (0.1695) 
Vocational L3 4.7448*** 5.0887*** 
                     (0.4920) (0.5260) 
A-levels 0.8875 0.8727 
                     (0.1182) (0.1162) 
Vocational L4 and above 2.3759*** 2.5271*** 
 (0.2576) (0.2729) 
Degree and above 0.3348*** 0.3347*** 
                     (0.0477) (0.0477) 
Pseudo  R-Square      0.1859 0.1805 
Wald chi2 4100 4100 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 
Observations  208551 208551 
Source: LFS, 2003-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only. 
Notes: Logit model. Sample: all those in employment, aged 16 to 59 (women) and 64 (men). Figures 
are odd ratios; figures in parentheses are standard errors; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
Controls for region and year are included. Reference category: a man, age 36-45, working full-time, 
married without children, White and born in the UK, with no qualification, living in the south-east.  
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Chapter 7  
Pay, qualifications and the skills demands of childcare work 
 
Introduction  
One of the commonly cited reasons for childcare workers’ low pay is their low-level 
qualifications. All previous work on the characteristics of the childcare workforce 
has supported this view by pointing to the scant presence of graduates in this 
occupation and more generally to the tendency to recruit childcare workers among 
school leavers with poor educational attainment (Cameron, Owen, and Moss 2001; 
Cameron, Mooney, and Moss 2002; Simon et al. 2003). Evidence from Chapter 6 
broadly supported this view. Between 1994 and 2008 the educational profile of the 
childcare workforce has remained fairly similar, with the majority of childcare 
workers holding either a school-leaving certificate or a medium level vocational 
qualification.  
 
At policy level, the implication of this view is straightforward: raising qualifications 
among childcare workers can increase their pay. This is based on the well 
documented relationship between pay and qualifications, whereby  better educated 
individuals earn higher wages than their less-educated counterparts.  While this result 
holds across the whole workforce, wage differentials within individual occupations 
have not been as extensively explored and it is therefore not altogether clear whether 
wage dispersion within occupations is accounted for by differences in qualifications. 
Indeed, much of the wage premium associated with higher qualifications derives 
from the fact that higher qualifications ensure access to better paying occupations. 
But what happens to those people holding, say, degrees but working in a low-paying 
occupation? Are higher qualifications associated with higher earnings within the least 
paid occupations and within childcare in particular? Despite the majority of childcare 
workers not being highly qualified, Chapter 6 documented that a sizable minority of 
the workforce holds qualification at tertiary level – either vocational or bachelor 
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degrees. It is possible therefore to investigate to what extent pay varies across 
different types and levels of qualifications.  
 
A focus exclusively on qualifications can however be misleading. Clearly, 
qualifications can be considered as an indicator of individuals’ skills, albeit partial 
and imprecise. Indeed, information on qualifications is used in much empirical 
analysis as a proxy for skills. But one of the problems highlighted by the literature on 
women’s occupations is precisely the lack of formal recognition of the skills used on 
the job. Thus, it is often the case that educational or vocational programmes do not 
exist in relation to the skills used in “women’s work”. Chapter 3 has offered some 
evidence on this point relative to the specific case of childcare in the UK. Indeed it 
has illustrated the difficulties in establishing a post-18 vocational qualification 
relevant to childcare work. Relying on formal qualifications had therefore the risk of 
conflating individual characteristics, institutional arrangements in relation to 
education and training, and jobs requirements. In the case of childcare work, there is 
no perfect correspondence between these three dimensions.  
 
An example will clarify the point. Let us take the case of teachers. With considerable 
oversimplification, it can be argued that those willing to enter into teaching can enrol 
in suitable training, which will certify and further develop their skills. The training 
will be in line with the requirements of the job – thus it will aim at fostering the skills 
demanded by teaching. Of course, in practice, misalignments are likely to arise and 
there can be disagreement about teachers’ training and also about what is demanded 
from teachers. Notwithstanding these imperfections, in the case of teaching one can 
infer what the job demands are from looking at the qualifications held by those 
working as teachers. And indeed teachers are all similarly qualified, in that they 
almost all have qualification at or above degree level. By contrast, in the case of 
childcare work it is not possible to make a similar inference, because childcare 
workers hold qualifications spanning from low vocational ones to degrees and above. 
In the case of childcare workers an education and training infrastructure is somewhat 
lacking – a point that has been extensively documented in Chapter 3 and by early 
years commentators (Abbott and Pugh 1998; Pugh 2003; Sylva and Pugh 2005). 
Further, Chapter 3 has also shown that childcare services in the UK did not share 
until very recently a common core function, and it remains contested whether the 
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integration of different functions (and of care and education in particular) has 
actually occurred (West, Roberts, and Noden 2010; Moss 2010). Thus, in the case of 
childcare work, a perspective centred exclusively on qualifications misses the 
structural and institutional factors that are arguably implicated in its low pay.  
 
It is clear that it is difficult to disentangle workers’ qualifications from jobs’ skills 
demands. A much more complex analysis is needed in order to go beyond the 
recurrent finding that childcare workers are low-paid because they are not highly 
qualified. Such more complex analysis would, for example, ascertain the actual job 
content of childcare jobs, would seek to reveal the cultural assumptions and the 
institutional factors that shape the job content and relate these to workers’ 
characteristics and pay. Further, a longitudinal or comparative perspective would 
help illuminate these issues. It is however obvious that such a project is difficult to 
undertake. Here the scope of the analysis is much more limited and the aim more 
modest. The objective is, first, to offer some evidence on the relation between 
qualifications and pay and to interpret the results in light of the institutional context 
in which childcare work is embedded. Second, the analysis attempts to go beyond 
qualifications and seeks to explore childcare work skills demands. The methodology 
is in line with this double approach. The LFS will be used mainly in relation to 
qualifications, although evidence from the interviews will complement it. The 
interviews, instead, will be used to explore workers’ views on the skills required to 
do the job competently.  
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The next section reviews some theoretical 
perspectives that can be useful to understanding how qualifications and skills relate 
to pay. From this review two research perspectives will be derived. The third section 
presents the data and the methodology. The fourth section reports the results. It is 
divided in two sections, one for each research question. The last section concludes.   
 
Theoretical perspectives  
The theme of skills is one of the most researched in the social sciences. Both the 
economic and sociological literatures on the relationship between skills and earnings 
are vast. Within economics, the perspective is centred on the individual – skills are 
an attribute of the worker rather than of the job. The perspective is reversed in the 
212 
 
sociological literature (Vallas 1990). Here the interest lies in understanding the skills 
requirements of jobs, thus shifting the focus from the individual to the structure of 
work, itself the outcome of social processes at the level of individual organisations, 
occupations and society at large.  
 
Feminist contributions to the debate on skills have emerged mainly from sociology 
and have uncovered a variety of structural mechanisms contributing to the gender 
pay gap.  Here the focus will be, in particular, on the literature which takes 
“occupations” as its level of analysis. Gender interacts with skills at different levels – 
namely work group, workplace, occupation and society. Yet, in the case of childcare 
work, it is occupational sex typing that appears to be the most salient, given that 
childcare workers are overwhelmingly female and this feature is stable over time and 
across countries.  
 
In what follows I outline briefly economic perspectives on skills and then turn to 
feminist contributions. As will be made clear, the two literature do not overlap and, 
in fact, are developed on the basis of irreconcilable assumptions about individual 
decision-making processes and the determinants of the value of skills. As will be 
explained at the end of the section, the aim of the empirical analysis will not be to 
adjudicate between incompatible theoretical frameworks. Rather, the analysis aims to 
explore those theoretical insights that can be the most helpful in explaining low pay 
in relation to skills.  
 
Perspectives from economics 
Much of economists’ thinking about skills and wages rests on some critical 
assumptions about the functioning of the labour market and its link with the product 
market. In the conventional neoclassical labour market there is a perfect matching of 
workers to jobs, whereby more skilled workers obtain better paying jobs. Employers 
are able to pay higher wages to more skilled workers because workers’ skills increase 
the productivity of the firm. Competition on the product market ensures that the more 
productive firms thrive, while those that fail to be productive enough to meet their 
labour costs are driven out of the market. As noted by Horell, Rubery and Burchell 
(1989), in a neoclassical labour market there is a perfect alignment between the 
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workers’ skills, their productivity, the demands of the job and the value of their 
work.  
 
Within this framework, economics’ perspective on education and its relationship 
with earnings is based on human capital theory (Machin 2004). The decision to 
undertake education is understood, according to human capital theory, as individuals’ 
choice to invest in their productivity in order to obtain higher earnings. Individuals 
bear the costs of education – direct costs and opportunity costs of forgone immediate 
earnings – in order to acquire the knowledge and skills that will enhance their future 
productivity and therefore their future earnings. And indeed there are volumes of 
empirical evidence that show how better-educated workers earn relative higher 
wages than less educated ones, thus suggesting that there are positive returns to 
education.  
 
Much of the applied economics literature on education has been devoted to 
estimating such returns to education. The conventional technique is to use data on 
earnings and education and to regress pay on education and a series of individual 
characteristics which are thought to influence wages (Machin 2004; Blundell, 
Dearden, and Sianesi 2005). The idea therefore is to net out other determinants of 
wages in order to isolate the “true” effect of education. More sophisticated 
econometric techniques have been developed precisely with the objective of 
distinguishing the contribution of education on earnings from other factors, most 
notably innate ability (Card 1999). 
 
While studies from the US tend to measure education as “years in full-time 
education”, in the UK the approach has been to use qualifications instead (Blundell, 
Dearden, and Sianesi 2005). This approach better fits an education system in which 
academic courses and vocational ones are often of similar duration but are generally 
considered of markedly different value (see Chapter 6). This way, the UK literature 
offers detailed evidence on the returns to different types of qualifications  (Dearden, 
McGranahan, and Sianesi 2004; Dearden et al. 2000; Jenkins, Greenwood, and 
Vignoles 2007; Robinson 1997, 1996). The thrust of the results is that the returns to 
some vocational qualifications, especially NVQs are very low. Thus, individuals 
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holding these qualifications do not have earnings that are significantly higher than 
those of workers without any qualification.  
 
Importantly, empirical analyses on the returns to education do not account for 
occupations. Indeed, much of the wage premium associated with higher 
qualifications derives from the fact that higher qualifications ensure access to better 
paying occupations. Someone with a medicine degree is able to earn more than most 
other workers precisely because she is likely to work as a doctor, not because of the 
degree itself. Thus, in the empirical literature on the returns to education, the 
structure of occupations is treated as exogenous.  
 
Interest in the returns to human capital is also prominent in the literature on the 
gender pay gap. In particular, the closing educational gap between men and women 
in the last three decades prompted the need to look at other sources of differences in 
the human capital of men and women. In relation to education, attention has moved 
from gender differences in levels of education to other characteristics: subject of 
study or, relatedly, the level of specialisation of human capital. Further, human 
capital theory has been used to explain the sex occupational segregation and the fact 
that prevalently male jobs pay more than prevalently female jobs (henceforth: male 
jobs and female jobs) (England, Budig, and Folbre 2002; England 1992, 1982). 
There is a socioeconomic literature that looks at the relation between pay, jobs’ 
characteristics and individuals’ human capital. One distinction put forward to explain 
male jobs’ relatively higher pay is the one between general and specialised human 
capital. The idea is that investment in specialised human capital is relatively more 
risky, as it reduces the chances of transferring it to other jobs. This explains why 
occupations requiring more specialised training pay more than those which demand 
general human capital. The negative effect on wages of working in female 
occupations is thus attributed to the fact that female occupations tend to require 
lesser levels of specialised training and education than male occupations (Tam 1997; 
for a reply, see England, Hermsen, and Cotter 2000). Recent analysis of UK data 
partly confirms this point. Female occupations appear to require lower levels of 
specialist knowledge relatively to male ones, but a negative relationship between 
occupational feminization and wages remains even after controlling for a wide range 
of relevant factors and individual-specific effects (Perales 2010).  
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Yet, similarly to economic analyses of the returns to education, this type of study 
needs to take the structure of occupations and their skills requirements as exogenous. 
Indeed, variations in skills demands of different occupations are usually captured by 
using data on the qualification required to enter the occupation and standard 
classifications of the work complexity within each occupation. There is the problem 
thus that the relationship between pay and skills is explored only within a given 
labour market at a specific point in time. This way it is not possible to understand 
what drives the structure of occupations and/or of jobs’ demands.  
 
Within economics, the short answer to these questions is: technology. And in recent 
years much attention has been devoted to exploring the relationship between 
technological change and skills. It is argued that technological change has increased 
the demand for “skilled” labour as opposed to that for “unskilled” labour, thus 
altering the structure of occupations (for a review, see Katz and Autor 1999, 1530-
1538). Further, the argument runs that technological change has made “skilled 
labour” more productive, thus allowing for greater pay growth relatively to 
“unskilled labour”. Indeed, within economics, the relationship between qualifications 
and pay hinges invariably on productivity.  
 
But, it has been difficult, so far, to increase the productivity of caring activities by 
the systematic application of technology (Goos and Manning 2007). This raises the 
problem of what mechanism ensures that wages in low productivity sectors do not 
fall too far behind wages in the more productive sectors – a problem originally 
identified by Baumol (Baumol 1967). Baumol’s answer was public spending.  
 
Overall then, the analytical framework prevalent within economics can guide the 
empirical analysis insofar as we are interested in differences in the returns to 
different qualifications. However, economists’ perspective remains anchored to the 
notion of productivity. Insofar as this notion may not be applicable to the case of 
childcare, economics may have little to say about the relationship between skills and 
wages.  
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Feminist perspectives 
There is a large body of feminist studies focusing on the pay inequalities between the 
sexes arising from the fact that women tend to concentrate in jobs classified as low-
skilled. Conceptually, these contributions apply a social constructionist perspective 
to reveal how processes of skill designation uncritically incorporate a male-bias. At 
the political level, the comparable worth movement in the 1980s and the research 
surrounding it offered a telling account of gender discrimination, whereby female 
jobs were systematically paid less than comparable male jobs (Remick 1984; 
Steinberg 1990; England 1992; Acker 1990). Some of the most famous examples 
brought forward by comparable worth proponents in the USA involved childcare 
jobs: dog pound attendant or zoo-keeper (typically male jobs) were rated higher than 
nursery school teacher and day care worker (Remick 1984).  
 
Crucially, feminist perspectives reject the idea that the designation of jobs as skilled 
or unskilled is a neutral process, driven by technology. In stark contrast with 
orthodox economic thinking, “the acquisition, valuation and utilisation of skill” are 
viewed as “socially determined processes” (Green 2010, 7). Three insights from the 
vast literature on gender and skills are particularly relevant to the case of childcare 
workers.  
 
The first regards the lack of union organisation and of craft tradition of female work. 
Historical studies of specific occupations uncover the very process through which 
skills are recognised. Examining manufacturing occupations in the 1970s in Britain, 
these studies conclude that the skills divisions whereby men’s work had been 
classified at a higher level of skills than women’s resulted from the struggle of 
unionised men to retain their higher status, often at the expenses of women  (Phillips 
and Taylor 1980; Craig et al. 1982). Collective bargaining and, more generally, the 
distribution of power and control within the labour market is thus often responsible 
for skill distinctions along gender lines. In the service sector, where female 
employment growth in the last four decades has concentrated, Dex notices that the 
idea of women’s work as unskilled was “built in from the start” (Dex 1985). 
 
A second, related point, refers to the training system, which is considered as another 
important mechanism perpetuating the employers’ and societal views on women’s 
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work. Within the field of the sociology of the professions, a number of accounts shed 
light on the politics behind the emergence of “female professions”. Witz (1990) aptly 
illustrated the contested nature of the development of training systems in the cases of 
nurses and midwives at the turn of the twentieth century. The claims that nurses and 
midwives could make were limited by the power of the (male) medical class and, 
more generally, by societal views on the role of women. Likewise, Davies’ (1995) 
account of reforms of nurses’ education in the 1980s illuminates the contested and 
gendered nature of training. Yet, according to Davies, formalised training poses 
problems to the nursing profession because it ill-fits the type of knowledge and 
expertise relevant to nursing (1995, 56-63). Put simply, formal training tends to be 
moulded on a male-centred notion of skills and knowledge which privileges abstract 
universal principles over contextually relevant knowledge. Thus it fails to recognise 
the type of skills and knowledge actually used and developed by nurses.  
 
This takes us to the third contribution of feminist analyses of skills. Comparable 
worth studies not only reveal inconsistencies in the valuation of skills, whereby 
similar job demands are rated differently in female and male jobs. They also 
uncovered the fact that emotional skills brought to jobs remain largely invisible and 
thus were not compensated (Steinberg 1999; Steinberg and Figart 1999). But this 
literature concentrates on revealing the strain and the effort involved in emotional 
work without exploring how the ability to deal with other people’s emotions is 
developed and how it may relate to other skills.  
 
Thus, the main lesson from feminist scholarship on gender and skills is that skills 
definition is biased against female work and that this bias is embedded at different 
levels and in a variety of institutional mechanism, from the structure of pay system to 
that of training. Because the relation between wages and skills is viewed as a socially 
determined process, little attention has been given to the issue of productivity.  
 
Yet, drawing on Baumol (1967; Baumol and Bowen 1965), feminist economist 
Himmelweit (2005) insists that the relation between wages and productivity is highly 
problematic in care services, because care services “by their very nature, permit only 
sporadic increases in productivity” (Baumol 1967, 416). The low productivity of the 
caring sector makes it difficult to sustain any wage growth. This results in low wages 
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relative to the rest of the economy, as continuous productivity increases elsewhere 
will lead to rising wages in other sectors. While suggesting that limited productivity 
is at the heart of the problem of low wages in care, Himmelweit proposed a solution 
which requires “the political will and power” to allocate more resources to caring 
activities (Himmelweit 2005: 173). Thus, ultimately, the process determining the 
rewards for care work needs to be a social one.         
 
The research questions 
It is clear that the frameworks of analysis just outlined are very different. They differ 
in their assumptions and in their focus. Within economics, agents are assumed as 
responding to the economic incentives they face, rather than to the social context 
surrounding them. The assumption is reversed in feminist contributions and far 
greater attention goes to examining the context. Further, within economics the focus 
is on the supply side. This way there is no direct examination of jobs’ content. 
Rather, as noted by Horell, Rubery and Burchell (1989), jobs are considered 
undemanding if the incumbents are low-skilled. By contrast, sociological analyses – 
and feminist ones in particular – focus on jobs characteristics and treat the notion of 
skill as problematic. Although on a general level these two different approaches are 
irreconcilable, they both provide helpful insights on how skills are implicated in the 
low pay of childcare workers.  
 
Thus, the research questions guiding the analysis do not aim at testing the validity of 
one approach against the other. Instead, the objective is to document empirically 
some of the processes that the literatures suggest contribute to low pay in childcare. 
To mark the questions, I use here the same numbering as in Chapter 4, where the 
research questions were briefly overviewed. The first question is:  
2a) Within childcare, are individual productive attributes, and qualifications 
in particular, correlated with pay?  
 
This question follows in the footsteps of conventional economic analysis of the 
association between individual characteristics and pay. But whereas this association 
is usually estimated across the entire labour market, here the aim is to check if a 
positive correlation exists also within childcare. Further, this approach makes it 
possible to test the differences across qualifications. As chapter 6 has shown, 
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childcare workers have different qualifications and there has been an increase in the 
incidence of NVQs. It is interesting therefore to examine whether different 
qualifications are associated with greater or smaller pay advantages.  
 
The second question moves away from formal qualifications and aims at tackling the 
problem of skills in relation to the job done: 
 
2b) What are workers’ views on the skills demands of childcare? 
 
The question is exploratory. It aims at understanding possible processes of valuation 
and utilisation of skills from the perspective of workers. The objective here is double. 
First, to overcome the assumption that the relation between skills and qualifications 
is unproblematic. As the review of the literature suggested, in the case of female 
occupations the system of formal qualifications may be especially ill-fitted to reflect 
the skills used on the job. This prompts the need to look at skills not exclusively from 
the angle of formal qualifications. Second, by addressing this question the analysis 
shifts the perspective from the workers to the job itself - what does the job require in 
terms of skills?  
 
Terminology will change throughout the chapter to reflect the different foci of 
analysis. In the first part, the analysis will be on qualification, while the second part 
will be on skills. Before presenting the results, I explain the data and methods used.  
 
Data and methods 
As in previous chapters, I use data from both the LFS and the interviews. In relation 
to the first question, I rely mainly on LFS data and use the interviews to help 
interpret the evidence. This approach has also been used in Chapter 6 and is 
especially fruitful given the possible measurement problems that arise in relation to 
qualifications (Chapter 6). In addition, as the previous section has outlined, 
economics makes strong assumptions about the functioning of the labour market. 
Once these assumptions are relaxed, the interpretation of the results are no longer 
unequivocal. Thus the interviews will be helpful also in order to understand the 
mechanisms underpinning the relationship between pay and qualifications. In 
relation to the second question, the interviews are the only source of information.  
220 
 
 
The Labour Force Survey 
The analysis of LFS data will be based on a conventional earning function. However, 
the aim of the analysis is not to estimate the returns to education, or to the different 
qualifications. Rather, the intent is simply to verify to what extent better qualified 
workers are better paid than less qualified ones. In other words, I seek to explore the 
wage structure in childcare in relation to qualifications. To this end, I use a linear 
regression model to estimate the following wage equation:  
W    Q  Y  X   W  W    Q  Y  X  
W    Q  Y  X    
Where W is the log of the hourly wage. As in Chapter 5, information on wages is 
derived by dividing the gross weekly wage by the usual weekly paid hours, and I use 
2005 as base year to deflate hourly wages by the consumer price index. Q  are a set 
of dummy variables indicating the highest qualification held. I use the same 
classification used in Chapter 6 to classify the different qualifications. Importantly, I 
exclude from the analysis those childcare workers who have as their highest 
qualification a foreign or “other” (non classified) qualification. The category “no 
formal qualification” is set as the reference group. 
 
I also use information on other characteristics, which are conventionally considered 
to increase workers’ “productivity” – indicated as X .  These are job tenure and 
potential experience. Indeed we would expect workers with greater experience to 
have higher wages than workers who are new to the job. Unfortunately, the LFS does 
not contain information on experience in the occupation. Thus it is possible to 
account for time spent in the current job only. In addition, potential experience serves 
as proxy for time spent in employment. I will also use information on supervisory 
responsibility. This is a feature of the job, rather than of the worker. So it will be 
possible to glean the relationship between jobs hierarchy and pay. These two 
variables – experience and responsibility – will be discussed in more detail when 
they are introduced in the model.   
 
Y  indicates a set of control variables. I include age to account both for the empirical 
regularity that wages tend to increase with age and for the fact that workers of 
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different age are likely to hold different qualifications, because they have received 
education and training at different points in time. As noted by Green, Machin and 
Manning (1996), one could argue endlessly about the choice of controls and indeed 
there is not a right answer as to what should be included or not. In particular, one 
problem could be that the attainment of certain qualifications could be correlated 
with demographic characteristics, like family status or ethnicity.39 If we want to tease 
out the correlation between qualification and pay, this aspect of a qualification may 
be important and consequently should not be netted out. In fact, and perhaps most 
importantly, the results do not vary whether these variables are included or not, and 
indeed personal characteristics, with the exception of age, are never statistically 
significant. The only variable which is not included in the model, but which appears 
to be correlated with pay, is part-time. Results including part-time are reported in 
Appendix 6, but, again, this different specification does not alter the patterns of 
results.  
 
I restrict my sample to women only. As Chapter 6 has shown, the number of men in 
this occupation is very small. Excluding men does not affect the results. Further, I 
control for proxy respondent to take into account the fact that information of wages 
obtained by proxy respondents is systematically lower (Chapter 5). I also net out 
possible regional effects, by including twenty dummies indicating region. Time 
trends are controlled for by a set of dummy variables for the year of the interview.  
 
In contrast to most individual characteristics, the choice to leave out employers’ 
characteristics has more substantial implications. As Chapter 5 and 6 have shown, 
there are considerable differences in pay across sectors. In this chapter, I start the 
analysis with a specification that does not incorporate controls denoting employer’s 
characteristics. Subsequently, I will move on and explore the demand side of the 
childcare labour market. I will take into account employers’ characteristics and 
concentrate especially on the sector of employment.  
 
                                                      
39 For example, Calder (1995) mentions that NNEB courses had traditionally had a bias against 
minority students.   
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The interviews 
Interviewees were asked a series of questions related to both qualifications and skills. 
In particular, workers were asked about their education and training and the 
advantages (or lack of) from attaining qualifications. Some of that evidence has 
already been reported in the previous chapter. In addition, workers were asked what 
they thought was the level of training required to enter the job. Importantly, the 
interviews also gained information from employers. Thus it was possible to 
understand whether employers considered the available qualifications appropriate to 
the job. 
 The interviews  also sought to elicit workers’ view on the skills required by the job. 
All workers were asked: “what do you think makes someone good at this job?”. The 
question aimed at distinguishing between qualifications and skills by investigating 
workers’ views on what the actual skills required were. In order to distinguish, albeit 
at a superficial level, between workers’ normative views on what the job required 
and their actual experience, interviewees were also probed by the question: “what has 
made you good at this job?”  
 
Clearly, open-ended interviews of this kind cannot be used to assess the demands of 
childcare work in an “objective” way. Questions were not sufficiently systematic to 
resemble a job evaluation exercise. Indeed, workers varied in the categories of job 
content they talked about: some referred to the skills or responsibilities involved, 
some to effort required and others to the undesirable working conditions.  
 
Nevertheless, the material elicited was informative of the variety of perspectives held 
by workers. The fact that some placed greater emphasis on some aspects of the job 
rather than others was a finding in itself. Importantly, the interviews took place 
between June and September 2009, almost a year after the introduction of the new 
curriculum – the EYFS. The EYFS established a single set of standards across all 
types of provision and contained detailed guidance to practice. All settings and all 
childminders were required to base their practice on the EYFS. In theory, therefore, 
all types of provision were meant to share similar objectives and involve similar 
work. 
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Pay and qualifications, and other productive characteristics 
Do childcare workers holding higher qualifications receive on average higher pay 
relative to less qualified workers?  I start by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model to estimate the wage regression presented above. Results are reported in Table 
7.1, column 1. Qualifications are entered into the equation as a vector of 7 dummy 
variables and the omitted category is ‘no qualification’. Thus, for each qualification, 
the coefficient indicates the percentage increase in wage associated to that specific 
qualification relative to ‘no qualification’.   
 
The figures reported indicate that the pay hierarchy does not match the qualifications 
hierarchy. In particular, the pay advantage associated with A-levels and degrees is 
lower than the pay advantage associated with good GCSEs or Vocational 
qualification above level 4. For example, someone with good GCSEs is likely to be 
paid 33 percent more than someone without any qualification, while someone with 
A-levels or a degree is likely to be paid only 29 percent and 23 percent more than a 
worker with no qualification. Furthermore, someone with vocational qualification 
above level 4 is paid on average 42 percent more than someone without any 
qualification. Such a large pay advantage may be interpreted as a sign of large 
returns to occupational specific qualifications gained at tertiary education levels. It is 
however more difficult to explain the large pay advantage accruing to those workers 
with good GCSEs, as this qualification cannot be considered occupation specific.  
 
The ‘mismatch’ between pay hierarchy and qualifications appears also in relation to 
Vocational qualifications at level 3. Results suggest that those holding a vocational 
qualification at level 3 earn 26 percent more than workers without any qualification. 
By contrast, workers with good GCSEs tend to be paid 33 percent more than those 
without any qualification.  
 
In sum, the coefficients reported in Table 7.1 column 1 suggest that childcare 
workers who have gained some educational qualification tend to be paid between 20 
and 42 percent more than those workers who, instead, lack any qualification. 
Qualifications thus seem to matter. It is however more difficult to understand how 
advantageous qualifications are relative to one another. Vocational qualifications 
obtained in the tertiary education appear consistently to be associated with the largest 
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29Table 7.1 The association between pay and ‘productive’ attributes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic 
specification 
Controlling for 
experience 
 
Controlling for 
experience and 
responsibility 
    
GCSE (≥ 5A*-C) 0.252*** 0.201*** 0.205*** 
                     (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Vocational L2 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.197*** 
                     (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
GCSE (< 5A*-C) 0.325*** 0.256*** 0.260*** 
                     (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Vocational L3 0.256*** 0.230*** 0.238*** 
                     (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) 
A-levels 0.286*** 0.225*** 0.231*** 
                     (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
Vocational L4 and above 0.419*** 0.336*** 0.342*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Degree and above 0.228*** 0.114* 0.122* 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.064) 
Age  0.058*** 0.059*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Job tenure  0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Potential experience  -0.024*** -0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
  -0.030* Supervisory/managerial 
responsibilities   (0.017) 
    
Controls for regions and 
years Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 2866 2866 2866 
R-squared 0.302 0.379 0.380 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note:  
1. Sample: all female childcare workers, age 16-59.  
2. Dependent variable: log(hourly wage) 
3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4. Omitted category for education: no qualification or entry qualification (Level 1) 
5. Additional control: proxy respondent. 
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30Table 7.2 Qualifications relevant to childcare 
 Percentage 
Standard 
Deviation 
Vocational L4 and above 0.48 0.50 
Degree and above 0.34 0.47 
Source LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, first wave respondents only. 
Notes: sample includes childcare workers holding a post-secondary qualification,  
for whom the subject of the qualification is not missing.  
 
 
pay advantage. But there does not seem to be much of a pay gain associated with 
holding vocational qualifications at level 3 or A-levels or even degrees. Workers 
with these qualifications do not appear to earn more than those with simply good 
GCSEs.  
 
There are several possible explanations for the relatively low pay of workers with A-
levels and degrees. First of all, pay figures for these two groups are less precise than 
those for other groups of workers, simply because these two qualifications are less 
common within childcare (see Chapter 6). Secondly, and more substantially, these 
two qualifications are likely to be less relevant to work in childcare in so far as 
typically they do not cover subjects related to the job such as nursing, teaching or 
developmental psychology. It could be therefore that degrees and A-levels indicate a 
lack of occupation specific training, whereas vocational qualifications signal the 
opposite.  
 
Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 have pointed to the dearth of qualifications relevant to 
childcare work at tertiary education level, and in particular at degree level. In order 
to understand whether degrees are less occupational specific than vocational 
qualifications, I use information on the subject studied at tertiary education level. 
The LFS codes a very high number of possible subjects, but this variable is reported 
as missing for a large proportion of  the sample considered here. As I do not attempt 
to address this “missing-values” problem, caution should be used when interpreting 
the figures. I have coded the information on the subject studied and constructed a 
binary variable taking value 1 if the subject is relevant to childcare and value 0 
otherwise.  Relevant includes subjects belonging to the broader subject areas of 
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nursing, teaching, psychology and social work. It is therefore possible to gain some 
insight into the subjects studied by childcare workers. Table 7.2 shows that among 
those obtaining a vocational qualification, almost half fall into subject areas related 
to childcare. By contrast, only a third of those with degrees have studied a relevant 
subject. This supports the assumption that vocational qualifications are more likely to 
be occupation specific than degrees. As for A-levels, although there is no 
information about which subjects were covered in the examination, it is plausible to 
consider them as not occupation specific.  
 
But what about other ‘productive’ individual characteristics? Do they bear any 
positive correlation with pay? The second column of Table 7.1 reports the results of 
an OLS regression that includes age, job tenure and potential experience among its 
covariates. The inclusion of these variables reduces the coefficients of all 
qualifications, thus showing that pay advantages correlated with qualifications are 
partly driven by other factors. In particular, the large pay advantage associated with 
good GCSEs appears greatly reduced once age is taken into account. This suggests 
that it is mainly older workers to have good GCSEs as their highest qualification. 
 
Both age and job tenure are positively associated with pay, thus indicating that older 
workers and those who remain in the same setting for longer earn relatively more. As 
job tenure is expressed in months, the result indicates that an additional month in the 
job is associated with pay 0.2 percent higher. The negative coefficient of potential 
experience indicates that workers who left full-time education earlier on in their lives 
tend to be paid less than those who left later and who therefore have less potential 
work experience. This correlation between potential experience and pay is 
responsible for reducing the coefficient of degrees, as workers with degrees are those 
who are more likely to have left full-time education later in life. Thus, work 
experience does not seem to be an important source of pay advantage, especially vis 
à vis qualifications.  
 
Finally, I include a further variable in the regression – managerial and supervisory 
responsibility. This variable captures job demands more than individual productive 
characteristics: if a worker is responsible for supervising others, her job is generally 
considered more demanding. At the same time, we would expect employers to assign 
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more qualified workers to posts with greater responsibility, not least because 
regulation in childcare imposes such constraint. Thus supervisory responsibility 
could be reflecting workers’ productive characteristics and is likely to be positively 
associated with some qualifications. Contrary to the expectations, the coefficient of 
supervisory and managerial responsibility is negative (Column 3, Table 7.1). 
Furthermore, all other coefficients remain largely unvaried. It would seem therefore 
that workers assigned to more demanding jobs are paid less than those who do not 
have such responsibilities and that there is no correlation between qualifications and 
job roles. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the correlation between some qualifications and 
pay is strong, while other qualifications make little difference. In addition, there is no 
correspondence between responsibility and pay, thus hinting to the lack of career 
structure which the literature on childcare work often refers to (Rolfe 2005). 
It could be argued that a clear educational gradient in pay cannot emerge within an 
occupation that is narrowly defined. The LFS sample excludes teachers and nursery 
managers, thus by definition truncates the progression routes available to childcare 
workers. Nonetheless Chapter 6 has illustrated that childcare workers tend to hold 
different qualifications – this occupation is not as homogenous as it may be the case 
of teachers or nurses or domestic staff. In other words, although this occupation is 
rather narrowly defined, there is some variety in the profile of the workforce. For 
example, given the diversity of childcare workers’ qualifications, we could have 
expected employers to hire people with different qualifications or experience and pay 
accordingly. In other words, a stronger relation between qualifications and pay could 
have resulted by systematic differences across employers, with those seeking better 
qualified or more experience candidates paying higher wages.    
 
Differences across sectors in the correlation between pay and qualifications 
This sub-section explores precisely this point – whether differences across employers 
affect the correlation between pay and qualifications. In particular, I concentrate on 
sectoral differences and examines whether employers in the public sector 
compensate qualifications and experience more generously than employers in the 
private sector. Chapter 5 has shown that pay is substantially higher in the public 
sector. In addition, pay is set differently in the sector, with collective agreement and 
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pay scales affecting only workers in schools and in local authorities settings. It is 
therefore of interest to understand whether a more regulated labour market may 
result in smaller pay differentials among workers. Or whether, instead, the use of pay 
scale may result in a more visible association between subsequently higher 
qualifications and higher pay.  
 
31Table 7.3 The association between pay and ‘productive’ attributes, by sector 
 (1) (2) 
 Private sector Public sector 
   
GCSE (< 5A*-C) 0.055 0.401*** 
                     (0.055) (0.075) 
Vocational L2 0.088 0.307*** 
                     (0.057) (0.079) 
GCSE (≥ 5A*-C) 0.106* 0.405*** 
                     (0.059) (0.076) 
Vocational L3 0.106* 0.386*** 
                     (0.056) (0.076) 
A-levels 0.074 0.393*** 
                     (0.064) (0.081) 
Vocational L4 and above 0.147** 0.469*** 
 (0.059) (0.075) 
Degree and above -0.018 0.423*** 
 (0.079) (0.103) 
Age 0.041*** 0.026*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Job tenure 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Potential experience -0.020*** -0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
0.064*** 0.020 Managerial/supervisory 
responsibility (0.021) (0.025) 
   
Controls for regions and 
years 
Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1658 1166 
R-squared 0.415 0.370 
Source: LFS, 1994-2008, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note:  
1. Sample: all female childcare workers, age 16-59.  
2. Dependent variable: log(hourly wage) 
3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
4. Omitted category for education: no qualification or entry qualification (Level 1) 
5. Additional control:proxy respondent. 
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The estimation strategy is straightforward. I estimate the same regression equation on 
two samples, one for each sector.  Table 7.3 presents the estimates and it is 
immediate to notice that in the private sector only good GCSE and high vocational 
qualifications attract some statistically significant returns. By contrast, in the public 
sector, the returns to all qualifications are positive, large and statistically significant. 
There is therefore a stark difference between the sectors, and indeed the coefficients 
are statistically different in the two groups.  
 
Starting from the public sector, there are two key points to emphasise. First, the 
coefficients of high vocational qualifications and of degree are large and although 
they are not statistically different from one another, they are significantly larger than 
the coefficients of other qualifications. This means that someone with a qualification 
gained in a higher education institution is paid 47 percent more than someone 
without qualifications and approximately 7 percent more than someone with good 
GCSE. The second point refers to all other qualifications: their coefficients are large 
but the difference among them is not statistically significant. This means that, as 
usual, there appears to be little difference across qualifications: someone with A-
levels does not earn on average more than someone with a vocational qualification 
below level 2.  
 
In the private sector, the results suggest a very different story. Workers holding good 
GCSEs, a vocational qualification at level 3 or a higher vocational qualification are 
paid between 10 and 12 percent more than workers without any formal qualification. 
Instead, there appears to be little evidence that other qualifications are associated 
with any sizable pay advantage. Interestingly, in the private sector supervisory 
responsibilities are correlated with higher pay, around 5 percent higher, whereas in 
the public sector the coefficient is not significant. Childcare workers are more likely 
to have managerial or supervisory responsibilities when employed in the private 
sector than when working in schools. This is probably because in schools nursery 
officers work alongside teachers, who remain in charge of the administration of the 
nursery classes, and teachers are not included in the sample here.40 Insofar as 
                                                      
40 In the next section I will discuss in more detail the difference in responsibilities between teachers 
and nursery officers working in schools. It may however useful to clarify that in schools the 
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workers employed in the public sector have higher wages, this could partly explain 
the negative coefficient of supervisory responsibilities reported in Table 7.1 when the 
estimates were calculated on the entire sample without controlling for sector.   
 
Overall then, the link between qualifications and pay is fairly weak in the private 
sector, especially in comparison to the large coefficients in the public sector. 
However, for neither sector is the hierarchical structure of qualifications perfectly 
mirrored in pay differences. Nonetheless, the difference between sectors is 
remarkable and raises the question of whether public sector workers differ 
systematically from private sector ones. Is the pay gap between the private and the 
public sector accounted for by these differences in returns to qualifications? Or is it 
the case that workers employed in the public sector have different characteristics?  
 
The conventional way of decomposing wage separates the average wage differential 
between private and public sector workers into two elements: differences in the 
average value of wage-determining characteristics and differences in the returns to 
such characteristics  (Jann 2008). Here I control for those demographic 
characteristics that have been explored in Chapter 6, which showed that public sector 
workers and private sector ones were slightly different in terms of age, family status 
and ethnicity. The thrust of the results however does not change if I control for 
qualifications only.  
 
Table 7.4 indicates that, on average, public sector workers earn 44 percent more than 
workers in the private sector. Of this large pay differential, slightly less than a third is 
accounted for by differences the observable characteristics between the two groups, 
while two thirds are due to differences in the returns to such characteristics and 
therefore can be considered a public sector wage premium. This result seems 
plausible in light of the fact that public provision is geographically concentrated in 
some urban areas  and therefore it is unlikely that better qualified workers over the 
entire UK manage to gain access to public sector employment (Owen and Moss 
1989). As chapter 6 reported, only a quarter of the workforce is employed in the  
                                                                                                                                                         
responsibility for the supervision of children and the organization and involvement in children’s 
activities tends to be shared equally between teachers and nursery officers.    
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32Table 7.4 Decomposition of the private sector/public sector wage 
Portion attributed to differences in 
Overall differential 
Characteristics Public sector premium 
0.439 0.149*** 0.270*** 
(0.0161) (0.0240) (0.0183) 
100% 34% 62% 
Source: LFS data, fifth wave respondents only.  
Note: 
1. Sample: female childcare workers aged 16-59.  
2. Standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Controls include: highest qualification, ethnicity, family status, 
presence of children, part-time work, temporary employment, size of workplace (base category: 10 or 
less), educational sector, proxy respondent, region and year.  
 
 
public sector. The evidence reported by researchers from the Thomas Coram Unit 
(Cameron, Owen, and Moss 2001; Cameron et al. 2001) is also in line with this 
finding. The sample of childcare students they surveyed had a clear preference for 
working in schools. However, by the end of their studies, only a few of those 
students who had found a job had obtained it in a school (Cameron, Owen, and Moss 
2001, 44).   
 
Taken together, the results suggest that workers in the public sector enjoy higher 
base wages and larger returns to qualifications than workers in the private sector. In 
both sectors wage differentials between workers with different qualifications are 
narrow. This is particularly the case in the private sector, where high vocational 
qualifications do not seem to be associated with higher wage than lower 
qualification. Consequently, only workers in the public sector have an incentive to 
improve their qualifications, although the monetary returns do not appear to be 
substantial.   
 
Managers’ and workers’ views on qualifications 
The interviews were used to explore the role of qualifications in the childcare sector. 
This evidence can help further our understanding of the relationship between 
qualifications and pay. The earnings of childcare workers who have different 
qualifications do not vary substantially, but there is a considerable difference 
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between the pay of workers employed in the public sector and of those in the private 
one. Is it the case that the available qualifications are weak and inadequate? Are 
managers willing and able to recognise worker’s qualifications with pay rises? 
Through the interviews it is possible to glean, although cursorily, the context shaping 
the relationship between qualifications and pay.   
 
The interviews pointed to some differences between the managers in the public and 
in the private sector, in relation to their judgement about qualifications. Three heads 
of  children centres, which were manged by the local authority, had strong views 
about NVQs, which, as shown in Chapter 6, have become the most widespread 
qualification.   
These level 3 vocational, which I think are a load of rubbish, absolute rubbish […] They 
do not prepare the students for what actual work that they need to be doing. […] I 
expected a level 3 to come in, work with babies, and do that, not for me to actually train 
them on the job. [Janet] 
The new qualification is NVQ3s.  Crap I’m afraid.  I mean, there are occasional 
individuals who are good, but that’s not because they had that training, they’re good 
because they’re good.  The training is rubbish and quality of the applicants is poor.  
[Susan] 
We were finding with the NVQs and such, like the level 3 NVQ, a lot of people that had 
done the NVQ level 3, their literacy and such wasn’t as high as a level 3. They were 
coming in at quite low level. [Claire] 
Conversely, managers of private or voluntary nurseries did not single out specific 
qualifications, but talked about ‘qualifications’ more generally. Their views appeared 
somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand they were ready to say that workers needed 
qualifications. On the other, when they described what they look for in job 
applicants, qualifications seemed a secondary concern:  
Yes they’ve got to have their qualifications but for me they’ve got to have a bit of heart.  
A bit of personality that I know that, you know, that I’m satisfied that they can work 
with the staff that are already existing and the staff can work with them and I look at 
their attitude.  You know, qualities like that that you can’t see.  Qualities that you can’t 
put on paper. [Angela] 
They have to have qualifications and they’ve probably got the experience but 
sometimes it’s just that gut feeling that you know that they’re going to get on well with 
the staff because they’re going to have to get on well with the staff and the children. 
Sometimes it’s not always about qualifications, sometimes it’s experience and how that 
person comes across to you. [Rose] 
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Moreover, sometimes there was no interest in selecting a qualified person, because 
on-the-job training was considered sufficient. Cath described the process of hiring 
someone responsible for children with special needs this way:   
At the time with the special needs worker the SENCO [Special Education Needs 
Coordinator] from the [name of the local authority] said that they would do in-house 
training, so they were saying it’s more important to get a person that’s gonna be loving 
and kind and patient and we can train them to what we want them to be, so in that 
respect this is what we were hoping with this lady.   
Maral describes interviews with job applicants and implies that qualifications lead to 
an overemphasis on paperwork:  
If they are newly qualified they all talk about health and safety, all those things, and 
equal opportunities: all that paperwork comes up first thing.  
Despite their talking about ‘qualifications’ without further specifying which 
qualification they referred to, in almost all private and voluntary sectors nurseries 
visited staff were not qualified above level 3. Thus, in effect, managers in the private 
sector seemed not to trust those same qualifications that the three heads of children’s 
centres considered “crap”.  
  
The evidence collected from workers further supported private sector managers’ 
views, as it showed how work was not organised on the basis of qualifications. For 
example, Ann said: 
I don’t really see the difference of having Level 2 and having Level 3 [qualifications]. 
Because some of the girls that work here they done Level 1. And I’ve never heard of 
Level 1, because when I started I went straight onto Level 2. So I think it should just be 
the same... the same... because everyone does the same amount. No one’s different.  
Everyone does everything the same, they all do the planning. They all have to do their 
observations. […] So there’s no point in having Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3, because 
you’re still... Level 2 people are still doing the same work as Level 3. So I don’t see the 
point in it. It should just be Level 3. 
 
Indeed Ann was still classified as ‘Nursery Assistant’ – without supervisory 
responsibilities – rather than ‘Nursery Officer’ even though she had obtained her 
level 3 qualification. As a consequence, her pay had not increased after she gained 
the qualification.  
A further insight was given by Jenny, who recounted her experience in a nursery 
where she had been employed: 
At one point there was no manager, there was no room leader, there was nobody there 
to give everyone guidance on what to do so I sort of then took it on board to make sure 
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simple things like the register, accident reports were done because I discovered what the 
other room needed so I kind of had the experience and just sort of watched everyone 
and then I just took it on board to do it myself because there was no-one else to do it.  
Then we had a new manager coming in and then she said to me: ‘do you want to be the 
room leader?’ and I said ‘well I’m not qualified, I’ve got no qualification’ and she was 
quite shocked that I didn’t have any so she put me on to do the Level 2 and then 
obviously we worked from there.    
Thus, there was a poor correspondence between qualifications, job roles and pay. Not 
only there were few job titles, but, in addition to that, the evidence seems to suggest 
that they do not necessarily match with the available qualifications. This, in turn, 
could explain why the results from the LFS do not indicate a monotonic correlation 
between pay and qualifications. 
 
Managers’ ability and willingness to reward their staff upon gaining qualifications 
varied across settings. In one setting, run by a voluntary committee, the manager 
expressed some frustration with the fact that workers were not granted any pay raise: 
Amanda’s done the NVQ3, I’ve asked for an increase for her, there may be, could be, in 
the future, but I think that that should just go with it because, you know, if people 
choose not to do, then why shouldn’t the ones that choose to do it get some 
compensation for doing it - it’s dedication.[Cath] 
 Another manager treated the issue more matter-of-factly, as she explained why 
wages had not gone up: 
That wasn’t down to me; it was down to the owners. But apparently the proprietor 
doesn’t have to give a pay rise because you’ve done your qualifications. [Rose] 
 
Sometimes difficulty in rewarding staff financially for the qualifications gained was 
mixed with some reluctance in seeing higher qualifications as a vehicle to improve 
practice.  For example, Patricia, who owned and managed a small nursery, explained 
the problemes faced by private nurseries when she talked about workers gaining the 
Early Years Professional Status (EYPS): 
The government has funded all these courses for three years now these people have 
reached their professional status, they should be paid like a teacher but nurseries don’t 
have money to pay them. […] Nurseries cannot generate that money. You can’t 
generate unless you charge parents…£15 an hour? £20 an hour? 
At the same time, she was sceptical about the need for staff to obtain a degree. 
All my staff are level 3, level 4. That’s it. They don’t need to go any higher.  
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But one worker from Patricia’s nursery had embarked on an Early Childhood 
Degree, with the objective of becoming an EYP. When asked if she was going to 
have a pay rise, Patricia said no, but later also added:  
I don’t think a degree would make my teaching of the children any better.  
 
The opposite picture emerged from one of the children’s centre, where Tessa, the 
head, explained at length how she was able to recruit graduates: 
I have been very lucky with the staff.  I’ve been able to attract a considerable number of 
staff with very high qualifications who are working at what some people might consider 
in the years gone by, a more menial level. I, for example, have people with good 
degrees working as nursery officers on a scale 4. 
Tessa’s ability to attract qualified workers depended on sevaral factors. First, a 
nursery officer on a scale 4 was paid more than most private sector workers.  Indeed, 
Steven, who had previously worked as agency worker in different settings and was 
employed in the children’s centre led by Tessa, remarked: 
I get paid more here as a nursery worker than someone who’s a head of room in a 
private nursery, so they’re higher than me but they’re on less pay. 
Thus, the public sector premium was important. In addition, Tessa explained that she 
managed to employ highly qualified workers also because she was “very heavily 
committed to Continuing Professional Development” and sought every occasion to 
offer training opportunities to her staff: 
I begged, borrowed and stole. So if I was helping a school out with some work on early 
years myself and they had got an in-service day with a specialist, I would send my staff 
on that course.  It was bartering really: “I’ll do something for you, you do something for 
my staff.” 
Her dedication was also matched by considerable public funding, a proportion of 
which she could devote to fund staff training: 
We got Investors in People at the beginning of 2001 and then we put in for Early 
Excellence status and that brought us money direct from the Government, ring fenced 
on top […] So I was able to offer people, you know, so they [staff] could go off and do 
their degree and I could afford the supply cover and perhaps pay for their course or if I 
couldn’t I would buy them laptops and the textbooks to go on the course, you know, and 
sort of help them and support them. 
 
Notwithstanding Tessa’s willingness to reward qualifications and her access to 
public funding, it remained the case that salaries did not reflect staff’s qualifications. 
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Indeed Steven, who had a Bachelor degree in Education, was on a scale 4 and paid 
around 19K, well below the starting salary of a teacher.  
 
Even though Children’s Centres could pay their staff more than other nurseries, 
managers remained constrained in their ability to reward staff financially on the basis 
of qualifications. Janet, the head of another centre, explained it very clearly: 
We can’t [differentiate pay according to qualifications], it’s set, [Local Authority’s 
name] sets the salaries. […] All the qualified [i.e. with level 3 qualification] come in as 
a scale 4 and then there’s I think, 16, 17, 18 point increment, once you reach 18 that’s it, 
you stay there, even if you’ve got a Level 4, you stay there.  
She also explained that ‘room leaders’ were paid as much as other workers, although 
the local authority was looking into giving “them a bit of extra money, probably not 
going to be a lot.” When probed about the fact that room leaders were paid the same 
as other staff, Janet replied: 
The same yes, it’s only that we say to them you can put it on your CV that you’re 
actually supervising staff, we can’t give them financial rewards for it, it’s just we have 
to play it up. 
Therefore, the local authority’s pay scales did not differentiate either between 
qualifications or between job roles. Managers had to compensate their staff in 
different ways, either by subsidising staff’s courses – as Tessa did – or through 
additional payments outside the basic pay. So, Susan, also head of a children’s 
centre, explained the complicated way in which she had managed to give more 
money to a member of her staff:  
So I wanted to promote her to a senior.  I wanted to pay her more money.  I talked about 
paying scale 6, but scale 6 would have been less money than scale 4 on her terms and 
conditions, because it [scale 4 on those terms] is such an advantageous arrangement.  So 
what we’ve agreed to do, me and Human Resources, is to pay her scale 4, plus 
honorarium. And so basically it’s plus £1,500 a year. […] This is a short-term 
arrangement, but I needed to recognise her skills and her seniority 
 
Thus, the substantial difference between the two sectors was that managers in the 
public sector were able to attract workers who held a tertiary level qualification, 
while managers in the private sector were not. The children’s centres could pay 
higher salaries across the board. In addition, when managers were determined to 
recognise and promote workers’ qualifications, they could find ways to support them 
financially outside the official pay scale. 
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The evidence from the interviews is therefore in line with the results from the LFS. 
The weak correspondence between qualifications and pay is not only common in the 
private sector, but also built in the pay scale operating in the public sector.   
 
Discussion 
Although the relation between pay and qualifications in childcare is not 
straightforward, some clear-cut points have emerged from the empirical evidence 
presented. First, workers holding qualifications tend to be paid more than those 
without. Qualifications are, thus, important and workers without any qualification 
earn on average substantially less than other workers. But it is difficult to trace a 
clear pattern in the relation between pay and other qualifications. Only vocational 
qualifications above level 4 are associated with a pay advantage. The size of this 
advantage varies between sectors, but it remains visible across all specifications 
used. Instead, when other qualifications are considered, there is no consistent 
association with pay. Workers holding different qualifications tend to be paid fairly 
similarly. In particular there seems to be little difference in the pay of workers with 
good GCSEs and those with vocational qualifications at level 3. This finding is in 
line with evidence on the returns of NVQ2 and NVQ3, which suggested that workers 
gained nothing or very little by obtaining these qualifications (Dearden et al. 2000; 
McIntosh 2006; Jenkins, Greenwood, and Vignoles 2007). Furthermore, evidence 
from the interviews suggested that some employers do not rate NVQs highly. This 
also matches with evidence on the role of NVQs in the elderly care sector (Cooke et 
al. 2000).  
 
The evidence on the difference between private and public sectors in the correlation 
between pay and qualifications raises another set of issues. The results show that the 
two sectors differ in the ability to pay staff and to compensate for qualifications.  
Better qualified workers have very small wage premium in the private sector. In the 
public sector, on the other hand, the pay premiums are substantial. In the public 
sector the qualification premium is likely to derive from collective wage 
negotiations. But also, more generally, public sector provision could be more able to 
attract better-qualified workers because of public funding. In the public sector, 
funding from government gives managers greater opportunities to support their staff 
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financially. In other settings, on the hand, managers operate within much tighter 
margins, and pay increases have to be matched by higher fees. Notwithstanding these 
difference in constraints, it could be that managers in the public sector are more 
willing to recognise qualifications and compensate for them than is the case in the 
private sector. More research would be needed to explore this point, but a recent 
exploratory study suggests that providers in the public sector spend a higher share of 
their budget on staffing costs relatively to voluntary and private sector providers 
(West, Roberts, and Noden 2010).  
 
Finally, both results from the LFS and the interviews suggest that qualifications are 
not tightly linked to occupational titles and, consequently, with pay. This result holds 
both in the private and public sectors. The results underscore a more general feature 
of the British labour market, namely the limited relevance of “occupational labour 
market” – labour markets that are based on occupational-specific qualifications (), as 
could be said to be the case for teaching or pharmacy. Indeed, studies on the 
vocational education system in the UK point to the poor linkage between labour 
markets and many vocational qualifications (West and Steedman 2003).  
 
Take the example of childcare in Germany – a country in many respects similar to 
the UK, with historically low levels of services and little reliance on public 
provision. In Germany a more regulated labour market and a stronger vocational 
education system create a closer match between occupational titles and qualifications 
attainment. In the childcare sector, there are three occupational groups, each 
corresponding to a specific training programme and qualification. In order to work as 
a Kinderpfleger, one has to successfully complete two-year vocational training in a  
Fachschule (similar to further education colleges). The title of Erzieher, instead, 
requires the completion of a two- or thre-year programme in a Fachhochschule 
(broadly equivalent to a higher education college, ex-polytechnics). Finally, one can 
become Sozialpädagog upon completing a bachelor degree in Social Pedagogy 
(Oberhuemer, Schreyer, and Neuman 2010; OECD 2006; Oberhuemer and Ulich 
1997). Erzieherinnen make up roughly two thirds of staff employed in childcare 
settings (Oberhuemer, Schreyer, and Neuman 2010). 
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The findings from the LFS thus reinforce the results from Chapter 3 and Chapter 6. 
Chapter 3 illustrated the difficulties that had beset the Labour Government’s 
lukewarm attempts to reform the qualification system and to raise entry qualification 
requirements. The point made was that childcare remained an open occupation, 
insofar as no qualification was required to work as a childminder or in a nursery. 
Chapter 6 confirmed this picture by documenting an increase under Labour in the 
number of workers with NVQs, but no sizeable change in the incidence of workers 
with degrees or high vocational qualifications. In a context in which qualifications 
requirements are low and the vocational qualification system is not well-developed, 
it is predictable that the relationship between pay and qualifications will not be 
strong.  
 
The skills demands of childcare work 
So far we have looked at childcare mainly from the point of view of workers’ 
qualifications. Even though the results have been commented on extensively in light 
of the institutional arrangements in which they are embedded, the perspective has 
presumed that the demands of childcare work are fixed and determined somewhat 
exogenously. This section attempts to complete the analysis by addressing the second 
research question of this chapter: 
“What are workers’ views on the skills demands of childcare?”. More specifically, 
the analysis attempts to go beyond the assumption that childcare is undemanding 
because qualifications are not an important factor in the determination of pay and 
because childcare workers have low general education qualifications or intermediate 
vocational ones. The focus thus shifts from workers’ formal qualifications to the 
skills requirements of the job itself.  
 
Ideally, this exercise would require direct and systematic observational measures of 
job content. The analysis reported here is much more tentative and relies on workers’ 
self-assessment about the requirements of the job as gathered through the interviews. 
Both managers’ and front-line workers’ views are reported. Questions aimed at 
eliciting workers’ views about the demands of the job, with a particular focus on 
skills. However, workers touched on other demands of the job, for example 
responsibility or effort. Perhaps unsurprisingly, interviewees varied tremendously in 
their answers. Some considered it hard work, involving complex tasks and a fair 
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share of theoretical knowledge. Others considered it easy and undemanding. The 
whole spectrum of complexity was reflected in the answers collected, and this 
already suggests the difficulty in pinning down exactly the skills required by this job.  
 
The interviews gave prominence to emotional skills necessary to deal with children, 
parents and also other staff. Angela explained what was needed by to work well in 
this job in the following manner:  
A good mind. You’ve got to be mindful that you’re working with people where the job 
is extremely hard.  You’ve got to have…to care I think.  You’ve got to have your 
knowledge and you’ve got to have a lot of strength.  A lot of patience. [short pause] Yes 
care. Because if you’ve got parents who are stressed and they come to you because 
they’ve got a concern, then you’ve got to care.  You’ve got to care about the human 
element of it […] I’ve got the parents, I’ve got the staff, I’ve got the children and that’s 
so many different characteristics to be dealing with.  So you’ve got to have an open 
mind and also try and keep yourself somewhere in there I think. Listening skills are 
very good. I’ve still got to fine-tune mine.  Communication has got to be in there as 
well.  You know, communication is hand in hand with this and an understanding that 
everyone is different.   
Being required to deal with different sets of people may be considered demanding in 
itself and this idea that the job entailed dealing with different peoples and their 
demands was also conveyed by Donna: 
It is draining on all levels, because we are containing most of the feelings that the 
children are facing, and, so we’re like their containers, but not only the children but also 
the parents anxieties, so one you’re absorbing all that, it’s obviously, it’s a physically, 
mentally and emotionally draining job. 
 
In what follows I explore more in depth the demands linked with the direct work 
with children, and will not report, for reasons of space, on the challenges arising 
from working with other staff or dealing with parents. This is because the particular 
features of childcare are most evident when examining the direct work with children.  
 
Among those who considered their job difficult, some emphasised the observational 
skills involved:    
You need to be on the ball all the time, and you need to have that peripheral vision, like 
constantly scanning what’s going on and what’s going to happen and that way. That is, 
that is difficult. [Donna] 
If you’re sitting down doing a puzzle with ‘em, you’re not just sitting and helping them 
with the puzzle, we’re talking colours, we’re talking about what they’re seeing and 
you’re watching whether their physical… you know what their coordination’s like 
and… you’re looking all the time, for all those different things.  You’re not just sitting 
doing a puzzle with them. [Lorraine] 
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Another aspect of the work that emerged quite clearly was the need to pay attention 
to the individual child – who could be somehow problematic – as much as to the 
group and the overall environment: 
It’s not easy working with children. It’s very demanding. It can be stressful. […] If 
you’re working with two to three year olds, you will have the odd child that’s gonna 
keep going round biting all the children and… but you have… as I said, because of your 
knowledge of child development and how children learn, you expect it, so you just take 
it as part of your role, how to deal with it and obviously with experience you deal with 
situations better. [Deborah] 
By contrast, some workers made the opposite point – namely that working with 
children was easy. For example, Ann described her role in the nursery:  
I just work in the room. Basically, the children in pre-school they’ve got a lot of 
independence, so they basically do everything themselves and we’re just there to 
interact with them and just play with them and if they need any help then we’ll help 
them, but we prefer for them to try themselves first.  
Jenny, on the other hand, gave prominence to the relational and menial aspects of the 
job:  
I don’t think there’s anything that I find difficult really.  There’s, you know, I don’t 
have a problem with anything really.  You know, I get on well with the parents, I get on 
well with the children, I don’t mind clearing up and tidying up after my mess, I don’t 
mind doing nappies.    
 
Interestingly, some interviewees noticed how the introduction of the curriculum had 
changed workers’ practice. In particular, workers were required to observe children 
more attentively and also to reflect more explicitly on the goals of their practice.  
It [the curriculum]’s changed the way we think about how we write our profiles.  We 
don’t just write them […] we’re not just writing daily diaries every day and not noticing 
what the children are doing.  It’s given us food for thought.  [Angela] 
It [the curriculum]’s made a big difference because everything’s more involved, because 
everything’s more structured and because you’re working to… to the curriculum, as I 
said.  Going back to when I first started doing it, we would just come in and we’d put 
the puzzles on the puzzle table and some counting thing on another table and some 
drawing on another table, but there was no… there was no actual meaning to it like 
there is now with the curriculum.  You’re working towards something all the time. 
[Lorraine] 
The greater emphasis on observations was accompanied by increased paperwork: 
workers needed to record children’s progress in a detailed manner. Staff often 
complained about the amount of paperwork involved, but it often meant more 
training. Therefore paperwork was associated with learning new skills in order to 
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write observations and activities plans.  So, for example, Deborah reported the 
changes brought about by the introduction of the curriculum:   
In the practice-wise no, paperwork yes, because it was a lot to get our heads around […] 
But we had training.  We all had an in-set day training for Early Years Foundation 
Stage.  
For some, the paperwork involved had increased the status of the job:  
My husband even thinks of it as a job now. But he just used to think that I’d be standing 
in a hall making sure children don’t hurt themselves and letting them play with some 
toys. So even he realises now with all the stuff that I have to do at home, all the 
paperwork. [Cath] 
Childcare workers’ comments on the introduction of the curriculum pointed to 
changes towards a more active role, with workers engaged in more observations, 
planning and the connected paperwork.  
 
A related theme was that around the distinction between workers’ role and that of 
teachers. Terrence framed the problem very clearly:  
I don’t think you need to be a university graduate to do this [work in a nursery]. It 
depends on how far you want to go though. I mean if you’re talking about teaching 
secondary school and primary school that would be, yes, I think you should go to 
[university], as a teacher you should have that level. Nursery practitioner, no. Because 
what you have to understand is you are not here to teach the children, you’re here to 
help them develop. That might sound like a contradiction but you’re not here to teach 
them, you’re not qualified to actually teach like a teacher. You don’t have a lesson plan. 
We have planned activities. It is about learning, [children] learning by themselves. 
Thus, according to Terrence, childcare workers have a supportive role because 
children are “learning by themselves”. There is therefore the idea that teachers’ role 
is more active. In order to pursue this point further, it is useful to explore the views 
of teachers. As Chapter 3 explained, one of the features of the current system of 
childcare and early years provision in the UK is that teachers are also employed to 
work with pre-schoolers. Do teachers working with children under 5 see themselves 
as teaching? If not, how do they describe their role?  
 
Dianne was especially articulate on this point: 
Children are able to extend their own learning and what we do is we enhance their 
learning. So we might think: “oh, they seemed really interested in power rangers last 
week, how can we use their interest in power rangers to teach them about size, length, 
maths, literacy?”   
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The account given by Sandra, a nursery teacher who had been working in a 
Children’s Centre, where none of the staff was qualified at tertiary level was 
especially insightful:  
The main thing that we changed was the planning which was based on the observations 
of the children. So I set up a system where we had four focus children for the week and 
everybody observed those children and then we took them to the planning meetings and 
then we discussed their interests and needs and things like that. So I had an influence on 
what the other staff were doing because I suggested, sort of, activities that they could 
follow on, that the children needed or wanted. 
These quotes suggest that teachers shared Terrence’s view on what their job was 
about, namely supporting children’ learning. Although work with pre-schoolers did 
not entail teaching in the traditional sense of being primarily a teacher-led activity, 
teachers saw themselves as actively involved in extending children’s learning. This 
entailed observing children, understanding their interests and using such interests to 
design activities that furthered children’s development.    
 
But Terrence’s comment noticeably points to a link between training and workers’ 
subjective views on the demand of the job. His way of describing the role of a 
nursery practitioner was coherent with the training he had received and thus 
downplayed the demands entailed in “supporting children’s development”.  
 
Training requirements appeared to influence also Aisha’s view of the demands of 
childcare work:  
In offices it’s like they need to train you up.  I know in all jobs they need to train you 
up, but office work, it’s like…if it’s in a council there’s so much to learn.  Obviously 
it’s a good thing, but you know you have to know a lot of things.  Whereas in childcare, 
kids come first and that kind of comes sort of naturally – looking after the kids – and 
then the written work and stuff like that you get trained up on.  Obviously like certain 
things you get trained up on, but I just find childcare a bit more easier.  
Childcare seemed easy precisely because it did not require extensive training and 
knowledge.  
 
Two points emerge from this evidence. First, institutional features of the provision of 
childcare affect the work content and workers’ views of their job’s demands. In 
particular, the evidence suggests that the curriculum was largely regarded as making 
the work harder. Not only had this regulation introduced new tasks – like the 
recording of observations and planning. It had also required a stronger focus on 
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learning and development goals. As Lorraine put it, the curriculum involved 
“working towards something all the times”. This evidence dovetails with a recent job 
evaluation study of nursery nursing in Scotland (Findlay, Findlay, and Stewart 2009). 
Beside the curriculum, the availability of training and related requirements appeared 
to influence workers’ views about the demands of the job. Although further research 
would be necessary to better understand the ways in which training influences 
workers’ perceptions of their role, it is hardly surprising that training imparts a view 
on how the job should be done. Rigorous and thorough training implicitly and 
explicitly conveys the idea that the job is demanding. Further, this evidence is in line 
with previous studies showing how the job content varied in relation to the prevailing 
approach and the philosophy underpinning the service, which, in turn, have 
historically been correlated with the training system.  
 
The second point that emerges from the interviews relates to some intrinsic features 
of childcare work. The interviews suggest that the job can be anything between 
letting children play to actively enhancing children’s learning.  This variation relates, 
in part, with the long-standing distinction between care and education. And indeed 
teachers were especially articulate in describing what enhancing children’s learning 
entailed. However, this variation in job content touches upon a defining feature of 
care work, namely that care can be active and passive, entailing both tasks and 
responsibilities (e.g. Leira 1992). In the literature on care, this double meaning of 
care has emerged more prominently in relation to family childcare. It particular, 
time-use studies have found it difficult to distinguish between forms of childcare that 
involve being at home in order to be available to children and other forms, like 
performing household chores with children in tow (Folbre and Yoon 2007). But paid 
childcare workers are confronted with a similar continuum, whereby their work 
spans from letting children play to constantly observing them or interacting with 
them.  
 
However, a discourse around skills pertains to the active aspect of care only. It is 
difficult to see how “being available” can be skilled. Indeed, as noted by Davies in 
the case of hospital nursing, our conventional notion of “being skilled” is deeply 
“agentic”, in that it presupposes an active actor “making a difference in the world” 
(1995, 59). However, care remains a relational activity. This means that care 
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recipients are involved in the relationship. The extent to which children can be acted 
upon is therefore necessarily limited.   
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has set to answer two questions: first, what is the correlation between 
qualifications and other “productive characteristics” and pay in childcare? Second, 
what are workers’ views on the skills demands of childcare work? The results have 
suggested that pay in childcare is rather flat and particularly so in the private sector. 
There is a sizable difference in the pay of workers who hold a qualification as 
opposed to those without any qualification. But there is little difference between the 
pay of childcare workers with different qualifications. Likewise, experience does not 
seem to account for differences in pay between workers. Instead, the pay advantage 
associated with qualifications is much larger in the public sector as opposed to the 
private sector, and this difference in the returns to qualifications explains much of the 
pay gap between public and private sector workers. Within the general picture, the 
case of vocational qualifications above level 4 is slightly exceptional, as they are 
invariably associated with the greatest pay advantage.  
 
The evidence from the interviews underscored the fact that there is a poor link 
between job titles and qualifications. In addition, some managers were found to hold 
new vocational qualifications in low esteem. Finally, material from the interviews 
suggests that workers’ views about the demands of the job are likely to be influenced 
by factors like training and other requirements like the curriculum. So, for example, 
the introduction of the curriculum has favoured a more active approach, whereby 
childcare workers are more aware of the learning outcomes of the various activities 
done by children.  
 
How do the results relate to the different theoretical perspectives outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter? The conventional economic approach of estimating the 
association between qualifications and earnings has been helpful to show which 
qualifications are associated with greater pay advantages. In particular, the specific 
qualifications that have been sponsored by the Labour Government are associated 
with no or very low additional earnings. Policy aimed at improving the career 
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structure in childcare should, instead, promote those occupational qualifications at 
tertiary level that are associated with additional financial returns.  
 
Yet the results also show that better qualified workers have a very small wage 
premium in the private sector. By contrast, in the public sector the pay premiums are 
substantial. This disparity was explained in relation to the difference in public 
funding between the two sectors. The interviews confirmed that public settings have 
access to more generous government funding than is the case for private and 
voluntary settings (see also Chapter 3; West, Roberts and Noden, 2010). This, in 
turn, affects settings’ ability to pay their staff good wages. Chapter 5 pointed to the 
role of collective bargaining, prevalent in the public sector, in securing higher wages 
relative to the private sector. This chapter adds a further piece of information by 
showing the role of both managers’ commitment to improving staff’s qualifications 
and of government funding in enabling such commitment. Indeed, public sector pay 
scales alone do not seem to ensure a close correlation between pay and 
qualifications.   
 
But the problem remains as to what market mechanism should ensure that more 
qualified workers receive better pay in the private sector, where government 
subsidies are much more limited. Within economics, the link between qualifications 
and pay hinges on productivity: better qualified workers make it possible to increase 
output relative to costs. In the case of childcare, this could translate into more 
children being care for by a given worker. Employers would have an incentive to hire 
better qualified workers if they could care for more children relatively to less 
qualified ones. It is worth noticing that staff to children ratios usually introduce this 
kind of incentive, whereby a higher ratio applies to more qualified staff. The 
underlying idea is precisely that better qualified staff are more able to care for 
children and can, therefore, care for a greater number (McGurk et al. 1995). In the 
English case, however, ratios are set according to type of provision (see Chapter 3) 
rather than workers’ qualification. This means that the regulatory framework does 
not encourage employers to hire better qualified staff.  
  
More fundamentally perhaps, it is clear that after a certain point an increase in the 
number of children cared for will lead only to a deterioration of quality.  As pointed 
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by Himmelweit (2005), it is difficult to increase the productivity of childcare 
activities.  
Thus, quality, rather than productivity, is the notion that better capture the effects of 
an improvement in qualifications may have. However, despite being better suited, 
quality does not make the relation between qualifications and pay any simpler. 
Unlike productivity, quality tends to drive up costs – productivity gains result in 
lower production costs, whereas quality improvements usually entail higher costs. 
Unless higher costs are recuperated by higher prices, there is no market mechanism 
that ensures the pursuit of quality. Moreover, the actual possibility of increasing 
childcare prices is restricted. If families have limited resources (and therefore place 
emphasis on prices), price competition is likely to outtrump competition on quality.41 
This problem is likely to be especially acute in childcare, where demand is 
particularly sensitive to prices (for an overview, see Blau 2001: chapter 4).  
 
There also remains the question of whether highly qualified workers are more able to 
deliver good quality childcare relatively to less qualified ones. The answer will 
depend on cultural images of what constitutes good care – what Kremer (2007) refers 
to as “ideals of care”. She persuasively argues that welfare states actively promote 
specific ideals of care and such ideals are underpinned by precise views on what is 
required in the job. Thus, in Denmark, the dominant “ideal of professional care” 
means that good quality is equated to childcare delivered by highly qualified 
workers. By contrast, in Flanders the dominant ideal of care is that of the “surrogate 
mother”. Consequently, there is high reliance on home-based provision and qualities 
like warmth and affection are deemed more important than qualifications.  
 
Cultural ideas about good childcare are also likely to be shaped by existing 
institutions, in that insitutions shape what is actually feasible. Thus, a poor training 
system undermines the “professional ideal of care” described by Kremer (2007) 
because it falls short of preparing workers to do their job well.  Likewise, it is 
difficult to see how an ideal of professional care can emerge in a context 
characterised by inadequate funding.  
                                                      
41 Indeed, research in health suggests that that if buyers give importance to prices this drives down 
quality (for a review, see Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and Propper 2012). 
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It would seem therefore that the idea that the skill status of an occupation is socially 
constructed in especially pertinent in the case of childcare. Not only are the skills 
demands of childcare work better understood if they are viewed as the outcome of a 
social process.  But cultural notions of what constitutes good quality childcare 
services are especially salient. Indeed, the actual job content comes to depend on 
societal views on what childcare services are about and what they should try to 
achieve. 
 
Undoubtedly, care work, and childcare work in particular, requires “loving, thinking 
and doing” (Leira 1994). The interviews have confirmed this well-known aspect, 
with some workers pointing to emotional skills, other mentioning menial tasks, and 
some others referring to theoretical knowledge of child development. Yet what 
remains contested is the actual balance between the three components. Much of the 
focus of the new wave of qualifications in England has been on “doing”. Indeed 
NVQs refer to the ability to perform a certain task to agreed standards.  At the same 
time, both the introduction of the curriculum and the launch of a new professional 
category of staff at graduate level have moved the emphasis on thinking – “food for 
thought”, as Angela put it. Further research would be needed to explore whether the 
most recent shift towards a “professional ideal of care” is mirrored in wages changes. 
Finally, the “loving” aspect of care work remains problematic in relation to skills 
insofar as it is not clear what learning process may be underpinning emotional skills. 
The next chapter leaves aside the theme of skills, but explores in more detail the 
relation between love and pay.  
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Chapter 8  
For love and for money: motivation among childcare workers  
 
Introduction 
Those feminist scholars that have unravelled the many explanations of the low pay in 
caring occupations have argued and shown that skills and qualifications are only part 
of the story (England, Budig and Folbre 2002). They suggest that implicit 
assumptions about care workers’ motivations may be implicated in the low pay of 
these sectors (Nelson 1999; England 2005; England and Folbre 1999). This chapter 
therefore completes the empirical analysis of this study by presenting evidence on 
the relation between pay and motivations.   
 
There is little question that highly motivated and caring workers are desirable. A 
cursory look at job advertisements in the leading national childcare sector magazine 
confirms this, as nurseries appear to be seeking enthusiastic, passionate, highly 
motivated, kind and loving applicants. Furthermore, a recent study exploring parents’ 
trust in childcare providers suggested that staff motivations and attitudes play an 
important role in reassuring parents (Roberts 2011).  
 
What is instead highly contested is the relation between caring motivations and pay. 
The mix of money and love is an uneasy one. The two indeed appear to belong to 
different spheres and to appeal to different motives. So love is associated with 
personal relations, altruism and authenticity. Money, on the other hand, is the 
prototypical medium of market transactions, which are seen as self-interested 
exchanges. Such a dichotomous view is however increasingly challenged by 
empirical realities in which activities that entail altruistic concerns are performed for 
pay. The case of formal childcare work is obviously a case in point. If money and 
caring motives are seen as incompatible, it becomes difficult to account for the fact 
that often paid childcare workers are strongly committed towards the children they 
care for. More generally, the fact that increasingly large amounts of what used to be 
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unpaid care work is done by paid workers makes such a dichotomous view not 
especially useful from an analytical perspective. Indeed, the idea that money and 
love are necessarily antithetic cannot uncover the arguably more complicated 
interplay between the two.  
 
Feminist scholars of care have long explored the several tensions arising from the 
coexistence of pay and care work. Crucially, they have dispelled the romanticised 
view of care as consisting only of feelings, which strips care of the labour activity 
necessarily involved in it (Graham 1983). Likewise, they have revealed how unpaid 
family care is not necessarily the expression of pure love, but can often result from 
“compulsory altruism” (Land and Rose 1985). Thus they have offered insightful 
accounts of the complexities involved, which escape analyses that do not straddle 
usual dichotomous categories like paid/unpaid, private/public or formal/informal. 
Yet many of these early analyses had unpaid care work as their starting point. 
Although many of the dilemmas they illustrated are almost ubiquitous, their accounts 
are of inevitably lesser cogency in the case of waged care work.   
 
Interest in the dynamics of motivation has also developed within other areas of 
research, and in particular within economics and more generally public policy 
studies. This has often occurred in the context of reforms of public services (for 
example, Le Grand 2003, 1997). In fields such as health, care or education, quality is 
difficult to monitor or measure, thus hampering both users’ and policy makers’ 
power to control providers. In addition, it is generally recognised that providers’ – 
whether organisations or staff – motivations play an important role in shaping the 
kind of service offered. More specifically, whether or not providers are intrinsically 
interested in the service they provide becomes a salient factor. However, if 
motivations are recognised to be more varied that the simple pursuit of profit or pay, 
the use of financial incentives becomes questionable. Indeed, in the presence of 
complex motives it is not all together clear if financial incentives can elicit more 
effort or commitment. 
 
This chapter addresses a specific set of questions within this wider theme. More 
precisely, the analysis presented here is interested in exploring the relation between 
motivations and pay in the case of childcare work. The ultimate objective is to 
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understand whether assumptions on workers’ motivations are implicated in their low 
pay. Systems of rewards often contain implicit assumptions about agents’ 
motivations (Le Grand 2003, 1997). Thus this chapter examines a number of 
alternative theoretical propositions on the way pay and motivations interact. The 
main goal is not to offer a complete account of the interplay between pay and 
motivations in the case of childcare workers. More simply, the analysis aims at 
providing some evidence that can help assess the merits and limits of different 
theoretical propositions. The methodology used is in line with this approach. I use 
data from the LFS and evidence from a series of interviews with childcare workers. 
This double-headed empirical strategy serves to both test the theoretical propositions 
found in the literature and to assess their relevance to the case of childcare workers.  
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The next section presents a number of 
theoretical propositions about the relationship between pay and motivations and 
presents the research questions. The third section describes the data and the 
methodology used. The fourth section reports the results. It considers to what extent 
high pay is associated with lower levels of motivations; it also examines whether pay 
increases are correlated with a reduction of intrinsic motivation. The last section 
discusses the findings and considers their implications for theory.  
 
Theoretical perspectives 
With considerable oversimplification, this overview identifies two different 
literatures that have put forward a number of theoretical propositions about 
motivations that are relevant to the case of childcare workers that will guide the 
empirical analysis. First, there are economists’ accounts on the role of pecuniary 
incentives when individuals have been motivated also by non-pecuniary rewards. 
Second, there are feminist perspectives on care work, which have explored 
motivations in relation to both the nature and quality of care services and in relation 
to women’s position and agency. 
 
These two perspectives have developed separately and have moved from distinct 
concerns. Feminist scholars are interested in care work, broadly defined. Economists, 
on the other hand, are more generally concerned with the provision of those services 
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that have a marked aspect of public utility and which do not rely predominantly on 
‘selfish’ motives. Thus, the idea cutting across the two perspectives is that a salient 
aspect of the provision of services such as childcare is that workers care about the 
output being produced – they are intrinsically motivated. The specific case of 
childcare can therefore be fruitfully examined in light of the propositions offered by 
both of these perspectives.  
 
Perspectives from economics 
A major focus within economics has long been the study of incentive systems. 
Standard economic theory suggests that an increase in the financial incentives given 
to a person will enhance her effort and performance. Financial incentives can thus be 
an effective tool for overcoming information asymmetries and monitoring problems. 
Efficiency wages are a case in point. Employees whose performance cannot be 
constantly monitored are paid above their productivity. This, in turn, will reduce 
their incentive to shirk because it increases the opportunity cost of losing their job.  
 
The long-standing tenet that financial incentives increase effort has however been 
challenged in recent years, partly because it does not accommodate motives other 
than self-interest well. If individuals are motivated by altruism or more generally by 
social concerns of different kinds, financial incentives may turn out to be a blunt 
tool. This problem arises especially in the context of those economic activities in 
which human behaviour is widely seen as underpinned by some form of commitment 
or sense of responsibility. This is the case, for example, of services whose 
consumption yields collective benefits, like education or health. In such cases, 
efficiency wages may not be the appropriate solution, because workers are not 
predominantly interested in pay.  
 
Conversely, low pay may reduce the need for both monitoring and for paying 
efficiency wages. Individuals whose motivations are sustained by the pursuit of 
activities enhancing collective benefits will be interested not only in their current and 
future remuneration but also in the quality of the service they provide. In their 
discussion on how to increase productivity in the provision of services with strong 
external benefit, like health and education, Besley and Ghatak (2003) observe that 
“individuals who work in the production of these goods may factor the value of the 
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output that they produce into their decision to work in that sector and in the amount 
of effort that they put in” (241). As long as workers can find the organisation that 
produces what they value – whether education or preschool services – it is possible 
to save on financial incentive and achieve, for less money, a more efficient output.  
 
When this type of argument is applied to the case of a specific occupation, we have 
what Heyes (2005) has referred to as the “economics of vocation”. Workers with a 
vocation are defined as those who will work “beyond the call of duty” because they 
experience an intrinsic fulfilment in doing the job. For them, total pecuniary plus 
non-pecuniary remuneration will exceed the actual wage. Since what attracts workers 
to a job is total remuneration (pecuniary and non-pecuniary), higher wages risk 
attracting the wrong type of workers – namely those who have lower levels of 
motivation towards the job. Hereafter, I will refer to this view as the “screening 
proposition”, because low pay is here considered as a screening device that reduces 
an adverse selection problem.  
 
Heyes’ argument essentially applies the logic of compensating wage differentials to a 
context in which people differ in their level of vocation or commitment toward one 
occupation – nursing is his example. Based on this logic, Heyes contends that “other 
things being equal a lowly paid nurse is more likely to have a vocation, and so over-
perform in his role, than a highly paid one” (568). While the reasoning underlying 
the screening hypothesis may explain why an individual with a strong vocation is 
willing to accept a lower wage relative to a someone with no vocation, Heyes’ 
conclusion points to a composition effect, whereby higher wages in vocation-
intensive sectors will reduce the overall proportion of committed workers employed 
in the sector. However, the model does not take into account the role of alternative 
employment opportunities, and in particular the fact that people may differ in 
regards to not only their level of vocation, but also their job options.  
 
Thus economics offers an understanding of the interplay between intrinsic 
motivations and pay in which the two are essentially traded-off, in line with the logic 
of wage compensating differentials. This perspective equates motivations to choice, 
and views choice as the outcome of a costs vs. benefits calculation. This way 
economics widens its perspective, traditionally restricted to selfish motives, and 
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incorporates a new area of analysis: altruistic motivations or commitment. Yet it 
analyses motivations with traditional and powerful economic concepts and tools, 
without exploring whether commitment or altruistic motive would be better 
understood within a different framework.  
 
In recent years, more sophisticated accounts of how intrinsic motivations respond to 
incentives have emerged within economics. Especially notable are the contributions 
by Bruno Frey and his colleagues (Frey and Jegen 2001; Frey 1998, 1997; Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997), who have pursued the idea that payment rewards may, in 
fact, reduce performance. They have introduced into economics a more nuanced 
understanding of motivation, by importing the distinction, well-established in social 
psychology (e.g. Deci 1975), between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Extrinsic 
motivation refers to a situation in which a person performs an activity because of an 
external reward attached to it; this external reward can take different forms: money, 
promotions, awards etc. For example, a childcare worker who works hard in order to 
receive a promotion would be considered extrinsically motivated. On the other hand, 
intrinsic motivation describes a situation in which a person is rewarded by the 
activity itself, either because she takes pleasure in it or because it fulfils her sense of 
duty. In this case the example would be a childcare worker who finds the activity of 
taking care of children fulfilling, rewarding and important in itself.  
 
External rewards may reduce performance because, although they increase extrinsic 
motivation, they may crowd-out intrinsic motivation. According to Frey’s 
“motivation crowding-out theory” (henceforth: the crowding-out theory), such a 
detrimental effect on intrinsic motivation occurs when the external reward is 
perceived as controlling by the individual performing the activity. A childcare 
worker may lose her own willingness to care for children if she feels pushed in that 
direction by a set of external incentives. By contrast, external rewards can crowd in 
intrinsic motivation when the “individuals concerned perceive it as supportive” (Frey 
and Jegen 2001, 595). In the case of workers Frey suggests that an external 
intervention may foster intrinsic motivation when it is considered by workers as 
“acknowledging their high work morale” (Frey 1997, 91). This would be the case of 
a childcare worker who is promoted because her manager sees her as eager to learn 
and to take on more responsibility. The psychological mechanism at work is simple: 
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if the individual feels that the locus of control over her performing a certain activity 
shifts outside herself, her sense of intrinsic reward from the performing that action 
diminishes.  
 
The motivation crowding-out theory offers a more varied understanding of the 
interplay between different sources of motivations. Different motivations are not 
fixed and simply traded-off; instead, they interact in a more complex way. Another 
salient aspect of the theory is its attention to the nature of external rewards. The 
effects of external rewards come to depend on the way they are perceived and 
interpreted by the recipient. If the reward is “controlling” it is likely to crowd-out 
intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, when the reward is “acknowledging” it is likely 
to enhance intrinsic motivation. Given the saliency of this distinction, Frey and his 
colleagues have studied under which conditions an external incentive is likely to be 
perceived as controlling rather than supportive or acknowledging. Within the domain 
of work motivation and compensation policy, Frey points to some regularities. 
Employees are likely to interpret as controlling those external interventions that are 
uniform across the workforce. Indeed, if the reward is the same for all employees it 
cannot be acknowledging the individual worker’s intrinsic motivation or effort. 
Conversely, more personalised and non-monetary rewards are more likely to boost 
the recipient’s intrinsic motivation (Frey 1997, Chapter 10).  
 
The crowding-out theory therefore offers a complex picture of how intrinsic 
motivations respond to external incentives and money incentives in particular. But 
theory has developed to challenge the idea, dominant in economics, that financial 
incentives enhance effort and performance. Much of the emphasis is therefore on the 
crowding-out effects rather than on the crowding-in ones. For this reason perhaps, 
claims that pay increases are likely to reduce workers’ intrinsic motivation are often 
supported by invoking the crowding-out theory. Yet such claims do not carefully 
examine the context in which such pay increases are introduced or their intention. 
The introduction of this distinction between different types of incentives complicates 
the assessment of the crowding-out theory but makes it more relevant to the case of 
childcare workers.  
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Feminist perspectives 
Within feminist scholarship motivation to care has long been recognised as an 
intrinsic aspect of care work. Indeed, since the seminal work of Graham (1983), care 
is understood as demanding both love and labour. Subsequent literature has reiterated 
how caring means both caring for – the activity of attending another person’s needs – 
and caring about – the desire for another person’s wellbeing – and has explored the 
ramifications of this double meaning. In the context of family relations, often caring 
about provides the motivation to engage in caring for. So, for example, parents attend 
their children’s needs because they care about them. Yet in the case of care work 
performed by paid workers it is more difficult to see caring activities as triggered by 
a sense of love and connectedness. Inevitably, in the case of waged work, the role 
and the nature of motivations becomes more problematic.    
 
Himmelweit (1999) contends that the intrinsic double nature of caring implies that 
paid workers will be concerned about the results of their work and, necessarily, their 
motivations will not be entirely monetary. Because “what people hope to take from 
work is not just pay” (Himmelweit 1999, 36), pay will not drive out intrinsic 
motivation.  From a slightly different perspective, Folbre and Weisskopf (1998) 
discuss the need for a new social contract able to promote caring activities based on 
feelings of affection and concern. They argue that within the context of wage 
employment higher pay may facilitate caring relationships but will not be sufficient 
without social norms favouring a diffuse sense of responsibility for caring for and 
about other people. Indeed, a higher wage will reduce the opportunity costs of caring 
work, thus enhancing the opportunities of intrinsically motivated workers to actually 
engage in such work. But ultimately, the supply of caring labour will not depend on 
market forces, but on the presence of the kind of values that underlie such caring 
labour, like altruism and sense of responsibility. 
 
This idea that pecuniary incentives are not necessarily conflicting with caring 
motives has been further elaborated by economists Julie Nelson and Nancy Folbre, 
and sociologist Paula England (England 2005; Nelson and England 2002; Folbre and 
Nelson 2000; England and Folbre 1999; Nelson 1999). They reject both the dualism 
between self-interest and altruism, and the notion of money as related to self-interest 
alone. In relation to the former, they propose a richer understanding of motivation 
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whereby multiple motives coexist alongside each other without conflicting. In the 
relation to the latter, they draw on the sociological literature on money (for example, 
Zelizer 1994) and argue that the meaning of money often depends on the context in 
which money transaction occurs. Thus, pay can be interpreted as a gift as much as an 
insult, with obviously different effects on motivations.  
 
These views almost dovetail the propositions of the crowding-out theory. Similarly 
to the approach proposed by Frey, these feminist scholars argue that caring activities 
are motivated by different types of motives – intrinsic as much as extrinsic. But the 
emphasis has been on the complementarity between the two, rather than on external 
incentives crowding-out caring motives. Moreover, Nelson and Folbre (Nelson 1999; 
Folbre and Nelson 2000) have insisted on the relevance of the distinction between 
types of external rewards – whether controlling or acknowledging. This distinction 
bears strong similarity to the idea that the meaning of money is not univocal, but 
pushes the point further. Indeed Frey suggests that money, by virtue of being 
fungible and anonymous, is less likely to be perceived as acknowledging. Rewards in 
kind and prizes, on the other hand, can be more easily personalised, thus are more apt 
to convey the kind of appreciation that boosts intrinsic motivation. Yet in the context 
of women’s work, payment levels may become more important than the distinction 
between rewards in kind and money. Indeed, both Zelizer’s (1994) analysis and 
Kessler-Harris’ (1990) historical account have illustrated how the meaning of “a 
women’s wage” has changed over time and how different amounts of money tend to 
convey different meanings. So, small payment are often viewed as tokens and reflect 
not so much the value of the recipient’s contribution, but rather an appreciation of 
commitment. From this perspective, low levels of payment for care work implicitly 
reinforce the idea that care work is undertaken predominantly for love.  
 
Feminist literature on care has therefore insisted on the importance of motivations in 
care work. In particular, intrinsic motivations are a constitutive aspect of caring 
activities, which entail that workers ‘care about’ the persons they are caring for.  In 
relation to pay, feminist scholars have challenged the view that pay necessarily 
erodes the ‘care about’ component of caring work.  Correspondingly, their emphasis 
is on the possible crowding-in effects of pay. Furthermore, some scholars suggest 
that pay can be understood as conveying reward from the employer and society, 
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rather than signalling greediness from the side of the employee. Viewed from this 
angle, pay therefore becomes an important tool to boost intrinsic motivation.  
 
Research questions 
Given these different propositions and views on the interplay between pay and 
motivations, this chapter examines two sets of questions. As in the previous 
chapter, I indicate the questions according to the numbering used in Chapter 4, 
when the “operational research questions” were overviewed. However, I add 
here two ancillary questions (3b and 3d). The first set refers to the screening 
proposition, and in particular to the idea put forth by Heyes. They are:  
3a) All else equal, are lower-paid childcare workers more likely to over-
perform in their role or to exhibit a higher level of commitment to the job? 
3b) Do the assumptions underlying the screening proposition fit the case of 
childcare workers?  
Question 3a is fairly straightforward and calls for the empirical testing of this 
specific prediction. Crucial to this exercise are the measurement of both pay and 
commitment. The second question (3b) requires teasing out the assumptions 
underpinning the screening proposition. So I explore the extent to which the “all else 
equal” clause is plausible and what its implications are. Further, I investigate whether 
workers’ choices are framed according to the logic of the compensating differentials.  
 
The second set of questions, instead, refers to the crowding-out theory. Empirical 
investigation of crowding-out effects is no simple matter. It is impossible to ascertain 
simultaneously whether an external incentive crowds-out intrinsic motivation and, at 
the same time, whether the incentive is acknowledging or controlling. Usually, 
experimental approaches control the type of incentive used and test the theory by 
examining the effect produced. If uniform and explicitly controlling pay incentives 
are found to crowd-out intrinsic motivations, the theory is confirmed.  
 
In the case of childcare workers, it difficult to validly test the crowding out theory 
because there are no incentive payments. Thus this chapter will explore a more 
general proposition: 
3c) Are payment increases associated with a decrease in workers’ 
commitment? 
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3d) Is it possible to identify other factors that support or undermine workers’ 
intrinsic motivations?    
Question 3c is relatively clear-cut. Yet, in this case, results cannot confirm or refute 
the crowding out theory. More simply, they can only be interpreted in light of the 
analytical framework proposed by the crowing out theory. The second question (3d) 
instead seeks to explore the context in which pay and other rewards are given to 
childcare workers. This exercise will help assess to what extent the effects of 
external interventions vary in relation to the context in which they occur.   
Cutting across the two sets of questions are different sources of information and 
different methodologies. Questions 3a and 3b will be explored using LFS data. 
Questions 3c and 3d will be examined by drawing on material from the interviews. 
The next section explains the different methodologies in more detail.     
 
Data and methods 
As in the previous chapter, I use two different sources on information: data from the 
LFS and material from the interviews with childcare workers. The choice of using 
both microdata and interviews is consistent with an empirical strategy that seeks to 
be both deductive and inductive. More specifically, the data from the LFS are used in 
two ways. First, to test the hypothesis that among childcare workers higher pay is 
positively associated with higher levels of commitment. Second, to verify what 
happens to motivations when pay increases. Information from the interviews, on the 
other hand, is used to explore whether both the screening proposition and the 
crowding out theory need to be formulated differently. In other words, the interviews 
help verify which new issues should be integrated in a conceptual framework that 
tries to analyse the relation between pay and motivations. In this section I present the 
variable used (in relation to the LFS) and the questions asked (in relation to the 
interviews).  
 
The Labour Force Survey 
As it was explained in Chapter 4, the LFS is a quarterly survey, but is structured as a 
rotating quarterly panel: each sampled household is surveyed for five consecutive 
quarters, so that in each quarter one fifth of the sample will be interviewed for the 
first time, one fifth for the second time and so on. I use the LFS both as a cross-
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section survey and as a panel survey, and perform three separate analyses: two in 
relation to question 3a and one in relation to question 3c. Because the longitudinal 
analysis can be carried out only for the 1997-2008 years, the entire chapter is based 
on this time span to increase consistency and comparability across sets of results.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The main problem of any empirical analysis interested in motivations and using 
observational data is that of finding a suitable proxy capturing workers’ vocation or 
motivation. In relation to the screening hypothesis I use two different variables, and 
the analysis is performed on two slightly different samples. In relation to the 
crowding-out hypothesis, I use one of the previously used outcome variables, but, 
again, the sample will be slightly different.  
 
First, I use information on unpaid overtime to measure workers’ level of 
commitment. Unpaid overtime has been recently used by Gregg et al. (2008) in order 
to examine whether people employed in the public and non-profit sector are more 
likely to ‘donate their labour’ than employees working in the private sector. In the 
case of childcare, this seems a suitable indicator because of the way work in 
nurseries is generally organised. Beside the actual work of caring for children, 
childcare workers need to carry out a series of tasks while not directly engaged with 
children, for example planning weekly activities or keeping records of children’s 
progress (Findlay, Findlay, and Stewart 2009). Yet nurseries tend to operate with a 
minimum level of staffing, and this means childcare workers are rarely entitled to 
time during which they can carry out planning and reporting tasks – so-called “non-
contact time”. Consequently, this type of work often gets done while children are 
around. Alternatively, workers can work longer hours or take work home. It seems 
therefore that unpaid overtime can be a plausible proxy of dedication to the job: 
those workers who are more dedicated and involved are likely to be reluctant to do 
the planning and reporting while directly engaged with children and are, therefore, 
more likely to work overtime. Thus, in the first part of the analysis on the screening 
proposition, unpaid overtime is the outcome of interest.  
 
The LFS asks all respondents in work for information on the usual number of unpaid 
overtime hours. One fifth of childcare workers do work some overtime hours, but 
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among those who do so the actual amount of overtime tends to be limited. Given that 
there is little variation in the number of overtime hours, I construct a variable with 
value 1 when respondents work any unpaid overtime and 0 when they do not.42  
In the second part of the analysis on the screening proposition, I measure 
commitment using a different variable. I examine the probability of childcare 
workers remaining in the sector, as opposed to gaining employment somewhere else. 
 
If accepting a low wage denotes high intrinsic reward from doing the job, we would 
expect workers with lower wages to be more likely than workers with higher wages 
to remain in childcare in face of better-paid jobs in other sectors. In addition, the 
issue of retention among childcare workers is of interest in itself. Indeed, from a 
policy perspective retention in the sector is important because it affects the overall 
number of recruits needed and because it reduces the average level of experience 
among childcare workers. However, it is important to notice the difference between 
questions about the ‘vocation’ of workers on the one hand and ‘caring motives’ on 
the other. If the perspective adopted is that of vocation, the interest lies in the number 
and type of workers employed in the occupation at hand – childcare in this case. In 
this case, a measure of the probability of remaining in the sector is appropriate. By 
contrast, if the focus is on the individual caring relationship between worker and 
child, it would be more correct to examine the probability of changing job, 
irrespective of sector of employment.  
 
The LFS, as mentioned above, contains a rotating panel. Since 1997, questions on 
wages are asked at the first and fifth interviews. This allows the matching of 
individuals across waves in order to obtain a panel with two observations fifteen 
months apart. I pool these short panels across years to have a sufficient number of 
observations. The resulting dataset spans from 1997 to 2008 and observes each 
individual at two points in time, which I will refer to as t0 and t1 respectively.43  
The sample I am interested in for this part of the analysis includes those working in 
childcare at t0. Among those who are in childcare at t0, 84 percent stay on, whereas 
                                                      
42 I have also constructed the overtime variable as a continuous variable and I have used this to carry 
out the same analysis presented here. I used both a tobit model and a linear probability model – the 
results were very similar to those presented here. 
43 Because of the rotation structure of the panel, t0 will be any quarter between the first quarter of 1997 
and the last quarter of 2007. t1 will be any quarter between the first quarter of 1998 and the last quarter 
of 2008.  
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16 percent move to different jobs.  These new jobs may either have some affinity 
with childcare (e.g. speech and language therapist or educational assistant) or be 
totally unrelated (e.g. shelf filler or sales assistant).  Although tracking whether 
workers remain in a sector which may be similar to childcare could offer useful 
insights on motivations, the small sample does not allow investigating this point 
further. What is instead possible is to explore whether there is some support for the 
idea that the lower the initial wage of a childcare worker, the higher her devotion to 
and preference for the job, measured by her probability of still being in the job after a 
year. So, the screening proposition is also investigated by using a dependent variable 
that equals 1 if the respondent is still employed in the childcare sector and 0 if she 
has moved to another sector.   
 
The analysis of the crowding-out theory, by contrast, uses unpaid overtime as an 
indicator of commitment. In this case however, the variable is constructed in a 
different way. What is of interest in the crowding-out theory are variations in 
commitment induced by external incentives. Therefore I use the longitudinal LFS 
sample and I construct a variable as the difference in the number of hours of unpaid 
overtime between t0 and t1. This way a childcare worker who worked 5 hours of 
unpaid overtime in t0 and 1 hour only in t1 will be assigned the value -4. Given that 
only a minority of workers work unpaid overtime, for the majority of them the 
assigned value will be zero. The sample used here is only slightly different from the 
previous longitudinal one. For this part of the analysis, I am interested in those who 
are in childcare both at t0 and t1. Thus, the sample is a bit smaller than the previous 
one, which, instead, included workers who had chosen a different occupation in t1. 
 
Independent Variables 
I use a similar set of covariates in the three parts of the analysis and in all cases the 
main independent variable of interest is pay. As explained previously in Chapters 5 
and 7, the LFS contains information about gross weekly pay. I derive hourly pay by 
dividing the gross weekly wage by the usual weekly paid hours. These wages are 
then deflated by the consumer price index, using 2005 as base year.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are well-known measurement problems affecting 
earnings information elicited directly from workers, and in particular from low-paid 
workers, who tend to not receive regular pay slips. Thus there will be some 
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measurement error in the independent variable, which will cause attenuation bias in 
the estimates. The coefficients are therefore likely to underestimate the correlation 
between pay and the outcome of interest (Greene 2000, 365; Wooldridge 2003, 305).  
 
Of course, both unpaid overtime and the probability of being employed in 
childcare at time t1 are likely to be affected by several factors and not only by pay. 
Central to my selection of control variables in the regression analysis, is the idea of 
capturing those influences that are likely to be relevant to the reality of childcare 
work and to the characteristics of the sample. I control for age and presence of small 
children to account for differences in personal characteristics that are likely to affect 
the possibility of working overtime and of finding a different job. I include a set of 
dummy variables capturing educational qualification. Qualifications are likely to be 
correlated with responsibility, and therefore with the necessity of working some extra 
hours. Likewise, workers with higher qualifications are better positioned to find 
alternative employment. 
 
 I also incorporate two controls related to job-characteristics which are likely to limit 
the willingness to work overtime and, on the other hand, may provide an incentive to 
move to another sector: number of usual hours worked and being on a temporary 
employment contract. Furthermore, I control for sector of employment for two 
reasons. Chapters 5 and 7 have shown that pay is highly correlated with sector, with 
public sector workers paid substantially higher wages than private sector ones. In 
addition, previous research on motivations and pro-social behaviour has highlighted 
how workers in the private sector are less likely to ‘donate their labour’ than 
employees in the public and non-profit sector. I also net out regional influences and 
year effects, but, in fact, the results do not change whether or not they are included. 
Finally, I include a dummy variable indicating whether a proxy respondent had in 
fact provided the information.  
 
As in Chapter 7, only women are included in the sample and no control for ethnicity 
is included. As before neither the inclusion of men in the sample, nor the additional 
control for ethnicity change the pattern of the results.  
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 The interviews 
As explained in Chapter 4, the interviews were mainly geared towards eliciting 
information about workers’ motivations. Information on the decision to enter into 
childcare was elicited mainly through two questions: “How did you start working in 
childcare?”; and “When you started, what were your expectations?”. The first served 
to set the decision into the context of the respondent’s life. The second question 
helped to better identify those workers who had “slipped” into childcare because it 
suited their circumstances at the time and had subsequently stayed on. Beside these 
initial questions, respondents often provided additional, sometimes contradicting, 
information on their occupational choice at later stages of the interview and were 
consequently probed.  
 
It was more challenging to elicit meaningful information about motivations as such. 
Indeed, in line with well-established findings in social psychology, people tend to 
present accounts of their experience whereby they appear consistent and committed 
to the choices they made (for example, Cialdini 2001, Chapter 3). Given that I was 
interviewing only people working in childcare at the time of the interview – not 
people who had worked in the sector and left it afterwards – I was bound to come 
across an overall positive account of the rewards of the job. Some indirect questions 
were therefore used to explore what aspects of the job people most disliked or liked. 
For example, respondents were asked: “Have you ever thought of looking for another 
job?”. Furthermore, they were asked about their future plans and where they saw 
themselves in five years time. Finally, I asked respondents what advice they would 
give to a young person who was considering starting to work in childcare. All these 
questions helped gain a more nuanced picture of the benefits and the problems 
experienced by different workers.  
 
In relation to money, unsurprisingly, different terms were likely to bring out diverse 
reactions, simply because they had different connotations; for example “big bucks” 
as opposed to “pay”. This, in turn, highlighted the relevance of framing problems. 
But such different reactions, and the variety of meanings that the topic of money 
could take, became a finding itself rather than an obstacle.   
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Findings 
Findings are presented in two sections, corresponding to the screening proposition 
and the crowding-out theory respectively. Within each section, results from the LFS 
and the interviews are presented separately. While some immediate comments are 
offered alongside the results, the bulk of the discussion is put off to the concluding 
section.  
 
Low wages as a screening tool: results from the LFS 
I start by estimating a logit model on the probability of working unpaid overtime. 
Results are reported in Table 8.1. the difference between the columns (1) and (2) is 
simply that the latter includes  controls for the sector of employment – private, 
voluntary or public; all other covariates are identical between the two specifications. 
Looking at column (1), the coefficient of pay is positive and significant, indicating 
that those on higher wages are more likely to work overtime without receiving 
additional payment. This is contrary to the intuition offered by the screening 
hypothesis, which suggests that low-paid workers are more likely to over-perform 
their role relative to better paid ones.  
 
When looking at the other variables, the results indicate that longer work hours are 
associated with a higher propensity to work unpaid overtime. This result is perhaps 
surprising, given that working longer hours in itself reduces the number of hours 
available to work unpaid overtime. But it could perhaps capture the fact that full-time 
workers tend to have more work responsibilities. The coefficient of temporary 
employment contract is negative. This may reflect the fact that staff on temporary 
contract are likely to be employed by an agency, rather than directly by the nursery, 
and this, in turn, may reduce their level of commitment.  
 
This pattern of results remains stable when controls for sector of employment are 
included. Indeed, all coefficients in column (2) are very similar to the ones in column  
(1), with only the exception of “presence of children”, which is now statistically 
significant. The presence of small children is negatively correlated to unpaid 
overtime, presumably because family caring responsibilities make it more difficult to 
work longer that the contracted hours. At the bottom of column (2), the coefficients  
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33Table  8.1 Pay and the probability of working overtime 
 (1) 
Basic specification 
(2) 
With sector 
Pay 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Children -0.024 -0.030* 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Work hours 0.002** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary job -0.067*** -0.066*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Voluntary sector  0.156*** 
  (0.035) 
Public sector  0.059*** 
  (0.019) 
  Controls for: 
Qualifications, temporary 
job, regions and years Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0983 0.1098 
Wald chi2 235.88 257.68 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 
Observations 2704 2704 
Source: LFS, all quarters, fifth wave respondents only, 1997-2008.  
Note:  
1. Sample: female childcare workers age 16-59  
2. Entries are the estimated marginal effects (calculated at the mean) in logistic regressions on the 
probability that the respondent works unpaid overtime.  
3. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
4. Additional control: proxy respondent.  
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of sector of employment are positive, suggesting that those employed in the public 
and voluntary sector are more likely to work unpaid overtime. This is in line with the 
results of Gregg et al (2008), who, using British data, show that workers in the public 
and voluntary sector are more likely to work unpaid overtime because of a sorting 
mechanism, whereby more motivated workers tend to select this type of organisation 
as opposed to the private sector.  
 
Overall then, these results suggest that childcare workers on a higher pay are more 
likely to “donate their labour” than workers with lower wages. The association is 
however small: other things being equal, a wage increase of £1, which is equal to an 
increase of 17 percent of the average wage, is associated to an increase of one 
percentage point in the probability of working unpaid overtime. Relative to average 
probability of working unpaid overtime, this increase is only of five percent. In short, 
the association is not very strong, as a very large wage increase corresponds to a 
small, albeit not negligible, variation in the probability of working overtime. Yet 
there seems to be little support to the idea that workers receiving lower wages are 
more likely to over-perform relative to better paid ones.  
 
The other strategy used to examine commitment is to estimate the probability that 
someone employed in childcare will still be working in the sector fifteen months 
after the first interview. Similarly to the previous set of findings, Table 8.2 presents 
the results in two columns, according to whether or not the specification includes 
controls for sector of employment. The results are however very similar across 
columns.  
 
The immediate point to notice is that the higher the pay at t0, the higher is the 
probability of working in childcare at t1. This correlation contrasts with the 
prediction of the screening hypothesis, according to which a lower initial wage 
attracts the most motivated people, who are, by virtue of their motivation, most likely 
to continue to work in the sector.  When looking at the coefficient of pay at t1, we 
find that the higher is the wage at t1, the lower the probability of being in childcare at 
t1. Here it is important to notice that wage at t1 reflects wage both in childcare and  
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34Table  8.2 Pay and the probability of working in childcare at t1 
 (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Sector 
Pay (t0) 0.0213*** 0.0136* 
 (0.00690) (0.00695) 
Pay (t1) -0.0156*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.00529) (0.00523) 
Age -0.000273 -0.000870 
 (0.00100) (0.000986) 
Children -0.0506** -0.0485** 
 (0.0251) (0.0246) 
Work hours (t0) 0.000669 0.00106 
 (0.00154) (0.00149) 
Work hours (t1) -0.00174 -0.00146 
 (0.00164) (0.00158) 
Voluntary sector  0.0763*** 
  (0.0213) 
Public sector  0.0946*** 
  (0.0238) 
  Controls for: 
Qualifications, temporary job, 
regions and years Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0704 0.0910 
Wald chi2 58.97 74.35 
Prob > chi2  0.0342 0.0021 
Observations 1096 1096 
Source: LFS, five quarters longitudinal datasets, 1997-2007.  
Note: 
1. Sample: female childcare workers age 16-59 at time t0 
2. Entries are the estimated marginal effects (calculated at the mean) in logistic regressions on the 
probability that the respondent will be still working in childcare at time t1  
3. Variables that appear only once refer to t0 
4. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
5. Additional control: proxy respondent 
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outside of it, therefore the negative coefficient could indicate that that those who 
move to other jobs, have, on average, higher wages. As for the other coefficients, 
only a few are statistically significant. Presence of children is negatively correlated 
with working in childcare, thus suggesting that childcare workers without children 
are more likely to move to other jobs. Interestingly, being employed in the public or 
voluntary sectors is positively associated with remaining in childcare. This is 
consistent with evidence of a higher turnover rate in private sector settings than 
elsewhere (Phillips et al. 2009). As wages are higher in the public sector than 
elsewhere, when this control is included the coefficient of pay at t1 becomes smaller.    
 
The results suggest that a childcare worker who is better paid at t0 is more likely to 
stay on in childcare. This positive correlation holds despite the fact that a childcare 
worker with high wage at t0 is more likely to have a higher wage at t1, and those with 
higher wages at t1 are less likely to be working in childcare. As in the previous set of 
results, the association is rather small. When sector of employment is taken into 
account, a wage increase of £1, equivalent to almost a 19 percent increase, is 
associated with an increase of one percentage point in the probability of remaining in 
childcare. This in turn means an increase of only one percent relative to the average 
probability of working in childcare at time t1. Yet over the limited time span of 
fifteen months, an increase of one percent may not be considered insignificant. In 
addition, if there is measurement error in the pay variable, the coefficient is likely to 
be biased downwards, thus underestimating the positive association between pay and 
continuity.  
 
Clearly, these findings from the LFS are rather descriptive and do not go far into 
explaining which mechanism may be underpinning the positive relation between pay 
and overtime, and between pay and continuity in childcare. Simply put, these 
positive associations could be due to several factors that are not related to 
motivations. For example, the fact the positive association between wages and 
unpaid overtime could be brought about by money concerns, rather than intrinsic 
motivation towards childcare. Workers with lower vocation are likely to choose 
better paid jobs within the sector, and, at the same time, will have more incentive to 
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work unpaid overtime in order to obtain a promotion. Furthermore, the analysis is 
looking at wages across the entire childcare workforce, rather than at initial wages, 
which, unfortunately, is not part of the information recorded by the LFS. These 
concerns are certainly valid, but do not appear especially cogent in the case of the 
childcare sector, which is notably characterised by poor advancement prospects and 
low wage increases (Rolfe 2005). Indeed, individual wage profiles are likely to be 
rather flat, with little seniority raises and few chances of obtaining a promotion to 
more senior level. Therefore the idea that childcare employees work unpaid overtime 
out of interest in future promotions seems rather implausible.  
 
As for the association between pay and the probability of being in childcare after 15 
months, the coefficient of pay can be interpreted as an elasticity of separation to 
other jobs not in childcare. This result is not altogether surprising: higher wages 
seem to help retention in the sector. But what can we say about the type of people 
who continue working in childcare? The negative coefficient of pay at time t1 
suggests that those workers who stay on in childcare are foregoing better-paid jobs 
elsewhere – they are therefore more committed to the job than those who leave. The 
short time window and the small sample size necessarily limit the scope of the 
analysis, leaving unaddressed the important question as to whether this positive 
association would emerge also when examining longer intervals. Furthermore, the 
association could be endogenous: employers pay higher wages to more committed 
workers, who by virtue of their commitment are more likely to remain in the 
childcare sector. This interpretation is perfectly plausible, but does not change the 
essence of the results. Indeed, what the LFS findings indicate is that employers do 
not, for whatever reasons, use low pay to select the most motivated staff.  
 
Taken together, the results presented in this section indicates that higher pay is 
associated with a higher probability of working unpaid overtime. Likewise, higher 
initial pay is positively correlated with the probability of not leaving the childcare 
sector. Therefore, the results call into question the proposition that a low paid worker 
is more likely to over-perform or have a vocation than a highly paid one.  
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Low wages as a screening tool: evidence from the interviews 
The screening hypothesis makes the assumption that workers trade-off between 
money and their intrinsic motivation to care for children. This section will use 
material from the interviews to investigate the extent to which this assumption is 
plausible, if at all. The idea that childcare workers saw their jobs as intrinsically 
rewarding is generally supported by the interviews. With only a few exceptions, all 
workers enjoyed working with children and expressed their passion for seeing 
children growing up:  
It’s so rewarding when you see the child progress. It is really. [Ann] 
It’s because you can see a child that comes in not speaking, very shy, not confident or 
they come in as a baby and you just see them leave as a child ready for school with the 
tools ready to go and learn.  That’s what’s rewarding about the job. [Rose]  
However there were only a few workers who talked about their choice to enter into 
childcare in relation to other, better-paid options. These workers had degrees and had 
chosen childcare after becoming dissatisfied with their previous job.  
I don’t want to deal with the office politics, so that’s why I found it difficult going back 
to HR [Human Resources] […] And with children it is rewarding, it’s hard work, and 
sometimes I do think “why am doing this?” especially because you know, the pay is not 
fantastic  but then you think about what do you want from life as well: “is money 
everything?” to be in an unhappy job or [to be] where you know what you’re doing has 
a significant impact on those lives. [Donna] 
I did work as a customer service advisor, but I hated it. … it’s mainly sat in an office 
and that’s quite a bit higher paid, but it’s just not what I want to do right now. [Mary] 
By contrast, there was little support for the idea that workers with lower 
qualifications had traded off money for the intrinsic reward of working with children.  
For example, Lorraine explained:  
I did one time look into going to work in Sainsbury’s, but the money was so poor and I 
thought well if you’re gonna change your job, you don’t change your job for less money 
than what you’re getting, because I really looked into it you know, what with the petrol 
money and everything, getting up to work every day, but it’s still… still not enough.  
A similar point was made by Amanda. She worked part-time in childcare and part-
time in a supermarket. When asked if she would swap her job in the supermarket to 
take a part-time position in childcare for less pay, she said: 
I don’t think you could pay less [laughs], I don’t think anywhere’s going to pay less 
than Morrisons! [Amanda].  
Indeed several interviewees reported that their previous jobs has been in other low-
paid sectors:   
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I’ve done a million things…I worked in Top Shop […]. I worked in Choice. I worked in 
a hairdresser as well. I've worked in a flower shop. I used to clean. [Tasha]  
Likewise Jenny, who had had a few jobs in hairdressing before coming to childcare, 
said: 
When you look in the paper, if you’re looking for jobs, you’re right at the bottom with 
the cleaners and, you know, you think “well I might as well become a cleaner then”.  At 
least you’re sort of there by yourself and you can get on with it.  
 
In several cases thus the intrinsic reward of working with children had not figured 
prominently in the choice of occupation, which was, instead, the result of a limited 
set of options all of which were similarly low-paid.  This meant that the reward of 
seeing children growing was often not weighted against better-remunerated but less 
rewarding jobs. Instead, it was one of the few positive aspects of the job, as a 
manager explained:  
It’s poorly paid as it is and there really isn’t any reward other than seeing your children 
grow up and move onto the next stage.  There isn’t any more.  You might make a few 
good friends and I think from their [workers’] point of view it’s not that much more.  
You know, the pay is poor. [Angela] 
There was only one worker who clearly expressed the idea that genuine choice about 
the job was essential to motivation: 
I think you need to have passion, you need to enjoy what you’re doing and that’s the 
difference between, I would say, like the old set of practitioners … where they’re just 
doing the job because it was a dead end job and they didn’t know what else to do … and 
there are some individuals, like, they’re looking at why they’re in the job and it’s, it’s 
more their own choice, I think that’s the difference. [Donna] 
More implicitly, one manager mentioned the fact that workers often choose childcare 
out of a few options and hinted to the implications that this had on the “type” of 
workers applying:  
Always childcare has been an easy option when you’re at school, you either go off and 
do hairdressing or you do childcare. […] I’m seeing young girls coming in now that, 
possibly because they want to get off the dole queue, and because they’ve had that love 
missing in their life, so they’re trying to make up for it by working with children, but 
they shouldn’t be here, they’re getting the wrong thing out of it. [Janet] 
There was also evidence that workers had different “reservation wages”, and this 
difference was often related to age. Among older workers there was, for instance, the 
view that their main family role had been to raise their own children and thus the 
money they earned was topping up family income rather than contributing 
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substantially. Clearly, these workers saw their husband as the main breadwinner. For 
example, Lorraine described her first job in childcare: 
It was just a little part-time job that fitted in with the children basically. 
Likewise, Thelma, a childminder in her late fifties, when asked if she was planning 
to stop working soon, replied:  
While I can keep going I need to keep working or else that’ll be the end of holidays. 
The money she earned was therefore seen as earmarked for treats, like holidays, not 
for living expenses. On the other hand, younger workers expressed concerns about 
their ability to earn more money: 
A lot of pressure from my partner as well to earn more money, quite poorly paid in 
childcare … He [partner] is very money, salary orientated in terms of us progressing 
and moving on in our home, in terms of buying a house and just moving up that way.  
So obviously he knows that working with children isn’t the quickest way to do that. 
[Deborah] 
Another worker with young children gave prominence to similar issues, and 
expressed resentment about childcare precisely because of its low pay:  
I don’t think it [working in childcare] is worth [working in].  I think they give us too 
much work to do for the amount of money […] To me that [money] is what makes the 
world go round, because if you didn’t have money where would you be? You know you 
couldn’t support your kids if you had nothing.  You know, you couldn’t support a 
house, you couldn’t pay a mortgage, you know you couldn’t pay your bills so, why do 
you want to work? [Lizzie] 
The focus and extent of these critical views on pay in childcare varied within 
workers’ accounts and seemed to be in part related to their family income, normative 
views on their role in the family and their expectations about pay. There was 
therefore evidence that workers had different reservation wages, with younger 
workers possibly facing more pressure to contribute financially within their family. 
 
Despite these differences, all workers were acutely aware of the low pay problem. 
Yet they did not frame the problem as an unavoidable dilemma between money and 
love for the job. Rather, they experienced it as a contradiction that they had to put up 
with: 
This is the one sort of job where you love it and hate it at the same time. Everybody 
does it, loves working with children but hates it because of the pay. The pay is really 
bad. [Tasha] 
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My first lot of wages was really rubbish and it’s not much better here.  It doesn’t affect 
me in regards to be with the children and, you know, it doesn’t affect me in that way.  
Obviously personally like paying bills and stuff like that it does affect but it doesn’t 
affect me in being with the children at all. [Jenny] 
More generally, workers insisted that money was not their priority but nonetheless 
they did not hold the idea that a desire for money necessarily signalled greediness or 
selfishness, because money, as Lizzie had put it, “makes the world go round”. 
Indeed, comments on pay were mostly framed in relation to necessities. For example 
Ann, after explaining that she was currently paid more than in the nursery where she 
had worked previously, commented:  
But then it doesn’t seem like you get paid that much when you’ve paid everything out, 
you’re not really left with very much, like once you’ve paid your rent and say your bus 
pass for the month and whatever.  You’re not really left with very much.  
Money was perceived as conflicting with childcare work when it was referred to as 
‘big money’. For example Cath stated the obvious, when she remarked:  
It’s not the job that you come in for if you want big money, big bucks…[Cath] 
But later, after reporting that a woman holding a similar same role in a nearby 
nursery was paid a few pounds more, Cath commented: 
It would be lovely [to be paid more].  Money’s always lovely isn’t it? I can then buy my 
grandchildren something. [emphasis added]. 
So the evidence seems to suggest that levels are important and what the money is for 
is also important. Thus being able to make ends meet does not seem to be in conflict 
with the workers’ job role.  
 
Overall then, the material from the interviews highlights a number of issues that are 
relevant to the understanding of how pay and motivations interact in the context of 
an occupation like childcare in the UK. Findings from this type of study clearly 
cannot be generalised; they have, instead, to be considered as the results of an 
exploratory exercise. If seen this way, these findings can be useful to uncover the 
extent to which the screening hypothesis rests on premises that are relevant to the 
case of childcare.  
 
In particular, the intuition that only the most motivated workers accept low wages is 
based on the assumption that workers trade-off wages and intrinsic reward – 
implicitly compensating differentials. Thus workers are assumed to face job offers 
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that vary in relation to both wages and the intrinsic reward they offer. The interviews 
however gave little support to the idea that worker’s occupational choice had been 
based on the careful weighting of pecuniary advantage against the non-monetary 
rewards of working with children. Although workers expressed their liking for work 
with children, the majority of them had no better-paid employment alternatives. That 
is, they had chosen childcare out of a limited set of low-paid job options.  
In addition, workers appear to have different financial responsibilities towards their 
families. We cannot presume that workers who contribute relatively more to their 
household income are less likely to have a vocation or show commitment to their 
job. But differences in reservation wage influence the effective functioning of low 
pay as a screening device.  
 
These two points already call into question the assumptions used by the screening 
hypothesis. More specifically, the interviews suggest that the intuition that low 
wages may help attracting the ‘right sort’ of people may have limited relevance to 
the case of the childcare occupation. This is not so much because motivations are not 
salient for this type of work. It is, instead, because childcare workers differ not only 
in their motivations, but, more importantly, in the range of alternative employment 
opportunities they face and in terms of the financial responsibilities they shoulder.  
 
Finally, the interviews offer little insight about the interaction between motivation 
and choice. It is plausible to presume that workers with genuine occupational choice 
are highly motivated. This is indeed the point made by one worker, who framed her 
decision to work in childcare as a careful and deliberate choice.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that almost all workers found the job intrinsically rewarding may suggest that 
even those who drifted into the job are likely to develop caring motivations. 
Repeated interviews would be needed in order to explore the dynamics of workers’ 
motivations over time and to better understand how the initial choice of entering into 
childcare is related to subsequent motivation.  
 
Money crowds out motivation:  findings from the LFS 
So far the analysis has been concerned with the “screening proposition”. In this 
section and the next one, the focus will be on the crowding-out theory. More 
specifically, in this section I will  test whether pay increases are associated with a 
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reduction in commitment, measured as a decrease in the number of unpaid overtime 
hours. Hence I estimate the association between variation from t0 to t1 in unpaid 
overtime and variation from t0 and t1 in pay. If pay reduces commitment, we would 
expect a negative correlation. The coefficient is presented in the first column of  
 
35Table 8.3 Pay and variation in overtime hours 
 (1) 
Without any control 
(2) 
With controls 
∆ pay -0.164*** -0.157*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0480) 
Age  -0.00506 
  (0.00773) 
Children  0.236 
  (0.188) 
Work hours (t0)  -0.00166 
  (0.0154) 
Work hours (t1)  0.00609 
  (0.0162) 
Temporary job (t0)  0.242 
  (0.420) 
Temporary job (t1)  -0.310 
  (0.413) 
Voluntary sector  0.0478 
  (0.276) 
Public sector  0.181 
  (0.186) 
  
Yes Yes 
Controls for: 
Qualifications, temporary job, 
regions and years   
Observations 919 919 
R-squared 0.014 0.045 
Source: LFS, five quarters longitudinal datasets, 1997-2007.  
Note: 
1. Sample: female childcare workers age 16-59 at time t0 and t1  
2. Entries are the estimated OLS coefficients on the difference in unpaid overtime hours between t0 and t1 
3. Variables that appear only once refer to t0 
4. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
5. Additional control: proxy respondent 
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Table 8.3 and is indeed negative, which suggests that as pay increases, unpaid 
overtime decreases.  
 
Column (2) report the results obtained when covariates are included. Yet, variations 
in overtime hours appear not to be significantly correlated to any of the controls. 
Instead, what remains stable, is the coefficient of variation in pay. Similarly to 
column (1), the correlation between variation in pay and variation in overtime hours 
is negative.  
 
These results therefore suggest the presence of a strong crowding-out effect. This 
finding is especially striking given that, overall, workers with higher wages are more  
likely to work overtime, and we would expect those on higher wages to have better 
working conditions, and, in turn, larger pay increases. That is, we would expect that 
more committed workers receive the largest pay increases and are more likely to 
increase their unpaid overtime. In fact, the opposite seems to be occurring: workers 
with positive pay increases drop their number of unpaid overtime hours.  
 
The crowding-out theory maintains that crowding-out effects are more likely to 
occur when the external intervention is uniform across the recipients. The rest of the 
section will explore this point further. Indeed, once I have checked that pay increases 
are negatively associated with increases in unpaid overtime, the question arises as to 
what type of incentive such pay increases are.  
 
As Chapter 5 has shown, the introduction of the NMW in April 1999 and its 
subsequent upratings have lifted the bottom tail of the wage distribution in childcare. 
If pay growth is largely driven by the NMW we would expect to see larger increases 
at the bottom of the wage distribution. This is indeed the case. Table 8.4 shows the 
average wage growth rate of the different quartiles of the wage distribution. Wages 
in the bottom quartile have grown more than the subsequent quartiles. Wages in the 
top quartile have negative growth. In short, the lower the wage the largest the pay 
rise.  
 
In order to take into account differences in the pay growth rate along the wage 
distribution, I interact the wage growth with the four quartiles of the wage  
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36Table 8.4 Average pay growth by pay quartile 
 Average hourly pay growth rate 
1st quartile 0.327 
 (0.603) 
2nd quartile 0.116 
 (0.328) 
3rd quartile 0.098 
 (0. 259) 
4th quartile -0.004 
 (0. 286) 
Observations 919 
Source: LFS, five quarters longitudinal datasets, 1997-2007 
Notes:  
1. Sample: female childcare workers age 16-59 at time t0and t1  
2. Entries are the average growth rate of hourly pay between t0 and t1  
3. Standard deviation in parenthesis; significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
distribution (at time t0). This allows me to check whether similar variations in pay 
are associated with different variations in unpaid overtime depending on the level of 
pay the worker starts from. If the NMW has depressed morale especially among 
those on relatively higher wages, we would see a larger correlation coefficient.  
 
This is indeed the case. Results are reported in Table 8.5 and indicate that the 
crowding-out effect remains statistically significant only for workers in the third 
quartile. These workers are likely to be above the NMW, and therefore unaffected by 
the introduction of the NMW and the uprates. At the same time, they are the ones 
who have felt the most the narrowing of pay differentials, because workers paid less 
than them have enjoyed larger pay increases.  
 
These findings should be taken cautiously. Measurement errors are likely to be more 
pronounced in this part of the analysis, which uses the difference between pay at t0 
and t1 as an independent variable. By combining the two there is indeed the risk of 
magnifying possible errors and the consequent statistical bias. Yet the evidence is not 
altogether implausible; it is, in fact, in line with other findings. Evidence from the  
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37Table 8.5 Pay growth by quartile and variation in overtime hours  
 (1) 
 
∆ pay  -0.0755 
 (0.251) 
∆ pay * 2nd quartile -0.686 
 (0.522) 
∆ pay * 3rd quartile -1.596** 
 (0.648) 
∆ pay * 4th quartile -0.778 
 (0.621) 
Age -0.00540 
 (0.00775) 
Children 0.196 
 (0.188) 
Work hours (t0) -0.000648 
 (0.0153) 
Work hours (t1) 0.00441 
 (0.0161) 
Voluntary sector (t0) 0.0462 
 (0.275) 
Public sector (t0) 0.242 
 (0.189) 
Controls for:  
Qualifications, temporary job, regions and Yes 
Observations 919 
R-squared 0.049 
Source: LFS, five quarters longitudinal datasets, 1997-2007.  
Notes:  
1. Sample: female childcare workers age 16-59 at time t0and t1  
2. Entries are the estimated OLS coefficients on the difference in unpaid 
3. Variables that appear only once refer to t0 
4. Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
5. Additional control: proxy respondent 
 280
 
Low Pay Commission for example confirms my findings: wage increases have been 
larger for the lower deciles of the wage distribution, where wages below the NMW 
concentrate. This, in turn, has meant that wage differentials have been squeezed, and 
this may have, in turn, affected morale. One illustrative example reported by the Low 
Pay Commission describes the case of a nursery in which qualified staff had resented 
the large pay increases given to unqualified staff (Low Pay Commission 2003, 95).  
 
Beside pointing to a crowding-out effect, these results could be interpreted in a 
slightly different way. It could be that childcare workers have perceived and judge  
the increase in pay not only on the basis of their previous situation – “more money 
than before” – but also on the basis on the information that external intervention 
itself conveys: the wage previously received was below a minimum standard 
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). It could be therefore that increases brought about by 
the NMW served to expose the paucity of previous pay rather than being perceived 
as a personalised acknowledgment of workers’ performance. 
 
Overall the evidence from the LFS suggests that increases in wages among childcare 
workers are associated with a decrease of unpaid overtime – a crowding-out effect is 
indeed recognisable when examining the wage of childcare workers. As wage 
increases have been driven, in the main, by the introduction and subsequent uprating 
of the NMW, the evidence has been interpreted as suggesting a negative correlation 
between the NMW and intrinsic motivation. This of course should not be interpreted 
as evidence against the NMW. The analysis does not say much about the impact of 
the NMW on workers’ income and position. If anything, the data are unambiguous in 
suggesting the extent to which the NMW has been important in improving wage 
levels. Thus it is clear that the NMW can be effective in overcoming the problem of 
very low wages among childcare workers. But it remains similarly clear that the 
NMW is not and cannot be an effective intervention to bolster childcare workers’ 
intrinsic motivation. Indeed the NMW does very little to recognise and acknowledge 
workers’ commitment.  
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Money crowds out motivation: evidence from the interviews 
The results from the LFS suggest that pay increases delivered through the NMW do 
not support workers’ intrinsic motivation as measured by variation in unpaid 
overtime. Yet the question remains as to whether such a crowding-out effect is due to 
the characteristics of the NMW – its being uniform and blind to commitment – or to 
the fact that money itself tends to drive out intrinsic motives. This section uses 
material from the interviews to explore whether money and/or other factors sustain 
or undermine workers’ intrinsic motivations.  
 
The interviews confirmed that in the childcare labour market incentives payments are 
not used, nor are other forms of monetary incentives. For most workers earnings 
consisted of basic pay only, and differences across settings regarded the extent to 
which employees were entitled to holidays, sick pay or pension contributions. In this 
context, there cannot be much evidence of possible crowding-out effects, simply 
because money does not seem to be used to elicit more effort or commitment. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to tease out some distinctions across types of employment 
conditions and to relate them to differences in motivations.   
 
Perhaps the most vivid example of a “basic” employment contract was given by 
Angela: 
We don’t get sick pay.  There’s not a pension in place but if they [workers] have got 
their own private pension then more power to them. We just get basic pay and that’s it.  
There’s no bonuses, no rewards.  
This was therefore a one-dimensional transaction in which only labour was 
exchanged for money. Shortly after, when asked about whether she ever takes work 
home, Angela reported:  
I can say, I can honestly say in my career of spanning 26 years […] I don’t do it [taking 
work home].  I understand that my boss pays me from this time to this time and 
whatever I’ve got to do gets done inside that time.  You don’t pay me for anything extra 
so you’re not going to get that out of me.  If I feel love and warmth for you then I 
might.  
Angela’s comment seems to suggest that as long as employment contracts are viewed 
as ‘narrow’ and entailing only the trading of labour and money, workers’ 
commitment to ‘over-perform’ is unlikely to be enhanced.    
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There was also evidence that the problem of pay resulted in more hostile 
relationships between employers and workers. Employment contracts seldom include 
pay premiums and pay scales, in use mainly in the public sector, do not automatically 
recognise seniority. This effectively means that workers have often to fight in order 
to obtain pay increases. This was, for example the case of Harriet, who was working 
in a primary school: 
We had to fight really hard to move up from the scale to the next, so our pay would 
continue to rise, and that took a real battle, we had to write to the Chair of Governors, 
who then spoke to the rest of the Governors, who then spoke to the Head and it was a 
real battle to get that increase. 
Likewise, Michelle described her previous employment experience by an agency: 
From beginning [pay] wasn’t good at all.  I think it was about £5.  And I was qualified 
then, Level 3 really.  So for me to actually get to what I’ve got, which was £8, it was a 
struggle, cause every time you had to really fight with the agency to put your money up 
or to sort of threaten them, “Oh, I’m gonna leave you and find somewhere that pays a 
bit higher.”  
Conversely, many workers obtained pay increases by moving to a setting offering 
more favourable conditions. Reporting about her previous job in another childcare 
setting, Amelia explained: 
We [herself and three more colleagues] did not leave because of the kids; we left 
because of the manager. We would have gone nowhere over there. About the money: 
she [the manager] never put the money up, never. I was working there for 6 years and 
my money never went up, but when I came here I had it [pay raise] three times - they 
changed my wages, so that’s why [I came to current setting].  
There was also some evidence of mistrust towards employers, especially in private 
nurseries. For example Jenny commented:   
They [private providers]’re trying to trick you into making you get less money for more 
hours. They’re always trying something new and they make you think that it’s a good 
idea at the time and then when you think: “hang on a minute, this ain’t right”. And 
because you’re young at the time you don’t think things through and I think that’s why 
a lot of young girls go to these private nurseries – because they’re just fooled to believe 
in things like that.  
This view was echoed by Tasha: 
There's something about private nurseries that I just don't like. You get overworked, you 
are underpaid. You want to take time out that you're owed and everyone wants to make 
a big fuss about it.  
More generally, often workers raised the problem of low pay alongside that of lack 
of praise, thus conveying the impression that both factors contributed to their not 
feeling appreciated. For example, Jenny, again, said: 
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[Childcare is] hard work, because […] you want to do your best, so you’re doing your 
best but it’s not appreciated through praise or through pay.  
The lack of appreciation for the work done was an issue raised also by Deborah, who 
described the situation in her previous job this way:  
There wasn’t much praise given but if you made the wrong decision about something, 
you would be come down on like a ton of bricks.  
Within this context of difficult relationships with employers, the bond with children 
seemed to become a less prominent concern. Indeed most workers were glad they 
had left jobs in which they had not felt supported or paid fairly, although many of 
them expressed regret of having left the children behind. Not surprisingly, it would 
seem that caring motivations do not flourish or cannot be fully acted upon if workers 
distrust their managers and feel undervalued. What is however noticeable is that, 
often, low pay was not the only factor causing suspicion and antagonism towards 
employers. For some workers “feeling appreciated” through praise for example was 
similarly important.    
 
Yet there were also several workers who described much more favourable work 
environments. Relationships with managers and other colleagues were often viewed 
as supportive. So, for example, Amelia described her manager: 
Sue helps me, I mean: she’s great; she helps. You can go to Sue and say, ask for 
anything, advice, how to do this, and she would tell you, she’s a great help. 
Likewise, Steven reported how his manager was “always available”. For Lorraine, 
her manager was “more like a friend” because they had been working together “as a 
team” for a long time. Lorraine had been taking home the washing for the small 
setting where she worked every week for many years. More specifically, it was very 
important for staff to be in a workplace in which managers and colleagues were 
ready to accommodate each other’s needs, and this aspect was especially crucial for 
those workers with family responsibilities or undergoing training. Debbie and Jenny 
are two cases in point: 
When I was getting my Level 3, I was given loads of support from the nursery […] 
everyone was really supportive […]. So I didn’t find it that hard. [Debbie]  
I have got a little boy who is four and […] if I am running late or I have got a situation I 
can always say to Patricia [manager]: ‘Pat I am really sorry but can I do this or can I…’ 
and she has always been very flexible with things like that so that’s why it makes it a bit 
easier to come back after having a child. [Jenny] 
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The theme of support was interwoven with that of recognition and of valuing 
workers for what they do. Tessa, the head of a children’s centre described her 
experience as manager making these two points:  
Always supporting them [workers] […] They know I’ll listen to them if their mother 
has just been diagnosed with dementia, or they have just fallen out with their boyfriend; 
but in return I do expect quite a lot from them in that I expect them to take joint 
responsibility.  
One of the hardest thing I have had to do was to build the confidence of the staff who 
believed they were in dead end jobs: there wasn’t any chance of promotion; if you had 
been there for years you might get a senior job then you could boss around the other 
ones but your qualifications and experience weren’t valued. 
Correspondingly, workers often felt recognised if they had an input and they could 
“take joint responsibility”:  
Our opinions are valued, everyone’s always contributing to try and improve and 
change… just making the practice better really and obviously our views and opinions 
are listened to and, as long as it’s feasible, change does happen. [Deborah] 
Recently it’s been sort of a team effort, with Helen [coordinator] it was a team effort 
and we had a really fantastic year together. And last year was great here with the 
Nursery, and looking back over photos thinking: “oh actually we did this, we did this 
and we did this” so we had done a lot, even though they were quite small! [Harriet] 
 
Recognition and value were also granted through pay.  
 
Yet more money did not always imply more respect. Some workers who had worked 
in schools had had mixed experiences: for some the better pay and working 
conditions had been accompanied by lack of acknowledgement from the nursery 
teachers or the headteacher. One worker had been referred to as “the woman in the 
afternoon” for almost two years by the headteacher. Another worker reported that 
she had worked with teachers who had not involved her nor sought her input in the 
management and planning. As Jenny put it: 
You’ll get more money in a school but it doesn’t necessarily mean that you’d be valued 
by a head or by the Government.  Sometimes value does a lot more than pay. 
There was, finally, a worker who talked about a different source of recognition: a 
prize. She had recently received the award “Best childcare worker” organised by the 
Local Authority. When I asked what it had meant for her, she described “how 
amazing” the award ceremony had been for the whole team and how she got “lots of 
praise from everyone”, and concluded: 
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My kids were so pleased and because my husband never ever praises you with anything 
or that, I put it [the award] in the doorway […] I never have ornaments in the doorway 
and he said: “what’s that doing here?” and I said: “That’s so you know who I am when I 
come in.” [Cath] 
 
It would seem thus that a more appreciative and supportive working environment 
contributed to sustain workers’ intrinsic motivation in two ways. At the most basic 
level, workers who enjoyed supportive staff and managers could keep their job while 
having small children, doing training or having family difficulties. Second, when the 
employment relationship was framed in terms of commitment and reciprocal 
understanding – as described by Tess – workers appeared to be better positioned to 
contribute to the improvement of the service.   
 
Overall, the interviews highlight how the absence of clear rules governing labour 
contracts in the childcare sector leaves space for personal, and therefore 
discretionary, exchanges. In this way, pay and working conditions come to depend 
on mutual respect and generosity, or lack of them. But motivations seem also to be 
sustained or hampered by the nature of the employment relationship. A relationship 
that is based exclusively on the labour exchange, does not appear to foster workers’ 
commitment. For Angela, who works only the exact number of hours she is paid for, 
the exchange is clearly limited to the accomplishment of her duties as nursery 
manager – that is what she is paid for. Furthermore, the labour exchange does not 
seem to last if workers feel “tricked”, underpaid and overworked. Indeed many 
change setting. By contrast, workers appeared more able to take on responsibilities 
for the service – from doing the laundry to proposing changes – when the 
employment relationship was underpinned by reciprocal interest in wellbeing and 
mutual respect.  
 
This set of findings from the interviews has several limits and, most importantly, 
cannot be used to verify whether pay increases support or undermine workers’ 
intrinsic motivations. Indeed, the childcare labour market is not a context in which 
crowding-out effects can be tested easily, given the total absence of performance-
related-payments or other similar kinds of monetary incentives. Nonetheless, the 
material presented here can bring some helpful indications concerning the problem 
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of when external incentives are likely to be perceived as supportive rather than 
controlling.  
 
Generally, when the employment relationship was characterised by reciprocal 
understanding, workers perceived management’s initiatives as supportive. Amelia 
does not view her recent three pay increases as a way to elicit more effort. Nor does 
Jenny think that Patricia’s accommodating nature is ultimately a “trick”. In a context 
of trust, external rewards are likely to be perceived as acknowledging and supportive. 
Furthermore, workers from all settings appeared invariably aware of the poor pay 
that characterises the childcare sector and of the practice of setting pay levels at the 
very minimum. This awareness may contribute to a sense of gratitude towards 
employers who do pay above the minimum, thus reinforcing workers’ commitment. 
Although this interpretation of the interviews is somewhat tentative, it suggests that 
in the case of childcare work external incentives are likely to crowd-in intrinsic 
motivations rather than undermine them.  
 
Conclusions 
Interest in motivation within the childcare labour market is well justified. This 
interest accords with the long-standing insistence by feminist scholars that 
motivation to care is an intrinsic aspect of care work. It is also in line with the 
widely-held view that working in a sector like childcare offers some form of intrinsic 
reward to some people. The relationship between such intrinsic reward and pay is 
however much more debated. This chapter has presented some evidence on two 
specific aspects of the problem.  
 
First, it has explored if low pay is an effective screening mechanism, which helps 
selecting into childcare only those who are most highly motivated – only applicants 
who are highly motivated will accept a low wage. The evidence from the LFS gives 
no empirical support to this idea; in contrast, it suggests that those childcare workers 
who are better paid are also more likely to work unpaid overtime or to remain in the 
childcare sector. Furthermore, the material from the interviews has highlighted the 
shortcomings of the logic underpinning the screening mechanism: the logic of the 
compensating wage differentials cannot alone explain occupational choices, thus 
other factors need to be incorporated in the analysis. Indeed for many interviewees 
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the choice to enter into childcare is dictated by caring motives as well as by different 
kinds of constraints.  
 
Second, the chapter has explored whether pay increases are associated with a decline 
in intrinsic motivations and commitment. Findings from the LFS suggest that this is 
indeed the case, despite the fact that across individuals those on a higher pay show 
stronger commitment (expressed in terms of hours of unpaid overtime). Such a 
crowding-out effect can be explained by the introduction, and subsequent uprating, 
of the NMW: the NMW is indeed the major determinant of pay increases among 
childcare workers. The NMW is a uniform external intervention, which has lifted the 
wages of all workers whose pay was under a specific threshold.  
 
Its negative effect on pay can be explained by the fact that the NMW, by design, 
cannot acknowledge and support workers’ commitment, because it is an external 
intervention which is by definition not tailored on the individual recipient. Workers 
receiving a pay increase because of the introduction of the NMW are unlikely to see 
the change as recognition of their work. More plausibly, the NMW could have 
depressed workers’ motivations by highlighting the paucity of their wages. Indeed, 
material from the interviews suggests that pay increases and, more generally, better 
pay levels are one important way of valuing childcare work. In a context 
characterised by minimum  wage levels and little appreciation of the work done, 
better pay levels are associated with more understanding managers and more 
supportive working environments. All together, these factors appeared to facilitate 
workers’ commitment and involvement.  
 
What are the implications of these finding for the theoretical approaches outlined in 
section 2? I discuss them starting from the screening proposition with the objective 
of bringing together the results from the different parts of the analysis. A useful 
starting point is a graph showing the relation between the supply of caring labour and 
wage. I reproduce here (Figure 8.1) the graph presented by Folbre and Weisskopf 
(1998, 193) and draw on their analysis. I comment on the graph as if it refers to the 
specific case of childcare workers and with reference to the results. The graph 
describes the supply of childcare in a society, where childcare is measured by total 
amount of people/hours. Up to the point H*, childcare is offered without any 
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compensation – by relatives or neighbours for example. Yet further than H*, a wage 
is necessary to elicit more childcare. If caring motives are not taken into account, the 
supply curve will be Sx – the upward slope indicates that the higher the wage the 
more hours will be provided, in line with economic theory. People will be ordered 
along the X axis according to their alternative wage possibilities, with those who had 
a low reservation wage coming forward first – for lower wages – whereas those with 
better alternative possibilities will require higher wages in order to offer childcare. 
Suppose now that some people are motivated not by money only, but also by their 
interest and pleasure in providing care. A lower wage can be offered and some 
people – those most strongly motivated – will come forward and provide childcare 
for a wage W (which is lower than Wx). On the basis of this intuition we can draw a 
curve, S, which indicates the supply of childcare labour in a society in which some 
people have caring motives.  
 
How will people order themselves along the X-axis? This time both alternative wage 
opportunities and caring motives must be taken into account. The first to be available 
for working in childcare will be the people who have poor alternative opportunities 
and high caring motives. Subsequently, as wages increase, childcare will attract 
either people who have poor alternatives and low motivation, or those with good 
alternatives and high motivation. Finally, the very high wage will elicit the care 
provision of people with low motivation and good alternative options. On the basis 
of this insight, it is possible to further discuss the results and the screening 
mechanism. 
 
The screening mechanism seems to work only in part. At the extremes of the wage 
spectrum we find people with different motivations: at very low wages there will be 
only those very keen on caring for children; in contrast, for the very high wage, there 
will be, almost exclusively, those who have few caring motives. The evidence from 
the interviews suggests that it is indeed the group at the bottom that forms the 
majority of childcare workers: respondents generally enjoyed working with children 
and found it rewarding; at the same time their alternative employment opportunities 
were all within the lowest paying sectors. But among people who do not have access 
to better-paid jobs, it is not the low pay that allows screening among applicants. 
Childcare, as every job, tends to attract those who find it fulfilling and enjoyable 
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(England, Budig, and Folbre 2002, 459). The matching process is ensured by the fact 
that there are different jobs from cashier to sales assistant or hairdresser – the 
“million things” that Tasha referred to. So it is not surprising that the overwhelming 
majority of workers liked their job. If they preferred hairdressing, for instance, they 
could easily take a job there. This effectively means that even when all things are 
equal and workers have similar alternative opportunities, low wages do not work as a 
screening device.  
 
But what about those who are keen on providing childcare and also have better 
employment opportunities? These people would be in the middle, along the X-axis. 
For this group of people, sorting through wage becomes a less effective mechanism 
because it is more difficult to distinguish between those who have few alternatives 
and poor motivation from those who, despite having other options, are motivated 
enough to enter this type of job. In other words, it is impossible to separate ‘caring 
motives’ from ‘lack of alternatives’ motives, and this in turn makes it hard to 
translate the screening mechanism into practice: what is the wage level that would 
ensure that only very motivated people take the job? According to the logic of the 
screening mechanism, a wage so low to attract only volunteers. But if, more 
realistically, a wage is to be offered, then its level will ultimately depend of the 
distribution of caring motives across the population and the structure of alternative 
opportunities.  
 
Folbre and Weisskopf (1998) for example insist, convincingly, on the importance of 
values: caring motives indeed will also be shaped at societal level. Presumably there 
will be more people willing to engage in caring activities in societies that especially 
value care work. But the structure of alternative opportunities is also crucial. This 
point has been explored mainly in relation to teaching, another vocation-intensive 
sector. Eide, Goldhaber and Brewer (2004) show that teachers in the US used to be 
among the most academically proficient college graduates in the 1960s, whereas, 
nowadays, teachers are drawn from the bottom end of the achievement distribution. 
Chevalier and Dolton (2005) point to similar problems in the UK. In both cases, the 
authors suggest that graduates with strong academic skills can find alternative 
occupations where they will receive higher pay. Thus the composition of the teacher 
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workforce depends simultaneously on the compensation of teachers and on the 
compensation in other occupations.  
 
The first part of the analysis of LFS data has assessed precisely this composition 
effect in the case of childcare work. Indeed I have investigated whether, on average, 
a better-paid childcare worker is less likely to work unpaid overtime or to remain in 
childcare, as would happen if lower wages were effective in sorting more motivated 
applicants. But the opposite seems to be occurring: the higher the pay, the more 
childcare workers over-perform their role or remain attached to the sector. In relation 
to overtime, it is possible to partly attribute the positive association to an element of 
gift and reciprocity within the employment relationship (Akerlof 1982). Employers 
paying above the necessary minimum are likely to receive some ‘donated labour’ in 
exchange. This is a very different dynamic from that suggested by Heyes (2005).  
 
The importance of the nature of the employment relationship has also been 
highlighted by the interviews used to examine the crowding-out theory. In a labour 
market in which pay is set on an individual basis and which is characterised by very 
low wages, personal bonds between employers and employee are especially salient. 
The picture emerging from the interviewees is not one of anonymous and impersonal 
market exchange. Employment relations, by virtue of often being long-term and 
close interactions, rarely have the characteristics of pure market exchange. A strong 
gift economy is likely to run parallel to market exchange (Offer 1997). Thus the 
usual relation between employers and workers entail not only a “money versus 
labour” trade, but also a much richer exchange based on trust, reciprocity and 
loyalty. The case of childcare work is no exception: many workers described the 
importance of supportive and trusting relationships with managers and colleagues. 
What is perhaps different in the case of childcare is the degree to which pay seemed 
to depend on such relationships.  
 
This aspect can perhaps be explained by the absence of labour market institutions in 
this specific labour market. Indeed there is little in terms of collective agreements, a 
uniform payment system or clear rules. Pay is, in the main, set by the manager 
according to the circumstances of the individual setting and her own personal 
approach. This arbitrariness, which responds only in part to the impersonal laws of 
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demand and supply, effectively means that labour exchanges function more like gift 
exchanges rather than market ones. Indeed the relationship conveys regard as much 
as, if not more than, economic advantage. Drawing on Offer (1997), regard is here 
used to describe the various products of personal relationship: acknowledgment, 
respect, love, friendship etc. Employment relationships are therefore highly personal, 
reciprocal and discretionary.  In this context it is perhaps not surprising that pay can 
often become a means to grant approval and recognition, or to deny it. The 
relationship is so personal that even the money exchange becomes personalised and 
is therefore interpreted as acknowledging or, if money is withheld, as debasing.  
 
This discussion highlights a sort of paradox, but also helps to uncover what are the 
assumptions underpinning the crowding-out theory. The paradox is the following: 
childcare workers seem to be caught in a double bind. The arbitrariness that prevails 
in the childcare labour market makes employment relationships highly personal. 
Such arbitrariness often results in poor working conditions, very low pay and 
mortifying experiences. At the same time, the flip side is that the employment 
relationship can be extremely rich and personal, entailing the exchange of regard and 
economic advantage. This, in turn, reduces the chances that pay increases afforded 
by the employer crowd-out intrinsic motivations. Thus, in the case of childcare 
workers, the distinction between different types of external rewards – whether 
supportive or controlling – turns out to be of little cogency. Rewards are given only 
within the context of supportive relationship and are therefore interpreted as such.  
Conversely, much of the discussion put forward by Frey has in mind performance-
related payments. These compensation schemes however work under precise rules 
and measurement criteria. In addition, they are introduced in the context of 
employment relationships that are highly formalised. Examples are public sector 
services or large private organisations. This means that the context in which these 
schemes are introduced is recognisably less personal than is the case in the childcare 
labour market. This in turn makes it more difficult to determine from the context of 
the employment relationship whether an incentive is supportive or controlling.  
 
To conclude, I would like to notice that the evidence presented in this chapter 
questions the usefulness of economists’ framework of analysis focussed on 
incentives. Indeed such interest and emphasis may be wrong-headed in the case of 
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childcare work, or of those activities that benefit from altruism and commitment. 
Economists have always suggested that behavioural change can be pursued by 
altering the system of incentives, rather than by promoting different values 
(Hirschman 1977, 1985). Indeed, incentives, and economic incentives in particular, 
have been long presented as the most effective way to “economize love” – whereby 
love stands for altruism, commitment or, according to Offer, regard (Robertson 
1956).   Yet, in the case of childcare workers, we want exactly the opposite: we do 
not want to “economize love”. Instead, a desirable policy objective is to foster 
workers’ intrinsic motivations. This, Frey (1997) suggests and the evidence from the 
interviews corroborated the point, can be done with external interventions that are 
acknowledging and supportive. As such, these interventions, whether through money 
or rewards in kind, do not try to steer the recipient’s behaviour into a certain 
direction – they are not incentives. Instead, acknowledging rewards attribute an 
intrinsic value to what the recipient is doing. Frey (1997) gives the example of titles 
given for one’s life-long achievements as likely to crowd in intrinsic motivation. 
They do so exactly because they do not want to steer the person into “more 
achievement”, rather they reflect the fact that society values what that person has 
done. Thus, as suggested by Folbre and Weisskopf (1998), a different system of 
values rather than a correct system of incentives is arguably what is needed in the 
case of childcare workers. 
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Figure 8.1 The supply of childcare labour
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions 
This thesis has set out to answer the question of why childcare is a low-paid 
occupation. It has presented an empirical analysis examining the specific case of the 
childcare workforce in the United Kingdom from 1994 to 2008. The UK offers an 
interesting case study because, since the late 1990s, childcare policy has taken a 
much larger place on the policy agenda and childcare services have witnessed 
substantial developments.  
 
As childcare is increasingly provided by formal services, the issue of the rewards 
attached to this type of work becomes more prominent for several reasons. From a 
gender equality perspective, the fact that the great majority of childcare workers 
continue to be female makes the problem of low pay one of women’s disadvantage 
relative to men (Lewis 2009).  Low pay is also problematic when the policy 
perspective is centred on children’s wellbeing, as low pay makes it harder to secure 
highly qualified staff or, more generally, to attract workers (Moss 2003). Finally, 
increasing public support for care services arguably means that the social services 
workforce – its position and its characteristics – becomes an important dimension of 
welfare state analysis (Morga n 2005).  
 
The thesis has adopted a policy-oriented perspective. In this respect, it has sought to 
highlight the relevance of the policy dimension in shaping the services in which 
childcare work is carried out, the content of such work and the position of childcare 
workers.  Within this perspective, the argument running through the thesis is that 
childcare work has some unique characteristics that make it prone to poor 
remuneration. Drawing on the feminist literature on care, and in particular on 
feminist economists’ contributions, the thesis has used the insight about the “cost 
disease” in the care sector as its starting point. The thesis has then enriched the 
analysis of this problem by identifying the series of mechanisms that, at institutional 
and cultural level, contribute to keep care work wages low. In particular, it has 
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singled out two sets of issues. The first relates to the skill content of childcare work. 
Feminist scholars have long revealed a bias against the skill status of female jobs 
(Acker 1989; Jacobs and Steinberg 1990; England 1992). Work usually done by 
women is often considered unskilled not so much because of its demands, but 
because of the inferior position of women relative to men (Phillips and Taylor 1980; 
Steinberg 1990). Institutional arrangements reinforce such bias – the lack of training 
systems for the accreditation of skills being one example (OECD 1998).  
 
The second set of issues concerns the salience of intrinsic motivations in childcare 
work.   Systems of reward often contain implicit assumptions about workers’ 
motivations. In the case of care work, images of devotion and selflessness can 
reinforce the normative idea that the appropriate reward of care work should not be 
monetary (Nelson 1999; Folbre and Nelson 2000). 
 
In relation to pay, the assumption underpinning the whole analysis is that pay serves 
multiple purposes and is the result of the complex net of relations between economic 
forces, social norms and institutional arrangements (Grimshaw and Rubery 2007; 
Figart, Mutari, and Power 2002; Rubery 1997). Thus the thesis has not sought to 
ascertain one single mechanism responsible for low pay in the childcare sector. 
Rather, its contribution lies in revealing the way in which such economic forces, 
social norms and institutional arrangements interact with the unique features of 
childcare work to result in low pay.  
 
Within this framework, the thesis has used a mixed-methods strategy. It has 
combined analysis of data from two large national data surveys with the collection 
and interviews of childcare workers. The different data sources have complemented 
each other, thus extending the scope of analysis. In particular, national survey data 
have been used to understand workers’ pay and characteristics. On the other hand, 
interviews have made it possible to elicit workers’ views and experiences.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises the findings in the order in which they have 
been presented in the thesis. It then moves on to reflect on the analytical framework 
used in the thesis. In particular I will relate the findings to the theoretical issues 
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presented in Chapter 2 and I will discuss the overall empirical approach used, its 
limits and possible further developments. Finally, the last section discusses the 
policy implications of the findings and offers some tentative thoughts on the likely 
outcomes of the most recent policy developments.  
 
Summary of the key findings 
The importance of childcare policy 
An overarching theme in the thesis has been that of the role of policy in influencing 
the rewards attached to childcare work. In particular, the thesis has concentrated on 
childcare policies, while considering labour market institutions as contextual factors. 
The focus on childcare and early education is justified on the basis that employment 
in childcare is not seen as an example of “low-waged occupation”, on a par with 
cleaning, shelf-filling and several others (Gautié and Schmitt 2010; Lloyd, Mason, 
and Mayhew 2008). Instead, childcare work is viewed as being at the interface 
between social policy and the labour market, in that childcare services have 
increasingly fallen within the remit of social policy.  
 
The policy dimension of low pay in childcare has been explored in two ways. First, 
an account of policy through policy documents has been offered (Chapter 3). Second, 
part of the empirical evidence has been examined in relation to policy (Chapter 5 and 
6). In this section I bring together findings from these three chapters in order to 
highlight the complementarities across different parts of the analysis.  
 
With regard to childcare policy, Chapter 3 has analysed the complicated system of 
childcare and early years services in the UK. In particular, the chapter has focused on 
the last Labour Government’s Childcare Strategy (DfEE and DSS 1998) and the 
several related policy initiatives that have taken place since 1997. Under Labour, 
early childhood services received unprecedented attention and resources, which 
contributed to a substantial increase in the number of childcare places.  
 
However, when considering the specific issue of the workforce, it was found that an 
increased policy commitment towards early childhood services did not result in a 
matching commitment towards improving the position of childcare workers. From 
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the outset the Labour Government recognised that “working with children is a low 
status, low pay occupation” (DfEE 1998: 1.16). Repeatedly, the policy goal of 
reforming the childcare workforce appeared in policy documents. Yet the first 
initiatives addressing directly the theme of the workforce appeared only during 
Labour’s third term in office.  
 
Inevitably, raising the status and pay of the childcare workforce militated against 
achieving affordable and accessible provision in a context of limited public 
resources. If childcare workers had to be paid more, provision was likely to become 
either scarcer or more expensive. Given that Government had set out to pursue the 
triple objective of achieving available, affordable and high quality childcare, 
attempts to increase the wages among childcare workers were bound to hinder other 
policy goals.   
 
The empirical analysis on LFS data dovetailed with this interpretation of policy. 
Chapter 5 examined changes between 1994-2008 in the pay of childcare workers 
(here defined as excluding teachers and nursery managers, see Chapter 4). The 
results indicated that the relative position of childcare workers in the labour market 
did not substantially change (Chapter 5). It was found that real wages had increased 
over time, but that this trend was in line with wage growth across the entire labour 
market. As a consequence, relative wages had remained low – on average around 65 
percent of the median. Thus, childcare work was found to be a low-wage occupation 
throughout the period considered.   
 
The results on the composition of the workforce (Chapter 6) mirrored those on pay 
and confirmed the lack of change in the characteristics of childcare workers and their 
employment pattern. In particular, the demographic profile of childcare workers was 
found to have remained broadly similar between 1994 and 2008. Childcare workers 
continued to be predominantly female and from a White British background. The 
proportion of mothers, relative to childless women, had also remained stable, with 
half the workers having children under the age of 16. 
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The only notable variation over time regarded the incidence of lone parents, who had 
visibly increased, in line with government’s effort to recruit childcare workers 
specifically among lone mothers. Despite half the workers having their own children, 
family-friendly employment patterns were not found to be a salient feature of 
employment in childcare, with perhaps the exception of childminding 
 
Yet, the fact that, at policy level, little was done to change the condition of childcare 
workers was not simply attributed to the clash between higher wages and 
government’s goal of increasing provision and making it affordable for parents, 
while limiting public funding. Rather, the analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that a 
number of issues stood in the way of tackling directly the predicament of childcare 
work. The first was the presence of private sector provision.  
 
Labour inherited a system of provision that consisted, to a great extent, of private 
providers, in the forms of childminders, voluntary playgroups and nurseries and 
private for-profit businesses. Publicly provided services were mainly school-based 
and generally catered for three- and four-year-olds only. In order to expand 
provision, Labour not only relied upon existing forms of provision, but explicitly 
favoured provision by the private sector.   
 
The empirical analysis of pay complemented that of policy and revealed stark 
differences in pay across sectors. Childcare workers employed in the public sector 
were found to enjoy a substantial wage premium, which had however narrowed over 
time. This difference pointed, once again, to the role of policy and in particular of 
funding in relation to workers’ pay. Material from the interviews suggested that 
public sector providers had greater financial resources and could, therefore, pay 
higher wages than private and voluntary providers. Indeed, outside the maintained 
sector, parents’ fees were the main source of income. This inevitably capped the 
prices that nurseries could charge, and, in turn, reduced their ability to increase 
wages. Thus, nurseries faced the trade-off between offering affordable places and 
paying adequate wages. This dilemma was particularly sharp among those managers 
who effectively wanted to pay better wages and struggled to do so. 
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Yet the differential pay between the private and public sector was also found to be 
related to the different wage-setting systems.  Collective agreement was prevalent in 
the public sector, whereas workers’ pay was set individually in the private sector. 
This evidence pointed to significant role of wage setting systems in limiting low pay 
by shifting the balance more in favour of workers’ interests. Outside collective 
bargaining, the National Minimum Wage was the only mechanisms that protected 
workers against even lower wages.  
 
Overall the results underscored the importance of childcare policy in affecting pay. 
By favouring private sector provision, where employment conditions are relatively 
worse, childcare policy indirectly contributed to the low pay levels. Indeed, private 
sector provision, whether for-profit or voluntary, cannot alone generate the resources 
to pay workers adequately. In this respect, the level of public funding available to 
private nurseries was found insufficient.   
 
Chapter 3 identified a second important factor, which stood in the way of 
implementing reforms related to the childcare workforce: the fragmentation of 
services. Indeed Chapter 3 illustrated that the British system of services had 
historically been incoherent. Services varied along several dimensions: their 
underpinning philosophy and main function, the age and the socio-economic 
background of children catered for, and the sector – public, private or voluntary – in 
which they operated. As a result, the childcare workforce did not exist as a clear-cut 
occupation. Instead, various groups of workers were employed in a variety of early 
childhood services. Labour’s commitment to sustain a mixed economy of provision 
inevitably maintained these long-established differences between services and within 
the workforce. This, in turn, made reforms much harder to devise if only for the fact 
that the overall system of services was complex. 
 
Furthermore, differences across type of service provided were found to be correlated 
with pay. Chapter 5 explored the care/education divide was explored and found that 
pay was higher when services were classified as educational rather than care, 
irrespective of the public/private distinction. This result was interpreted as 
confirming the higher status enjoyed by educational work relative to care work. In 
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this respect, policies favouring the integration of services under the education banner 
had the potential to improve pay.  
 
In the context of a mixed economy of services, Chapter 3 described how regulation 
became a crucial policy instrument. In particular, the Labour Government pursued an 
approach to quality centred on regulation. This resulted in making early childhood 
services heavily regulated by international standards. However, the analysis showed 
that the implications for workers lay not so much in the introduction of statutory 
regulation per se, but in the aspects of provision which were most strictly regulated.  
A specific regulatory domain was identified: that concerned with who is to work in 
early childhood services. Qualification requirements are an example of regulation 
about who can work in childcare. This regulatory domain was distinguished from 
two contiguous domains: that of direct service regulation and that of employment 
regulation. The former concerns what service is to be provided and how; health and 
safety regulations or a curriculum are examples of this type of regulation. The latter 
relates to the conditions under which labour is provided, for example the national 
minimum wage is such a type of regulation.  The policy analysis found that Labour 
had privileged direct service regulation over regulation of who is to provide early 
childhood services and employment regulation. For example, Labour introduced an 
extensive curriculum standardising practice across settings. However, only minimum 
qualification requirements were set up, thus leaving work in childcare as an open 
occupation. This had the effect of limiting the influence of regulatory intervention on 
the profile and the position of the childcare workforce. Furthermore, the choice of 
regulating service delivery was found to contrast with evidence from other countries, 
where more stringent qualification requirements are accompanied by looser 
regulation regarding the curriculum. 
 
But this form of regulation maintained intact the long-standing division between 
public and private sector, whereby more qualified staff concentrated in the former. 
Indeed, it was only in schools where regulation had traditionally concerned all three 
‘domains’. Labour maintained this distinction and issued a regulation stating that 
school-based services for three and four year olds were to be led by teachers.  In 
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addition, teachers’ employment conditions also were subject to collective agreement 
and stricter employment regulation than is the case in other early childhood services.  
 
As has been observed by West, Roberts and Noden (2010), the resulting regulation 
of early childhood services was uneven, thus falling short of providing a single and 
coherent regulatory framework to all services for pre-schoolers. In addition, it was 
argued that the costs of this form of regulation fall more clearly on government 
rather than on providers and/or parents. Indeed, more stringent requirements on entry 
qualifications would have increased providers’ labour costs, with repercussions on 
prices or, more likely, on providers’ profit. By contrast, a centralised system of 
inspections bears on government’s budget alone. Labour’s support for the private 
sector influenced the regulatory design.  
 
The analysis revealed a further contextual factor that had slowed down reforms of 
the childcare workforce: the lack of a coherent and well-developed vocational 
training system. Although the Labour Government stated the intention of creating a 
‘climbing frame’ whereby qualifications were linked to one another, new 
qualifications in childcare were introduced without regard for the principles of 
progression or transferability. As a result, by 2008 there was no established 
progression route. 
 
Chapter 6, using LFS data, reported descriptive statistics about childcare workers’ 
qualifications. Unlike commonly reported statistics, the thesis classified 
qualifications in a more detailed manner, in order to capture their different content 
and characteristics. This approach allowed  changes to be assessed more precisely. In 
particular, the analysis pointed to strong continuity over time: the majority of 
childcare workers were found to be qualified only at very basic level. The prevalent 
qualifications were the GCSE generally taken at the end of compulsory education 
and vocational qualifications gained at age 16 or 18. Only a small proportion of 
workers were qualified at tertiary level, either with a degree or high vocational 
qualification. Change had taken place only with the rapid increase in proportion of 
workers holding NVQ at level 3 (NVQ3). This result is in line with the analysis of 
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policy documents, which had suggested that Labour initiatives to ‘up-skill’ the 
childcare workforce had mainly consisted in promoting NVQs at levels 2 and 3.  
 
However, the analysis showed that the NVQ3 was less selective than other 
equivalent vocational qualifications, and material from the interviews underscored 
the variability of training arrangements which characterised NVQs. This finding 
dovetails with Wolf’s (2004) comment that the system of vocational training has a 
built-in incentive to offer NVQs rather than other, more expensive and arguably 
more rigorous, qualifications. Furthermore, in the field of childcare the NVQ3 was 
not linked to any higher qualification, thus limiting workers’ chances of educational 
advancement. The enduring lack of vocational qualifications at higher level partly 
explained why the vast majority childcare workers were found to be qualified at 
secondary level only. 
 
Skills in childcare work: a long way to better pay recognition  
The evidence that emerged from examining childcare policy and from the descriptive 
analysis of childcare workers’ pay and characteristics was used as springboard for 
the analysis carried out in Chapter 7. Here the focus was on two sets of issues. First, 
the relationship between qualifications and pay was explored using LFS data. 
Second, workers’ views on the skills required by their job were analysed.  
 
The first part of the analysis, on LFS data, tested whether workers with higher 
qualifications receive on average better pay. The results pointed to a weak 
correlation. As expected, workers with no formal qualification were found to earn 
less than all other workers.  But beside that, there was no systematic relationship 
between qualifications and pay.  After controlling for a number of characteristics, 
childcare workers with higher qualifications were found to earn no more than those 
with lower qualifications. So, for example, someone with A-levels is not on average 
paid more than someone with poor GCSE results. More surprisingly, graduates did 
not appear to earn more than other workers. Only vocational qualifications obtained 
at post-secondary level were found to be consistently associated with a pay 
advantage.  
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When examining the differences between private and public sectors, the analysis 
showed that qualifications are rewarded much more generously in the public sector 
than in the private one. The structure of wages in the private sector was found to be 
flat: workers’ productive characteristics do not appear to be systematically correlated 
with pay. So, for example, on average there was no difference in the pay of someone 
with a degree and someone without any qualification. Only those with 5 or more 
GCSEs at grades A*-C, or vocational qualifications at level 3 or above were found to 
earn about 10% more than all other workers. The pay advantage was much larger 
among childcare workers in the public sector. Workers with qualifications at tertiary 
level – either degrees or vocational ones – were likely to be paid 50 percent more 
than those without any qualification. This stark difference between sectors 
effectively meant that sector was a much better predictor of pay than were 
qualifications.  
 
The interviews complemented these findings and pointed to the variations in 
employers’ and managers’ willingness and ability to recognise qualifications with 
higher wages. Indeed, managers’ views on qualifications were necessarily shaped 
also by what was in fact feasible. For private nurseries it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to generate the money to pay graduate-level salaries. At the same time, 
the lack of correspondence between job roles and qualifications supported the view 
that qualifications did not actually mattered – “everybody is the same”, as one 
worker put it. Access to public funding was found to contribute to wage premiums 
for better qualified workers. However, managers themselves needed to be personally 
committed to qualifications and training, as, even in the public sector, pay scales 
were flat (with the exception of teachers’).    
 
The absence of a systematic correspondence between pay and qualifications was 
explained in two complementary ways. First, these results matched with analyses on 
the returns of NVQ qualifications, which point to their negligible impact on wages 
(Jenkins, Greenwood, and Vignoles 2007; Dearden et al. 2000). Put simply, if 
employers consider some of the existing qualifications “a load of rubbish” as one 
manager put it, there is little reason to expect that workers wih those qualifications 
will earn more than others without. Relatedly, the positive correlation between wages 
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and vocational qualifications obtained at tertiary level suggested that more advanced 
qualifications could help to increase wages. The fact that some qualifications were 
more strongly correlated to wages than others was therefore interpreted in light of the 
evidence on the different characteristics of the various qualifications. In short, some 
qualifications are more rigorous and better recognised by employers than other.  
 
Second, results on the difference between the private and the public sector pointed to 
a wider underpinning issue – the fact that care activities allow only small and 
isolated increases in productivity. This, in turn, reduces employers’ ability to reward 
financially better qualified workers. If better qualified workers cannot, because of the 
nature of the job, improve productivity, there is no market mechanism that 
guarantees that better qualified workers receive higher pay. Thus, in childcare, the 
relation between pay and qualifications is more likely to be influenced by notions of 
quality and more generally by societal ideas on what childcare services are about. 
Indeed, public settings have a longer history in hiring staff with relevant 
qualifications – mainly the NNEB and teaching qualifications (Chapter 3). This is in 
part due to the view that “education”, as opposed to “care”, required better qualified 
staff.    
 
In relation to the demands of childcare work, the analysis relied on interviews with 
managers and workers. Interviewees were found to have differing views in relation 
to their role with children. These views seemed to be informed by the training 
received. More highly qualified workers, and teachers in particular, saw their role as 
actively contributing to children’s learning and development. By contrast, workers 
with lower training tended to see children as learning on their own and requiring only 
support to their learning. These results put into question a view that job requirements 
can exist irrespective of training. Training itself shaped job requirements, as workers 
interpreted the skill demands of the job on the basis of the training they received. 
Variations were considered substantial in light of fact that all workers were working 
under the same detailed statutory curriculum.  
 
The analysis of the interviews pointed to some distinctive features of childcare work. 
Childcare work, by virtue of being a relational activity, retains an irreducible aspect 
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of open-endedness. While childcare is a purposeful activity, it remains hard to define 
its output, because it is the result of a continuous relationship. This makes it more 
susceptible to being shaped by societal views about the purpose of services and, 
relatedly, workers’ views about their role. In addition, childcare work can be both 
active and passive, but it is difficult to see how the notion of skill could be relevant 
to the more passive aspects of this work.  
 
Motivation to care: money is not all, but better pay is important 
The last theme explored in the thesis was that of motivations.  Motivation to care has 
long been recognised as an intrinsic aspect of care work. The analytical framework in 
Chapter 2 outlined some of the mechanisms through which motivations could 
influence pay and made the point that actors’ motivations cannot be examined in 
isolation, but need to be understood in relation to their opportunities.  Consequently, 
the empirical analysis sought to explore the relation between pay and motivations by 
also bringing into focus the context in which childcare workers can actually make 
their choices.  
 
The analysis tested whether low pay was an effective mechanism for selecting into 
childcare only those who are most highly motivated. The logic of the wage 
compensating differentials would predict that only job applicants who are highly 
motivated will accept a low wage. The empirical findings from the LFS, however, 
did not support this idea. By contrast, it was found that workers receiving higher pay 
were more likely to work unpaid overtime or to remain in the childcare sector. This 
evidence was then complemented with material from the interviews. The interviews 
revealed that the choice to enter in childcare depended on motivations and on the 
narrow set of alternative employment opportunities. It was found that childcare 
workers could choose only among low-paying occupations, and that they had chosen 
childcare because they found it enjoyable and rewarding. There was little evidence 
that workers had given up jobs in better paid sectors in order to fulfil their vocation.  
 
When considering whether pay increases were associated with a decline of 
commitment, the analysis indicated this was indeed the case. There was therefore 
evidence of a motivation crowding-out effect triggered by wage increases. This result 
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was found to be driven by the NMW. The NMW increased the wage of the lowest 
paid workers and had a limited impact on wages above the threshold.  By design, 
therefore, the NMW did not acknowledge childcare workers’ commitment either 
individually – as individual pay increases may do – or for the entire sector – as a 
more uniform impact across the sector would have achieved.  
 
This evidence was discussed in relation to the findings from the interviews. The 
picture emerging from the interviews was one of minimal wage levels and little 
appreciation for the work done. This was in line with the general findings of this 
thesis. In this context, managers’ support was crucial and often took the form of pay 
rises or at least pay above the bare minimum. Money exchange was therefore part of 
a wider system of support and appeared to reinforce workers’ commitment and 
involvement.  
 
Theoretical propositions that saw pay as having an adverse effect on motivations did 
not find much empirical support. These results stem in part from the specificities of 
the context explored. The reality of childcare work in the UK and its unskilled status 
means that most workers did not trade off better pay for the reward of working with 
children. Instead, they chose childcare as the preferred option among a variety of 
low-paying jobs. In addition, pay in the childcare sector was found to be rarely 
regulated and therefore there was little scope for systematically introducing forms of 
pay incentives. The fact that the NMW was a major factor behind pay increases is 
itself revealing of the paucity of wages, and the lack of monetary incentives. In this 
context, explanations of low pay which invoke the theme of motivations appeared to 
have little purchase. But this result highlights once again the importance of the 
context in which caring activities occur. This has been a central theme in feminist 
literature, which however has not been explored extensively in the context of waged 
care work.  
 
The fact that motivations did not seem to respond negatively to pay per se was also 
explained by some of the inconsistencies underlying the theoretical propositions 
examined. In particular the point was made that economists’ insistence on incentives 
is likely to be wrong-headed when the objective is to increase intrinsic motivations. 
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Indeed, an instrumental approach is unlikely to foster commitment, altruism or love. 
Rather, a value system that acknowledges the importance of care may be more 
effective in promoting intrinsic caring motives.  
 
The analytical framework and the overall empirical approach: some reflections  
This thesis has approached the question of why childcare workers are low paid from 
a policy perspective. At the most immediate level, a policy perspective is justified 
because the care for children by paid workers has become an important item on the 
policy agenda of several western governments. Thus, governments have taken a 
more active role in relation to the provision of services for pre-school children. This 
prompts the need for attention to the nature and the implications of governments’ 
initiatives in this field.  
 
In addition, the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 and employed in the 
analysis was based on the view that childcare work has some unique features, and 
that low pay had to be explained in relation to those. Childcare work was seen, 
throughout the thesis, as an example of care work. By seeing the problem of low pay 
in childcare as related to the broader theme of care, the thesis drew on the large 
feminist literature on care.  
 
The link between a policy-centred perspective and the theme of the peculiarities of 
care work was drawn out in Chapter 2 by pointing to the specific problems care 
poses  in relation to the market. In particular, the low productivity of care activities 
results in low wages relatively to the rest of the economy. From an economic 
perspective thus, public funding is necessary to ensure the sufficient supply of care. 
In addition, in focusing on the role of policy, the thesis follows that line of feminist 
scholarship that studies the role of social policies in informing care arrangements and 
their implications for women (Finch 1993; Daly and Lewis 2000).    
 
The policy focus has proved fruitful because it has highlighted the complicated ways 
in which public policy can simultaneously reinforce and mitigate the factors behind 
childcare workers’ low pay.  “Policy” is never a monolithic variable and, in relation 
to childcare, a number of scholars have documented the ambiguities, contradictions 
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and dilemmas that beset Labour’s approach (for example, Moss 1999; Lewis 2004; 
West, Roberts and Noden 2010). This thesis contributes to this literature by showing 
how the funding, the organisation and the regulation of early childhood services 
affect the position of childcare workers.   
 
At the most immediate level, the thesis offered new empirical evidence on the way 
“the costs disease” plays out in the context of childcare work in the UK. The analysis 
of childcare workers’ wages confirmed the picture delineated by Himmelweit (2005). 
Indeed wages in childcare lag behind those in the rest of the economy. In the private 
sector, wages are even lower and there is evidence that employers, unable to pass 
higher costs on to parents, tend to recruit among those who have few employment 
alternatives. In relation to public funding, interviewees offered evidence that funding 
fell short of covering costs. In the public sector, on the other hand, higher public 
spending allows greater scope for hiring more qualified staff and pay higher wages.  
 
Following Morgan (2005), it could be argued that it was precisely by relying on the 
private sector that Labour managed to expand childcare provision. Furthermore, both 
funding mechanisms and regulation minimised the possibility that greater public 
funding translated into higher wages. As a result, the system is divided, with private 
provision characterised by lower quality and by lower wages than the maintained 
sector (West, Roberts, Noden 2010; Mathers, Sylva and Joshi 2007; Sylva et al 
2004).  
 
Yet, one limit of the analysis is that it did not explore in greater depth the 
relationship between funding and wages. In particular, it would be important to 
understand how employers respond to a rise in public funding. Do they lower prices? 
Or do they increase wages? Evidence from the USA suggests that the supply of 
childcare labour is inelastic – increases in subsidies to parents translate in greater 
provision rather than higher wages and prices (Blau 1993). A similar exercise in the 
UK would require setting-level data. The Providers’ Survey does not allow 
examining this issue, as it does not ask questions on both wages and sources of 
funding. Interviews with settings’ managers could be a viable alternative (West, 
Roberts and Noden 2010). However, for small-scale studies, reaching all types of 
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providers is likely to be challenging. In particular, settings belonging to larger chain 
may be weary or unable to disclose financial information.  
 
The relationship between funding and wages could be explored at a more macro-
level, by examining the correlation between funding streams and wages aggregated 
at geographical level, for example local authority. However, the funding system is 
intricate, with some monies reaching parents and others channelled to providers. In 
addition, local authorities vary not only in the amount of funding they receive but 
also in the way they spend it (NAO 2012). These complexities make it difficult to pin 
down precisely the link between wages and public spending. 
 
Despite not being able to pursue more precise questions on the role of funding, the 
thesis has succeeded in offering detailed analysis of other aspects of policy. In 
particular, the thesis has drawn attention to the importance of the training and 
qualification system. At the level of policy analysis, the thesis revealed major 
ambiguities about who is best suited to work in these services, with different policy 
initiatives promoting the professionalization of childcare workers on the one hand 
and expanding the workforce with unskilled labour on the other. In addition, it 
suggested that two contextual factors helped minimise these contradictions: first, a 
weak vocational training system and, secondly, a labour market characterised by a 
loose connection between job roles and qualifications.  
 
With regard to these findings, future research could compare how the training system 
and the regulation of childcare services complement each other in various countries. 
The case of Germany could be potentially interesting (in particular the old Länder) 
because the training system is much more closely linked to occupational structures 
and job titles. In particular, Germany has, relative to the UK, more prominent 
occupational labour markets, which tend to favour women at the bottom and middle 
of the job hierarchy (Rubery 2009). However, similarly to the UK, Germany has very 
few graduates among childcare workers (Spieß, Berger, and Groh-Samberg 2008). In 
other words, in Germany the ideal of care is not professional care, as is the case in 
Denmark for example. Germany would therefore be a suitable comparison, because 
it would make it possible to ‘isolate’ the role of occupational training.   
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The thesis also made the point that lack of a well-established system of training and a 
clear qualifications structure is related to specific features of childcare work and the 
way it is organised in the UK. In particular, it is difficult to imagine that private 
sector employers will support the development of a qualification system that can lead 
to higher costs. This is clear, for example, in relation to the new category of staff 
created by Labour – the Early Years Professional (EYP).  From the perspective of an 
employer, an EYP may be desirable, but, in fact, can be feasible only insofar as 
parents are able and willing to pay more. The evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests that employers do not see this possibility – parents are, in their views, 
income-constrained and more sensitive to prices than to staff qualification. Thus, a 
market system, whereby providers compete on price, removes an important 
precondition to the development of a training system – namely employers’ support of 
such training.   
 
Yet the public sector, where funding allowed for better qualified staff, was found to 
have pay scales that recognised staff qualifications only in the case of teachers. For 
other workers pay variations did not univocally reflect qualifications. In part, this can 
be explained in relation to budget constraints. But, more fundamentally perhaps, it 
reflects cultural ideas on what childcare requires.  
 
On this point, the thesis offered some evidence on the lack of consensus among 
workers and managers. It was clear that intereviewees tended to consider the training 
they had received adequate for the job. And indeed, training varies, spanning from 
post-graduate qualifications to NVQ2. Likewise, the current system of provision 
reinforces such confusion on what the job demands. Indeed, although services are 
supposed to be of similarly good quality irrespective of the type of setting, early 
years education in a school needs to be delivered by a teacher, while in a private 
setting is can be someone with an NVQ3.  
 
It could be argued that the confusion around the demands of childcare work is 
indicative of a system of provision still in flux. Indeed, the years examined in this 
thesis were a period of dramatic change, which saw a tremendous amount of policy 
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initiatives in the sector. Surely, the meaning of childcare has in part changed, as the 
shift in vocabulary and the use of the term “early years” suggest. Views on quality 
have also changed, as the introduction of the curriculum is a testimony to that. But 
the current system does not seem to contain the preconditions for delivering high 
quality provision (West, Roberst and Noden 2010).  
  
Indeed research findings first from EPPI and more recently from the Millennium 
Cohort Study show that that settings staffed by teachers are the most effective in 
supporting children’s learning, and their social and emotional development (Sylva et 
al 2004; Mathers, Sylva and Joshi 2007). Policy makers, on the other hand, have 
been reluctant in promoting such view of quality among parents.   
  
Parents, on the other hand, appear to use other indicators of quality: staff’ 
friendliness, warmth and continuity (Mathers, Singler and Karemaker 2012; Roberts 
2011). Staff qualifications do not seem to feature highly (Mathers, Singler and 
Karemaker 2011).  And yet, the current system may be even unable to offer parents 
the friendliness and continutity they look for. Indeed, the evidence from the analysis 
of motivation suggests that workers gain motivation by being in a working 
environment that support and value them, financially and in other ways.  
 
In this respect, the contribution of this thesis has been mainly to demostrate that 
conventional ideas about the interaction of money and motivation have limited 
applicability and are therefore misleading. But several questions remain. In 
particular, it would be important to understand how workers’ motivation to care for 
children correlates with the setting’s ethos and organisational form. Are staff in for-
profit nurseries less motivated? Some of the evidence presented would suggest so, 
but a more thorough investigation would be needed. This is important especially 
because the majority of settings are in fact private and, as Penn (2007) points out, 
belong to large corporations. Likewise, it would be important to explore the relation 
between providers’ organisational forms, the design of funding and workers’ 
motivation. Evidence from the Netherlands suggests that childcare workers’ 
motivation is affected by the design of employment contracts and work management 
systems, but these do not depend on providers’ reliance on parental fees (Plantinga, 
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Plantenga and Siegers 2010). Some of the evidence presented here would suggest, 
however, that providers’ willingness to reward their employees is related to their 
sources of funding. A more systematic investigation between funding forms, 
workforce management and workers’ motivation would be needed to explore this 
theme further. Finally, a limitation of the thesis is that it does not integrate the theme 
of motivations with that of skills. But there is evidence that more qualified workers 
may be more motivated. Future research could combine the two themes and compare 
groups of workers with markedly different qualification levels. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the main contribution of the thesis has been to use 
insights from the literature on care to demonstrate that various perspectives on pay 
originating within mainstream (neoclassical) economics are out of kilter with the 
specific case of childcare work. In particular, the thesis has shown the limited 
applicability of two central notions in mainstream economic thinking: market value 
and incentive. The limits of the former have been shown in relation to qualifications. 
Within economics, the value of qualifications is typically measured by their financial 
returns (Robinson 1996). This interpretation however relies on the assumptions that 
employers can and are willing to reward qualifications. In other words, a 
precondition for qualifications’ financial returns is precisely the smooth functioning 
of the market. By contrast, the thesis has started from the premise that the allocation 
of care via the market is problematic (Chapter 2). In addition, it has developed an 
understanding of the relation between qualifications and pay that takes into account 
both institutional and cultural factors. This way, the analytical approach has brought 
to bear on the issue perspectives from sociology and feminist scholarship, which 
uncover how the notion of skilled labour is socially constructed and reinforced by 
existing institutional mechanisms (for example, England 1992; Grimshaw and 
Rubery 2007).  
 
The limits of the notion of incentive have been discussed in relation to caring 
motivation. It has been argued that, within economics, incentives are seen as a 
powerful tool for achieving behavioural change. However, when we are trying to 
foster intrinsic motivation, or genuine altruism or love, incentives are likely to be a 
blunt tool. In these cases, the type of “incentives” needed are those that do not try to 
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steer behaviour into a certain direction. They are, instead, “incentives” that 
acknowledge and support a certain bahaviour. But this means that this latter type of 
incentive is not infact an incentive as such. They are, instead, rewards that attribute 
intrinsic value to the person’s behaviour.  In the case of childcare work, as of care 
more generally, what is indeed needed is a system of value that attributes intrinsic 
value to care.  
 
Overall, the thesis has combined different levels of analysis – macro and micro – and 
insights from various disciplines. Although the empirical analysis was largely based 
on individual-level data, the approach developed has given considerable attention to 
the context of childcare work. Thus, low pay in childcare was viewed as embedded in 
the institutional arrangements governing the provision of childcare services, the 
characteristics of the labour market and cultural beliefs about childcare work. The 
advantage of a multi-layered analysis is that of uncovering possible synergies 
between different factors. Moreover, a broader analysis makes it possible to 
recognise that some explanations about low pay assume that the problem has only 
one dimension. As is often the case with deeply entrenched problems, low pay in 
childcare is a multi-faceted issue. This in turn requires a framework that brings 
together various strands of investigation and connects different dimensions of 
analysis.  
 
Policy implications 
Despite its broad framework of analysis, the thesis has a few, precise policy 
implications. The first relates to the role of the private sector in the overall system of 
provision. It is clear that if childcare services are allocated entirely through market 
forces the resulting scenario cannot be one in which childcare is available, 
affordable, of high quality and provided by well-paid staff. The current system 
closely resembles a pure market-based one.  
 
Other countries have a system of provision that relies mainly on non-maintained 
providers, for example Norway or New Zealand (OECD 2006). Yet they have in 
place more effective policies to avoid a low wages/low quality scenario. In Norway, 
for example, fees are capped and based on family income, qualification requirements 
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are more stringent than in the UK, and funding is channelled to providers directly. In 
New Zealand, the amount of funding settings receive is correlated to the level of 
qualifications of their staff. In addition, there is a general requirement of employing a 
qualifief teacher.  
 
By contrast, the UK does not have a system of funding which is linked to the quality 
of provision. In addition, the overall level of funding is low. Indeed, a recent report 
by the European Commission (EC 2009) suggests that parents’ contribution to the 
overall (macro) costs of childcare is around 75%. In other countries like Germany or 
the Netherlands is around 19%. Provision is therefore mainly paid for by parents. At 
the level of the setting, there is evidence that the funding received by providers to 
offer the entitlement fall short of covering the costs of the service (NAO 2012). In 
short, both the level of funding and the design of the funding mechanisms need to 
change and should incorporate incentives that promote quality.   
  
The second issue relates to the fragmentation of services. An explicit policy about 
early childhood service needs to address the question of what these services are 
about. What kind of services should be available and why? A common, broad 
understanding of these services is necessary for the development of a childcare 
workforce.  
 
Despite the contradictions and the many ambiguities of Labour’s strategy, such a 
vision has in part emerged, and is reflected in a common curriculum across the birth 
to five age range and across different types of settings and provision. Leaving aside 
the much contested issue of the appropriateness of such a curriculum, the problem 
remains that services remain characterised by different organisational structures, 
different funding systems and different staff. In short, there is little other than the 
curriculum that holds together these services.  
 
Of course, early childhood services will always pursue a number of different 
objectives. These however tend to overlap, rather than conflict. For example, 
ensuring children’s well-being, developing their cognitive skills, enhancing their 
emotional development and supporting working parents are not incompatible 
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objectives.   Different forms of provision will retain their specificity and vary in their 
approach. But this variety can exist within a common broad understanding of the 
function of such services. At the moment, as in the past, such overall function is not 
clear. This has, in turn, several implications.  
 
One of them is that, without such broad overarching framework, it becomes difficult 
to devise a training system. And yet this study has repeatedly shown that the 
education and training system is an integral part of the problem of low pay. In 
addition, workers’ education and training affect the quality of provision. The current 
Coalition Government has commissioned to Professor Nutbrown a review into early 
education and childcare qualifications, with the objective to  “strengthen 
qualifications and career pathways” (DfE 2011) for new recruits and employed 
workers. The report by Nutbrown (DfE 2012) states that the current system is not 
coherent, does not allow progression and expresses the view that the current sector-
specific qualification at level 3 is poor. These are, indeed, also this thesis’s findings. 
In her reccomendations, Nutbrown proposes a linear system of qualifications made 
of essentially three levels. A new level 3 qualification should serve as entry 
qualification, although it would require around 2 years of full-time education to be 
obtained. This would allow progression towards a level 4 qualification, and 
afterwards a postgraduate qualification conferring the title of early years teacher.     
 
The thesis has not explored questions around the content and design of training in 
early years. It has however shown how poor content and design of the qualification 
system surely undermine the correlation between pay and qualifications. The system 
proposed by Nutbrown is clear and, in relation to content, appears thorough and 
relevant to the work done in nurseries. Importantly, the review proposes that each 
qualification level is clearly linked to a job title, indicating the role held in the 
setting. So, for exaple, a person qualified at level 3 would be an Early Year 
Practitioner, and could be room leader. Someone at level 4, instead, would lead 
across rooms. In short, the review touched upon one of the factors that contributed to 
a flat pay scale – the poor correlation between job roles and qualifications. However, 
settings are often small and do not offer several job roles. There are therefore some 
limits to the extent to which individual workers can actually develp a career. Overall 
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then, the changes proposed by the review have the potential to improve quality of 
childcare workers’ qualification.  
 
Yet this thesis has pointed to some obstacles to the establishment of a training 
infrastructure for childcare workers. These obstacles need to be removed if the single 
qualification framework proposed by Nutbrown is to retain its value. If qualifications 
are awarded by a myriad of bodies and training is offered by even more numerous 
organisations, the chances that training will be of poor quality are high. Training 
providers compete to offer courses, and training bodies compete for their awards to 
be widespread. Moreover, a coordinated training system cannot exist without an 
organisation actually ensuring such coordination. The childcare sector is 
characterised by small employers. It does not have, as mentioned above, a clear 
function and is composed of providers from the private, public and voluntary sector. 
The fragmentation of childcare provision matched with the fragmentation of training 
provision cannot result in a coherent system. The National Nursery Examination 
Board succeeded, for a few decades and with enormous difficulties, in establishing 
and running a qualification that became the industry standard precisely because it 
was awarded by a single, well-established organisation. Subsequent national bodies 
have all been short-lived. The National Training Organisation for the Early Years 
Sector was created and dismantled within five years. The Council for the 
Development of the Childcare Workforce was axed by the Coalition Government six 
years after it had been established by the Labour Government. In short, the sector 
needs an organisation whose central role is to promote and coordinate training within 
the sector.  
 
In this respect, the Nutbrown review does not offer specific suggestions, although it 
calls for the support and collaboration of the “early years sector”. It is not clear 
however what the mechanisms are for such a participation and collaboration. 
Questions also remains in relation to funding. Wage levels in the sector are too low 
to encourage workers to invest themselves in training. Likewise, private providers 
are likely to be unwilling and unable to support workers’ training. Public funding is 
necessary if more workers are to be trained. But, again, funding has to be linked to 
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the quality of training received and mechanisms have to be in place to hinder the 
proliferation of weak qualifications. 
 
Finally, something has to be done in relation to qualifications’ statutory 
requirements. At the level of rhetoric, all policy makers appear to endorse an ideal of 
“professional care”. The new Coalition Government has stated the need for well-
trained and highly qualified workers as much as the Labour Government did. If 
workers are recognised as the key factor behind the quality of provision, then 
regulation must also relate to the workforce. But regulation as to initial training is 
almost non-existent and regulation about staff:children ratios do not distinguish 
appropriately between workers with different qualifications. There are few incentives 
for providers to hire staff with qualifications beyond an NVQ3. The Nutbrown 
review recommends that all workers counted in the ratios are to be qualified at level 
3 (DfE 2012).  
 
At the moment there is in place an extensive system of regulation and inspection of 
early years providers. Providers are assessed against existing regulations – welfare 
requirements and the curriculum. But inspections could also examine workers’ 
qualifications and, additionally, their job tenure. These are measurable factors, and 
information on qualifications is already collected by inspectors but not reported in 
any detail. But if government holds qualifications as so important, there is no reason 
why this aspect of provision should not be inspected. Additionally, if there is 
agreement about the desirability of a stable workforce, inspections could state how 
long staff in a nursery have been working there. This in turn would create an 
incentive for employers to attract suitable staff and retain them.  
 
In the last twenty years policy makers have come to recognise the importance of 
early childhood services. Never before was this area of policy accorded such 
attention and resources. Increasingly, recognition of the importance of children’s 
early years of life has been matched by the admission that childcare workers 
contribute significantly to children’s education, care and wellbeing. But the 
contradiction between the importance of this work and its low pay has yet to be 
solved.  
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